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ABSTRACT
MONARCHIANISM AND ORIGEN’S EARLY TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

Stephen E. Waers, B.A., M.Div.
Marquette University, 2016

This dissertation unfolds in two parts. In the first, I offer a reconstruction of the
core of monarchian theology using four main primary texts: Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum,
Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, the Refutatio omnium haeresium (often attributed to
Hippolytus), and Novatian’s De Trinitate. The monarchian controversy enters the
historical record at the beginning of the third century, but we know little of its origins or
motivations. The first part begins with a hypothesis about what might have prompted the
rise of monarchianism. Following that, I give an account of the core of monarchian
teaching using the sources listed above. My account gives specific attention to both major
theological themes and exegetical trends in monarchian theology. Not only is such an
account lacking in English-language scholarship, but I also use a different method than
the methods used in those few non-English accounts that exist. The result of part one of
the dissertation is a portrait of the monarchians who sought to preserve the unity and
uniqueness of God by claiming things such as “the Father and the Son are one and the
same.” Such an overtly anti-Trinitarian theology, I argue, catalyzed the development of
Trinitarian theology by creating a need to better articulate the unity and distinction of the
Father and Son.
In part two of the dissertation, I offer a limited rereading of Origen’s early
Trinitarian theology in light of the monarchian controversy. I focus on books 1-2 of his
Commentary on John. Against the trend of many contemporary scholars who use
anachronistic categories to interpret Origen’s Trinitarian theology, I seek to read him
within his own context in the early third century. I argue that Origen’s anti-monarchian
polemics caused him to develop and utilize a rich Wisdom Christology. Finally, I
approach the question of whether Origen was a “subordinationist” by reframing the
question within the horizon of anti-monarchian polemics in the early third century. I
conclude that Origen can be considered a “subordinationist” and that subordinationism
was a commonly employed anti-monarchian polemical strategy. Origen used
subordinationism to articulate and defend the distinction of the Father and Son.
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INTRODUCTION

The opening books of Origen’s Commentary on John (ComJn) are some of the
most important for the study of his early theology.1 Origen’s commentary on the
“spiritual Gospel” in these books is preserved in Greek that Rufinus has not emended.
Within these two books that focus on the prologue to the Gospel of John, one particular
passage stands out for the vivid way in which it discusses the relationship between the
Father, Son, and the created order: ComJn 2.13-33. As I argue in the last two chapters of
the dissertation, the first two books of ComJn and especially this passage are an
important touchstone for reconstructing Origen’s early Trinitarian theology. 2
Near the beginning of ComJn 2.13ff, Origen informs his readers that he is
attempting to resolve the problem of some God-loving, but misguided Christians.3 There
are some Christians, Origen observes, who are afraid that they could be understood to be
proclaiming two gods. To avoid this misunderstanding, some of these Christians affirmed
that the Son is divine but denied that he is distinct from the Father; others affirmed that

1

I discuss the reasons for the importance of ComJn 1-2 in much greater detail at the beginning of
chapter four. Briefly stated, however, it is important for the following reasons: (1) it survives in Greek; (2)
the vast majority of Origen’s theological writing occurs in biblical commentaries; (3) Origen thinks the
Gospel of John has pride of place among the Gospels; (4) the Gospel of John was important for a number
of divergent theological streams in the early-third century, like Valentinianism. See Ronald Heine’s
discussion of ComJn’s importance: Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church,
Christian Theology in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 86–103.
2

My judgment about the importance of this passage is shared by other notable scholars. Jean
Daniélou notes that “this passage expresses the very heart of Origen’s vision of the Godhead.” See his
Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. John Austin Baker, History of Early Christian Doctrine
before the Council of Nicaea 2 (London: Longman & Todd, 1973), 382. Henri Crouzel also observes the
importance of this passage and notes that it has caused a good deal of controversy. See Henri Crouzel,
Origen, trans. A. S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 181.
3

Origen, ComJn 2.16.

2
the Son is distinct from the Father but denied the Son’s divinity.4 Origen does not identify
the proponents of this theology by name or tell us much about their background. A survey
of Christian writings roughly contemporary with the beginning of Origen’s ComJn
reveals that the theology Origen was attempting to correct was not an isolated
phenomenon. In these writings, we encounter Christians who were so concerned to
protect the uniqueness of God that they accused their opponents of proclaiming two gods
or being ditheists.5 In order to avoid what they viewed as ditheism, these theologians
often professed that the Father and the Son are “one and the same,” thus denying any
distinction between them.6 These theologians, attested outside of Origen’s ComJn,
propounded a theology that seems very similar to what Origen is dealing with in ComJn
2.16. Scholars refer to this theological position as monarchianism, among other titles.7
If in ComJn 2.13ff Origen was addressing monarchian theology, then a proper
historical understanding of Origen’s argument requires knowledge of the state of
monarchian theology at the beginning of the third century. Many scholarly accounts of

4

The two attempts to avoid proclaiming two gods here roughly line up with what I label
“monarchianism” and “psilanthropism.” The former dealt with the problem of proclaiming both that there
is only one God and that the Son is divine by arguing that the Son is the same as the Father. The latter dealt
with the problem by denying that the Son was divine. Although they answered the question differently,
each position was concerned to protect the claim that there is only one God. As I make clear in my later
discussion of monarchianism, it is often linked to psilanthropism—probably because they shared the
concern to protect the uniqueness of God.
5
For the concern to avoid proclaiming two gods, see: Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 11.1, 14.2-3;
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.1; and Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.12.16. As I discuss in much detail
later, questions about the authorship of the Refutatio are so debated that I treat it as an anonymous text.

For the explicit claim that the Father and Son are “one and the same,” see: Tertullian, Adversus
Praxean 2.3; Refutatio 9.10.11-2. Again, I examine these texts very closely in the following chapters.
6

7

As I discuss below, there is no consensus among scholars about what to call this theological
position. Other names used to denote the position are “patripassianism,” “modalism,” and “Sabellianism.”
Beyond the issue of what to call this theology, there is no universally agreed upon definition of what made
up the core of this theology. Therefore, I continue to use the title “monarchian;” but I define it clearly so as
to delineate the core of the theological position.

3
Origen’s Trinitarian theology are inadequate because they are deficient in two respects.
First, scholars frequently fail to read Origen as engaging with monarchianism.8 Second,
when scholars do include attention to Origen’s engagement with monarchianism, they
typically work with an anemic understanding of monarchianism as some vague, generic
form of modalism, which itself functions as an ill-defined buzzword.9 These two specific
deficiencies are the result of a broader trend in scholarship on Origen’s Trinitarian
theology. A number of scholars are more concerned with the role of Origen’s theology in
the development of later Nicene and post-Nicene Trinitarian theologies than they are with
how it functioned in its contemporary context. The unfortunate byproduct of this way of
reading Origen is that scholars give his contemporary context—especially his
engagement with monarchianism—too little attention.
The work of this dissertation is to remedy both of the deficiencies in scholarly
readings of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. First, it argues that Origen’s engagement with
monarchianism as he wrote the opening books of his ComJn shaped the way he
articulated his Trinitarian theology. Second, it provides a clear and detailed
reconstruction of monarchianism as it had developed by the beginning of the third
century. The first part of the dissertation reconstructs the main contours of monarchian
theology using primary sources written in the first half of the third century. The
dissertation then rereads key passages from ComJn 1-2 where Origen engages with

As I note later, some scholars note that Origen’s polemic against modalism shaped his theology;
but they do not elaborate on how it did. There are also a few notable exceptions to this trend, which I
discuss later.
8

9

Such is the case with the recent work of Christoph Bruns. For him, monarchianism or modalism
is the bugaboo Origen is attempting to avoid and refute, but Bruns provides no detail or texture about the
position Origen is opposing. See Christoph Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos: Zur Gotteslehre des Origenes,
Adamantiana 3 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2013).

4
monarchian theology. Not only does the dissertation focus on the fact that Origen was
engaged with monarchians early in his career, but it also offers a clearer picture of what
the monarchians taught than is common in scholarship. The result is a deep, contextual
rereading of Origen’s early Trinitarian theology as expressed in one small part of his
expansive corpus.10 It is not an attempt at a grand pan-oeuvre reconstruction of Origen’s
Trinitarian theology and, thus, does not attempt to address the question of development
within Origen’s thought.11

Monarchianism

Questions about monotheism and the position of Jesus in relation to the one God
remained active and disputed well into the third century of the Common Era.12 These
questions were raised with exceptional intensity in the so-called monarchian controversy,
which erupted in Rome at the beginning of the third century. Despite and because of the

This dissertation is a long-form version of what Michel R. Barnes calls a “dense reading.”
Barnes has laid out the criteria that are needed to judge the credibility of a reading of any given historical
text. See Michel R. Barnes, “Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity,” in The Trinity: An
Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 150–4. I will summarize the main points he makes instead of
reproducing his seven criteria here. A “Barnesian dense reading” requires that a text be read with careful
attention to its contemporary context. Attention to both the immediate context in which a text was produced
and the antecedent tradition that shaped that context is necessary for a credible reading of the text. Barnes
gives more detail about this methodology in the essay cited above, but the main point is that we best
understand a text by reading it in its original context and with attention to the forces that shaped that
context. In the case of my dissertation, my reading of Origen required that I first reconstruct
monarchianism. Had I not reconstructed this primary context for the key passage from ComJn 2.13ff, my
reading of Origen would have lacked credibility.
10

11

Such an ambitious project will be able to build on of the work I do here. My hope is that dense
and textured accounts such as the one I give will enable more nuanced portraits of Origen’s Trinitarian
theology as a whole and over the whole course of his career..
12

See, among others, the work of Larry Hurtado, who has traced the question of the divinity of
Jesus and monotheism well into the second century. Larry W. Hurtado, One God, One Lord: Early
Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism, 2nd ed (London: T&T Clark, 1998); idem, Lord Jesus
Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2003).
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strident opposition to monarchianism that arose in the early third century, it is difficult to
develop a clear account of monarchian theology. The reconstruction of the main contours
of monarchian theology is the focus of the first part of this dissertation.
Monarchian theology is difficult to reconstruct for two main reasons. The first is
that we possess no texts from the monarchians themselves. Whereas the study of the
varieties of Gnosticism has been aided by the discovery of the Nag Hammadi texts,
scholars have not been so fortunate as to discover a cache of monarchian primary
sources. The second difficulty arises from the fact that any portrait of monarchian
theology at the beginning of the third century must be built upon four main texts, all of
which are hostile witnesses to monarchianism.13 Their hostility to monarchianism means
that their accounts can be tendentious and offer polemical caricatures.14
The four main texts that attest to monarchianism are Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum,
Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, the Refutatio omnium haeresium (often attributed to
Hippolytus), and Novatian’s De Trinitate. There is general agreement among scholars
about the authorship and dating of Adversus Praxean and De Trinitate, but the same
cannot be said of Contra Noetum and the Refutatio.15 These texts were produced during

13

By hostile witnesses, I mean that each of these texts seeks to refute monarchian positions.
Because of their anti-monarchian orientation, these texts are often prone to distort the positions of those
whom they oppose. As I discuss later, Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History can be of some use for
reconstructing the situation of the church at Rome during the time the monarchian controversy broke out;
but he is oddly silent on the details of the controversy itself.
14

This is especially the case with the Refutatio, whose well-known polemical distortions I discuss
in more length in a later chapter.
15

I discuss the many issues surrounding these texts and questions about the identity of Hippolytus
in the later chapters. For the time being, suffice it to say that there is little scholarly agreement about the
authorship, dating, and geographical provenance of these texts. Most scholars think the Refutatio was
produced in Rome or the surrounding regions, but they are divided about the geographical provenance of
Contra Noetum. As I detail later, most think it is either from Rome or somewhere in Asia Minor.

6
the first half of the third century, and they offer different views of monarchianism.16 The
first part of my dissertation uses these four texts to build a picture of monarchian
theology. My primary interest in these texts is not what they can tell us about the
theology of their authors; it is what they can tell us about the theology of their opponents,
the monarchians. Specifically, I am interested in establishing the monarchians’ core
theological commitments and the theological themes to which they give the most
attention. Furthermore, my account of monarchianism focuses on which biblical texts
they used and how they exegeted scripture; for in the minds of the disputants, the debate
was fundamentally about the proper interpretation of scripture.17

Major Scholarship on Monarchianism

Such a detailed account of monarchian theology is necessary because it has been
neglected in much recent scholarship. Furthermore, most of the serious treatments of
monarchianism have focused on something other than a reconstruction of the core of
monarchian theology and exegesis. A brief survey of the major accounts of

16
By suggesting that these texts were produced in the first half of the third century, I am rejecting
the claims of Josef Frickel’s later work, where he argues that Contra Noetum, at least in its final form, is a
product of the fourth century at the earliest. See Josef Frickel, “Hippolyts Schrift Contra Noetum: ein
Pseudo-Hippolyt,” in Logos: Festschrift für Luise Abramowski, ed. Hans Christof Brennecke, Ernst Ludwig
Grasmück, and Christoph Markschies, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und
die Kunde der älteren Kirche 67 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993), 87–123. In addition, as I note in later chapters,
most scholars think there is some sort of dependence between Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean.

Note especially Hippolytus’ repeated remarks about Monarchian misuse of scripture in Contra
Noetum. He accuses the Noetians of interpreting individual verses outside of the context of whole passages
(3.1). He complains that they “hack the scriptures to pieces” (περικόπτουσι τὰς γραφάς) (4.2). Later in the
work, he implies that the Noetian exegesis is the result of a misuse of προαίρεσις (9.3). See also Mark
DelCogliano’s article on anti-Monarchian exegetical strategies: Mark DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of
John 10:30 in the Third Century: Antimonarchian Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading
Techniques,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 6, no. 1 (2012): 117–38.
17

7
monarchianism will help demonstrate the need for my work.18 Following Hagemann’s
seminal study of the church in Rome, 19 Harnack produced a number of accounts of
monarchianism that shaped discourse for much of the twentieth century.20 Harnack’s
division of monarchianism into two main streams, modalistic and dynamistic, has
become a scholarly commonplace.21 Harnack’s account is colored by his overarching
assumption that the speculative theology of the learned Logos theologians was at odds
with the simple faith of the uneducated masses.22 He proposed that it was this opposition
between the learned theologians and the simple laity that gave rise to the monarchian
controversy and that monarchianism was an attempt to protect the pure faith against the
intrusion of speculation which derived from Hellenistic philosophy.23

18
My account here is highly selective. I am only discussing the most substantial and influential
treatments of monarchianism, especially those that address monarchianism as their main topic.
19

Hermann Hagemann, Die römische Kirche und ihr Einfluss auf Disciplin und Dogma in den
drei ersten Jahrhunderten (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1864). Note also La Piana’s oft-cited article on the
Church in Rome in the late second century: George La Piana, “The Roman Church at the End of the
Second Century: The Episcopate of Victor, the Latinization of the Roman Church, the Easter Controversy,
Consolidation of Power and Doctrinal Development, the Catacomb of Callistus,” Harvard Theological
Review 18, no. 3 (1925): 201–77.
20
Harnack’s most comprehensive treatment is found in Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der
dogmengeschichte, vol. 1 (Freiburg: Mohr, 1886), 556–662. I will quote from and cite the following
English translation: Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. 3 (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1907), 1–118. Note also Harnack’s influential encyclopedia entry:
“Monarchianismus,” in Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, ed. J. J. Herzog and
Albert Hauck, 3rd ed., vol. 13, 24 vols. (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1903), 303–36. An abridged English
translation of this article can be found in “Monarchianism,” in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of
Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson and George William Gilmore, 13 vols. (Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Baker, 1963), 7:453–61.

See, for example, Harnack, History of Dogma, 3:13; Harnack, “Monarchianism,” 454. Although
the referents of Harnack’s terms are fairly clear, I later propose a more restrictive definition of
monarchianism that aims to highlight their central concern. I will discuss the difficulties that accompany
naming the controversy shortly.
21

22
23

He gives this position at length at the beginning of the third volume of his History of Dogma.

There are a whole host of factors that influenced his thinking in this regard, but they are beyond
the scope of this current dissertation. For an exploration of some of the motivations behind Harnack’s
thought, see Claudia Rapp, “Adolf Harnack and the Paleontological Layer of Church History,” in Ascetic

8
Harnack’s theory about the divide between the scholars and the laity quickly
found a proponent in the work of Jules Lebreton, who produced a series of essays that
were influential for years to come.24 His essays in turn influenced the authors of major
encyclopedia entries on monarchianism during the first half of the twentieth century.25 In
the middle of the twentieth century, Ernest Evans gave a condensed account of the
monarchian controversy in the introduction to his translation of Adversus Praxean.26 His
is a good general overview, although its brevity still leaves a need for a fuller account.
In the 1980s, Michael Decker completed a dissertation on monarchianism.27 One
of the chief goals of the dissertation was a source-critical study of monarchianism. From
this source-critical study, he concludes that nearly all of the biblical exegesis attributed to
the Noetians in Contra Noetum is the polemical invention of Hippolytus; he does not

Culture: Essays in Honor of Philip Rousseau, ed. Blake Leyerle and Robin Darling Young (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 295–314.
24
Jules Lebreton, “Le désaccord de la foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans l’Église
chrétienne du IIIe siècle (à suivre),” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 19, no. 4 (1923): 481–506; “Le
désaccord de la foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans l’Église chrétienne du IIIe siècle (suite et fin),”
Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 20, no. 1 (1924): 5–37. These essays have since been criticized. See
Marguerite Harl, Origène et la fonction révélatrice du verbe incarné, Patristica Sorbonensia 2 (Paris:
Éditions du Seuil, 1958), 46. She writes, “Ces deux articles sont typiques d'une conception encore fort
répandue dans les dictionnaires et encyclopédies, mais qui semble dépassée.” See also a similar thesis to
that of Lebreton advanced in the 1960s: Harry James Carpenter, “Popular Christianity and the Theologians
in the Early Centuries,” Journal of Theological Studies 14, no. 2 (1963): 294–310.

Gustave Bardy, “Monarchianisme,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, contenant l’exposé
des doctrines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, ed. Alfred Vacant, E. Mangenot,
and Emile Amann, 15 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1929), 10.2:2193–2209; Henri Leclercq,
“Monarchianisme,” in Dictionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie, ed. Fernand Cabrol and Henri
Leclercq, 15 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1934), 11.2:1947–64. The structure, content, and wording of
these two articles is strikingly similar. Leclercq seems to have been almost solely reliant on the prior work
of Bardy, to the point that his own work lacks much original material.
25

26

Tertullian, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, ed. Ernest Evans (London: S.P.C.K., 1948), 6–

18.
Michael Decker, “Die Monarchianer: Frühchristliche Theologie im Spannungsfeld zwischen
Rom und Kleinasien” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hamburg, 1987). This dissertation is rarely cited in
English language scholarship, and I first discovered it in Uríbarri Bilbao’s book.
27
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think that Noetian theology relied heavily on biblical exegesis.28 Throughout the course
of his dissertation, Decker casts the monarchian controversy as a clash between different
theological systems developed in Asia Minor and Rome.29 Despite its novel approach to
the monarchian controversy, Decker’s work still does not leave us with a coherent picture
of the core of monarchian thought.30
Shortly after Decker’s work, two scholars produced major studies of
monarchianism. Starting in the late 1980s, Reinhard Hübner developed a series of
arguments that radically reinterpreted a number of the primary texts related to
monarchianism.31 One of Hübner’s main contentions is that monarchiansim arose as a
reaction against Gnosticism and that it appeared early in the second century. 32 Perhaps
the most idiosyncratic feature of Hübner’s arguments is that he reasons that Noetus was

28

See, for example, Ibid., 156–7. As I note in my chapter on Contra Noetum and my conclusions
about Monarchianism, I find Decker’s conclusion problematic. Biblical exegesis was deeply interwoven
into the thought of the Noetians and all of the other monarchians. If Hippolytus invented this Noetian
exegesis, he is a skillful literary craftsman indeed.
29

He articulates this point very strongly on pp. 200-5. I also have some serious objections to his
presentation of the monarchian controversy as a conflict between Eastern and Western theologies, but I
deal with that at more length later.
30
By “core of monarchian theology” I mean those theological elements that recur in the four
major texts that I study. As I note numerous times throughout the dissertation, I think the core of
monarchianism entailed two commitments and one accompanying conclusion: (1) There is one God (the
Father); (2) Jesus is God; therefore, Jesus and the Father are one and the same. The beginning of Contra
Noetum presents a very condensed account of monarchian teaching and its exegetical underpinnings.

Hübner’s essays, which were published in various venues, were gathered into a collected
volume in 1999. For the sake of ease, I will cite them as they appear in that volume. See Reinhard M
Hübner, Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden; Boston:
Brill, 1999). Note also Mark Edwards’ somewhat critical review of the volume: M. J. Edwards, “Review of
Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert,” Journal of Theological
Studies 52, no. 1 (2001): 354–56.
31

See in particular two of his essays within the collected volume: “Die antignostische
Glaubensregel des Noët von Smyrna,” (39-94); and “Der antivalentinianische Charakter der Theologie des
Noët von Smyrna,” (95-129). As I have argued in an essay tentatively forthcoming in Studia Patristica, I
think Hübner’s broad thesis is correct. Anti-Gnostic polemics probably played some role in the formation
of monarchian theology. However, I disagree on many of the particular details of his argument, especially
his revisionist chronology.
32
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active early in the second century and that figures like Ignatius and Melito were reliant on
his theology.33 His argument calls for a highly revisionist chronology that is not justified
by the evidence. Like the treatments of monarchianism before him, Hübner’s fails to
produce a clear account of the core of monarchian teaching.
The latest major treatment of monarchianism is Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao’s tome
written in the mid-1990s.34 Bilbao’s main concern is to trace the use of the term μοναρχία
in order to determine how it relates to Trinity. Specifically, he wants to know whether the
term μοναρχία necessarily excludes a Trinitarian understanding of God. To answer this
question, he begins by tracing the early philosophical roots of the term and follows its
usage well into third-century Christian texts. At the end, Bilbao concludes that μοναρχία
is not necessarily opposed to a Trinitarian understanding of God. Because of this
conclusion, he judges Praxeas’ alleged anti-Trinitarian use of the term to be a
bastardization of its normal use.35 Although Bilbao’s book is a careful and nuanced study
of the use and history of the term μοναρχία, he does not seek to offer a comprehensive
account of monarchian theology. Indeed, as Bilbao reminds his readers on multiple
occasions, the term μοναρχία itself was not at the heart of the monarchian position. His

33
Most think Ignatius wrote somewhere between 105 and 115 C.E. Melito probably wrote during
the 160s. From the scarce data available, scholars typically place Noetus at the end of the second century.

Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad: El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la
controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie 1:
Estudios 62 (Madrid: UPCO, 1996). See also his earlier exploration of the question: “Monarquía : Apuntes
sobre el estado de la cuestión,” Estudios eclesiásticos 69, no. 270 (1994): 343–66.
34

See Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 226. There, he writes, “Praxeas' way of
understanding the monarchy is an isolated and exceptional case within the Christian literature that has been
handed down to us” (La manera de entender la monarquía de Praxeas es un caso aislado y excepcional
dentro de la literature Cristiana que se nos ha transmitido).
35
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compelling argument that the term μοναρχία was not at odds with Trinitarian theology
still leaves need for the careful reconstruction I undertake.
None of the major works on monarchianism provides a nuanced reconstruction of
their core theological positions by using the full array of extant sources.36 This is
precisely the gap in scholarship that I aim to fill in part one of this dissertation.
Monarchianism did not arise out of nowhere. Although the extant witnesses we have for
it are laconic with regard to its theological origins, I first offer a hypothesis about what
theological developments in the second century might have prompted its rise. After
giving a hypothesis about the theological origins of monarchianism, I seek to establish a
stable core of monarchian theology through a careful examination of the four primary
sources I listed above. I describe their theology by focusing on major themes that recur
throughout the different texts, such as the visibility of God, the explicit identification of
the Father and Son, and the suffering of the Father, among others. By focusing on these
major themes, I am able to identify both a stable core of monarchian theology (the things
that remain constant over the time period of the texts that I study) and the elements of
monarchian theology that underwent development, perhaps in response to the growing
criticism from anti-monarchian writers. In addition, I highlight their exegetical tendencies
and popular biblical texts that might have belonged to some sort of monarchian dossier of
proof texts.
There is one more problem I must attend to in this introduction: what to call the
monarchian controversy. Scholars have long noted that settling on a name for the

36

There are, however, some excellent and nuanced studies of Monarchianism that focus on a
smaller issue. See, for example, Ronald Heine’s excellent study, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of
Theological Studies 49 (1998): 56–91.
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phenomenon often referred to as the monarchian controversy is difficult. In antiquity, the
proponents of this theology were variously called “monarchians,” “Sabellians,” and
“patripassians.”37 Each of these names for the theological position is objectionable for
different reasons. In the first place, not all of the so-called “monarchians” gave the term
μοναρχία a central place in their theology.38 The use of the title “Sabellian” for the
theology I am considering is also problematic. One of the primary reasons such a title is
problematic is that we know almost nothing about the theology of Sabellius. As I note in
an excursus in my discussion of Novatian, we have almost no specific details about
Sabellius’ theology from contemporary sources; and the later heresiologists mistakenly
attribute later teaching to him. Calling this theology “Sabellianism” obscures the fact that
these theological positions antedated Sabellius, about whom we know very little.39
Finally, to call this theology “patripassianism” veils the central concern of these
theologians. As Ronald Heine notes, the claim that the Father suffered was built on the

37
Contemporary scholars also call them “modalists;” and while this term can be helpful, it does
not easily map onto any of the key terms used in the primary texts. I avoid using it for this reason, although
I do not find it completely unhelpful.
38
This is one of the central contentions of Bilbao. See Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad,
226, 279. Instead of “monarchians,” Bilbao prefers to call them “patripassians” or “Sabellians.” But these
designations have their own sets of problems. See especially his discussion of the naming: Ibid., 497–500.
Note also Simonetti’s critical response to some of Bilbao’s conclusions about the use of the term μοναρχία:
Manlio Simonetti, “Monarchia e Trinità: Alcune osservazioni su un libro recente,” Rivista di storia e
letteratura religiosa 33, no. 3 (1997): 627–8.

For discussions of the difficulties surrounding Sabellius, see Reinhard M Hübner, “Die
Hauptquelle des Epiphanius (Panarion, haer 65) über Paulus von Samosata: Ps-Athanasius, Contra
Sabellianos,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 90, no. 2–3 (1979): 201–20; Joseph T. Lienhard, “Basil of
Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra, and ‘Sabellius,’” Church History 58, no. 2 (1989): 157–67; M. Simonetti,
“Sulla recente fortuna del ‘Contra Sabellianos’ ps. atanasiano,” Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 26,
no. 1 (1990): 117–32; Wolfgang A. Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” in
Logos: Festschrift für Luise Abramowski (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1993), 124–39; idem, “Wer war
Sabellius?,” Studia patristica 40 (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 359–65.
39
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more fundamental, exegetically-based claims that the Father and Son were identical.40
Even more, as becomes evident in my later discussions, although the commitment to the
identity of Father and Son remained unwavering, judgments about the patripassian
implications of this fundamental stance varied as the theology developed.41
Although there are problems with each of the main terms used to describe the
theology I am studying, I have chosen to refer to it as “monarchianism” in this
dissertation.42 As is clear at the end of my examination of the primary texts in the first
part of the dissertation, the monarchians had two core commitments: (1) God is one
alone; (2) Jesus is God. These two core commitments led them to conclude that the
Father and the Son are “one and the same” (ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ).43 This is the heart of the
theological position I am calling monarchianism. Thus, those whom I call monarchians
are the same as those called “modalistic monarchians” in Harnack’s popular
phraseology.44 By confining my definition of “monarchianism” to those who hold (1) and
(2) above, as well as the concomitant identification of Father and Son, I am able to

He writes, “The monarchian thesis, in which the Noetians included Christ, is derived from their
reading of Scripture, but the patripassianist thesis is supported solely by logic based on the monarchian
thesis.” Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 83.
40

41

Of note here are the sections in Adversus Praxean and the Refutatio where monarchian
theologians seem to shy away from affirming that the Father suffered. I discuss these passages in later
sections on the suffering of the Father in the chapters on Adversus Praxean and the Refutatio.
I do this fully conscious of Bilbao’s valid critique and observation that the term itself is not
necessarily opposed to Trinitarian understandings of God. I think the problems with the other terms, such
as “Sabellianism” and “patripassianism” outweigh Bilbao’s point about the use of μοναρχία.
42

43

See Refutatio 9.10.11-12 for this claim. See also the same claim in Adversus Praxean 2.3.

In the later chapters, I discuss the differences and similarities between Harnack’s “dynamistic
Monarchians,” whom I prefer to call “psilanthropists,” and his “modalistic monarchians.” Although they
share a similar concern to protect the oneness of God, they differ dramatically on the question of Jesus’
divinity.
44
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identify the core of the theology while still allowing for more precise descriptions of the
diversity and development within it.
My research into monarchianism constitutes part one of the dissertation and
presents a clearer picture of the monarchian theological commitments than has yet been
produced. The spate of anti-monarchian works produced at the beginning of the third
century shows that some prominent theologians viewed it as a major threat. With my
reconstruction of monarchian theology in place, we will be better able to understand why
some viewed it as such a threat.45 Furthermore, this reconstruction of their theology
allows us to understand the role they played in the development of Trinitarian theology in
the early third century. Part two of this dissertation is a modest attempt to begin revisiting
the development of Trinitarian theology at the beginning of the third century with fuller
attention given to the anti-monarchian context.

Origen

Origen is a battlefield on which scholars anachronistically fight about pro- and
anti-Nicene trajectories, all laying claim to his “true” thought.46 The vast impact of his

45

A fulsome reconstruction of monarchian theology will allow us to move beyond such outdate
assumptions as those that underwrote the work of Harnack and Lebreton, for example.
46

The legacy of Origen was already controverted less than one hundred years after his death. His
theology was appropriated and adapted to support varied, and sometimes opposed, theologies. See, for
example, two clear treatments of the appropriation of Origen in the fourth-century doctrinal conflicts:
Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 20–30; Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, rev. ed (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002), 117–57. Consider also R. P. C. Hanson’s deliberation about the
relationship between Origen’s theology and Arius: The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The
Arian Controversy, 318-381 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988), 60–70. For a more recent account in which
Origen plays a foundational role, see Christopher A. Beeley, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict
in Patristic Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). Beeley is more concerned with
Christological issues than with Nicaea, but his whole project hinges on his reading of Origen, “the great
master.” The conflict over the legacy of Origen has continued to unfold throughout Christian history.
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thought in the fourth century and beyond is undeniable, but the preoccupation with
determining who got Origen “right” often distorts our vision of his thought.47 Origen is
more than the Nachleben of his theology in the fourth century. Instead of reading Origen
in situ, scholars often read Origen with one eye toward Nicaea, looking for anticipation,
development, and consonance in every phrase.48 They depict an Origen always coursing
through time toward Nicaea and its aftermath.49 Origen, it seems, is always on a train
barreling forward in time that scholars often fail to examine before it leaves the station of
his own context, his own time in the first half of the third century.

Writing in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas could echo the sentiment of earlier heresiologists that
Origen was the source of Arius’ heresy: Super Boetium de Trinitate, II, Q. 3, A. 4.
47

Our readings of Origen are shaped as much by later appropriations of him as they are by his
contemporary context.
48

A prime example is the continuous debate about whether Origen used the term homoousios. The
most important attestation of the term in Origen’s corpus comes from a fragment of Origen’s Commentary
on Hebrews in Rufinus’ Latin translation of Pamphilius’ Apology for Origen. Despite such scant evidence
that Origen actually used this term, scholars devote substantial attention to the question of whether Origen
could have used it. This focus, I contend, is the product of reading Nicaea back onto Origen. The reasoning
runs something like this: 1) Origen’s theology was important in the Nicene debates; 2) homoousios was a
key term in the Nicene debates; 3) therefore, we must determine how (or if) Origen used this important
term. Scholars pursue the question even though the preponderance of evidence suggests that Origen did not
use the term, or that if he did, it was not a major part of this theology. With the caveat that I think the
question itself is anachronistic, I am inclined to agree with Hanson, Williams, and Ayres that Origen
probably did not use the term. See R. P. C. Hanson, “Did Origen Apply the Word Homoousios to the
Son?,” in Épektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou, ed. Jacques Fontaine and
Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 293–303; Williams, Arius, 131–7; Ayres, Nicaea and Its
Legacy, 24. For a scholar who argues in the affirmative, see M. J. Edwards, “Did Origen Apply the Word
Homoousios to the Son,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 658–70. See also Ramelli’s more
recent claims that Origen used homoousios: Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its
Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christianae 65, no. 1 (2011): 31–2. Note also
Henri Crouzel, Théologie de l’image de Dieu chez Origène, Théologie, Études publiées sous la direction de
la facultéde théologie S.J. de Lyon-Fourvière 34 (Paris: Aubier, 1956), 99–100.
49

Geoffrey Dunn observes this tendency in scholarship, even if he cannot completely extricate
himself from it: “The hermeneutical principle that texts and theological history are to be understood in their
own contexts and not in the light of later developments is an important one to repeat. Words like orthodoxy
and heresy are often not helpful when considering the development of doctrine because they condition us to
project backwards thoughts, expressions, positions, and outcomes which were not in place at the time.”
Geoffrey D. Dunn, “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” Ephemerides theologicae
Lovanienses 78, no. 4 (2002): 387.
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This tendency to project Origen toward Nicaea is easily recognizable in some
major contemporary narratives about Nicene and post-Nicene Trinitarian theology and
Christology.50 This debate has, for some time, revolved around the question of whether
Origen was a “subordinationist.”51 The bulk of scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries have had no doubt that Origen’s Trinitarian theology was a prime example of
subordinationism.52 Some of these scholars, like Lebreton,53 lack nuance in their

See especially in this regard Beeley, The Unity of Christ. Beeley’s reading of Origen forms the
substrate on which the rest of his argument is built. This trend is even evident in the title of one of
Ramelli’s essays on Origen: Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene and
Cappadocian Line.” My point here is that the trend for reading Origen is “Origen and X Nicene or postNicene figure or concept” rather than “Origen and X antecedent or contemporary problem.”
50

Lewis Ayres discusses the difficulty that accompanies the use of the term “subordinationism.”
He notes that its application to pre-Nicene figures often “directs our attention away from the concern to
emphasize continuity of being between the [Father and Son].” Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 21. Ayres
himself prefers to use the term to describe theologies “whose clear intent is to subordinate the Son to the
Father in opposition to the gradual emergence of Nicene and pro-Nicene theologies” (Ibid.). Ayres’
corrective here is useful, but I will continue to use the term in my description of pre-Nicene theologians.
My continued usage is partially motivated by the fact that the term is so embedded in debates about preNicene theology that it is difficult to proceed without using it. The primary reason for my continued usage,
however, is that I intend to recontextualize the term when it is applied to pre-Nicene theologians. As I
argue in my last chapter, the subordination of the Son to the Father was a common strategy for
distinguishing the Father and Son. Far from being a rejection of emerging fourth-century orthodoxy, it was
an intentionally employed polemical strategy in the anti-Monarchian milieu. With these caveats in place, I
will no longer use quotation marks around subordination language.
51

52
Good examples of this position include the following: Harnack, History of Dogma; Eugène de
Faye, Origen and His Work (Folcroft, Pa.: Folcroft Library Editions, 1978); Jules Lebreton, The History of
the Primitive Church (New York: Macmillan Co, 1949). Jean Daniélou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); T. E. Pollard, “Logos and Son in Origen, Arius and Athanasius,”
Studia Patristica 2 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 282–87; Williamina M. Macaulay, “Nature of Christ
in Origen’s Commentary on John,” Scottish Journal of Theology 19, no. 2 (1966): 176–87; J. Nigel Rowe,
“Origen’s Subordinationism as Illustrated in His Commentary on St John’s Gospel,” Studia Patristica 11.2
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1972), 222–28; J. Nigel Rowe, Origen’s Doctrine of Subordination: A Study in
Origen’s Christology, vol. 272, European University Studies. Series XXIII (Berne; New York: P. Lang,
1987); A. H. B. Logan, “Origen and Alexandrian Wisdom Christology,” in Origeniana Tertia: The Third
International Colloquium for Origen Studies, University of Manchester, September 7th-11th, 1981, ed.
Richard Hanson and Henri Crouzel (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 123–29.
53
Lebreton, The History of the Primitive Church, 940–1. Note especially his uncritical insertion
of the notion of consubstantiality. He states, “The vital truth that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit
transcend all other beings was always affirmed by Origen, and we find it already in the treatise De
Principiis. But we must allow that there is in this treatise a hierarchical conception of the divine persons
which endangers their equality and their consubstantiality. This idea appears in the treatise De Principiis, in
spite of all the corrections made by Rufinus; it is also very marked in the Commentary on St. John; it will
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discussion of Origen’s so-called subordination, while others, like Jean Daniélou, have
very detailed accounts that nonetheless employ the language of subordination with its
negative connotations.54 Within the past 20 years, however, a handful of scholars have
argued that Origen was actually an anti-subordinationist and that the old scholarly
consensus was misguided. There were a few scholars in the twentieth century, notably
Crouzel and Kannengiesser, who championed this position prior to its recent
resurgence.55 The scholars who have recently argued against Origen’s alleged
subordinationism have insisted that he taught the equality of the Father and the Son.56
Christoph Bruns’ recent consideration of Origen’s Trinitarian theology is
preoccupied with the question of subordination in Origen’s Trinitarian theology.57 Bruns
sets out to determine if Origen was, in fact, a subordinationist. If the question is answered

dominate the whole theological work of Origen, and he will even regard it as the rule governing Christian
worship.”
54
See especially his discussion of Origen’s Christology: Daniélou, Origen, 251–75. There, he
gives a very nuanced account of Origen’s Christology before noting that “it is obviously tainted with
subordinationism” (255).

Crouzel, Origen, 181–91; Charles Kannengiesser, “Christology,” in The Westminster Handbook
to Origen, ed. John Anthony McGuckin, 1st ed, The Westminster Handbooks to Christian Theology
(Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 73–78.
55

Christopher Beeley writes, “Although he has been accused for centuries of subordinationism (or
making Christ to be less divine than God the Father), Origen asserted the divinity of Christ in stronger
terms than any Christian theologian to date…. Origen argues that Christ is equal to God the Father in both
divinity and eternity” (Beeley, The Unity of Christ, 17–8). See also Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen, Greek
Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of Hypostasis,” Harvard Theological Review 105, no.
3 (2012): 302–50; Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene and
Cappadocian Line.” As is clear throughout my discussion of Origen, I disagree with the claims of both
Beeley and Ramelli. The last chapter demonstrates the grounds from which I reject Beeley’s assertion that
“Origen argues that Christ is equal to God the Father in both divinity and eternity.” My disagreement is not
with Beeley’s claim about the eternity of Christ; it is with his claims about the equal divinity.
56

57

Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos. Bruns notes that his book, which is a revised version of his
dissertation, fills a lacuna in Origen scholarship—namely, the lack of a protracted study of his Trinitarian
theology (14). Bruns is right to note that the lack of protracted treatment of Origen’s Trinitarian theology is
a major lacuna in scholarship. Edwards suggested in his review, however, that Bruns’ book might not have
completely succeeded in filling the lacuna. See M. J. Edwards, “Review of Trinität und Kosmos,” The
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 66, no. 2 (2015): 390–91.
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in the affirmative, Bruns wishes further to determine if Origen’s subordinationism was
ontological or relational/functional (which is to say, “economic”).58 Bruns’ treatment
spans Origen’s entire corpus, although it is heavily weighted toward the Commentary on
John and De principiis. Bruns acknowledges that adoptianism and modalism are two of
the primary opposing positions against which Origen’s Trinitarian theology was
formed.59 Beyond this assertion at the beginning of the book, however, neither
adoptianism nor modalism plays a significant role, even as Bruns asserts repeatedly that
Origen’s Hypostasenkonzeption was largely formed in his anti-modalist polemic.60 He
mentions modalism repeatedly, but it remains a vague bugaboo in the background of his
reconstruction of Origen’s thought.

See especially his discussions of the distinction in types of subordination (22-3). Bruns’
distinction between these two types of subordinationism is strained—especially in his discussion of the
ontological status of Holy Spirit in chapter three. In this chapter, the majority of the passages do not map
cleanly onto his distinction. Origen addresses the question of the relationship of the Spirit to the Son and
Father in the context of the Spirit’s work of sanctification among humans. Thus, it is clear that ontology
and economy are often of a piece for Origen. It seems as though Bruns introduces this distinction in order
to affirm that passages in Origen are subordinationist while protecting him from what he considers the
more damning charge of ontological subordination. Bruns himself acknowledges that his construct is not
necessarily found in Origen’s work itself (39).
58

59

Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos, 21.

See, for example, Ibid., 138. Bruns also notes that “Origen is clearly anxious to delineate the
independence of the three hypostases against contemporary modalism” (87). Bruns scarcely treats the
origins of modalism or the contemporary forms of its expression. In his narrative, it seems to be little more
than a vague overemphasis on the unity of the Father, Son, and Spirit. He does, however, offer one
interpretation of modalism: “[modalism], according to which the unity of God is guaranteed by the
existence of a single divine hypostasis and Father and Son are only two different aspects or forms of
expression of this one and only hypostasis” (102). Bruns’ laconic definition is made without reference to
any of the attestations to modalism (or monarchianism) at the beginning of the third century. For example,
one could easily press Bruns to identify what form of modalism used hypostasis, a somewhat technical term
that does not seem to have been used in the earliest stages of monarchianism. Heine also observes that
Bruns has scarcely defined modalism or considered its full significance: Ronald E. Heine, “Review:
Christoph Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos,” Augustinian Studies 45, no. 2 (2014): 306.
60
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From the outset of the work, it is clear that Bruns is considering Origen within the
horizon of the development of Nicene-Constantinopolitan Trinitarian theology.61 Bruns
pauses at regular intervals throughout the book to consider if Origen’s thought can align
with pro-Nicene Trinitarian theology.62 He often asserts that elements of Origen’s
thought align cleanly with later Nicene thought.63 More frequently, however, Bruns
argues that there is an unavoidable ambiguity in Origen’s Trinitarian theology, that at
times it appears to be subordinationist (whether ontological or economic, in his
construct).64 Such judgments about the ambiguity of Origen’s theology express as much
about Bruns’ reticence to label Origen an outright subordinationist as they do about
Origen’s theology itself.65 In the end, Bruns gives us a picture of an Origen whose
Trinitarian theology was ambiguous but was, nevertheless, the seedbed from which grew
multiple streams of fourth-century Trinitarian theology. While such a view conveys some
truth, however, his focus on Origen’s relationship to later Nicene and post-Nicene
theology often precludes a robust reconstruction of Origen’s contemporary context,
specifically his interaction with monarchianism. This tendency is especially evident when
Bruns considers Origen’s interpretation of John 14:28 (“the Father is greater than I”) with

Bruns signals this horizon in the introduction, when he writes, “So with good reason is Origen
referred to as the progenitor of the Nicene faith… which has been strongly reaffirmed by Illaria Ramelli”
(Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos, 19).
61
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See, for example, Ibid., 76–8, 88, 104–5, 304.

Thus he can write, “In the Trinitarian theology of Origen the Trinitarian faith of the church first
assumed clear contours, with it as the breeding ground from which Trinitarian dogma could grow” (Bruns,
Trinität und Kosmos, 20).
63

64

See, especially, Ibid., 21-3, 25, 51, 75, 88, 108–9, 112-3.

I am not here suggesting that there is no ambiguity in Origen’s thought; there is plenty. A good
bit of it, perhaps, stems from the difficulties in determining what parts of Origen’s Trinitarian theology
Rufinus has corrected in translation.
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reference to the exegesis of Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and John
Chrysostom instead of giving due weight to Origen’s contemporaries or predecessors.66
Bruns’ project is ambitious; but unfortunately, it does not situate Origen adequately
within his contemporary and antecedent theological and polemical contexts.

Subordinationism

Although terms denoting subordination have frequently driven the narrations of
Origen’s Trinitarian theology, scholars seldom take the time to actually define what they
mean by subordination.67 R. P. C. Hanson affirms that virtually every theologian,
excepting Athanasius, held some form of subordinationism before the dénouement of the
Arian controversy sometime after 355.68 He suggests that some type of subordination
would have been accepted as orthodox Trinitarian theology in the pre-Nicene era; but,
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Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos, 76. Bruns only briefly mentions Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, and
Clement of Alexandria in a footnote.
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Beeley is one of the few who defines the term. His two definitions of subordinationism or
subordinationists are (1) “making Christ to be less divine than God the Father,” and (2) “those who deny
the full divinity of Christ” (Beeley, The Unity of Christ, 10, 17–8). Another notable exception to this illdefined use of the term is the work of Wolfgang Marcus, which has received less attention than it is due:
Wolfgang Marcus, Der Subordinatianismus als historiologisches Phänomen: Ein Beitrag zu unserer
Kenntnis von der Entstehung der altchristlichen “Theologie” und Kultur unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung der Begriffe Oikonomia und Theologia (München: M. Hueber, 1963). Marcus surveys
what he deems “liberal” and “conservative” scholarly explanations of subordinationism and notes that both
view it as erroneous and locate the source of the error in the influence of Hellenism (27). Marcus views the
focus on the role of subordinationism as overplayed. Instead, he looks for the scriptural warrant for
subordinationism and any precedents in Judaism (48). One of Marcus’ main goals is to normalize preNicene subordinationism, to argue that it was not deviant. He thinks subordinationism is better understood
as an intermediate position between Marcionite theology and monarchianism (93). He labels this sort of
subordinationism “orthodox” and later argues that the theology of Arius cannot be seen as a logical
development of this orthodox subordinationism (93-5). Marcus’ reassessment of subordinationism has the
merit of considering the phenomenon within its own historical context instead of projecting anachronistic
categories onto it. His is one of the few accounts that does so. Nevertheless, it is still interesting that his
study is driven by determining whether the subordinationists were legitimately the forebears of Arius. He
offers a contextual reading of subordination, but he never quite escapes the orbit of the Nicene conflicts.
68

Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, xix.
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like many others, he does not produce a clear definition of what constitutes
subordinationism.
Given the current scholarly context, it is difficult to write about Origen’s
Trinitarian theology without addressing whether he was a subordinationist. As was the
case for most of the twentieth century, such is still the question du jour when it comes to
Origen’s Trinitarian theology. In my final chapter, I explore what it means to speak of
subordinationist theologies in the third century. I must develop a definition of
subordinationism that is based on specific theological statements in their third-century
contexts. This definition contains no implicit evaluative judgment about whether
something aligns with later theological standards. By defining subordinationism without
reference to Nicene and post-Nicene theology, we can make more meaningful claims
about what Origen sought to accomplish in his own theological context. In addition, I
formulate my definition of subordination with reference to my reconstruction of
monarchianism in part one of the dissertation, for the argument against monarchianism
was one of the main places in which our third-century authors deployed their
subordinationist theologies.
In order to avoid over-generalizing, I work with a definition of subordinationism
created from examples in the three main texts I consider in the final chapter: Tertullian’s
Adversus Praxean, Novatian’s De Trinitate, and Origen’s ComJn.69 As I observe when
reading these three texts, the subordination of the Son to the Father is not a uniform
phenomenon in the early third century. Thus, perhaps my definition will add nuance to
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In the final chapter, I consider the texts in this order, which is not the chronological order in
which they were written. I place Origen at the end of the chapter because he is the focus of my argument,
which needed the context of Tertullian and Novatian already in place.
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the ways we speak of subordination. In the texts I survey, subordination often occurs
when the authors speak of the relationship between a cause/source and its effect (in our
case, the Father and Son). When authors are dealing with a cause and effect, the effect
either lacks something present in the cause or possesses it less fully. For example,
Tertullian claims that the Father is invisible because of the greatness of his majesty, but
the Son is visible because his majesty is derived from the Father.70 The Son has
something derivatively from the Father (majesty), and because of this, has less of it than
the Father. Because the Son has less majesty, he is able to be seen. Elsewhere, Tertullian
speaks of the Father possessing the wholeness of substance while the Son only possesses
a portion of it.71
Novatian exhibits a similar manner of speaking about cause/source and effect. He
argues that the Holy Spirit is less than the Son because the Spirit receives what it
announces from the Son.72 Novatian here does not even broach the question of whether
the Spirit fully possesses what it receives from the Son; the mere act of reception implies
that the Spirit is less (minor) than the Son. Novatian applies this same logic to the
Father/Son relationship, arguing that the Son is less (minor) than the Father because the
Son receives sanctification from the Father.73 Later, Novatian uses an inverted form of
the same logic. The Father is unoriginate; but the Son has an origin and is, therefore, less
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.3.

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.1-4. There is a tension in Tertullian’s thought with regard to the
visibility of the Son. In Adversus Praxean 9, he suggests that the Son is visible because his majesty is
derivative. In Adversus Praxean 14, however, Tertullian argues that the Son is invisible as Word and Spirit
because of the condition of his substance.
71

72

Novatian, De Trinitate 16.3.

73

Novatian, De Trinitate 27.12.
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than (minor) the Father.74 In this case, the Father’s lack of something (an origin) is
desirable. The Son is less than the Father and distinguished from him because he has an
origin.75 For both Tertullian and Novatian, the reception or derivation of something from
a source necessarily implies that the recipient is less than the source. Novatian is explicit
about this and states multiple times that the Son is less than (minor) the Father.76 This is
what I mean by subordination. Notice also that this definition does not require particular
attention to the effect caused or the thing received.77
A similar scheme can be seen in Origen, but there are some notable variations
with him. As I lay out in more detail in the final chapter, Origen has a hierarchical
understanding of the universe, with the Father at the top. In my discussion of passages
where Origen discusses the goodness of the Father and Son, Origen employs this
hierarchy. He also speaks of the Father as the source of goodness and the Son as having
his goodness from the Father (or being an image of that goodness).78 In these passages,
he speaks of the Father as being superior to the Son or superseding the Son (using
ὑπερέχω and similar terms).
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Novatian, De Trinitate 31.3.

Despite the inversion of his logic, Novatian’s position is consistent. In each case, the Son’s
existence or qualities are more tightly circumscribed than the Father who is unoriginate and possesses all
good things in their fullness.
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See, for example, De Trinitate 27.12, 31.3.
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Later understandings of subordination will focus specifically on divinity and substance, but such
was not necessarily the focus of the third century authors I consider. At various points, the anti-monarchian
writers focus on the Son’s reception of divinity, substance, goodness, and sanctification, among other
things.
78

See especially, ComJn 13.151-3 and ComMatt 15.10.
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In the main passage from Origen that I survey (ComJn 2.13ff), Origen draws
together a number of these concepts. He speaks about the Father as cause and source.79
He speaks about the Son receiving divinity from the Father or drawing it into himself.80
At the end of this passage, Origen employs the same hierarchical framework as he does
elsewhere and speaks of the Son being transcended by the Father.81 It is clear that for
Origen, the Father transcends the Son because he is cause and source (of goodness or
divinity). What is interesting, however, is that in these passages Origen never explicitly
says that the Son is less than the Father. It is an obvious implication of his affirmation of
the transcendence of the Father, but the absence of explicit claims that the Son is inferior
differentiates his subordination from that of Novatian and Tertullian. Thus, at the
beginning of the third century, subordinationism was not some monolithic theological
movement. Different authors accented their theologies differently so that we may speak
of variation under the umbrella term “subordinationism.”
In these texts, we see a relatively stable subordinationist framework. In this
framework, the cause or source is greater than its effects or recipients. This is the
common ground shared by all three authors I study in the last chapter. There is variation
with how explicitly our authors draw out the consequences of this subordinationist logic.

At ComJn 2.14, he refers to the Father as the uncreated cause of the universe (τοῦ ἀγενήτου τῶν
ὅλων αἰτίου). Note again the alpha-privative descriptor. Later, Origen refers to both the Father and the Son
as sources but sources of different things. At ComJn 2.20, he writes, “For both hold the place of a source;
the Father, that of divinity, the Son, that of reason” (ἀμφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν, ὁ μὲν πατὴρ
θεότητος, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς λόγου) (Origen, Commentary on the Gospel according to John, trans. Ronald E. Heine,
Fathers of the Church 80 [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989], 100; Greek
from SC 120:226).
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In ComJn 2.17, he uses two verbs, σπάω and ἀρύω to speak of the Son “drawing” divinity into

himself.
81
Origen, ComJn 2.32. Origen again uses ὑπερέχω to describe the transcendence of the Father
over the Son.
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Some clearly claim that the Son is less than the Father, but Origen is content to say that
the Father is superior to the Son. This implies the inferiority of the Son; but in the limited
passages I have studied, Origen nowhere argues for the inferiority of the Son in explicit
terms.82
My discussion of third-century subordinationism here, as with the fuller study in
the final chapter, is an attempt to read Origen alongside his contemporaries and with
reference to one of the primary polemical contexts of his day. I adopt the focus of
scholarship on whether Origen was a subordinationist, but I reorient the discussion to the
early third century instead of the late fourth. My account does not attempt to be as
comprehensive as Bruns’ more recent study. It is an exercise in a disciplined reading of
important parts of Origen’s oeuvre that considers his theology in its own context and a
suggestion for how the rest of his corpus might profitably be reread.

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part, which is roughly twothirds of the whole, focuses on reconstructing monarchian theology. The second part
offers a rereading of key passages from ComJn 1-2 with a focus on Origen’s engagement
with monarchian theology. In the first chapter, I attempt to provide a plausible
background for the rise of monarchianism in the late second and early third centuries. In
order to do this, I survey models of articulating the Father-Son relationship in the second

This is a notable variation. A full exploration behind Origen’s motivations for this variation is
beyond the scope of my current project. As I broaden my further study of Origen beyond his early works, it
will be worth tracking whether he ever explicitly speaks of the Son as inferior to the Father or is merely
content to emphasize the Father’s transcendence over the Son.
82
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century. Specifically, I am concerned with how second-century theologians express the
unity and distinction between the Father and Son. Rather than a diachronic survey, I
organize the theologians along a spectrum that runs from what I term “soft distinction” to
“hard distinction” between the Father and Son. At the end of the chapter, I suggest that a
theology like that of Justin Martyr, which stressed the alterity of the Son from the Father,
was probably the sort of theology against which the monarchians reacted.83
After my exploration of what might have prompted monarchianism, I undertake a
reconstruction of monarchian theology in chapters two and three. I begin by examining
the relevant sections of Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History, which does not offer much
direct testimony about monarchianism but does give us valuable background information
about the church in Rome at the beginning of the third century. I then offer a close
reading of the four main sources that attest to monarchianism. This reading occurs in
what I deem to be the chronological order of the texts: Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum,
Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, the Refutatio omnium haeresium, and Novatian’s De
Trinitate.84
In order to fill what I consider to be a lacuna in scholarship, my reconstruction of
monarchian theology focuses on their major theological emphases and exegetical
practices. To that end, I pay particular attention to their discussions of the unity of God,
the divinity of Jesus, the visibility of God, and the suffering of God. With regard to

83

Although not included in the dissertation, I have an article forthcoming in Vigiliae Christianae
that rejects the claims of Daniel Boyarin that monarchianism was Judaism being “cast out” of Christianity.
The article is entitled “Monarchianism and Two Powers: Jewish and Christian Monotheism at the
Beginning of the Third Century.”
84

As becomes clear in those chapters, however, there is little consensus about the dating and
authorship of Contra Noetum and the Refutatio. One group of scholars reverses the order and considers the
Refutatio to be the earlier of the two. I discuss this matter in detail in the relevant chapters.
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exegesis, I draw particular attention to their focus on Old Testament theophanies and key
passages from the Gospel of John. The result of these two chapters is a picture of
monarchianism whose core teaching was that the Father and the Son were “one and the
same.” The monarchians actively denied that there was any real distinction between the
Father and Son by emphasizing their sameness. My reading of these four sources also
shows that while monarchianism maintained a stable core, there was development or
disagreement with regard to some of the implications of the core teaching. Specifically,
monarchians began to differ over whether their claim that the Father and Son were “one
and the same” necessarily meant that the Father suffered.85
In part two of the dissertation, I focus on rereading books 1-2 of Origen’s ComJn
in light of my reconstruction of the monarchian controversy. In chapter four, I begin by
giving a detailed account of the date and context for the first two books of ComJn. There,
I argue that Origen most likely wrote them in the midst of the monarchian controversy
and most likely after his return from Rome, which was the epicenter of the monarchian
controversy. Thus, I situate Origen firmly within the context of an early third-century
debate. In the remainder of chapter four, I consider how the Wisdom Christology Origen
develops in book one of ComJn has anti-monarchian polemical utility.86
In the final chapter of the dissertation, I undertake a dense reading of ComJn
2.13ff, which I consider to be an important passage for understanding Origen’s early
Trinitarian theology. I contextualize this passage by reading it alongside passages from
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As I make clear in the relevant chapters, it is unclear if this diversity was synchronic or

diachronic.
The core of this argument about Origen’s Wisdom Christology has been accepted for
publication in the Greek Orthodox Theological Review. The forthcoming article is entitled, “Wisdom
Christology and Monarchianism in Origen’s Commentary on John.”
86
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Tertullian and Novatian which fit my definition of subordinationism above. In order to
justify my focus on this passage instead of De principiis, which many scholars privilege
in accounts of Origen’s Trinitarian theology, I include an excursus on the reliability of
Rufinus’ translations of Trinitarian passages in Origen.87 At the end of my reading of this
passage, I argue that Origen’s theology can be properly labelled “subordinationist” when
using my specific definition. Furthermore, I argue that Origen’s subordinationism is
helpfully elucidated when read alongside that of his rough contemporaries, Tertullian and
Novatian. All three of these authors intentionally deployed subordinationist theologies in
order to combat the monarchian assertion that the Father and Son were “one and the
same.” Novatian is perhaps the bluntest about how subordinationism functions as
effective anti-monarchian polemic when he argues that what is less than the Father (that
is, the Son) cannot be the same as the Father. Here, I argue, is the primary horizon within
which we must consider Origen’s subordinationism.88

There, I argue that at least with regard to Trinitarian passages, Rufinus’ translations cannot be
trusted. My position in this regard goes against the views of some major contemporary scholars. For
example, in a review of a new translation of De principiis for a popular magazine, Christopher Beeley
writes, “But the tide has finally turned. In recent decades, scholars have concluded that Rufinus’s
translation is generally reliable, and certainly more faithful than Koetschau’s reconstruction.” Christopher
A. Beeley, “Rescuing Origen from Neglect,” The Living Church (February 2016): 10.
87
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Thus, we must offer a dense contextual reading of Origen’s theology before we try to untangle
the complicated legacy of his theology in the Trinitarian controversies of the fourth century.
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CHAPTER ONE: MODELS OF FATHER/SON RELATIONSHIP IN THE
SECOND CENTURY

Introduction

Scholars frequently refer to figures from the second century as “modalists” or
“monarchians” without first defining what either of those terms means. For example,
Campbell Bonner called Melito of Sardis’ theology “naïve modalism.”1 More recently,
Reinhard Hübner has argued that Ignatius of Antioch was a monarchian.2 As I noted in
the introduction and develop in the later chapters on the monarchian controversy, I prefer
a restrictive and specific definition of monarchianism. Using my definition,
monarchianism is restricted to those who explicitly claim that the Father and the Son are
“one and the same” in an effort to maintain that there is only one God.3 This definition
allows for a distinction between monarchianism and psilanthropism or adoptianism.
Although they are related, I distinguish monarchianism from psilanthropism because the

1
Campbell Bonner, The Homily on the Passion (London; Philadelphia: Christophers; University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 27–8. As I note later, I think calling any sort of modalism “naïve” betrays an
insufficient definition of modalism.

Hübner’s claims about Ignatius (and also Melito) rest on his problematic assertion that Noetus
antedated them and that they were drawing on his monarchian theology. In order to make his case, he
argues that Ignatius wrote in the second half of the second century. As I discuss in more detail later, I find
his chronology untenable. See the essays on Ignatius and Melito in Reinhard M Hübner, Der Paradox Eine:
antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
2

3
For two of the major places where we see monarchians claiming that the Father and Son are one
and the same, see Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.10.11-2; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3: “maxime haec
quae se existimat meram veritatem possidere dum unicum deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum
eundemque et patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum dicat.” Latin from Tertullian, Tertulliani Opera: Pars
II, ed. A Kroymann and Ernest Evans, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 2 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1954),
1161. Not everyone whom I consider a monarchian explicitly claimed that the Father and Son are “one and
the same.” However, all of the theologies I am labeling monarchian actively seek to deny any real
distinction between the Father and Son. By real distinction, I mean some sort of distinction of being, i.e., of
distinct things. Part of the problem with discussing these issues is that there was not yet a developed
technical vocabulary.
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latter appears to have been far less bothersome to figures like Hippolytus, Tertullian, and
Origen.4 More importantly, this definition makes it clear that monarchianism or
modalism was an actively chosen position. It was not the failure to distinguish the Father
and Son; it was an active and intentional identification of the two. Therefore, one could
not hold this sort of position accidentally.5
One of the difficulties with monarchianism is that its theological origins are
difficult to trace.6 We know that the two earliest named monarchian leaders, Noetus and
Praxeas, were both from Asia Minor; but we know little about their theological
background or motivation.7 The explosion of their theology at the beginning of the third
century begs for an explanation that the surviving texts from the period do not furnish.
This chapter explores the possible theological motivations of monarchianism. Because
we lack direct evidence, the best we can do is to offer a plausible explanation. Rather
than focusing on the use and development of the term μοναρχία, I begin with the
assumption that the claim that the Father and Son were “one and the same” and other

4

As will become clear in later analysis, the hard distinction between the two threatens to break
down at certain points. However, I still think it is a helpful distinction to make.
Regarding the phrase “naïve modalism,” it does seem that there were many unlearned people in
the early church who adopted this position. In that way, one might be able to speak of a “naïve modalism.”
The figures depicted in the anti-monarchian treatises, however, were not naïve. They knowingly rejected
any real distinction between the Father and Son.
5

A few scholars have traced the use of the term μοναρχία in early Christian literature, but this is
not sufficient to establish the theological motivations of monarchianism. The term μοναρχία was flexible
enough to be claimed by both monarchians and their opponents. For this reason, the monarchian use of the
term cannot be assumed to encapsulate all of their theology. For the examination of the term monarchia,
see Ernest Evans, “Introduction,” in Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas (London: S.P.C.K., 1948), 6–18;
Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad: El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la controversia
“monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie 1: Estudios 62
(Madrid: UPCO, 1996).
6

7
For the claim that Noetus is from Smyrna, see, Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.1; for Praxeas’
putative Asian origin, see Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.
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explicit denials of distinction between the two were the most distinguishing
characteristics of early monarchianism. As will be clear in the surviving texts of the
period, the monarchian identification of Father and Son was a reaction against certain
ways of articulating distinction between the Father and Son that they thought were
tantamount to ditheism.8
In order to determine what the monarchians might have reacted against at the end
of the second century, I offer a broad survey of the ways second-century authors spoke
about the relationship between the Father and Son. In this survey, I pay special attention
to means of expressing both unity and distinction between the Father and Son, as well as
expressions of monotheistic commitment. By establishing models of the Father/Son
relationship in the second century, I will provide the background necessary to establish
continuity and discontinuity between earlier models and monarchianism. This
consideration of monarchianism against second-century models will clarify its
motivations and distinctive features.9
In order to aid in this analysis of second-century models of the Father/Son
relationship, I employ the following heuristic. In the course of my discussion, I will
attempt to locate models of Father-Son relationship along a continuum between “soft

8

I avoid saying that monarchianism was a reaction against Logos theology. I avoid this common
assertion because I do not think the monarchians were reacting against Logos theology qua Logos
theology; they were reacting against the strong distinction drawn between the Father and Son by some
Logos theologians like Justin Martyr. As will become clear in my later analysis of Callistus’ positions in
the Refutatio, some monarchians developed a form of Logos theology that they deemed acceptable.
9

Although I read second-century texts here with an interest in how they might elicudate the
genesis of monarchianism, I hope to avoid an anachronistic imposition of later categories on them. The
interest in the relationship between the Father and Son was already current in second-century texts and,
thus, is not a projection of the concerns of the monarchian controversy into the second-century. For
example, consider how acutely Justin feels the need to articulate the distinction between the Father and Son
in opposition from his Jewish opponents.
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distinction” and “hard distinction.” By “soft distinction,” I mean primarily the distinction
of Father and Son by the use of names or titles. On this end of the continuum, theologians
exhibit little desire to articulate the manner of distinction between the Father and Son,
perhaps because they were not aware of any need to do this. By “hard distinction,” I
mean an explicit explanation of how the Father and Son are distinct. Justin’s claim that
the Father and Son are ἕτερος ἐν ἀριθμῷ is a prime example of this “hard distinction.” As
will become clear in the course of my analysis, I think all of the second-century authors
that I survey fall somewhere on this continuum. The early third-century monarchians, on
the other hand, do not fit anywhere on this continuum. Their explicit denial of distinction
between the Father and Son makes their theology a novel development in comparison
with that of the second century.10
As I remarked above, I consider Justin a turning point in second-century theology.
In order to demonstrate how things shifted in his work, it is first necessary to summarize
the salient points of Christology in the first half of the second century. Instead of
surveying the texts diachronically, I have chosen to divide them into groups depending on
how they describe the relationship between the Father and Son. These groupings, or
models, of Father/Son relationship are a helpful heuristic because theology did not
develop in a clean, linear manner in the second century. One prime example of this fact is
the comparison of the theology of Justin and Melito, discussed below. Justin, writing in
the 150s C.E., articulated the distinction between the Father and Son that was stronger

10

Some monarchians admitted a sort of superficial distinction by the use of names, but they
denied that this nominal distinction represented any underlying reality. The second-century authors who
distinguished the Father and Son by the use of names were unconcerned with whether the names
corresponded to any underlying reality.
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than any Christian theologian before him. Melito of Sardis’ Peri Pascha, probably
written between 160 and 170 C.E., shows almost no concern to distinguish the Father and
the Son. If I were approaching the second century with a model of linear development
and the presupposition that a stronger articulation of distinction is “more orthodox,” I
would have to judge Melito’s theology to be a regression of sorts.
The development of theology in the second century C.E. appears to have been
episodic and geographically driven, likely because of the limitations of textual
transmission and of the spread of ideas.11 What this means is that the geographic
provenance of texts is important to consider in the time-period we are studying. The
geographical provenance of theologies may help establish some theological context for
the genesis of the monarchian controversy.12 Noetus, perhaps the earliest to espouse a socalled monarchian position, was from Smyrna, in Asia Minor. Tertullian also claims that
Praxeas brought his theology to Rome from Asia. Both Noetus and Praxeas denied that
there was any real distinction between the Father and Son. Melito’s Peri Pascha,
probably written in Sardis, also exhibits little concern to distinguish the Father and Son.
Thus, the textual evidence suggests that at the end of the second century and beginning of

11

What I mean by this is that we cannot assume, without clear textual evidence, that one author in
the second century has read another second-century author. Although this occasionally happened, as in the
case of Irenaeus reading and utilizing Theophilus’ Ad Autolycum, we cannot take it for granted in the
absence of any evidence. Furthermore, the surviving textual evidence from this period is so sparse that it is
difficult to construct a coherent narrative.
12

If the earliest forms of monarchianism were an Asian phenomenon, a comparison with the
works of Melito will elucidate some of their theological tendencies. As I make clear later in the chapter, I
do not think that Melito was “guilty” of monarchianism because he was from Asia Minor. In his
dissertation, Decker casts the monarchian controversy as a disagreement between East and West. There is
something to be said for this approach, but I think Decker’s statement pushes beyond what the evidence
allows. See especially his conclusions: Michael Decker, “Die Monarchianer: Frühchristliche Theologie im
Spannungsfeld zwischen Rom und Kleinasien” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hamburg, 1987), 206–10.
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the third, at least one group of theologians in Asia Minor seldom used any technical
means to distinguish the Father from the Son.13
Because I group authors based on the characteristics of their theology rather than
the chronology of their texts, such labels as “Apostolic Fathers” or “Apologists” are
mostly unhelpful. These labels and divisions of the texts are largely the constructs of later
interpreters of the texts. For example, the collection of texts known as the “Apostolic
Fathers” was not gathered together until the end of the 17th century, and there is still
debate about which texts should be included in the collection.14 The label “Apologists” is
also a later construct. As I argue in what follows, Justin’s articulation of the distinction
between the Father and the Son differs substantially from that of Athenagoras or
Theophilus, thus making the common label “Apologists” unhelpful for my purposes.15
The following account is not a detailed examination of every aspect of each of the
primary texts, but rather an overview of the major writings of the second century. This
overview focuses on two key themes: (1) statements about monotheism; (2) articulations
of the relationship between the Father and the Son. The findings in this chapter will serve
as the backdrop against which I assess the rise of monarchianism at the beginning of the

13

As I noted earlier, I think the central characteristic of monarchianism is the claim that the Father
and Son are one and the same. While Melito does not carefully distinguish the Father from the Son, he
nowhere claims that they are one and the same. Therefore, I do not classify him as a monarchian.
14

For a succinct summary of this history, see Bart D. Ehrman, ed., The Apostolic Fathers, Loeb
Classical Library 24-25 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003), 24:1–14; Michael W. Holmes,
The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations, 3rd ed (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker
Academic, 2007), 5–6. For a recent discussion on the name “Apostolic Fathers,” see David Lincicum, “The
Paratextual Invention of the Term ‘Apostolic Fathers,’” Journal of Theological Studies 66, no. 1 (2015):
139–48.
15

This is not to say that there are not common features that merit the grouping of theologians
together. My point is that when it comes to articulating the distinction of the Father and Son, there is not a
common model among all of those labeled “Apologists.”
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third century. By focusing on these key themes in writers of the second century, I hope to
isolate the parts of their theology that are most relevant for explaining what might have
motivated monarchian theology.

Soft Distinction

1 Clement

Whereas the Epistles of Ignatius unambiguously call Christ “God,” 1 Clement
does not contain such evocative language.16 The author of 1 Clement preserves a form of
distinction between the Father and Son.17 One of the chief ways he accomplishes this
distinction is through the use of titles.18 He uses a few phrases to refer to the God: “Father
and Maker (πατέρα καὶ κτίστην)”19 and “Creator and Master (ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ
δεσπότης).”20 The author of 1 Clement consistently uses δεσπότης to refer to God and
κύριος to refer to the Jesus. This usage is striking because the LXX uses κύριος in place
of the Tetragrammaton. Because of this usage in the LXX, one would expect the title

16

Outside of the New Testament, 1 Clement is one of the earliest Christian writings we possess. It
was probably written in Rome during the mid-90s of the first century. For a concise introduction to its
dating, provenance, and theology, see Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 24:18–30.
My use of “Father and Son” in this chapter is, at times, artificial. These are often not focal terms
for the authors I am studying, and I use them in order to avoid confusion. For example, when secondcentury authors speak of “God” without any qualification, they are almost always referring to the Father.
Thus, in 1 Clement, the terms Father and Son do not play a central role.
17

18

I do not mean to imply here that the author of 1 Clement was self-consciously developing a
means of distinguishing the Father and Son. I am only drawing attention to patterns that are present in the
text.
1 Clement 19.2. In my discussion of 1 Clement, I am using Ehrman’s text and translation in the
Loeb edition: Bart D. Ehrman, ed., The Apostolic Fathers, 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library 24-25
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003). 1 Clement is in vol. 24.
19

20

1 Clement 20.11.
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κύριος to be applied to the Father.21 1 Clement also contains strong monotheistic
statements. Moses is described as acting “in order that the name of the true and only God
might be glorified.”22 Later, the author asks, “Do we not have one God and one Christ
and one Spirit of grace that was poured out upon us, and one calling in Christ?”23 1
Clement preserves the distinction between the Father and Son much more cleanly than do
the Ignatian Epistles.24 This distinction is done primarily by means of roles (for example,
the Father, not the Son, is creator) and titles. Perhaps one reason why the distinction
between Father and Son is more evident in 1 Clement is that this text does not contain
blunt descriptions of Christ as “God” like we see in the Ignatian Epistles.25 Nevertheless,
1 Clement does not exhibit any inclination to specify the manner of distinction between
the Father and Son. Its use of titles and roles is a rather soft way of articulating distinction
between the Father and Son.
2 Clement

Scholars have not reached any consensus on the relationship between 1 Clement
and 2 Clement. Nearly all agree that 2 Clement was not written by the same author as 1

21
Perhaps this usage of κύριος for Christ is an example of how thoroughly the worship of Christ
had permeated early Christianity.
22

1 Clement 43.6.

23

1 Clement 46.6.

24
Again, my use of “Father and Son” here is artificial. As noted above, 1 Clement’s use of κύριος
and δεσπότης does far more distinguishing work than do the titles Father and Son.

Apropos to this discussion is Vogt’s contention that 1 Clement teaches the pre-existence of
Christ and does not show signs of patripassianism. See Hermann Josef Vogt, “Monarchianismus Im 2.
Jahrhundert,” Theologische Quartalschrift 179, no. 4 (1999): 238–9.
25
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Clement and that 2 Clement is the later of the two.26 2 Clement contains a stronger
statement of Christ’s divinity than 1 Clement. The author writes, “it is necessary for us to
think concerning Jesus Christ just as [we think] concerning God.”27 Even this statement,
however, is not as strong as Ignatius’ reference to “Jesus Christ our God.”28 2 Clement
concludes with a doxology that uses familiar monotheistic language: “To the only God,
invisible, the Father of truth, who sent to us the Savior and Founder of immortality,
through whom he also revealed to us the truth and the heavenly life, to him be the glory
forever and ever. Amen.”29 None of these expressions in 2 Clement has the sort of
polemical edge that we see in the monarchian controversy. There are no signs that the
author of 2 Clement is concerned with the same questions.30 Neither is he concerned with
mapping out the manner of unity and distinction between the Father and Son, leaving him
in the category of “soft distinction.”

26
See Tuckett’s thorough introduction to 2 Clement and its critical issues: C. M. Tuckett, ed., 2
Clement: Introduction, Text, and Commentary, Oxford Apostolic Fathers (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012). Tuckett argues that the best we can do for dating the work is to place it somewhere in the
second century. There is not enough evidence to be more precise than this. Nearly all scholars agree that it
is not a letter. Tuckett argues that the best description for it is some sort of paraenetic homily. Ibid., 19–26.
On the whole, the author of 2 Clement is much more concerned with the ethical behavior of his readers than
he is with technical theological formulations.
27

2 Clement 1.1. “οὕτως δεὶ ἡμᾶς φρονεῖν περὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὡς περὶ Θεοῦ.”

28

See the preface in Ignatius, Ephesians for this statement.

2 Clement 20.5 (trans. Holmes, 165). “Τῷ μόνῳ θεῷ ἀοράτῳ, πατρὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, τῷ
ἐξαποστείλαντι ἡμῖν τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ ἀρχηγὸν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας, δι’ οὗ καὶ ἐφανέρωσεν ἡμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν
καὶ τὴν ἐπουράνιον ζωήν, αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. ἀμήν.” This doxology immediately
follows a section of the text that many authors view as an interpolation (19.1 – 20.4), but Tuckett argues
that it shares enough features with 2 Clement 1-18 that it is probably by the same author. See Tuckett, 2
Clement, 301–3.
29

30

Tuckett notes that some scholars have argued that 2 Clement is writing against incipient forms
of Valentinian theology. If it is present at all, Tuckett suggests that such polemic is very muted in 2
Clement. Ibid., 46–57.
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Ignatius of Antioch

The letters of Ignatius contain some striking passages about Jesus.31 Ignatius
seems concerned to emphasize both the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ.32 In two
places, Ignatius uses what appears to be a stock phrase, “Jesus Christ our God.”33
Elsewhere, Ignatius writes of God becoming manifest as a human (ἀνθρωπίνως).34 For
Ignatius, Jesus Christ is God; and he states this multiple times without qualification.35 In
addition to referring to Christ as God, Ignatius uses other images to affirm a close
relationship between Christ and the Father.36 He calls Christ the γνώμη of the Father and

I follow Schoedel’s dating of Ignatius’ Letters to the first twenty years of the second century:
William R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch,
Hermeneia—a Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 5.
This means that I reject the dating schema of Joly, upon which Hübner bases many of his conclusions about
Noetus and Ignatius. See Robert Joly, Le dossier d’Ignace d’Antioche, [Travaux] - Université libre de
Bruxelles, Faculté de philosophie et lettres 69 (Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1979);
Reinhard M Hübner, “Die Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer
Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1999), 131–206. In my discussion of the
Ignatian Epistles, I use Holmes’ text and translation: Michael W. Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers: Greek
Texts and English Translations, 3rd ed (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2007).
31

I discuss his emphasis on Jesus’ divinity in what follows. He emphasizes Jesus’ humanity in
response to those who say that Jesus “suffered in appearance only” (Trallians 10.1; Smyrnaeans 2.1). For
discussion of this dual emphasis, see Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest
Christianity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), 636–40.
32

33

Ignatius, Ephesians preface; Ignatius, Romans preface. See also Ignatius, Smyrnaeans 1.1,
where Ignatius writes, “I glorify Jesus Christ, the God who made you so wise” (trans. Holmes, 249).
34

Ignatius, Ephesians 19.3.
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In addition to the references above, see Ephesians 15.3, 18.2; Romans 3.3, 6.3; Polycarp 8.3.
Schoedel notes that some have argued that Ignatius did not view “Christ as God in an absolute sense.” He is
unconvinced by these arguments and notes that Christ is called God because he is so closely related to the
Father. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch, 39.
As noted above, Ignatius uses the phrase “Jesus Christ our God” in two places. In other cases, as
in Ephesians 18.2, Ignatius seems to use Christ as a title. There he writes, “ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς ὁ
Χριστός.” Ignatius does not appear to make the distinction between Jesus (the human) and Christ (the
divine) that we see in some other second-century writers.
36

39
the knowledge (γνῶσιν) of God.37 Christians are those who have taken on new life “in the
blood of God” (ἐν αἵματι θεοῦ).38 Ignatius writes that he wants to imitate the “suffering
of my God” (τοῦ πάθους τοῦ θεοῦ μου), again closely associating the suffering of Christ
with God.39 In one of his stronger statements, Ignatius urges his readers to “wait
expectantly for the one who is above time: the Eternal, the Invisible, who for our sake
became visible; the Intangible, the Unsuffering, who for our sake suffered, who for our
sake endured in every way.”40 Ignatius did not shy away from paradoxical statements like
“the Unsuffering, who for our sake suffered.” Elsewhere, he refers to Christ using two of
these paradoxical pairings, stating that Christ is “γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος” and “πρῶτον
παθητὸς καὶ τότε ἀπαθής.”41 As these statements make clear, Ignatius had no problem
closely associating the God and Jesus, or even attributing the sufferings of Jesus to
“God.” How exactly Ignatius understands these attributions of suffering to “God” is
another question. As his usage above seems to indicate, Ignatius does not necessarily

37

Ignatius, Ephesians 3.2, 17.2.

38

Ignatius, Ephesians 1.1.

39

Ignatius, Romans 6.3.

Ignatius, Polycarp 3.2 (trans. and Greek from Holmes, 264-5): “τὸν ὑπὲρ καιρὸν προσδόκα, τὸν
ἄχρονον, τὸν ἀόρατον, τὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς ὁρατόν, τὸν ἀψηλάφητον, τὸν ἀπαθῆ, τὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς παθητόν, τὸν κατὰ
πάντα τρόπον δι’ ἡμᾶς ὑπομείναντα.”
40

41

Ignatius, Ephesians 7.2. These sorts of pairings bear a striking resemblance to some of the
formulations that appear later in the monarchian controversy. For instance, the monarchians often spoke of
God as both invisible and visible. This is precisely the sort of language that Hübner picks up on in his
arguments about Noetus and Ignatius. Because he sees similar paradoxical expressions about God in
Ignatius and Noetus, and because he accepts Joly’s dating of the middle recension of the Ignatian texts,
Hübner posits that Noetus predated Ignatius and was one of Ignatius’ sources. For Hübner, Ignatius was a
monarchian. Although his argument is spread across a number of different essays, see especially: Hübner,
“Die Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna.” Given the lack of any attestation to Noetus prior to the beginning
of the third century, I find it problematic to offer such a broad revisionist narrative on the basis of such
tenuous evidence as these paradoxical statements about God. Furthermore, if we use my narrow definition
of monarchianism—a position that explicitly claims that the Father and Son are the same—Ignatius does
not qualify.
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mean “Father” when he says “God.” Because he explicitly states that Christ is God, he
might mean nothing more than that Christ suffered or bled when he writes about the
suffering and blood of God. Ignatius’ wording certainly does not reflect the sensitivity to
patripassianism that arose only 100 years later in response to some of the conclusions
drawn by early monarchians. Ignatius unequivocally expresses the divinity of Jesus
Christ, but the characterization of that divinity is left ambiguous in his theology.42
This is not to say, however, that Ignatius confuses the Father and the Son or that
he never distinguishes between them. He has several means of acknowledging the
distinction between the Father and the Son. Jesus is the one through whom Christians will
reach God.43 Jesus was alongside the Father before the ages, and appeared at the
consummation.44 Ignatius describes Jesus as the mouth in whom the Father has spoken,
making Jesus the agent of the Father.45 Ignatius writes that the Father raised Christ from
the dead.46 Thus, while some of Ignatius’ statements about God are ambiguous, the way
he uses Father and Son suggests that he understands some sort of distinction between

42

This ambiguity militates against calling Ignatius a monarchian. Neither party in the monarchian
controversy produced such ambiguous statements because they were concerned with a different set of
questions. The monarchians unambiguously taught that the Father and the Son were one and the same.
Some of the early monarchians elaborated on this teaching and plainly stated that the Father suffered. This
theology was unambiguous. The ambiguity in Ignatius’ theology here is what earns him the title of a “naïve
modalist.” Again, see Hübner, “Die Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna," 152. My definition of
monarchianism (and modalism, by extension) excludes Ignatius because he did not explicitly deny
distinction between the Father and Son.
43

Ignatius, Magnesians 1.2.

44

Ignatius, Magnesians 6.1.

45

Ignatius, Romans 8.2.

46

Ignatius, Trallians 9.2.
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them, if only the distinction of different actors or agents.47 The ambiguity present in the
way he speaks about God shows that the questions about the unity and distinction of the
Father and Son at the heart of the monarchian controversy were not yet pressing when he
wrote. Ignatius does not explicitly address how Father and Son are distinct. He
unequivocally states that Jesus is God, but the reader must infer from the titles he uses
that Ignatius considers the Son to be somehow distinguished from the Father. Thus,
Ignatius’ theology is an example of what I am calling “soft distinction.” He nowhere
seems concerned with defining how they are distinct, but neither does he claim that they
are the same.
Polycarp

Polycarp’s Epistle to the Philippians48 and the Martyrdom of Polycarp49 do not
offer extended reflection on the relationship between the Father and the Son. The Epistle
to the Philippians uses what appear to be stock phrases when speaking of the Father and
Son. At multiple points, he speaks of “God and Christ” or “God and our Lord.”50 In

Ignatius uses “Father and Son” far more frequently and consistently than the author of 1
Clement. Thus, we have in Ignatius much more of a Father-Son distinction than 1 Clement.
47

48
Polycarp’s Epistle seems to have functioned as a cover letter attached to the collection of
Ignatius’ letters that he was sending to the Philippians. Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 24:324–5. There is
a chance that it is actually two letters of Polycarp that were combined at a later date. See Ehrman’s
discussion of the critical issues surrounding the letter. Ibid., 24:326–9. For the text and translation in this
section on Polycarp, I rely on Ehrman’s text.
49

The Martyrdom of Polycarp was written by someone named Marcion (not the infamous
Marcion). Most scholars think that the Martyrdom was composed sometime around 155 – 156 C.E. See
Ehrman’s survey: The Apostolic Fathers, 24:361–2.
50

Polycarp, Epistle to the Philippians 1.1, 3.3, 5.2, 5.3.
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addition, actions are addressed to God through Jesus Christ (διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ).51
Likewise, the Martyrdom of Polycarp speaks of glorifying God through Jesus Christ the
eternal and heavenly high priest (διὰ τοῦ αἰωνίου καὶ ἐπουρανίου ἀρχιερέως).52 The
Martyrdom does assert that Christians worship (προσκυνοῦμεν) the Son of God, which
supports the arguments of Bauckham and Hurtado regarding the worship of Christ as a
means of expressing his divinity.53 Neither of these texts is concerned with the issues that
are at the center of the later monarchian controversy, and they exhibit no concern with
defining the distinction between the Father and Son.
Didache, Epistle of Barnabas, and Shepherd of Hermas

Neither the Didache54 nor the Epistle of Barnabas55 is terribly concerned with the
specifics of the relationship between the Father and the Son. The Didache is

51

Polycarp, Epistle to the Philippians 1.3.

52

Martyrdom of Polycarp 14.3.

Martyrdom of Polycarp 17.3. See, Richard Bauckham, “The Worship of Jesus in Apocalytic
Christianity,” New Testament Studies 27, no. 3 (1981): 322–41; idem, “The Throne of God and the
Worship of Jesus,” in Jewish Roots of Christological Monotheism (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 43–69; idem, “The
Worship of Jesus in Early Christianity,” in Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies
on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008), 127–51;
idem, “The Divinity of Jesus Christ in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian
Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2009), 15–36; Larry W. Hurtado, “New Testament
Christology: A Critique of Bousset’s Influence,” Theological Studies 40, no. 2 (1979): 306–17; idem, One
God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1988); idem, Lord Jesus Christ.
53

54
The Didache was probably compiled sometime around 110 – 120 C.E., although Niederwimmer
argues that the source material used probably dates from the end of the first century. Kurt Niederwimmer,
The Didache: A Commentary, Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 52–53. He also argues that the compiler of the document “is no
‘theologian.’ It would be foolish to attempt to derive the complete teaching or views of the Didachist from
the Didache.” Ibid., 2.
55

We know virtually nothing about the author of this letter, which is more of a treatise fit into the
epistolary form. Barnard argues that it was written “very early in the reign of Hadrian.” L. W. Barnard,
“The Date of the Epistle of Barnabas: A Document of Early Egyptian Christianity,” The Journal of
Egyptian Archaeology 44 (1958): 107. Ehrman is not as confident that we can date it with as much
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overwhelmingly concerned with Christian praxis and gives almost no information about
the relationship between the Father and the Son. At one point, however, the Didache does
refer to God as δεσπότης; but there is not enough of a pattern to discern if the author of
the Didache was using it in a manner similar to 1 Clement.56 The Didache also uses the
term Father, but it does this without correlating it to Son.57 Even more interesting is the
fact that when the Didachist uses “Father” in the Eucharistic section in Didache 9, he
refers to Jesus as the child (παῖς) of the Father.58 In addition to this the Didache twice
states that baptism is to be “in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.”59
These baptismal formulae are not explicated, and the author of the Didache does not
address the relationship between Father, Son, and Spirit.
The Epistle of Barnabas is mostly concerned with the relationship between
Christianity and Judaism and contains a “virulently anti-Jewish” message.60 The Epistle
of Barnabas does identify the Lord [Jesus] or the Son as the one to whom God spoke at
the creation of humans, when he said, “Let us make humans according to our image and
likeness.”61 The Epistle of Barnabas also speaks of the Son returning to earth.62 Even

specificity and places it sometime in the broad period between 70 – 135 C.E., though probably at the later
end of this spectrum. Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 25:6–8.
56

Didache 10.3.

57

Didache 1.5.

58

The Didachist continues to call Jesus the child in Didache 10.

Didache 7.1, 7.3. The formulas are almost exactly the same. In Eharman’s edition of the text,
7.1 reads, εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος.
59

60

Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 25:3.

61

Epistle of Barnabas 5.5, 6.12. At 5.5, God is said to have spoken to the Lord, while at 6.12, he is
said to have spoken to the Son. Given the putative Alexandrian provenance of the Epistle of Barnabas, this
comment could show an early Christian Alexandrian focus on this verse in the creation narrative.
62

Epistle of Barnabas 15.5.
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more striking, however, is the Epistle of Barnabas’ strong correlation between Father and
Jesus as Son of God.63 The Epistle of Barnabas addresses the question of the visibility of
the Son of God and seems to suggest that prior to the incarnation, the Son was invisible.64
Like the Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas is
predominantly concerned with praxis and holiness.65 It yields very little data about the
relationship between the Father and the Son because it scarcely mentions the Son at all.66
Although it is not concerned with propounding a developed doctrine of God and Christ, it
does bear the marks of monotheistic piety in at least one place. The first Mandate exhorts
the readers as follows:
First of all, believe that God is one, who created all things and set them in order,
and made out of what did not exist everything that is, and who contains all things
but is himself alone uncontained. Believe in him, therefore, and fear him, and
fearing him, exercise self-control. Observe these things, and you will cast off all
evil from yourself and will put on every virtue of righteousness and will live to
God, if you observe this commandment.67

63

Epistle of Barnabas 12.8-10. The author does not clarify the implications of this Father-Son
correlation, but he makes it very strongly here. See also 7.2 and 7.9 where the Epistle speaks of the
suffering of the Son of God.
64

Epistle of Barnabas 5.8-12. This is a marked contrast to the (probably later) theology of Justin,
who claimed that it was the Son who was visible in all of the Old Testament theophanies.
65
The dating of the Shepherd of Hermas is quite difficult. Carolyn Osiek writes, “Though there is
no consensus on dating, the majority of scholars would situate the writing in the first half of the second
century.” Carolyn Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas: A Commentary, Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical
Commentary on the Bible (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 19. Despite the uncertainty about the
dating of the text, most scholars are confident that it was written in Rome.
66

Hauck argues that Hermas is not a Christological or theological treatise and that the best way to
understand the Christology of Hermas is through a soteriological lens. Robert J Hauck, “The Great Fast:
Christology in the Shepherd of Hermas,” Anglican Theological Review 75, no. 2 (1993): 187–98.
67

Shepherd of Hermas Mand. 1 (trans. Holmes, 505).
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The passage begins with a classic exhortation to monotheism, πίστευσον ὅτι εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ
θεός.68 Later, the Shepherd of Hermas includes a lengthy parable that touches on the
relationship between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.69 The Father creates and hands
over control of the creation to the Son, indicating if nothing else that the Shepherd views
them as distinct actors in the drama of creation. While the treatise is relatively
unconcerned with the relationship between the Father and the Son, it clearly asserts a
monotheistic stance in its limited theological material. Osiek highlights the background in
Hellenistic Judaism of the assertion that God created all things out of nothing.70 On the
whole, the Didache, the Epistle of Barnabas, and the Shepherd of Hermas are not
concerned with developing a technical doctrine of God or the Father’s relationship to the
Son. The hints of distinction between Father and Son are faint, especially when compared
to their emphases on praxis and ethical living.
Epistle to Diognetus

Although the Epistle to Diognetus was probably written at the end of the second
century or the beginning of the third, it has some interesting continuities with the earlier
second-century texts and is useful for this overview.71 The author of the Epistle writes
concerning the place of Christians in the world,

68

Osiek notes that this strong affirmation of monotheism made this passage appealing for later
heresiologists. Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas, 103.
69

Shepherd of Hermas Parable 5.1-6.

70

Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas, 103.

71

Ehrman suggests that because of the style and content, a date in the middle of the second
century is probable. He even suggests that it might be one of the earliest apologies we possess. Ehrman,

46
On the contrary, the omnipotent Creator of all, the invisible God himself,
established among humans the truth and the holy, incomprehensible word from
heaven and fixed it firmly in their hearts, not, as one might imagine, by sending
them some subordinate, or angel or ruler or one of those who manage earthly
matters, or one of those entrusted with the administration of things in heaven, but
the Designer and Creator of the universe himself, by whom he created the
heavens… this one he sent to them.72
This passage refers to the truth and Word as Designer (τεχνίτην) and Creator
(δημιουργόν), language that 1 Clement used to describe the Father.73 The author later
uses almost the same language to refer to God, calling him Master (δεσπότης) and
Creator of the universe (δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων).74 It is clear from these two closely
related passages that the author views both God and the Word as sharing in the work of
creation. The author also writes that the Son was sent as God (ὡς θεόν).75 Despite using
such language for the Word, the author of the Epistle still preserves some distinction
between God and the Word. God is distinguished as invisible (ἀόρατος) and the Creator
of all (παντοκτίστης or δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων), a different term for creator than that used
for the Word. The Epistle to Diognetus does identify the Word and Son and state that the
Father sent the Word to whom he entrusted his mystery.76 In the Epistle to Diognetus,
then, we see some means of distinguishing the Father from the Son; but there is nothing
like a developed, technical means of distinguishing them. This is still soft distinction.

The Apostolic Fathers, 25:127. We know very little about the author of this letter or even about whether the
named recipient, Diognetus, was real or fictional.
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Epistle to Diognetus 7.2 (trans. Holmes, 705-7).
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In this section, the author does not use the terms Father or Son; and I use them here only for the
sake of clarity and continuity with my other discussions.
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Melito

Since its discovery in the early twentieth century, the majority of scholars have
held that the Peri Pascha was the work of Melito of Sardis. This is still the predominant
view, although at least one scholar opposes it.77 The traditional date for the text is
sometime between 160 and 170 C.E.78 Some scholars have borrowed Harnack’s phrase,
“naïve modalism,” to describe the theology of Peri Pascha.79 As with Ignatius, my
judgment against the use of the phrase “naïve modalism” still stands. Properly
understood, modalism (or monarchianism) is an intentional identification of the Father
and Son, not a position one accidentally adopts. What we see in the Peri Pascha is not
modalism per se but a lack of concern to distinguish the Father and Son.
The following passages illustrate the aspects of the Peri Pascha that lead scholars
to classify it as “naively” modalist. Speaking of the Son, Melito writes,
For he is all things: inasmuch as he judges, Law; inasmuch as he teaches, Word;
inasmuch as he saves, Grace; inasmuch as he begets, Father; inasmuch as he is
begotten, Son; inasmuch as he suffers, Sheep; inasmuch as he is buried, Man;
77
For an alternative theory, see the work of Lynn Cohick. Cohick notes that none of the text given
in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History is present in the Peri Pascha. Cohick addresses other information, such
as the dating of the archaeological finds of the synagogue in Sardis, in order to challenge the mainstream
views of the intent of the Peri Pascha. Cohick argues that Melito’s construction of “Israel” in Peri Pascha
“does not reflect any second- or third-century rivalry between Jews and Christians but rather highlights the
developing theological arguments concerning identity among Christians.” Lynn H. Cohick, “Melito of
Sardis’s Peri Pascha and Its ‘Israel,’” Harvard Theological Review 91, no. 4 (1998): 371. Cohick’s
arguments are strong enough to prove that traditional interpretations of the document are not quite airtight,
but I do not think they are compelling enough to shift the scholarly majority. See also Lynn H. Cohick, The
Peri Pascha Attributed to Melito of Sardis: Setting, Purpose, and Sources, Brown Judaic Studies 327
(Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2000). Despite her alternate arguments about setting and authorship,
Cohick still dates the text to the mid- to late second century. Ibid., 6–7.
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Stuart George Hall, “Introduction,” in On Pascha and Fragments, ed. Stuart George Hall,
Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1979), xxii.
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Stuart G. Hall calls attention to the fact that Bonner borrowed the phrase from Harnack: Ibid.,
xliii. See also Bonner, The Homily on the Passion, 27–8. Also note that Peri Pascha was not discovered
until after the death of Harnack, so he was not applying the phrase to this work. There are indeed some
striking passages in the Peri Pascha, but the label of “naïve modalism” is ill-suited.
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inasmuch as he is raised, God. This is Jesus the Christ, to whom be glory for ever
and ever. Amen.80
Immediately preceding these lines, Melito had referred to Jesus as God three times.81The
most striking detail of this passage is that Melito calls Christ Father, “inasmuch as he
begets” (καθ’ ὃ γεννᾷ πατήρ). Part of the difficulty with this passage is that Melito does
not clarify what exactly the Son begets. The later monarchian writings claim that the
Father became his own Son; but nothing that specific is being said here.82 Nevertheless, it
is jarring that Melito calls Christ “Father.”
When Melito speaks of the crucifixion, he plainly asserts that “the Sovereign has
been insulted; the God has been murdered” (ὁ δεσπότης ὕβρισται· ὁ θεὸς πεφόνευται).83
Melito’s use of δεσπότης here does not follow the pattern of earlier authors like Clement
of Rome, who consistently used δεσπότης to refer to God. Melito’s use of δεσπότης
shows no such consistency. He writes, “This is the cry, Israel, which you should have
made to God: ‘Sovereign, if indeed your Son had to suffer, and this is your will, then let
him suffer, but not by me” (Ὦ Δέσποτα, εἰ καὶ ἔδει σου τὸν υἱὸν παθεῖν καὶ τοῦτό σου τὸ
θέλημα, πασχέτω δή, ἀλλὰ ὑπ΄ ἐμοῦ μή).84 In this passage, Melito clearly uses δέσποτα to
refer to the Father. Shortly following this passage, Melito writes, “O lawless Israel, what
is this unprecedented crime you committed, thrusting your Lord among unprecedented
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Melito, Peri Pascha 9-10 (trans. and Greek from Melito, On Pascha and Fragments, ed. and
trans. Stuart George Hall, Oxford Early Christian Texts [Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford
University Press, 1979], 6–7).
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Melito, Peri Pascha 7-8.
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See, for example, Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 10.1.
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Melito, Peri Pascha 96 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 54-5).
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Melito, Peri Pascha 76 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 40-1). Italics in original.
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sufferings, your Sovereign, who formed you, who made you, who honoured you, who
called you ‘Israel’” (καινοῖς ἐμβαλών σου τὸν κύριον πάθεσιν, τὸν δεσπότην σου…)?85
Here Melito uses both δεσπότης and κύριος to refer to the one being crucified.
Presumably Melito is referring to Jesus, but even his usage here is not entirely clear. For
Melito, these titles do not serve to distinguish the Father and Son. In fact, Melito is
attempting to depict a relationship as close as possible between the Father and Son. In
Melito’s argument against Israel, it is advantageous for him to depict Israel as inflicting
“unprecedented sufferings” on the very God who called them Israel.86 Melito’s polemical
point is that the Jews perpetrated this perfidy on their own God. It is unclear if Melito
even felt that there was a need to distinguish the Father and Son; but if the need for
distinction was on his radar, such a need was passed over in favor of his more immediate
polemical purpose.
Raniero Cantalamessa has drawn attention to two passages in Peri Pascha that are
relevant for our further discussion of monarchianism. First, in Melito’s discussion of
what the Pascha is, he writes, “Learn therefore who is the suffering one, and who shares
the suffering of the suffering one, and why the Lord is present on the earth to clothe
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Melito, Peri Pascha 81 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 44-5).

Cohick has argued that Melito’s “Israel” is a rhetorical construction to help form the identity of
Christians. Cohick, “Melito of Sardis’s Peri Pascha and Its ‘Israel’”; Lynn H. Cohick, “Melito’s Peri
Pascha: Its Relationship to Judaism and Sardis in Recent Scholarly Discussion,” in Evolution of the
Synagogue: Problems and Progress, ed. Howard Clark Kee and Lynn H. Cohick (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity
Press International, 1999), 123–40. Other scholars have highlighted the possibility of real interaction
between Jews and Christians on the ground in Sardis. See, for example, Robert L. Wilken, “Melito, the
Jewish Community at Sardis, and the Sacrifice of Isaac,” Theological Studies 37, no. 1 (1976): 53–69. Still
others warn that we do not possess enough data to draw grand conclusions about Melito or his relationship
to Jews in Sardis. See David Satran, “Anti-Jewish Polemic in the Peri Pascha of Melito of Sardis: The
Problem of Social Context,” in Contra Iudaeos, ed. Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa, Texts and Studies in
Medieval and Early Modern Judaism 10 (Tubingen: Mohr, 1996), 49–58.
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himself with the suffering one and carry him off to the heights of heaven.”87 Second, in a
passage referring to Christ, Melito writes,
It is he who, coming from heaven to the earth because of the suffering one, and
clothing himself in that same one through a virgin’s womb, and coming forth a
man, accepted the passions of the suffering one through the body which was able
to suffer, and dissolved the passions of the flesh; and by the Spirit which could
not die he killed death the killer of men.88
Cantalamessa argues that Melito is correcting a Valentinian understanding of sympatheia
here.89 More interesting for the current study, however, is that Melito’s position in these
passages resembles psilanthropism—at least superficially—and that Melito uses the
language of compassion that shows up a few decades later in Adversus Praxean. The
passage from Peri Pascha 66 clarifies Melito’s statements in 46. Christ is the one who
comes from heaven and clothes himself in the suffering one. He is the one who shares in
suffering—not the Father, as Tertullian’s opponents would later argue. Furthermore,
Melito’s position is not the same as that of the psilanthropists, who argued that Jesus was
a mere man upon whom Christ descended at some point in his life (often at his baptism in
the Jordan).90 Melito argues that Christ clothed himself in the suffering one in the virgin’s

Melito, Peri Pascha 46 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 22-5): “μάθετε οὖν τίς ὁ πάσχων, καὶ τίς ὁ
τῷ πάσχοντι συμπαθῶν, καὶ διὰ τί πάρεστιν ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἵνα τὸν πάσχοντα ἀμφιασάμενος ἅρπάσῃ
εἰς τὰ ὕψηλα τῶν οὐρανῶν.”
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Melito, Peri Pascha 66 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 34-5): “οὗτος ἀφικόμενος ἐξ οὐρανῶν ἐπὶ
τὴν γῆν διὰ τὸν πάσχοντα, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκεῖνον ἐνδυσάμενος διὰ παρθένου μήτρας καὶ προελθὼν ἄνθρωπος,
ἀπεδέξατο τὰ τοῦ πάσχοντος πάθη διὰ τοῦ παθεῖν δυναμένου σώματος, καὶ κατέλυσεν τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς πάθη·
τῷ δὲ θανεῖν μὴ δυναμένῳ πνεύματι ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν ἀνθρωποκτόνον θάνατον.”
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Raniero Cantalamessa, “Les homélies pascales de Méliton de Sardes et du Pseudo-Hippolyte et
les extraits de Theódote,” in Épektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou, ed.
Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 263–71.
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See my discussions of psilanthropism in the sections on Eusebius and the Refutatio in later
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womb, such that the human Jesus was never without Christ.91 So, when Melito speaks of
compassion, he is speaking of the Christ suffering with the flesh, not the Father suffering
with the Son.
In a final passage relevant for this study, Melito uses sweeping language to
describe the Son:
It is he that made heaven and earth and fashioned man in the beginning, who is
proclaimed through the law and prophets, who was enfleshed upon a virgin, who
was hung up on a tree, who was buried in the earth, who was raised from the dead
and went up to the heights of heaven, who sits at the Father's right hand, who has
power to save every man, through whom the Father did his works from beginning
to eternity. He is the Alpha and the Omega; he is beginning and end, beginning
inexpressible and end incomprehensible; he is the Christ; he is the king; he is
Jesus; he is the captain; he is the Lord; he is the one who rose from the dead; he is
the one who sits at the Father's right hand; he carries the Father and is carried by
the Father. To him be glory and power for ever. Amen.92
Melito begins this passage by ascribing the works of creation to the Son, works that in
many earlier writers were attributed only to the Father. The rest of the section, however,
offers a reasonable degree of distinction between the Father and Son. The Son is twice
said to sit at the Father’s right hand. The Father is said to work through the Son. Thus,
understanding Melito as a “modalist”—naïve or otherwise—seems premature. The later
monarchians (or modalists) were actively concerned to preserve belief in only one God,
and they identified the Father and Son to safeguard monotheism. Melito, on the other
hand, does not signal anywhere in the Peri Pascha that he thinks monotheism is being
endangered. In the sections that scholars often identify as modalist, Melito’s theology is
driven by his polemic against Israel—not some proto-modalist concern to protect

Cantalamessa argues that Melito’s position here appears to be an early version of a “two
natures” understanding of the incarnation. Ibid., 265.
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Melito, Peri Pascha 104-5 (trans. Hall, 59-61).
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monotheism. Furthermore, such claims as the Son sitting at the Father’s right hand would
have been unpalatable for monarchians. What we see in Melito might be naïve, but it is
not modalism proper, for it lacks many of the major characteristics which form the core
of later monarchianism. Melito’s anti-Jewish polemic causes him to articulate a strong
and close connection between the Father and Son, and he exhibits little inclination to
outline the specifics of their distinction.

The Ambiguous Middle

Theophilus of Antioch

Scholars have offered widely divergent assessments of Theophilus’ three books to
a certain Autolycus (Ad Autolycum).93 On the one hand, Robert M. Grant finds Ad
Autolycum to be dilettantish, having a firm grasp of neither the Greco-Roman sources he
so frequently cites nor the Christian tradition to which he is heir.94 On the other hand,
Stuart Parsons argues that Ad Autolycum is a skillfully constructed rhetorical argument in
which Theophilus discredits his opponents’ sources and shows his own to be reliable.95
Whatever estimation one has of the quality of the work, it is clear that Theophilus is
concerned, like Athenagoras, with providing a strong account of monotheism. This
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Stuart Parsons argues that these three books are to be read as three separate, self-contained
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Rhetoric, and Scripture in Theophilus of Antioch’s Ad Autolycum,” The Greek Orthodox Theological
Review 53 (2008): 163.
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emphasis on monotheism, when coupled with the fact that he does not directly mention
Jesus, has caused some to argue that his theology is more Jewish than Christian.96 Despite
his his omission of any mention of Jesus by name, three aspects of this theology are of
interest for my current work: his articulation of monotheism, his Logos theology, and his
Sophia theology.
Throughout Ad Autolycum Theophilus repeats his claim that the prophets
proclaim that there is only one God. Although he argues that the pagan philosophers are
often misguided, Theophilus thinks they are sometimes in agreement with the prophets.
He writes, “Sometimes some poets, becoming sober in soul and departing from the
demons, made statements in agreement with those of the prophets in order to bear witness
to themselves and to all men concerning the sole rule of God (περί τε θεοῦ μοναρχίας)
and the judgment and the other matters they discussed.”97 For Theophilus, when the

Robert Grant notes of Theophilus, “The author was evidently a Christian, but as we shall show,
he was more a Jew than a Christian…. And we shall see that he was very close to what later fathers called
the school of Ebion” (“The Problem of Theophilus,” Harvard Theological Review 43, no. 3 (1950): 180).
See also the work of Bentivegna, which highlights the absence of Christ from Theophilus’ theology: J
Bentivegna, “A Christianity without Christ by Theophilus of Antioch,” Studia Patristica 13 (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1975), 107–30. Grant later goes on to employ Harnack’s terminology to argue that
Theophilus was a “dynamistic monarchian” and Judaizer (“The Problem of Theophilus,” 196). As evidence
for this claim, Grant offers a shaky reading of 2.24, where Adam is described as being created in a sort of
neutral state with the inclination for progress (ἀφορμὴν προκοπῆς). Grant comments on this passage,
“Moreover, his description in II 24 of what Adam might have accomplished is clearly modeled on what he
thinks Jesus did accomplish. God gave Adam a ‘principle of progress’ (ἀφορμὴ προκοπῆς) so that he could
‘grow’ and ‘become perfect’, and be declared God, and thus ascend into heaven, possessing immortality.
The word προκοπή was used by Ebionites to describe the ethical achievement of the human Jesus” (ibid.,
195). The perhaps insuperable difficulty with Grant’s assertion is that Theophilus does not once mention
Jesus. Therefore, we have nothing to compare with other “dynamistic monarchians” or the Ebionites Grant
mentions. Grant’s judgment is premature at best, for we scarcely catch a glimpse of the human Jesus in
Theophilus’ work, let alone anything as explicit as the sort of “mere man (psilanthropist)” Christologies
that Harnack associated with his term “dynamistic monarchianism.” Although Uríbarri Bilbao does not use
a restricted definition of monarchianism like the one I suggest, he likewise disagrees with those who judge
Theophilus’ theology to be monarchian. See Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 122–7. He does
highlight the fact that Theophilus’ use of μοναρχία is not anti-Trinitarian, and this observation accords well
with the thesis that I am advancing about the core of monarchian theology.
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philosophers get something right, they are merely imitating the inspired prophets, who
antedated them. In his discussions of monotheism, Theophilus frequently employs the
term μοναρχία.98 Unlike the later Praxeans, however, Theophilus appears to be using it
only to denote the rule of one God. There are no signs of its use as a polemical tool to
deny distinction between the Father and Son. Like Athenagoras, his emphasis on
monotheism serves as a bridge-concept between Greek philosophy and biblical faith.
Although developing a fulsome Logos theology is not Theophilus’ primary
concern in Ad Autolycum, there are a few notable passages where he discusses the role of
the Logos. His employment of Logos is often closely linked to his use of Sophia, so I will
treat the two themes in tandem. Perhaps the most important passage for these concepts in
Ad Autolycum comes near the beginning of book two. He writes,
Therefore God, having his own Logos innate (ἐνδιάθετον) in his own bowels,
generated him together with his own Sophia, vomiting him forth before everything
else. He used this Logos as his servant in the things created by him, and through
him he made all things. He is called Beginning because he leads and dominates
everything fashioned through him. It was he, Spirit of God and Beginning and
Sophia and Power of the Most High, who came down into the prophets and spoke
through them about the creation of the world and all the rest. For the prophets did
not exist when the world came into existence; there were the Sophia of God which
is in him and his holy Logos who is always present with him. For this reason he
speaks thus through Solomon the prophet: 'When he prepared the heaven I was
with him, and when he made strong the foundations of the earth I was with him,
binding them fast'. And Moses, who lived many years before Solomon,—or
rather, the Logos of God, speaking through him as an instrument—says: 'In the
Beginning God made heaven and earth'. First he mentioned beginning and
creation, and only then did he introduce God, for it is not right to mention God
idly and in vain. For the divine Sophia knew in advance that some persons were
going to speak nonsense and make mention of a multitude of non-existent gods.99
Theophilus’ use of μοναρχία is confined to books two and three. See Ad Autolycum 2.4, 2.8,
2.28, 2.35, 2.38, 3.7. Uríbarri Bilbao notes that Theophilus uses the term μοναρχία more frequently than
any of the other apologists (Monarquía y Trinidad, 105). He argues that μοναρχία is something of a
“missionary concept” for Theophilus, allowing him to build a bridge from pagan thought to Judaism and
Christianity (ibid., 108).
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Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.10 (trans. and Greek from Grant, 38-41): “Ἔχων οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὸν
ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐνδιάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις σπλάγχνοις ἐγέννησεν αὐτὸν μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας
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There are a number of notable features in this passage. The first is the apparent
inconsistency in Theophilus’ use of the title Sophia. First, Theophilus claims that the
Logos was generated “together with his own Sophia (μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας),” which
implies that they are distinct entities. Immediately following that description of their
generation, however, Theophilus uses Sophia as a title for the Logos, not to refer to a
separate being or entity.100 While Theophilus is not consistent with his use of Sophia,
other passages make it clear that he thinks Sophia is a being distinct from the Logos. In
his reading of Genesis 1:26, Theophilus interprets God saying “Let us” as God speaking
to Sophia and Logos, who were God’s partners in creation.101 Here, God’s hands appear
to be some sort of external actors to whom God speaks, although he still does not make
clear the manner of their distinction or connection. In the clearest of the passages where
he distinguishes Logos and Sophia, Theophilus writes regarding the creation account in

ἐξερευξάμενος πρὸ τῶν ὅλων. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἔσχεν ὑπουργὸν τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων, καὶ δι’
αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν. οὗτος λέγεται ἀρχή, ὅτι ἄρχει καὶ κυριεύει πάντων τῶν δι’ αὐτοῦ
δεδημιουργημένων. οὗτος οὖν, ὢν πνεῦμα θεοῦ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου, κατήρχετο εἰς
τοὺς προφήτας καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν ἐλάλει τὰ περὶ τῆς ποιήσεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἁπάντων. οὐ γὰρ
ἦσαν οἱ προφῆται ὅτε ὁ κόσμος ἐγίνετο, ἀλλ’ ἡ σοφία ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ οὖσα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ ἅγιος
αὐτοῦ ὁ ἀεὶ συμπαρὼν αὐτῷ. διὸ δὴ καὶ διὰ Σολομῶνος προφήτου οὕτως λέγει· “Ἡνίκα δ’ ἡτοίμασεν τὸν
οὐρανόν, συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ, καὶ ὡς ἰσχυρὰ ἐποίει τὰ θεμέλια τῆς γῆς, ἤμην παρ’ αὐτῷ ἁρμόζουσα.”
Μωσῆς δὲ ὁ καὶ Σολομῶνος πρὸ πολλῶν ἐτῶν γενόμενος, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς δι’ ὀργάνου δι’
αὐτοῦ φησιν· “Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν.” πρῶτον ἀρχὴν καὶ ποίησιν ὠνόμασεν,
εἶθ’ οὕτως τὸν θεὸν συνέστησεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀργῶς χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ κενῷ θεὸν ὀνομάζειν. προῄδει γὰρ ἡ θεία σοφία
μέλλειν φλυαρεῖν τινας καὶ πληθὺν θεῶν ὀνομάζειν τῶν οὐκ ὄντων.”
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Multiple scholars have noted this inconsistency on the part of Theophilus. See, for example,
Anthony Briggman, Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit, Oxford Early Christian Studies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 126–8; Jackson Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity, Supplements to
Vigiliae Christianae 127 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 160–2. Perhaps one reason for Theophilus’ inconsistency is
that Paul uses Sophia as a title of Christ in 1 Corinthians 1:24, “Christ the Power of God and Wisdom of
God.” Thus, Sophia appears in scripture as someone alongside God in creation (Proverbs 8:22) and as a
title for Christ (1 Cor. 1:24). It was not until the end of the second century that these two uses were merged
into one and Sophia became a title for Christ. Even Irenaeus, writing near the end of the second century,
used Sophia as a title for the Holy Spirit.
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Genesis, “Similarly the three days prior to the luminaries are the types of the triad of God
and his Logos and his Sophia.”102 He does not use precise terminology, but it is clear that
Theophilus thinks that God, the Logos, and Sophia constitute three somethings.103
The next notable aspect of Ad Autolycum 2.10 is Theophilus’ use of the Stoic
linguistic categories of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός. He develops this
concept later, when he writes that the Logos “was always innate (ἐνδιάθετον) in the heart
of God,” but that “when God wished to make what he had planned to make, he generated
this Logos, making him external (τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησεν προφορικόν), as the
firstborn of all creation.”104 It is difficult to tell what Theophilus thinks the status of the
Logos is when it is interior to God (ἐνδιάθετος)—whether it is identical with God or
maintains any degree of distinction. When the Logos is made external (προφορικός),
however, it is evident that there is a distinction between the two. Again, though,
Theophilus offers few clues regarding the manner of the distinction between God and the
externalized Logos.105
In his discussion of God walking in paradise, Theophilus focuses on the fact that
God, the Father of the universe, is not confined to any place.106 This ἀχώρητος God and
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Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.15 (trans. Grant, 53). See also Ad Autolycum 1.7 and 2.18.

Despite his use of “triad,” Theophilus does not here present something like a developed
doctrine of the Trinity. Immediately after his use of triad, Theophilus claims that a human can be added to
the triad to make a tetrad. See Grant’s discussion of this matter at, “The Problem of Theophilus,” 188.
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the complexity here. See Carl Curry, “The Theogony of Theophilus,” Vigiliae Christianae 42, no. 4 (1988):
321.
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Father of the universe is not present in any place, including paradise. Instead, the Logos is
present in paradise in the role of the Father and Lord of all. Theophilus then discusses the
voice that Adam heard in the garden, writing, “what is the ‘voice’ but the Logos of God,
who is also his Son?”107 Theophilus’ equation of Logos and Son here is noteworthy, for
this is the only place it occurs in Ad Autolycum. Furthermore, even when he refers to the
Son, he does not correlate the term with Father. The Father is Father of the universe (τῶν
ὅλων), but he is nowhere said to be Father of the Son. Thus, in Theophilus’ theology, the
Fatherhood of God denotes his role as creator and is not connected to the title Son, which
occurs only once.
In Theophilus’ three books Ad Autolycum, there are some signs that he views the
Logos as somehow distinct from God. He can speak of Logos and Sophia as members of
a triad, and he can speak of the Logos as external to God, at least for the work of creation.
At the same time, however, it is clear that carefully articulating the manners of unity and
distinction between God and the Logos is not something that concerns Theophilus. He is
far more concerned to present a strong picture of monotheism by employing texts from
both the Old Testament and pagan philosophical writers. This collection of characteristics
leaves Theophilus’ Ad Autolycum somewhere in the ambiguous middle when it comes to
articulating the distinction between the Father and Son.
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Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.22 (Greek and trans., Grant, 62-63): φωνὴ δὲ τί ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ ἢ
ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν καὶ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ;
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Irenaeus

John Behr asserts that disputants on both sides of the monarchian controversy
were developing the theology of Irenaeus. Regarding the Refutatio omnium haeresium, he
writes, “Despite the fact that this book is our primary source for determining their
theology, enough is indicated to suggest that Zephyrinus and Callistus were maintaining
the style of theology developed by Irenaeus…. The final protagonist in this series of
debates was Hippolytus who, in his Contra Noetum and other undisputed works,
developed a more Irenaean theology.”108 Behr does not specify how each of the parties
develops Irenaeus’ theology, perhaps because there is no clear evidence that either the
monarchians or their proto-orthodox opponents were drawing on Irenaeus in their conflict
with each other.109
Scholars have noted the development of Irenaeus’ Trinitarian theology over the
course of his career, both within Adversus haereses, his sprawling anti-Gnostic polemical
work, and in his later and more positive theological work, the Demonstratio.110 A
discussion of the development of Irenaeus’ Trinitarian theology is beyond the scope of
this work, and I focus here on a few key passages in Irenaeus that typify his articulation

108

John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, The Formation of Christian Theology 1 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St.
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 141–2.
The lack of any clear textual evidence has not kept others from speculating about Irenaeus’
legacy in the monarchian controversy. In fact, Stuart Hall has argued, rather fancifully, that Tertullian’s
Praxeas is actually a pseudonym for Irenaeus. Stuart George Hall, “Praxeas and Irenaeus,” Studia Patristica
14.3 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976), 145–47.
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Particularly of note here are the following more recent works: Michel R. Barnes, “Irenaeus’s
Trinitarian Theology,” Nova et Vetera 7, no. 1 (2009): 67–106; Briggman, Irenaeus of Lyons and the
Theology of the Holy Spirit; Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity. Briggman has argued that Irenaeus’ theology
of the Holy Spirit underwent a notable change after Irenaeus’ interaction with the theology of Theophilus
of Antioch, i.e., in AH, 3. Not all scholars agree that the Demonstratio is the later work. See, for example,
Behr, who argues that the Demonstratio is earlier: Behr, The Way to Nicaea, 112.
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of the relationship between the Father and the Son. It is important to remember that much
of Irenaeus’ theology was developed in counterpoint to his Gnostic opponents and that
this polemical context shaped some of his emphases.111
Irenaeus accused his Gnostic opponents of introducing spatio-temporal distance
between the highest God and the less-divine members of the Pleroma and describing God
by means of analogies from human life that were not fit for such a task. He responds to
both of these trends and states regarding the Father of all,
He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, and altogether
like, and equal to himself, since he is wholly understanding, and wholly spirit and
wholly thought, and wholly intelligence, and wholly reason, and wholly hearing,
and wholly seeing, and wholly light, and the whole source of all that is good—
even as the religious and pious are wont to speak concerning God.112
Irenaeus stresses the simplicity of God to counter what he perceives as the divisions and
distance within the Gnostic Pleroma.113 Another way Irenaeus seeks to combat the notion
of any spatial distance within God is by highlighting that God is spirit. Michel Barnes
writes, “The polemical purpose of Irenaeus’s emphasis on God as Spirit is to deny spatial
language of God and His generation(s).”114 The denial of any spatial language when
referring to God and the refusal to use causative language when describing the relations
among the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit means that Irenaeus’ picture of God emphasizes
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Lashier argues that the different historical and polemical circumstances in which the works of
Irenaeus and the Apologists were composed help to explain Irenaeus’ divergence from and development of
the theology of the Apologists. Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity, 15.
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Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2.13.3 (trans. ANF 1:374).
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In his forthcoming book, God and Christ in Irenaeus, Anthony Briggman argues that simplicity
and infinity are central to Irenaeus’ understanding of God.
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Barnes, “Irenaeus’s Trinitarian Theology,” 76.
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the unity of God.115 His resistance to the fracturing of the divine he perceived within the
Valentinian Pleroma explains why Irenaeus emphasized the unity of God.
When Irenaeus is able to take a step back from his fierce argument against the
Gnostics later in his career, he gives an account of God that emphasizes that God is never
without the Son and Spirit. Scholars have noted that Irenaeus’ overarching concern to
protect the unity of God against the Gnostics seems to have prevented him from
developing a “separate category approximating ‘person.’”116 Although Irenaeus does not
have any technical term to denote the distinct identities of the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, the Trinitarian nature of this thought is evident. In a passage near the beginning of
the Demonstratio, Irenaeus describes the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in a way that
makes it clear that are all divine and have distinct, yet intertwined, roles in the economy.
He writes,
Thus then there is shown forth One God, the Father, not made, invisible, creator
of all things; above whom there is no other God, and from whom there is no other
God. And, since God is rational, therefore by (the) Word He created the things
that were made; and God is Spirit, and by (the) Spirit He adorned all things: as
also the prophet says: By the word of the Lord were the heavens established, and
by his spirit all their power. Since then the Word establishes, that is to say, gives
body and grants the reality of being, and the Spirit gives order and form to the
diversity of the powers; rightly and fittingly is the Word called the Son, and the
Spirit the Wisdom of God. Well also does Paul His apostle say: One God, the
Father, who is over all and through all and in us all. For over all is the Father;
and through all is the Son, for through Him all things were made by the Father;
and in us all is the Spirit, who cries Abba Father, and fashions man into the
likeness of God. Now the Spirit shows forth the Word, and therefore the prophets
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Irenaeus does speak about the generation of the Son at Adversus haereses 2.28.6, but there he is
critiquing his opponents for thinking that they can describe the generation of the Son using human
analogies. The Son’s generation, argues Irenaeus, is indescribable and ought not be fit into the mold of
human analogies.
Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity, 209. Michel Barnes writes, “Here it may be useful to make an
apparently minor point about Irenaeus’s Trinitarian theology: it has no word to answer ‘two (or three)
what?’” (“Irenaeus’s Trinitarian Theology,” 84).
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announced the Son of God; and the Word utters the Spirit, and therefore is
Himself the announcer of the prophets, and leads and draws man to the Father.117
Irenaeus offers a rendition of the regula fidei immediately following this passage which
further clarifies that he views the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as having distinct
identities, even if he does not develop the technical terminology needed to give a strong
account of this distinction.118 Irenaeus’ statements of the equal divinity of the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit are stronger and more definite than most of his predecessors and
contemporaries. The exigencies of his opposition to the Gnostics did not require him to
develop a clear means of distinguishing the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Within his
specific polemical context, Irenaeus developed a theology that was strong on articulating
the unity of God and but did not focus on articulating the distinction among Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit.119 Although he occasionally offers means for distinguishing Father, Son,
and Spirit, they are never particularly clear or precise.
Clement of Alexandria

Clement of Alexandria exhibits a desire to show both that the Father and Son are
one and that they are also distinguished from each other. As I have demonstrated in this
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Irenaeus, Demonstratio 5 (trans. Irenaeus, St. Irenaeus: The Demonstration of the Apostolic
Preaching, trans. J. Armitage Robinson [London: S.P.C.K., 1920], 73–4).
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Irenaeus, Demonstratio 6. As is to be expected, Irenaeus structures the regula around the three
Trinitarian “persons” and lists the distinct activities of each. For example, the Son or Word was manifested
in the theophanies. He is the one through whom all things were made, the one who became visible and
tangible in the incarnation, etc.
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In an email conversation, both Briggman and Lashier noted that Irenaeus does not develop
strong categories for distinguishing Father, Son, and Spirit and that he focuses on their unity and equality.
They do, however, note that Irenaeus has something of a functional hierarchy among the three in the
economy. This is one of the ways Irenaeus can speak of distinction.
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chapter, the former impulse was shared by nearly every Christian writer of the second
century, whereas the latter was given considerable attention only by a few. Clement’s
exposition of the unity and distinction of the Father and Son, though original and novel at
times, is ambiguous. He holds both in tension, but he is never able to reconcile them with
sufficient clarity.
A number of scholarly treatments of Clement’s understanding of the Father/Son
relationship have focused on Clement’s Logos theology and on a fragment from
Photius.120 Because of the questionable authenticity of this fragment and the evocative
nature of other passages that are almost certainly authentic, I have chosen to bracket
questions related to Photius’ fragment.121 Instead, I focus my attention on passages from
the Excerpta ex Theodoto (Excerpta) wherein Clement discusses questions of unity and
distinction between the Father and Son.122 I will supplement these core passages with
relevant texts from his other works.
Before assessing Clement’s description of the relationship between the Father and
Son, we must first consider the ways in which Clement speaks about the Father. One of
the most important aspects of Clement’s understanding of the Father is the Father’s
On this, see Edwards’ disagreement with Casey about whether Clement held that there were
two distinct Logoi. R. P. Casey, “Clement and the Two Divine Logoi,” Journal of Theological Studies 25
(1924): 43–56; M. J. Edwards, “Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos,” Vigiliae
Christianae 54, no. 2 (2000): 159–77.
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Such considerations would, of course, be necessary in a fuller treatment of Clement’s
Trinitarian theology. The goal of the present section is not to give an exhaustive account of Clement’s
Trinitarian theology. Instead, I intend to outline the contours of his understanding of the relationship
between the Father and Son.
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In the Excerpta, Clement both reproduces Valentinian thought and gives his own. As will
become clear in my later analysis, not all scholars agree on which sections belong to Valentinians and
which belong to Clement. For a discussion of these matters, see the introductions in the editions of both
Casey and Sagnard: Clement, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria, ed. Robert Pierce Casey
(London: Christophers, 1934); Clement, Extraits de Théodote, ed. François Louis Marie Matthiew Sagnard,
Sources chrétiennes 23 (Paris: Cerf, 1948).
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absolute transcendence.123 In the first book of the Paedagogus (Paed.), Clement says,
“God is one, and He is more than one, beyond unity.”124 John 1:18 is a very important
verse for Clement’s understanding of both the Father’s transcendence and the Son’s
relation to the Father. In book five of the Stromata (Strom.) Clement reflects on this verse
and the difficulty of speaking about God. He writes:
No one can rightly express Him wholly. For on account of His greatness He is
ranked as the All, and is the Father of the universe. Nor are any parts to be
predicated of Him. For the One is indivisible; wherefore also it is infinite, not
considered with reference to inscrutability, but with reference to its being without
dimensions, and not having a limit. And therefore it is without form and name.
And if we name it, we do not do so properly, terming it either the One, or the
Good, or Mind, or Absolute Being, or Father, or God, or Creator, or Lord. We
speak not as supplying His name; but for want, we use good names, in order that
the mind may have these as points of support, so as not to err in other respects.
For each one by itself does not express God; but all together are indicative of the
power of the Omnipotent. For predicates are expressed either from what belongs
to things themselves, or from their mutual relation. But none of these are
admissible in reference to God. Nor any more is He apprehended by the science
of demonstration. For it depends on primary and better known principles. But
there is nothing antecedent to the Unbegotten.125
For a discussion of the philosophical and Philonic background of Clement’s understanding of
the transcendence of God, see chapters one and two of Raoul Mortley, Connaissance religieuse et
herméneutique chez Clément d’Alexandrie (Leiden: Brill, 1973). Eric Osborn also deals with Clement’s
understanding of God’s transcendence. See especially his Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122–6. Daniélou’s treatment of the transcendence of God in the
broader milieu surrounding Clement is also useful: Jean Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic
Culture, trans. John Austin Baker, History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea 2
(London: Longman & Todd, 1973), 323–43.
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Clement, Paed. 1.8.71 (trans. FC 23:63): “ἓν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν
μονάδα.” Greek from Clement, Le Pédagogue, ed. Henri-Irénée Marrou and Marguerite Harl, vol. 1,
Sources chrétiennes 70 (Paris: Cerf, 1960), 236. Just before this quotation, Clement quotes Jesus’ words in
John 17:21-23, thus, making it clear that Clement is referring to the Father when he here says “God.”
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Clement, Strom. 5.12.81.5 – 5.12.82.3 (trans. ANF 2:464): οὐκ ἂν δὲ ὅλον εἴποι τις αὐτὸν
ὀρθῶς· ἐπὶ μεγέθει γὰρ τάττεται τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἔστι τῶν ὅλων πατήρ. οὐδὲ μὴν μέρη τινὰ αὐτοῦ λεκτέον·
ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ τὸ ἕν, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον, οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀδιεξίτητον νοούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ
ἀδιάστατον καὶ μὴ ἔχον πέρας, καὶ τοίνυν ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ ἀνωνόμαστον. κἂν ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτό ποτε, οὐ
κυρίως καλοῦντες ἤτοι ἓν ἢ τἀγαθὸν ἢ νοῦν ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν ἢ πατέρα ἢ θεὸν ἢ δημιουργὸν ἢ κύριον, οὐχ ὡς
ὄνομα αὐτοῦ προφερόμενοι λέγομεν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀπορίας ὀνόμασι καλοῖς προσχρώμεθα, ἵν’ ἔχῃ ἡ διάνοια, μὴ
περὶ ἄλλα πλανωμένη, ἐπερείδεσθαι τούτοις. οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον μηνυτικὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἀθρόως
ἅπαντα ἐνδεικτικὰ τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δυνάμεως· τὰ γὰρ λεγόμενα ἢ ἐκ τῶν προσόντων αὐτοῖς ῥητά
ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως, οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων λαβεῖν οἷόν τε περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ
λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται, τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν
προϋπάρχει. Greek from Clement, Clemens Alexandrinus: Stromata Buch I-VI, ed. Otto Stählin and
125

64

In this passage, Clement uses a number of apophatic terms before conceding that some
positive ascriptions can be made of God, but only as something of a crutch for human
minds. For Clement, God is beyond our attempts at description.
For the purposes of this study, one more aspect of Clement’s description of God is
illuminating. Echoing Philo in multiple places, Clement describes God as unable to be
circumscribed (ἀπερίγραφος); and this is important for one of the primary ways he
describes the distinction between God and his Son in the Excerpta.126 In the first place,
Clement writes:
Since the gnostic Moses does not circumscribe within space Him that cannot be
circumscribed, he set up no image in the temple to be worshipped; showing that
God was invisible, and incapable of being circumscribed; and somehow leading
the Hebrews to the conception of God by the honour for his name in the temple.127
In this passage, Clement uses multiple terms with the alpha-privative to denote the same
basic concept, the illimitability of God. Daniélou notes, “It will be apparent… that the
epithet ἀπερίληπτος is virtually synonymous with ἀπερίγραφος.”128 Clement employs the
same concept later in Strom., writing, “For is it not the case that rightly and truly we do
not circumscribe in any place that which cannot be circumscribed; nor do we shut up in

Ludwig Früchtel, vol. 2, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 15 (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1960), 380–1.
For Philo’s prior use of the term, see De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini 59, 124. At 59, Philo writes,
ἀπερίγραφος γὰρ ὁ θεός, ἀπερίγραφοι δὲ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ. In 124, Philo states that God has
uncircumscribed wealth (ἀπερίγραφον πλοῦτον).
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Clement, Strom. 5.11.74 (trans. ANF 2:462): καὶ ὅτι οὐ περιλαμβάνει τόπῳ τὸ ἀπερίληπτον ὁ
γνωστικὸς Μωυσῆς, ἀφίδρυμα οὐδὲν ἀνέθηκεν εἰς τὸν νεὼν σεβάσμιον, ἀόρατον καὶ ἀπερίγραφον δηλῶν
εἶναι τὸν θεόν, προσάγων δὲ ἁμῇ γέ πῃ εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ τοὺς Ἑβραίους διὰ τῆς τιμῆς τοῦ κατὰ τὸν
νεὼν ὀνόματος. Greek from GCS 15:376.
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Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, 326.
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temples made with hands that which contains all things?”129 For Clement, God cannot be
limited or circumscribed. This assertion accords well with his apophatic approach to
speaking about God. Clement held that God was one (and even beyond unity) and that
God was beyond any human description or limitation.
For Clement, this one illimitable and indescribable God was both united to and
distinguished from the Son, who was also God. His description of this unity and
distinction is where the ambiguity manifests itself most fully. Before considering how
Clement distinguishes the Father and Son, let us examine some of the ways he speaks of
their unity. One of the primary ways Clement refers to the Son is through the use of the
title Logos, and it is precisely this term that makes Clement’s thought so ambiguous. As I
noted above, there is disagreement among scholars about the reliability of Photius’ report
that Clement taught “two Logoi.” I will bracket the questions attached to the Photian
fragment by focusing on Excerpta 8, 10-15, and 19.130
Clement, Strom. 7.5.28 (trans. ANF 2:530): Ἢ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῶς οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ
περιγράφομεν τὸν ἀπερίληπτον οὐδ’ ἐν ἱεροῖς καθείργνυμεν «χειροποιήτοις» τὸ πάντων περιεκτικόν;
Greek from Clement, Clemens Alexandrinus: Stromata Buch VII-VIII, ed. Otto Stählin and Ludwig
Früchtel, vol. 3, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 17 (Berlin: AkademieVerlag, 1970), 20. Clement’s usage of the term here supports Daniélou’s contention that Clement is using
them as synonyms.
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As I noted above, it can be difficult to parse out whether a particular passage in the Excerpta
should be attributed to Clement or to his Valentinian opponents. Sagnard clearly lays out the criteria he
uses to determine whose thought is being expressed in any given passage. See Clement, Extraits de
Théodote, 9. He has also presented the text using different indentation and font size to denote whose
position is being represented. One of the surest means to determine the Clementine provenance of a passage
is a direct statement by him in the text. He does this in one of the most important passages for my current
study, Exc. 8. After summarizing the Valentinian position, Clement counters, “But we say” (Ἡμεῖς δὲ...
φαμεν)… Both Sagnard and Casey, who have created editions of the text, agree that the sections I am
considering represent the thought of Clement. In his more recent article, however, Mark Edwards argues
that Exc. 19 cannot represent the thought of Clement. He writes regarding the content of Exc. 19, “This can
scarcely be Clement’s own opinion, as it affirms the identity of Christ on earth with the Creator at the cost
of divorcing both from God the Logos, who is not credited with any distinct hypostasis.” Edwards,
“Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos,” 174. Earlier in the article, Edwards lamented the
fact that “facile skepticism… is too readily adopted when a text proves inconvenient to scholarship,” but
such noble resistance to facile skepticism does not seem to prevent him from dismissing Exc. 19 as
unreliable because it does not fit his narration of Clement’s doctrine of the Logos (ibid., 171). Even more,
he dismisses the text as unreliable without making reference to the preponderance of earlier scholarship that
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One of Clement’s strongest statements of the unity between the Father and Son,
or, in this case, Logos, comes in Exc. 8. In this section, Clement is directly responding to
a Valentinian Logos theology based on a reading of John 1:1. In order to better
understand Clement’s rejoinder, a brief appraisal of the position of his Valentinian
opponents is in order. In Exc. 6, Clement records the key terms that the Valentinians
focused on in their exegesis: beginning (ἀρχή), Only-Begotten (Μονογενής), and Logos
(λόγος). In Exc. 7, Clement elaborates their position and writes:
Therefore, the Father, being unknown, wished to be known to the Aeons, and
through his own thought, as if he had known himself, he put forth (προέβαλε) the
Only-Begotten, the spirit of Knowledge which is in Knowledge. So he too who
came forth (προελθὼν) from Knowledge, that is, from the Father’s Thought,
became Knowledge, that is, the Son, because ‘through the Son the Father was
known.’131
In this passage, Clement’s Valentinian opponents use two verbs that denote the
exteriorizing of something from the Father (προβάλλω, προέρχομαι). This exteriorizing
of the Only-Begotten, who becomes Knowledge, is important because it reveals the
unknown (ἄγνωστος) Father.132 Later in the same passage, however, Clement speaks of
the one “who remained ‘Only-Begotten Son in the bosom of the Father’ explaining

claims that it is authentically and reliably Clementine. Furthermore, Edwards must surely search in vain for
any claim in Clement that the Logos is a “distinct hypostasis,” for Clement never uses the term hypostasis
to describe the distinction betweenthe Father and the Logos or Son. Such a specialized meaning for
hypostasis, as Daniélou notes, does not begin to develop until the next century. Daniélou, Gospel Message
and Hellenistic Culture, 367. I agree with Sagnard and Casey that Exc. 19 does represent Clement’s
thought, and I think it is a particularly important passage.
Clement, Exc. 7 (trans. Casey, 45): Ἄγνωστος οὖν ὁ Πατὴρ ὤν, ἠθέλησεν γνωσθῆναι τοῖς
Αἰῶσι· καὶ διὰ τῆς Ἐνθυμήσεως τῆς ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἐγνωκώς, Πνεῦμα γνώσεως οὔσης ἐν γνώσει,
προέβαλε τὸν Μονογενῆ. Γέγονεν οὖν καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ γνώσεως (τουτέστι τῆς πατρικῆς Ἐνθυμήσεως) προελθὼν
Γνῶσις, τουτέστιν ὁ Υἱός, ὅτι «δι’ Υἱοῦ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐγνώσθη.» Greek from SC 23:66-8.
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Clement also holds that the Father is unknown because of his transcendence. Furthermore, the
Son, as an intermediary, plays a crucial role in the revelation of the invisible and unknown God in
Clement’s schema. In this regard, he has some interesting overlap with his Valentinian opponents.
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Thought to the Aeons through Knowledge, just as if he had also been put forth
(προβληθείς) from his bosom.”133 In this one passage in Exc. 7, it is unclear whether the
Only-Begotten remains in the bosom of the Father or is exteriorized. Regardless of the
answer to that question, it is clear that it is necessary for something to go out from the
Father in order for him to be known to the Aeons—whether it be the Only-Begotten or
Knowledge.
At the end of the Valentinian excerpt, the focus shifts to the incarnation and the
relationship between the one who appeared on earth and the one who remained in heaven.
Here, the Valentinian author is commenting on John 1:14, which describes the glory of
the incarnate. Clement writes:
Him who appeared here, the Apostle no longer calls ‘Only-Begotten,’ but ‘as
Only-Begotten’ ‘Glory as of an Only-Begotten.’ This is because being one and
the same, Jesus is the ‘First-Born’ in creation, but in the Pleroma is ‘OnlyBegotten.’ But he is the same, being to each place such as can be contained [in it].
And he who descended is never divided from him who remained.134
Casey notes that the identification of the Only-Begotten with Jesus is the most striking
part of this teaching and the thing that causes Clement to be somewhat sympathetic to
it.135 Almost immediately following this statement of unity between the Only-Begotten

Clement, Exc., 7 (trans. Casey, 45 with my modifications): καὶ ὁ μὲν μείνας «Μονογενὴς Υἱὸς
εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρός», τὴν Ἐνθύμησιν διὰ τῆς γνώσεως ἐξηγεῖται τοῖς Αἰῶσιν, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ
κόλπου αὐτοῦ προβληθείς· Greek from SC 23:68.
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Clement, Exc. 7 (trans. Casey, 45): ὁ δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὀφθεὶς οὐκέτι «Μονογενής», ἀλλ’ «ὡς
Μονογενὴς» πρὸς τοῦ Ἀποστόλου προσαγορεύεται, «δόξαν ὡς Μονογενοῦς»·—ὅτι εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ἐν
μὲν τῇ κτίσει «Πρωτότοκός» ἐστιν Ἰησοῦς, ἐν δὲ Πληρώματι «Μονογενής». Ὁ δὲ αὐτός ἐστι, τοιοῦτος ὢν
ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ οἷος κεχωρῆσθαι δύναται. Καὶ οὐδέποτε τοῦ μείναντος ὁ καταβὰς μερίζεται. Greek from SC
23:68-70.
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Clement, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria, 103. The use of εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς
is particularly interesting for me because it will show up again in the monarchian controversy. There,
however, it will be used to argue for the absolute identity of the Father and the Son, not the earthly Jesus
and the heavenly Only-Begotten.
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and Jesus, the Valentinian author draws a sharp distinction between the Only-Begotten
and the Demiurge. Clement reports, “They call the Creator the image of the OnlyBegotten.”136 Thus, while they could affirm the unity of Jesus and the Only-Begotten, the
Demiurge is only an image of the Only-Begotten. Because he is not identified with the
Only-Begotten, the Demiurge is another step removed from the Father.
Following his report of the Valentinian interpretation of John 1, Clement
emphatically offers his own position. He writes, “But we maintain that the Logos in its
constant identity is God in God, who is also said to be ‘in the bosom of the Father,’
continuous, undivided, one God.”137 That Clement holds the unity of the Logos with the
Father here is unquestionable, but it is unclear exactly what Clement means when he
speaks of the Logos. Regardless of what Clement means by Logos, he immediately
affirms the Johannine claim that all things were made by [the Word] (Jn. 1:3). This
affirmation directly contradicts the Valentinian assertion that there was some sort of
disjunction between the Logos (or Only-Begotten) and the Demiurge. Later in the same
passage, Clement seamlessly shifts to speaking of the “Only-Begotten in his constant
identity” (ὁ δὲ ἐν ταὐτότητι μονογενής); so it seems that Clement identifies the two titles.

Clement, Exc., 7 (trans. Casey, 47): Εἰκόνα δὲ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὸν Δημιουργὸν λέγουσιν·
Greek from SC 23:70
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Clement, Exc. 8 (trans. Casey, 47 with modifications): Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν ταὐτότητι Λόγον Θεὸν
ἐν Θεῷ φαμεν, ὃς καὶ «εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρὸς» εἶναι λέγεται, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμέριστος, εἷς Θεός. Greek
from SC 23:72. Casey translates τὸν ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγον as “the essential Logos,” but this translation is
misleading because Clement does not use any “essence” language here. In his introduction, Casey notes
that Clement uses a novel formulation here: Clement, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria,
28. I think Sagnard’s translation of the phrase is truer to the original sense, so I have adopted it here.
Sagnard translates the phrase as follows, “LOGOS «dans sa constante identité…»” This translation
highlights the consistency of the identity of the Logos. It has the further advantage of not muddying the
waters by introducing semi-technical terminology that is not present in the Greek.
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For Clement, the Logos in its constant identity is “God in God” (θεὸν ἐν θεῷ).
Since Clement also describes the Only-Begotten using “ἐν ταὐτότητι,” it seems that
Clement would also consider the Only-Begotten as “God in God.” Shortly following this
in Exc. 8, Clement speaks of the Savior who works according to the “continuous power”
(κατὰ δύναμιν ἀδιάστατον) of the Only-Begotten.138 In the Exc., Clement often uses
“Savior” to speak about the earthly Jesus.139 In Exc. 8, then, we see Clement develop a
scheme wherein the Logos has a “constant identity” as “God in God.” The earthly Jesus,
or Savior, works according to the power of this Logos or Only-Begotten, who remains
God in God.
Regarding the novel phrase ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγος, Casey suggests that Clement
means something like the Stoic λόγος ἐνδιάθετος.140 In Exc. 8, however, we see neither
that specific terminology nor a scheme that would indicate that Clement was using the
λόγος ἐνδιάθετος / λόγος προφορικός distinction. That according to which the Savior
works is not some exteriorized word, but rather the “power of the Only-Begotten in his
constant identity.” As far as Clement is concerned in Exc. 8, the Logos does not cease to
be God in God.
At Exc. 19, Clement again speaks about the ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγος, but this time in
the context of the incarnation. He writes:
“And the Logos became flesh” not only by becoming man at his Advent, but also
“at the beginning” the Logos in its constant identity became Son by
circumscription and not according to essence. And again he became flesh when he
acted through the prophets. And the Savior is called a child of the Logos in its
138

Clement, Exc. 8 (Greek from SC 23:74).
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See, e.g., Exc. 4, where Clement uses both κύριος and σωτήρ to refer to the earthly Jesus.
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Clement, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria, 28. See also his article which
focuses on the Photian fragment: Casey, “Clement and the Two Divine Logoi.”
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constant identity; therefore, “in the beginning was the Logos and the Logos was
with God” and “that which came into existence in him was life” and life is the
Lord.141
This passage is evocative, for Clement elsewhere refers to God as the one who is unable
to be circumscribed (ἀπερίγραφος). In Exc. 8, Clement describes the Logos ἐν ταὐτότητι
as God in God; but here he ascribes something to this Logos that he denies of God—
limitability. This seeming inconsistency appears to be prompted by Clement’s argument
that some sort of mediator is needed for there to be a vision of the invisible God. The
Son, according to Clement, is the “face of the Father” (πρόσωπον δὲ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός), and
it is “through him that the Father is known” (δι’ οὗ γνωρίζεται ὁ πατήρ).142
For Clement, at least in the Exc., the distinction between the Father and Son
occurs not through the exteriorization of an interior Word but, rather, by the
circumscription of that Word in its constant identity. This Word, which should share
illimitability with the Father, becomes limited in order that the Father might be known.143
This begs the question about what happens to the “constant identity” of the Logos when
the circumscription occurs. Is this constant identity changed when it becomes Savior, or
is it able both to remain constant and reveal the Father in the form of circumscribed Son
at the same time? It seems as though Clement wants to have it both ways. Speaking of the
manifold appearances of Jesus, Clement writes:
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Clement, Exc. 19 (trans. Casey, 55 with my modifications): «Καὶ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο», οὐ
κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν μόνον ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ «ἐν Ἀρχῇ» ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι Λόγος, κατὰ
«περιγραφὴν» καὶ οὐ κατ’ οὐσίαν γενόμενος [ὁ] Υἱός. Καὶ πάλιν «σὰρξ ἐγένετο» διὰ προφητῶν ἐνεργήσας.
Τέκνον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι Λόγου ὁ Σωτὴρ εἴρηται. Διὰ τοῦτο «ἐν Ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς
τὸν Θεόν· ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ, Ζωή ἐστιν»· Ζωὴ δὲ ὁ Κύριος. Greek from SC 23:92-94.
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Clement, Exc. 10 (Greek from SC 23:80).

Mortley observes the following regarding this passage: “The incarnation, therefore, does not
lead to a change of essence but simply to a delimitation of this essence. That which is uncircumscribed
becomes limited.” Mortley, Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément d’Alexandrie, 81.
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By reason of great humility the Lord did not appear as an angel but as a man, and
when he appeared in glory to the apostles on the Mount he did not do it for his
own sake when he showed himself, but for the sake of the Church which is the
“elect race,” that it might learn his advancement after his departure from the flesh.
For on high, too, he was Light and that which was manifest in the flesh and
appeared here is not later than that above nor was it curtailed in that it was
translated hither from on high, changing from one place to another, so that this
was gain here and loss there. But he was the Omnipresent, and is with the Father,
even when here, for he was the Father’s Power.144
Clement argues that the Lord is both omnipresent and with the Father simultaneously,
that the incarnation does not entail some sort of separation of the Son from the Father. If
Clement’s logic holds, this would allow for the Logos to maintain a constant identity
while at the same time becoming circumscribed as Son.
This logic also helps to clear up a difficult passage at the end of Exc. 19, which
has drawn the attention of a number of scholars. Casey’s edition produces the passage
thus: ‘ἀοράτου’ μὲν γὰρ ‘θεοῦ εἰκόνα’ τὸν λόγον τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι,
‘προτότωκον δὲ πάσης κτίσεως·’145 Casey’s edition includes the idiosyncratic feature of
noting both “accepted” and “rejected” emendations of the text. He indicates that he has
rejected the reading of Bunsen and Stählin. Stählin’s edition of the text in the GCS reads,
τὸν <υἱὸν> λέγει τοῦ Λόγου τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι…146 Shortly after Casey’s edition of the
Exc. came out, Stählin reviewed it very negatively, taking issue with a number of Casey’s
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Clement, Exc. 4 (trans. Casey): Ὁ Κύριος, διὰ πολλὴν ταπεινοφροσύνην, οὐχ ὡς ἄγγελος
ὤφθη, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ὅτε ἐν δόξῃ ὤφθη τοῖς Ἀποστόλοις ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὄρους, οὐ δι’ ἑαυτὸν ἐποίησεν,
δεικνὺς ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν, ἥτις ἐστὶ «τὸ γένος τὸ ἐκλεκτόν», ἵνα μάθῃ τὴν προκοπὴν αὐτοῦ
μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἔξοδον. Αὐτὸς γὰρ καὶ ἄνω Φῶς ἦν, καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ «ἐπιφανὲν ἐν σαρκὶ» καὶ τὸ
ἐνταῦθα ὀφθὲν οὐχ ὕστερον τοῦ ἄνω· οὐδὲ διεκέκοπτο ᾗ ἄνωθεν μετέστη δεῦρο, τόπον ἐκ τόπου ἀμεῖβον,
ὡς τὸν μὲν ἐπιλαβεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀπολιπεῖν· ἀλλ’ ἦν τὸ πάντῃ Ὂν καὶ παρὰ τῷ Πατρὶ κἀνταῦθα· δύναμις γὰρ
ἦν τοῦ Πατρός. Greek from SC 23:58-60.
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“accepted” emendations.147 In his 1948 edition of the text in SC, Sagnard largely
reproduces Stählin’s critical text, including Stählin’s reading of 19.148 Casey’s choice to
produce the Greek text as he does is perhaps influenced by his decision in his earlier
article that Clement teaches “two logoi”—the same conclusion which leads him to posit
that ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγος in the Exc. 8 and 19 is synonymous with ὁ λόγος ἐνδιάθετος.149
The reading of Stählin and Sagnard, however, makes better sense of the passage
in its immediate context.150 Just above the phrase in question, Clement speaks of the
Savior as a “child of the Logos in its constant state (τέκνον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγου ὁ
σωτὴρ εἴρηται).”151 It seems only natural, then, that Clement would speak of the “FirstBorn of all creation” here as “Son of the Logos” instead of introducing the puzzling
phrase “the Logos of the Logos in its constant state.” The Son, Savior, or Lord is, for
Clement, the limited and knowable manifestation of ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγος, which always
remains with the Father, God in God.152

Otto Stählin, “[Rezension] Clemens Alexandrinus, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of
Alexandria 1935,” Theologische Literaturzeitung 60 (1935): 414–16.
147

Like Stählin, he thinks there are substantial issues with Casey’s text. He writes, “On peut y
noter un certain nombre d’erreurs de détail, parfois même sérieuses…” Clement, Extraits de Théodote, 50.
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Casey, “Clement and the Two Divine Logoi.”
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In his dismissal of Exc. 19 as authentically Clementine, Edwards makes no mention of the
discussion of the Greek text by the editors of the critical editions. Edwards, “Clement of Alexandria and
His Doctrine of the Logos,” 174.
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Clement, Exc. 19 (Greek from SC 23:92).
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Note the similarity of this scheme in Exc. to that Bogdan Bucur describes in Strom. 4.25.156,
which “speaks of the utterly transcendent God and the Logos as his agent. The difference between Father
and Son is very similar to Numenius' distinction between the first and the second god: God cannot be the
object of any epistemology (ἀναπόδεικτος; οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός), while the exact opposite is true of the
Son (σοφία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐπιστήμη; ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει). This difference on the epistemological level corresponds
to a different relation to the cosmos, where it is the Son who founds multiplicity: The Son is neither simply
one thing as one thing (ἓν ὡς ἓν), nor many things as parts (πολλὰ ὡς μέρη), but one thing as all things (ὡς
πάντα ἕν).” Bogdan G. Bucur, “Revisiting Christian Oeyen: ‘The Other Clement’ on Father, Son, and the
Angelomorphic Spirit,” Vigiliae Christianae 61, no. 4 (2007): 391.
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There is tension and ambiguity in Clement’s thought about the relationship
between the Father and Son as it is presented in the Exc. On the one hand, he states very
clearly that the Logos in its constant state is God in God. This would entail the host of
aphophatic epithets used of the Father, such as ἀπερίγραφος, being applied to the Logos
as well. On the other hand, the Logos in its constant state becomes Son κατὰ περιγραφήν,
seemingly interrupting the constancy for the sake of revealing the unknown and invisible
Father. Even more, Clement never clarifies the duration of this circumscription of the
Son. Is this a temporary circumscription that applies only to the incarnation, or does it
extend eternally? Scholars look for Clement to use some sort of language to signal that
the Son or Logos is a “hypostasis distinct from God the Father.”153 In the Exc. we are left
with the pregnant tension between the claim that the Logos is both God in God and limits
himself to become Son. Clement wants to affirm both the unity and distinction of the
Father and Son, but he never quite smooths out the wrinkles in his theory. Thus,
regarding the distinction of the Father and the Son, he too finds himself in the ambiguous
middle of authors in the second century.
Athenagoras

Athenagoras’ Legatio is unique among the works surveyed in this chapter. His
apologetic purpose and intended audience result in a treatise that is dense with references
from Greco-Roman literature and light on references from Jewish and Christian
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scripture.154 He does use scripture, but it is mostly to bolster the arguments he is making
on philosophical grounds. As David Rankin notes, Athenagoras probably did not cite
scripture more often because it would have had no authority for his intended audience.155
Athenagoras’ Legatio was probably composed between 176 and 180 C.E.156 The majority
of the treatise is devoted to rebutting the charge of atheism that was often directed at
Christians.
Athenagoras spends chapters four through eight addressing the charge of atheism
from Greco-Roman philosophical sources. Once he has proven that the philosophical
sources support the monotheistic belief of Christians, Athenagoras uses scripture to prove
that Christian beliefs are not merely of human origin (ἀνθρωπικόν):
Now if we were satisfied with considerations of this kind, one could regard our
doctrine as man-made. But since the voices of the prophets affirm our
arguments—and I expect that you who are so eager for knowledge and so learned
are not without understanding of the teachings either of Moses or of Isaiah and
Jeremiah and the rest of the prophets who in the ecstasy of their thoughts, as the
divine Spirit moved them, uttered what they had been inspired to say, the Spirit
making use of them as a flautist might blow into a flute—what, then, do they say?
'The Lord is our God; no other shall be reckoned in addition to him.' [Baruch
3:36] And again: 'I am God, first and last; and except for me there is no God.' [Isa.
44:6] Similarly: 'There was no other God before me and there will be none after
me; I am God and there is none beside me.' [Isa. 43:10-11] And concerning his
greatness: 'Heaven is my throne and the earth my footstool. What house will you
build for me, or what place for me to rest?' [Isa. 66:1] I leave it to you to apply
yourselves to these very books and to examine more carefully these men's
prophecies, that you may with fitting discernment bring to an end the abuse with
which we are treated.157
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David Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (Farnham, England; Burlington,
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William R. Schoedel, “Introduction,” in Athenagoras: Legatio and De Resurrectione, ed. and
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Athenagoras here lays out a web of texts that later shows up in the monarchian
controversy. Both Baruch 3:36-38 and Isaiah 44:6 would become favorite prooftexts of
the monarchians—or at least the Noetians with whom Hippolytus was in conflict.158
Athenagoras’ sustained argument demonstrates that he considered monotheism to be the
foundation of Christian belief in God, and these passages from the Old Testament were
his main scriptural proofs for this belief.
It is within this philosophical and scriptural framework of monotheism that
Athenagoras fits his understanding of the relationship between the Father and the Son:
We have brought before you a God who is uncreated, eternal, invisible,
impassible, incomprehensible, and infinite, who can be apprehended by mind and
reason alone, who is encompassed by light, beauty, spirit, and indescribable
power, and who created, adorned, and now rules the universe through the Word
that issues from him. I have given sufficient evidence that we are not atheists on
the basis of arguments presenting this God as one. For we think there is also a Son
of God. Now let no one think that this talk of God having a Son is ridiculous. For
we have not come to our views on either God the Father or his Son as do the
poets, who create myths in which they present the gods as no better than men. On
the contrary, the Son of God is the Word of the Father in Ideal Form and
Energizing Power; for in his likeness and through him all things came into
existence, which presupposes that the Father and the Son are one. Now since the
Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son [John 10:38, 14:10?] by a powerful
unity of spirit, the Son of God is the mind and reason of the Father.159
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See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.2-5 for the use of both of these passages in conjunction.
Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean notes that the Isaiah passage was a favorite of the monarchians, but he does
not include any reference to Baruch 3.
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Athenagoras, Legatio 10.1-2 (trans. and Greek from Schoedel, 20-3): Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄθεοι μὴ
εἶναι, ἕνα τὸν ἀγένητον καὶ ἀίδιον καὶ ἀόρατον καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀκατάληπτον καὶ ἀχώρητον, νῷ μόνῳ καὶ
λόγῳ καταλαμβανόμενον, φωτὶ καὶ κάλλει καὶ πνεύματι καὶ δυνάμει ἀνεκδιηγήτῳ περιεχόμενον, ὑφ’ οὗ
γεγένηται τὸ πᾶν διὰ <τοῦ παρ’> αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ διακεκόσμηται καὶ συγκρατεῖται, θεὸν ἄγοντες, ἱκανῶς
μοι δέδεικται. νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ μή μοι γελοῖόν τις νομίσῃ τὸ υἱὸν εἶναι τῷ θεῷ. οὐ γὰρ
ὡς ποιηταὶ μυθοποιοῦσιν οὐδὲν βελτίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων δεικνύντες τοὺς θεούς, ἢ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς
ἢ περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ πεφρονήκαμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· πρὸς
αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο, ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐν πατρὶ καὶ
πατρὸς ἐν υἱῷ ἑνότητι καὶ δυνάμει πνεύματος, νοῦς καὶ λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ.
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Athenagoras pointedly asserts that the Father and Son are one in this passage, which is in
accord with his earlier articulation of Christian monotheism. He also admits that there is
an apparent tension between the claim that God is one and the claim that God has a Son:
“Let no one think that this talk of God having a Son is ridiculous.” In addition to the use
of philosophical categories, he demonstrates that the Son is one with the Father because
the Son was also involved in creation. He then explains that the Son is the first begotten
of the Father (πρῶτον γέννημα), which does not imply that he began to exist at some
point.160 The Son existed with the Father from the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς) but came forth
(προελθῶν) for the purpose of creation. Athenagoras then quotes Proverbs 8:22 to
support his claims about the Son.161
Athenagoras’ presentation of the relationship between the Father and the Son,
however, is not one of unqualified unity. He writes, “Who then would not be amazed if
he heard of men called atheists who bring forward God the Father, God the Son, and the
Holy Spirit and who proclaim both their power in their unity and their diversity in
rank?”162 Thus, while Athenagoras does not equivocate about the fact that God is one, he
does recognize that there is diversity within the one God.163 Later, he repeats this

160
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Athenagoras, Legatio 10.4. Athenagoras’ use of Proverbs 8:22 in support of his arguments
about the begetting of the Son is suggestive of his knowledge of Justin. Compare this section in
Athenagoras with Justin, Dialogue, 61. Even more interesting is that Athenagoras introduces the quotation
from Proverbs by attributing it to the prophetic Spirit (τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα), one of Justin’s favorite titles
for the Spirit.

Athenagoras, Legatio 10.5 (trans. and Greek from Schoedel, 22-3): τίς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσαι
<τοὺς> ἄγοντας θεὸν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν θεὸν καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, δεικνύντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει
δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν, ἀκούσας ἀθέους καλουμένους;
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Regarding Athenagoras’ dual emphasis on unity and diversity in God, Schoedel writes, “We
shall try to show that an important reason for the phenomenon is the apologist's concern not only to stress
the oneness of God but also to set forth the pluralistic strain in Christian theism as an answer to traditional
polytheism” (“A Neglected Motive for Second-Century Trinitarianism,” The Journal of Theological
Studies 31, no. 2 (1980): 356–67). Schoedel later gives a paraphrase of what he thinks the main points of
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assertion that there is both unity and diversity in God: “We are attended only by the
knowledge of him who is truly God and of the Word that issues from him—a knowledge
as to what is the unity of the Son with the Father, what is the communion of the Father
with the Son, what is the Spirit, what is the unity of these powers—the Spirit, the Son,
and the Father—and their diversity when thus united.”164 Athenagoras has not yet made
clear the manner of this unity and diversity between God, his Son, and the Spirit; and he
has certainly claimed nothing so strong as Justin’s assertion that the Father and Son are
numerically different.165 Athenagoras uses language of origination in multiple places, and
this clarifies the distinction or diversity between God, Son, and Spirit some.166
Athenagoras once more asserts the unity and diversity among God, his Son, and
the Spirit, and he seems to employ an image that Justin uses in the Dialogue. He argues,
“We say that there is God and the Son, his Word, and the Holy Spirit, united in power yet
distinguished in rank (ἑνούμενα μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν <διαιρούμενα δὲ κατὰ τάξιν>) as the
Father, the Son, and the Spirit, since the Son is mind, reason [word], and wisdom of the
Father and the Spirit an effluence like light from fire.”167 Justin addresses light/source

Athenagoras’ argument were: “that is, our pure monotheism is proof enough of our piety, but our
Trinitarianism makes it still clearer that we are not atheists even if measured by the pluralistic conception
of paganism” (358).
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Athenagoras, Legatio 12.3 (trans. Schoedel, Athenagoras: Legatio and De Resurrectione, 27.).
“ὑπὸ μόνου δὲ παραπεμπόμενοι τοῦ τὸν ὄντως θεὸν καὶ τὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ λόγον εἰδέναι, τίς ἡ τοῦ παιδὸς
πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἑνότης, τίς ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν κοινωνία, τί τὸ πνεῦμα, τίς ἡ τῶν τοσούτων ἕνωσις
καὶ διαίρεσις ἑνουμένων.”
Athenagoras’ use of τάξις is, to a certain extent, a clarification of how they are distinguished;
but it leaves the exact relationship among the three unclear.
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imagery to explain the generation of the Son, but he rejects it because some were using it
to claim that when the sun sets, the light disappears.168 Justin rejects this image because
those using it claimed that the Son and angels who proceed from God as light from the
sun could be returned to God and cease to have a distinct existence. Athenagoras, on the
other hand, does not seem to be dealing with the same controversy; and he uses the
light/source imagery only to argue for distinction without a destruction of unity.
In his discussions of the relationship between the Father and the Son in the
Legatio, Athenagoras holds unity and diversity in tension. As the beginning of the treatise
makes clear, the oneness of God is foundational for him. Whereas Justin could write that
the Son was numerically different from the Father, Athenagoras always juxtaposes an
assertion of the diversity of the Father and Son with an equally strong assertion of their
unity. Athenagoras takes some steps to define the diversity between Father, Son, and
Spirit, such as using τάξις and language of origination. However he thinks the three are
distinct or diverse, he is clear that it does not destroy the unity of God. Athenagoras
seems aware of the tension between unity and diversity in the Godhead, but he does not
seem intent on resolving it. Like Clement, then, he remains in the ambiguous middle;
however, his introduction of τάξις into God, coupled with his use of origination language,
makes him closer to clearly defining the distinction between the Father and Son.

oratio de resurrectione cadaverum, vol. 2, Texte und Untersuchungen 4 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1891). Note
also that Athenagoras here identifies Wisdom with the Son, not the Spirit as Theophilus and Irenaeus did.
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Hard Distinction: Justin Martyr

Many of the scholarly works that treat the questions of monotheism and
Christology at the beginning of the Common Era are heavily weighted to texts in the New
Testament and the apostolic fathers. When Justin is addressed in these works, he is often
considered as an end-point or transitional figure.169 Hurtado writes,
I propose that the writings of Justin Martyr give us the earliest extant example of
a proto-orthodox Christian seriously attempting to articulate an understanding of
Jesus as divine in terms he hoped to make comprehensible and even persuasive
both to Jewish interlocutors and the wider culture.170
Hurtado is right: Justin does seem to represent something of a new approach to the
persistent questions raised by the tension between claims about monotheism and the
divinity of Christ. Justin’s new approach to the problem does not mean, however, that
what he is doing is somehow fundamentally discontinuous with what had come before.
As Hurtado, Bauckham, and others have demonstrated, Christians had long held their
affirmations of monotheism and the divinity of Christ in tension. Justin’s work accepts
the premises underlying the tension that the earlier writers had tolerated, but Justin
appears to have less of a tolerance for ambiguity than his predecessors.171
Thus, Justin begins to address how the Father and Son are one and how the Father
and Son are distinct. Justin is important for my reconstruction of the background of the

Hurtado, for example, views Justin as a transitional figure between “earliest Christianity and
what comes thereafter.” Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ, 642.
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For the sake of brevity, I will not here push the question of what Hurtado means by the “protoorthodox” and how one would go about distinguishing them from those who are not “proto-orthodox.” A
good place to start with these discussions is Rowan Williams’ excellent essay: “Does It Make Sense to
Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?,” in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed.
Henry Chadwick and Rowan Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1–23.
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monarchian controversy because he is overtly concerned with how the Father and Son are
distinct. While many of the other Christian authors from the second century do not give
much attention to the distinction of the Father and Son, the articulation of this distinction
comes sharply into relief in Justin’s Dialogue.172 Many of the other authors in the second
century do not even signal that they think it is a problem. Justin faces something that
makes the clear differentiation of the Father and Son important.
He employs philosophical language to clarify problems left unresolved by the
ambiguity of the language of his predecessors. The polyvalent concept of Logos plays an
important role for Justin as he seeks to articulate unity and distinction more clearly.
Scholars rightly note that Justin readily employs concepts from Hellenistic philosophy,
and this observation is often accompanied by the accusation that he thus perpetrates some
sort of pollution of pure Christianity with the foreign ideas of Hellenism.173 These
Hellenistic “fall narratives,” however, fail to account for the fact that despite the
supposed shift or evolution of the conceptual framework (from a “Jewish” to a
“Hellenistic” conceptual framework), there is still a fundamental continuity.174 Justin is

Justin’s works can be dated with a fair degree of precision. From internal evidence in the
Apologies, they can be dated sometime between 147 and 154 C.E. See Justin, Justin, Philosopher and
Martyr: Apologies, ed. Denis Minns and P. M. Parvis, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 44; Robert McQueen Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1988), 52–4. At Dialogue 120.6, Justin mentions the 1 Apology, thus
placing the composition of the Dialogue after that of 1 Apology. Marcovich suggests that this results in a
date range of 155-160 C.E. for the Dialogue: Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone, ed. Miroslav Marcovich,
Patristische Texte und Studien 47 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 1.
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decline from the pure faith of the Palestinian Primitive Community. Wilhelm Bousset, Kyrios Christos: A
History of the Belief in Christ from the Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus, trans. John E Steely (Waco,
TX.: Baylor University Press, 2013), 332.

R. M. Price has addressed the issue of Justin’s use of Logos and judgments about Hellenization.
Although his argument lacks precision at times, his main point is well taken: at the turn of the Common
Era, it is very difficult to speak of something like the pure Judaism Bousset’s argument presupposes. By the
turn of the Common Era, Hellenizing forces had been at work in Judaism for hundreds of years. Price
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addressing the very problem that was bequeathed to him by his forebears, the problem
that was at the heart of Christian theology and devotion during the first centuries of the
church: the relation between monotheism and the divinity of Christ. Given that Justin was
a Gentile who came to Christianity after a philosophical education, it is no surprise that
he uses different conceptual tools for addressing the same problems as Jewish Christians
had before him.175 The following analysis of Justin highlights both the fact that Justin is
addressing an old problem and the fact that he brings new tools and concepts to bear in an
attempt to clarify the question.
Among the many topics of debate between Justin and Trypho in the Dialogue,
perhaps the most prominent is how monotheism fits with the position of Christ in relation
to the Father.176 The centrality of this question is evident in the repeatedly expressed
concerns of both Justin and Trypho. Justin deploys his full arsenal of scriptural
argumentation to prove to Trypho that Christ is also God. Trypho remains unconvinced
by Justin’s proofs and will not admit that there is another called God alongside the

further argues that while Justin’s use of Logos was clearly influenced by Hellenistic philosophy, he was
probably also drawing some of it from the Old Testament occurrences of “word of God.” R M. Price,
“‘Hellenization’ and Logos Doctrine in Justin Martyr,” Vigiliae Christianae 42, no. 1 (1988): 18–23.
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Addressed,” Theological Studies 38, no. 3 (1977): 538–46; Michael Mach, “Justin Martyr’s Dialogus cum
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mass of “Judeo-Christianity.” Specifically, see Daniel Boyarin, “Justin Martyr Invents Judaism,” Church
History 70, no. 3 (2001): 427–61. For a broader picture of Boyarin’s project, see his lengthier treatment:
Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, Divinations (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
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Creator of all. Because the questions about monotheism and the divinity of Jesus are
central in the Dialogue, my analysis is weighted toward that work. Where there is
relevant data in the Apologies, I draw that in as well.
One God

As Justin and Trypho meet in the Dialogue, we see that they are both interested in
philosophy because it considers important questions about God. To Justin’s question
about why he would be interested in philosophy, Trypho retorts, “Why not, for do not the
philosophers speak always about God? Do they not constantly propose questions about
his monarchy and providence (καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας αὐτοῖς καὶ προνοίας)? Is this not the
task of philosophy, to inquire about the divine?”177 It is notable here that Trypho uses the
term monarchy, but it is not entirely clear how he is using it. Justin responds and says that
similar questions draw him to the study of philosophy, but he then complains that many
philosophers have failed to inquire about “whether there is one or even several gods.”178
After his account of his journey through the philosophical schools, Justin
describes a conversation with the “old man” who introduced him to Christianity. In the
course of this conversation, Justin gives his own definition of God. He writes, “God is the
Being who always has the same nature in the same manner, and is the cause of existence
to all else.”179 The old man approves of this definition of God and then states that there is
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only “one Unbegotten.”180 He also commends to Justin the writings of the prophets:
“They also are worthy of belief because of the miracles which they performed, for they
exalted God, the Father and Creator of all things, and made known Christ, his Son, who
was sent by him.”181 Already in this statement we see one of the ways that Justin will
distinguish between the Father and Son. For Justin, the Father, the unbegotten one, is
frequently referred to as the Creator of all. Later in the Dialogue, Justin will include
Christ in the prerogative of creation; but he never applies to Christ the title “Creator of
all.” It seems as though this descriptor is reserved for the Father alone in Justin’s thought.
In neither the Dialogue nor the Apologies do we see Justin dwelling on the fact
that Christians believe in only one God. The only such strong affirmation that Justin
makes in the Dialogue occurs near the beginning:
Trypho, there never will be, nor has there ever been from eternity, any other God
except him who created and formed this universe. Furthermore, we do not claim
that our God is different from yours, for he is the God who, with a strong hand
and outstretched arm, led your forefathers out of the land of Egypt. Nor have we
placed our trust in any other (for, indeed, there is no other), but only in him whom
you also have trusted, the God of Abraham and of Isaac and of Jacob. But our
hope is not through Moses or through the Law, otherwise our customs would be
the same as yours.182
In this statement, Justin is highlighting the fact that they are discussing the same God, but
the debate quickly turns to how Jews and Christians relate to this God vis-à-vis the law.
Trypho’s responses in this section of the dialogue show that the real disagreement was
over observance of the law, not whether they worshipped the same God. Other than this
passage , blunt professions of monotheism like “We Christians believe in only one God”
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are absent from Justin’s extant works. Justin does acknowledge multiple times that there
is only one “unbegotten,” but this does not appear to be motivated by his polemic with
Judaism.183 It seems that even in the Dialogue, monotheism is a taken-for-granted
bedrock assumption for both parties.
Theophanies: Visible Son

What Justin is concerned with, however, is proving that Christ is also God. This
comes sharply into focus around chapter fifty of the Dialogue, where Justin offers
Christological interpretations of the Old Testament theophanies. The interpretation of Old
Testament theophanies was a central point of contention in the later monarchian
controversy, so a thorough analysis of Justin on this point will help to provide
background for my later discussions.184 Justin belabors his point that the one who
appeared in the theophanies was not the Father. Regarding Genesis 18:1-3, he writes,
Moses, then, that faithful and blessed servant of God, tells us that he who
appeared to Abraham under the oak tree of Mamre was God, sent, with two
accompanying angels, to judge Sodom by another, who forever abides in the
super-celestial regions, who has never been seen by any man, and with whom no
man has ever conversed, and whom we call Creator of all and Father.185
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In this passage, the first notable thing is that Justin unequivocally refers to Christ as God.
Secondly, to avoid any confusion, Justin reiterates that the one seen (ὁ ὀφθεὶς) was sent
by another (ὑπὸ ἄλλου).186 Furthermore, the one who sent Christ “has never been seen by
any man.” Here, Justin has introduced his hard rule for interpreting the theophanies: the
“Creator of all and Father” (ποιητῆν τῶν ὅλων καὶ πατέρα) is never seen, never descends
to earth from the heavens.
Justin’s dialogue partners responded to his interpretation of Gen. 18:1-3 by stating
that his reading of the passage had not convinced them that there was any other (ἄλλος)
God or Lord mentioned in scripture.187 Undeterred by their response, Justin replied,
I shall attempt to prove my assertion, namely that there exists and is mentioned in
Scripture another God and Lord alongside the Creator of all things (ὅτι ἐστὶ...
θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἕτερος παρὰ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων), who is also called an Angel,
because he proclaims to man whatever the Creator of the world—above whom
there is no other God (ὑπὲρ ὃν ἄλλος θεὸς οὐκ ἔστι)—wishes to reveal to them.188
Justin unabashedly asserts that there is another God alongside the Creator God whom his
dialogue partners acknowledge. Trypho and his coreligionists were pleased that Justin
had clearly stated that there was no God above the Creator of all, but they remained
unconvinced by Justin’s argument that there was another God alongside the Creator.189
This exchange between Justin and Trypho signals one of the chief points of disagreement
that frequently recurs as the dialogue progresses. Justin again and again claims that the
Son is another God alongside the Father. Other second-century authors spoke of Christ as
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God, but they did not clarify that he was another God. Justin carries on the tradition of
maintaining the Son’s divinity, but he couples it with an equally strong affirmation that
the Son is a God distinct from, and even different than, the Father.
Justin continues to outline the details of his position despite Trypho’s incredulity
and writes:
I shall now show from the Scriptures that God has begotten of himself a certain
rational power as a beginning before all creatures (ὅτι ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν
κτισμάτων ὁ Θεὸς γεγέννηκε δύναμίν τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογικήν). The Holy Spirit
indicates this power by various titles, sometimes the Glory of the Lord, at other
times Son, or Wisdom, or Angel, or God, or Lord, or Word…. Indeed, he can
justly lay claim to all these titles from the fact both that he performs the Father's
will and that he was begotten by an act of the Father's will (ἔχει γὰρ πάντα
<ταῦτα> προσονομάζεσθαι ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ πατρικῷ βουλήματι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
πατρὸς θελήσει γεγεννῆσθαι).190
Justin had earlier simply asserted that the one who appeared in the theophanies was
another God alongside the Creator; but here, he further addresses the relationship
between the Creator and the Son. Here and elsewhere Justin argues that the Son is both
angel and God. Justin appears to be using angel functionally: Christ is angel because he is
the messenger of the Creator.191 Justin does not seem to think that the Son is
ontologically an angel. Justin also argues that the Son was begotten by an act of the
Father’s will, although he does not elaborate on the significance or manner of this
begetting.
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Justin has consistently argued that the Son is another God alongside the Father.
He repeatedly calls him God and posits that he was begotten by the Father. None of these
descriptors, however, is terribly precise. It is clear that Justin wants to place the Son with
the Father, but it is not clear what this means. Justin seems aware of the ambiguity of the
way he has described the Son and the Father, so he clarifies himself. He writes, “I wish
again to quote Moses to prove beyond all doubt that he spoke with one endowed with
reason and numerically different (ἀριθμῷ ὄντα ἕτερον) from himself.”192 In this passage,
Justin is trying to refute Trypho’s assertion that God was talking to himself when he said
“let us…” in Gen. 1:26. For Justin, the plural in those verses clearly signals that God was
talking to someone else who was present at the creation of the world. Elsewhere Justin
makes his case for the distinction between the Father and Son: “Let us return to the
Scriptures and I shall try to convince you that he who is said to have appeared to
Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, and is called God, is distinct from God, the Creator; distinct,
that is, in number, but not in mind” (θεὸς ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ τὰ πάντα ποιήσαντος θεοῦ·
ἀριθμῷ <δὲ> λέγω, ἀλλὰ οὐ γνώμῃ).193 Note again in this passage that Justin uses both
ἕτερος and ἀριθμός to articulate the distinction between the Father and the Son. Both of
these are very strong ways of distinguishing the Father and Son.194
Justin restates the distinction between the Father and Son in the strongest terms at
the close of the discourse: “It has also been shown at length that this power which the
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prophetic Word also calls God and Angel not only is numbered as different by its name…
but is something distinct in real number… but not by abscission, as if the substance of the
Father were divided.”195 Again, Justin is clear that the Son is God; but he is equally clear
that the Son is other than the Father. Unlike Ignatius or Melito, scholars never accuse
Justin of being a “naïve modalist.”
To further strengthen his case, Justin turns to the interpretation of Pr. 8:22,
writing, “But this offspring, who was really begotten of the Father, was with the Father
and talked with him before all creation as the Word clearly showed us through Solomon,
saying that this Son, who is called Wisdom by Solomon, was begotten both as a
beginning before all his works, and as his offspring.”196 By his Christological use of this
passage at this point in the debate, Justin attempts to prove that the Son was with the
Father before and during creation.197 Justin continues this line of thought later in the
Dialogue and suggests that all living beings were created by the Word.198 Not only has
Justin argued that the Son was present with the Father in creation, but he has also given
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the Son (or Word) a role in the act of creation itself. One of the reasons this is so
significant is that Justin consistently refers to the Father as the Creator of all. When he
attributes the creation of living beings to the Son, he is arguing that the Son is involved in
carrying out the divine prerogative of creation. One interesting thing to note is that Justin
modifies the passage from Pr. 8:22. In the LXX, the text reads “κύριος ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν
ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ…” Justin replaces “ἔκτισέν” with “γεγέννηκε” when he is
speaking about Wisdom.199 Justin often quotes passages in the dialogue and offers little
interpretation. His laconic streak continues here, and he does not offer an explanation for
changing the verb in Pr. 8:22.200 Perhaps Justin changes this verb for the same reason he
stresses the pre-existence of the Son—to make the Son prior to and above the created
order. Justin could have also changed the verb here because γεννάω is also used in Pr.
8:25, where Wisdom speaks of being begotten before the mountains were settled.201
Justin repeats his claim that the Son existed prior to the incarnation. Trypho is
aware that Justin claims that the Son “already existed as God (καὶ θεὸν αὐτὸν
προϋπάρχοντα λέγεις καὶ κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντα αὐτόν)” before the
incarnation.202 The issue of the Son’s pre-existence continues to be an important issue for
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Justin.203 Speaking of Christ, Justin writes, “This is he who was before all things, and the
eternal priest of God, and the King and Christ.”204 Throughout the Dialogue, Justin
repeats a sort of standard formula when referring to Christ. The following is a prime
example: “We know him as the first-begotten of God before all creatures, and as the Son
of the patriarchs since he became incarnate by a virgin of their race, and condescended to
become a man without comeliness or honor and subject to suffering.”205 In Justin’s
understanding, the pre-existence of the Son serves an important function, for it is one of
the things that proves that the Son is divine. Justin makes this connection explicit on
multiple occasions: “[Christ] is God, because he is the first-begotten of all creatures.”206
Even with all of Justin’s exegetical proofs, Trypho is not swayed; and he urges
that “Christians should… acknowledge this Jesus to be a man of mere human origin (καὶ
μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἄνθρώπων γενόμενον λέγειν τὸν Ἰησοῦν).”207 Trypho’s response
shows that Justin is faced with a difficult task in the Dialogue. He must convince his
Jewish interlocutor of three things: 1) that he, like Trypho believes in only one God; 2)
that Christ is God alongside the Father; 3) that the second claim does not negate the first.
Because Trypho resists affirming that there is another God alongside the Father, Justin
spends the bulk of his time arguing in favor of the divinity of Christ. At the same time,
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however, he must prove that Christ is not the same as the Father—that what we are
dealing with in Christ is another God. The introduction of this language of alterity
implies that Justin is suggesting that there are two Gods, something Trypho would
certainly never admit.
As Hurtado and others suggest, I think Justin marks a turning point in secondcentury theology. In his dialogue (real or fictional) with Judaism, he demonstrates a new
concern to distinguish the Son from the Father. Like earlier theologians, he held that the
Son was God; and he expressed this belief unequivocally. His development, however,
came when he claimed that the Son was another God alongside the Father. In response to
his Jewish interlocutors, Justin articulated the alterity of the Father and the Son more
strongly than any other Christian theologian of the second century. The Father and Son
were ἕτερος ἐν ἀριθμῷ. Even more, Justin is so concerned to discuss the distinction
between the Father and Son that he does not give equal stress to their unity.208 Justin’s
was a hard distinction between the Father and Son which was unparalleled in the second
century. As will become clear in my later discussion of monarchianism, I think such
strong articulations of the distinction of the Father and Son were what prompted the
monarchians to stress that the Father and Son were “one and the same.” Furthermore, it
might be no coincidence that Rome, where Justin taught, became the epicenter of
monarchianism at the beginning of the third century.209
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This is not to say that he rejected the unity of the Father and Son. It was not, however, one of
his chief concerns in the Dialogue with Trypho. Recall, for example, Dialogue with Trypho 56.11, where
Justin argues that Father and Son are not distinct in γνώμη.
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In the texts attesting to monarchianism, we are not told why the monarchians ventured to Rome
from Asia Minor. What I am suggesting is that, among other things, Justin’s strong articulation of
Trinitarian (or Binitarian) distinction might have drawn the monarchians to Rome so that they could oppose
it.
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Conclusion

Hurtado, Bauckham, and the so-called New Religionsgeschichtliche Schule have
argued that Jesus was considered divine very early in the history of Christianity.
Furthermore, they have demonstrated that the earliest Christians articulated Jesus’
divinity through the use of Jewish concepts and categories. Hurtado argues that Jesus was
fit into the Jewish divine agent paradigm but that devotion to Jesus also developed
beyond this paradigm. Indeed, no other divine agents were given such formalized cultic
worship in Judaism prior to the time of Jesus. This devotion to Jesus, argues Hurtado,
was a mutation of Jewish monotheism in the first century. Richard Bauckham argued that
the divinity of Jesus was expressed by including him in the divine identity of the God of
Israel. This move entailed ascribing to him things that were reserved for God alone:
creation and sole rule of the universe. Both note that the divinity of Jesus was not
expressed using ontological terminology. The earliest Christians, then, established the
divinity of Jesus through the use of Jewish categories and concepts.210
The so-called Apostolic Fathers took up where the earliest Christians left off.
They still maintained the divinity of Jesus and often used stronger language than the New
Testament—even using phrases like “Jesus Christ our God.”211 The divinity of Jesus
never seems to be in question in any of the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, but they are

210

A full consideration of the arguments of Hurtado and Bauckham is beyond the scope of the
current chapter. Their main arguments can be found in the following: Hurtado, One God, One Lord;
Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ; Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other
Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008).
Both have numerous articles that address the same themes, but I have chosen to list monographs and
collections of essays here for brevity.
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Ignatius, Ephesians, preface; Ignatius, Romans, preface.
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not terribly concerned to work out exactly how Jesus is divine or how he relates to the
Father. They distinguish between the Father and Son almost exclusively by means of
titles and functions, and they are not always consistent about such distinctions. They did
not explicitly address how the Father and Son were distinguished.
Melito’s Peri Pascha, written in the second half of the second century, bears
much in common with earlier Christian writings. Like his forebears, Melito considered
Jesus to be divine. Also like those before them, he was relatively unconcerned with
precisely distinguishing between the Father and Son. He also continued to use Jewish
concepts and categories as the primary means of distinguishing the Father and Son. As I
noted above, his lack of concern to distinguish the Father and Son caused scholars to call
his theology naively modalistic. His language was often ambiguous and seemed to risk
collapsing any distinction between Father and Son.
Of all of the writings surveyed in this chapter, Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho
stands out because of its strong concern to show that the Father and Son are distinct, even
different. He argues that the Son is another God and that he is distinct from the Father in
number. Justin’s descriptions of the difference between the Father and the Son offer a
sharp contrast to the other second-century theologies that did not take care to distinguish
them so strongly. Even more, while Justin uses an abundance of scripture from the Old
Testament to support his positions, he does not shy away from using Greek philosophical
concepts in a way that we do not see in the Apostolic Fathers. Athenagoras likewise uses
Greek philosophical categories to discuss monotheism and the divinity of the Son. Unlike
Justin, Athenagoras always holds the unity of God and the divinity of the Son in tension.
Athenagoras is also intent on showing that Christian monotheistic belief in God is in
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accord with the systems of Greco-Roman philosophers. In short, Athenagoras does not
articulate the distinction between the Father and Son as strongly as Justin.
Justin and Athenagoras represent the demographic shift in early Christianity that
Hurtado has discussed. Their theology bears the marks of the shift from a primarily
Jewish conceptual matrix to one that was indebted to both Judaism and Greco-Roman
philosophy. Justin employed more precise and technical language to define the
relationship between the Father and the Son than almost all of the other second-century
theologians. Justin’s argument that the Son was another God, I argue, is one of the
contexts which best illuminates the motivation of the monarchian controversy. Before
Justin, Christian theology did not carefully distinguish the Father and Son by means of
precise technical terminology. Justin’s developments, however, did away with much
ambiguity regarding the relationship between the Father and the Son: they were distinct,
even different. In his conversation with Trypho the Jew, Justin left no doubt that the Son
was another God alongside the Father. This would have problematized theologies like
that of Melito, theologies that did not carefully distinguish the Father and Son. Justin’s
theory of the alterity of the Father and Son would have also militated against any
theologies that wanted to deny any distinction between the Father and the Son. The
monarchianism that arose at the beginning of the third century was just such a theology,
and it is possible that it was a reaction to theologies like that of Justin.
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CHAPTER TWO: EUSEBIUS, CONTRA NOETUM, AND ADVERSUS
PRAXEAN

Introduction: The Beginnings of Monarchianism

The monarchian controversy erupted in Rome at the beginning of the third
century, but it does appear in any of the second-century theologies I surveyed in the last
chapter. While second-century theologians exhibited varying levels of concern to
articulate the distinction between the Father and Son, none explicitly denied their
distinction and claimed that they were the same. Nor did they seem to be defending this
distinction against those who denied it. This denial, however, is precisely what was at the
heart of monarchian theology: a denial of any distinction between the Father and the Son
in order to protect a commitment to the oneness of God.
As I have already noted, we lack any account of the origins of monarchianism.
One of the most probable explanations for its origins is that this strong affirmation of the
oneness of God and the denial of distinction between the Father and Son was a reaction
against theological developments that the monarchians perceived as endangering the
oneness of God. Of the models of relationship between the Father and Son surveyed in
the last chapter, Justin’s is the sort that could have easily provoked a monarchian
reaction. The monarchian insistence on the sameness of the Father and Son would make
sense as a reaction against Justin’s claims that the Son is another God.
Despite our lack of knowledge about the background of monarchianism, we can
imagine what sorts of theology would have troubled them, namely, those that stressed the
alterity of Father and Son. Now that I have offered this hypothesis about the theological
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motivations of monarchianism, I turn to a detailed analysis of the main texts of the period
that bear witness to monarchian theology. Unfortunately, we do not possess any texts
from the monarchians themselves.1 We are thus left with the difficult task of
reconstructing monarchian theology using only the fragmentary evidence we can extract
from hostile witnesses.
Although it is the latest of the texts I survey, I begin with an overview of passages
relevant to monarchianism in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History. He has little to say about
monarchianism itself, but his work does elucidate the state of the church in Rome at the
time when monarchianism made its appearance. Next, I discuss Hippolytus’ Contra
Noetum, which I take to be the earliest of the sources attesting to monarchiansim.2 Then, I
examine Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, which I consider to be dependent on Contra
Noetum. These two sources are the earliest attestation to monarchianism, and they show
that there was a stable core to monarchian theology. At the same time, there was also
variation and development within monarchian theology, early signs of which can be seen
in Adversus Praxean. In chapter three, I undertake a similar analysis of the Refutatio
omnium haeresium and Novatian’s De Trinitate, which give us later portraits of
monarchianism. At the close of that chapter, I summarize my conclusions about
monarchianism and reevaluate some of the major scholarly theories about it.

1

We thus have no primary sources for monarchianism. The best we can do is reconstruct their
position from secondary sources written by their contemporaries.
2
I offer a full argument regarding the date and authorship of Contra Noetum and the other thirdcentury works below.
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Eusebius

Although Eusebius of Caesarea’s Ecclesiastical History (EH) dwells at some
length on the life of the church in the late second and early third centuries, it offers
relatively little information on the varieties of monarchianism that were prevalent at the
beginning of the third century.3 His omission of details about monarchianism does not
seem to be motivated by a lack of concern for Trinitarian or Christological issues since he
lays out what he considers to be a proper view of Christ at the beginning of EH.4 Despite
the absence of any in-depth treatment of monarchianism itself, Eusebius does provide
chronology and lists of succession for the bishops of major sees during the period that
can be useful for determining the chronology of the monarchian controversy and some of
its possible antecedents.
In his discussion of the Ebionites, Eusebius states that they held a low view of
Christ and denied his miraculous birth.5 Specifically, according to Eusebius, they taught
that Christ was a simple (λιτόν) and common (κοινόν) man. Others of the same name,
recounts Eusebius, did not deny the virgin birth but nevertheless denied the pre-existence
of the Son.6 In a later discussion of the Ebionites, Eusebius states that they held Christ to

Reinhard Hübner argues that Eusebius’ silence regarding monarchianism is confirmation of his
contention that it was the dominant position well into the third century. See his, Der Paradox Eine:
Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 31. Many of Hübner’s
assertions, however, are built on dubious assumptions and chronology.
3

4

Eusebius, EH 1.2.

5

Eusebius, EH 3.27.

6

Robert M. Grant helpfully notes that this twofold categorization of the Ebionites comes from
Origen, and that Eusebius probably mentioned the second class so that he could distance himself from their
teaching. See Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 91.
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be a mere man (ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον).7 Variations on these themes will show up in later antimonarchian polemic, although Eusebius’ laconic treatment of them gives us little
information about what motivated the positions.
Eusebius uses the word μοναρχία twice in EH, and both of his uses are in
reference to works of other authors. In the first reference, Eusebius attributes to Justin a
work entitled περὶ θεοῦ μοναρχίας.8 Next, Eusebius tells us that Irenaeus composed a
number of letters to address conflicts in the Roman church. One of these letters was
addressed to Florinus and was entitled περὶ μοναρχίας.9 Eusebius reproduces a quotation
from this letter wherein Irenaeus emphasizes his connection to Polycarp, who, in turn,
was connected to the apostles. Irenaeus then repeats that Polycarp would have taken great
offense at the things Florinus was teaching. Eusebius states that Florinus was defending
the position that God was the author of evil. In addition to this letter, Eusebius writes that
Irenaeus composed a treatise On the Ogdoad because Florinus seems to have been
attracted to Valentinianism.10

7

Eusebius, EH 6.17.

8

Eusebius, EH 4.18. We now know that this treatise which Eusebius attributes to Justin was not
written by Justin. The treatise is a collection of excerpts from Greek literature arguing against polytheism
and idolatry. There is little in this treatise that makes it distinctively Christian, although many scholars
assume that it is. For a good introduction and critical edition, see Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Cohortatio ad
Graecos; De monarchia; Oratio ad Graecos, Patristische Texte und Studien 32 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter,
1990). Given that we do not know the author of the text, dating it can be rather difficult. The two major
pieces of information that inform dating the text are (1) the fact that it is cited by Eusebius, and (2) some
phraseology that seems to mimic Clement of Alexandria. Therefore, the latest it was composed was 311-2.
Given the apparent knowledge of Clement, the earliest date of the text would have been the last few years
of the second century. Marcovich splits the difference and argues that it was probably written in the middle
of the third century. Ibid., 82.
9

Eusebius, EH 5.20. Unfortunately, this letter is no longer extant.

10

Ibid. The Greek title of the work is περὶ ὀγδοάδος.
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It is striking that Irenaeus would write a letter On Monarchy to someone who was
inclined to Valentinianism. An emphasis on the monarchy or sole rule of God could serve
as a sharp rebuff of Valentinian pleromatology which included a multiplication of divine
figures who often rebelled against those above them in the hierarchy of the Pleroma.
Unfortunately, there is very little in the quotation that would alert us to the specifics of
Florinus’ teaching or Irenaeus’ response. We are, however, left with the fact that Irenaeus
wrote a letter On Monarchy to someone who was inclined towards Valentinianism, and
this is not insignificant in our reconstruction of the monarchian position.11 If the title is
indicative of anything, it appears that Irenaeus employed the concept of monarchy to
counter the Valentinian leanings of Florinus. It is also important to remember here that
Irenaeus gives no indication that the monarchian controversy had begun at the time of his
writing. Furthermore, Irenaeus was certainly not a monarchian. That he could use the
term monarchy to rebuff Gnosticism, however, demonstrates that such a use might have
been appealing a few decades later for those who wished to defend the uniqueness of
God.
Eusebius mentions a certain Apelles a few times in book five, following his
source Rhodo, and lumps Apelles with Marcion despite variance in their teaching.12
Eusebius repeatedly states that Apelles taught that there is only one principle (μίαν
ἀρχήν). He contrasts this position to that of Marcion, who taught that there were two

11
Ernest Evans was unconvinced that anti-Gnostic sentiment was an impetus for the rise of
Monarchianism. See his “Introduction,” in Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas (London: S.P.C.K., 1948),
6.

Eusebius, EH 5.13: “He said that he did not know how the unbegotten God is one but that he
believed it” (trans. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History: Books 1-5, trans. Kirsopp Lake, Loeb
Classical Library 153 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926], 469).
12
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principles (δύο ἀρχάς), and still others who taught that there were three natures (τρεῖς
φύσεις). When pressed on this teaching that there was only one principle, Apelles was
unable to defend it, but he held it nonetheless.13 Before the outbreak of the monarchian
controversy proper, theologians used the word μοναρχία to refute both pagan polytheism
and other positions that imperiled the unity of God.14
At the end of book five of EH, Eusebius provides us with the work’s most useful
information for our reconstruction of the monarchian controversy. It is contained within
another writing that Eusebius quotes three times, which he refers to as a treatise “against
the heresy of Artemon.”15 Some scholars argue that the sources Eusebius quotes in the
EH are often of more value than Eusebius’ own history or theology because his thought is
often driven by polemical concerns.16 Even in his introduction of these quotations,
Eusebius’ concern with Paul of Samosata is signaled when he accuses Paul of trying to
renew the heresy of Artemon. His animosity towards Paul of Samosata shapes how he
writes and what information he includes.

13
The problem with the teaching of Apelles seems to have been his views regarding seemingly
contradictory material in the Old Testament.

The work of Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao on the uses of monarchia prior to the outbreak of the
controversy at the beginning of the second century is very informative here. See his Monarquía y Trinidad:
El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad
Pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie 1: Estudios 62 (Madrid: UPCO, 1996). Note also the discussion of the
uses of monarchia at Evans, “Introduction,” 6–9.
14

15

Eusebius, EH 5.28.

See, for example, the rather harsh appraisal of Robert Grant: “Eusebius' accounts of the early
heresies thus possess no value apart from that of the documents he quoted or paraphrased” (Eusebius as
Church Historian, 86). See also John T. Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” in The Early
Church in Its Context, ed. Abraham J. Malherbe, James W. Thompson, and Frederick Norris (Leiden: Brill,
1998), 120–1.
16
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Scholars have pointed out that although Eusebius mentions a treatise against
Artemon, the quotations that Eusebius has preserved do not mention Artemon by name.17
There have, therefore, been numerous attempts to determine the title of the treatise and its
author. Many scholars are confident that the title of this treatise from which Eusebius
quotes is The Little Labyrinth. The main piece of evidence supporting this conclusion
comes from Theodoret’s Haereticarum fabularum compendium.18 Near the beginning of
part two of his compendium, Theodoret offers brief accounts of the heresy of Artemon
and Theodotus, both of whom Eusebius mentions. Then Theodoret states that “The Little
Labyrinth was written against the heresy of these [two].”19 Scholars have preferred the
title The Little Labyrinth because they are relatively certain that Theodoret has in mind
the same text Eusebius quotes. Although we have here no definitive proof of the actual
title of the treatise, we can be confident that it was known by this name at the time of
Theodoret’s writing.20
Although scholars have settled upon the title The Little Labyrinth for this treatise,
there is much less certainty regarding the authorship and date of the work. The most
frequently suggested authors are Origen, Gaius, and Hippolytus. Theodoret notes that
“some assume it is the work of Origen but the style [of the writing] refutes those saying

17

Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 124; Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian, 91–

18

For a full discussion of the evidence, see Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 124-

2.
126.
19

Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium 2.4-5 (PG 83.389-92). Translation mine.
Κατὰ τῆς τούτων αἱρέσεως ὁ σμικρὸς συνεγράφη Λαβύρινθος.
20

Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 126.
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[so].”21 The association of Gaius with the treatise is rather limited. The suggestion for
authorship that has received the most support is that of Hippolytus.22 Fitzgerald argues
that there are insurmountable objections to the Hippolytan authorship of this text and
suggests that viewing it as anonymous is the safest way to proceed.23 After his thorough
discussion of the problems of authorship associated with The Little Labyrinth, Fitzgerald
offers a proposal for the dating of the work. He argues that because Hippolytus seems to
be unaware of Artemon, the career of Artemon in Rome must have post-dated the work
of Hippolytus. He suggests that the work was probably written sometime between 240
and 255 CE.24 Although it appears to post-date many of the other works that attest to the
monarchian controversy, it is still of value because it gives us an alternative glimpse into
Rome during the period when the controversy was just beginning.
Between his quotations of The Little Labyrinth, Eusebius provides us with an
account of the succession of Roman bishops following Victor.25 In the Refutatio, both
Zephyrinus and Callistus are cast in a negative light and as major personalities in the
controversy. Eusebius states that Zephyrinus succeeded Victor during the ninth year of

Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium 2.5 (PG 83.392). Translation mine. ὅν τινες
Ὠριγένους ὑπολαμβάνουσι ποίημα, ἀλλ’ ὁ χαρακτὴρ ἐλέγχει τοὺς λέγοντας.
21

22

Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 133; Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian, 91–

2.
Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 133–6. “In view of these and other problems in
attributing the document to Hippolytus, it is not surprising that the majority of contemporary scholars
appear to reject Hippolytus's putative authorship and treat the work as strictly anonymous. Until a cogent
case can be made on behalf of some other early Christian author, The Little Labyrinth is best viewed as a
truly anonymous document” (136).
23

24

Ibid., 136–44.
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Eusebius, EH 5.28.
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the reign of Severus.26 The majority of Eusebius’ references to Zephyrinus are passing
mentions in lists of succession and do not imply anything about what his role in the
monarchian controversy might have been. In Eusebius’ first quotation from The Little
Labyrinth, we learn a bit more about Zephyrinus,even though the account is more
suggestive than explicit. This quotation from The Little Labyrinth merits being
reproduced in full:
For they say that all who went before and the apostles themselves received and
taught what they now say, and that the truth of the teaching was preserved until
the times of Victor, who was the thirteenth bishop in Rome after Peter, but that
the truth had been corrupted from the time of his successor, Zephyrinus. What
they said might perhaps be plausible if in the first place the divine Scriptures were
not opposed to them, and there are also writings of certain Christians, older than
the time of Victor, which they wrote to the Gentiles on behalf of the truth and
against the heresies of their own time. I mean the works of Justin and Miltiades
and Tatian and Clement and many others in all of which Christ is treated as God.
For who is ignorant of the books of Irenaeus and Melito and the others who
announced Christ as God and man? And all the Psalms and hymns which were
written by faithful Christians from the beginning of the Christ as the Logos of
God and treat him as God. How then is it possible that after the mind of the
church had been announced for so many years that the generation before Victor
can have preached as these say? Why are they not ashamed of so calumniating
Victor when they know quite well that Victor excommunicated Theodotus the
cobbler, the founder and father of this insurrection which denies God, when he
first said that Christ was a mere man (ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον)? For if Victor was so
minded towards them as their blasphemy teaches, how could he have thrown out
Theodotus who invented this heresy?27
Although all of Eusebius’ other references to Zephyrinus in EH were neutral or positive,
this reference in The Little Labyrinth suggests that things started to go awry during the
episcopate of Zephyrinus.28

26

Eusebius, EH 5.28.
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Eusebius, EH 5.28 (trans. LCL 153:517-9).
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For a classic discussion of the episcopate of Victor and the state of the Roman church at the end
of the second century, see George La Piana, “The Roman Church at the End of the Second Century: The
Episcopate of Victor, the Latinization of the Roman Church, the Easter Controversy, Consolidation of
Power and Doctrinal Development, the Catacomb of Callistus,” Harvard Theological Review 18, no. 3
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This section of The Little Labyrinth has a specific heresy in mind: that which
claimed that Christ was a “mere man” (ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον). Eusebius at first attributes this
heresy to a certain Artemon, but this quotation from The Little Labyrinth connects the
beginnings of this heresy to Theodotus, the cobbler.29 Regardless of who was actually
responsible for this heresy that called Christ ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον, The Little Labyrinth is
clear that Victor unequivocally rejected it and that he even excommunicated Theodotus
because of it.30 The Little Labyrinth’s statement about the corruption of the truth in the
time of Zephyrinus lacks any sort of specificity; but given the context surrounding this
statement, there is a good chance that this “corruption of the truth” had something to do
with teaching about Christ.
In the next quotation of The Little Labyrinth, we learn about a certain Natalius
who was persuaded by disciples of Theodotus the cobbler (who taught that Christ was
ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον) to become their bishop for a certain sum of money.31 Eventually his
guilt for accepting this illegitimate position got the better of him, and he repented before
Zephyrinus. Despite his change of heart and penance, however, The Little Labyrinth tells
us that he was either not readmitted to communion with the church or just barely taken
back into communion.32 This account of Zephyrinus from The Little Labyrinth contrasts
(1925): 201–77. La Piana’s discussion is concerned primarily with ecclesiological questions and the
growing authority of the Roman see. As a result, he does not focus on many of the doctrinal problems that
are of interest here.
Theodoret does connect the teaching that Christ was ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον with Artemon. See his
Haereticarum fabularum compendium 2.4 (PG 83.392).
29

Note again that Eusebius also accused the Ebionites of teaching that Christ was ψιλὸν
ἄνθρωπον. Whether anything actually connects Artemon, Theodotus, and the Ebionites with each other is
an open question, but Eusebius paints them as teaching the same thing about Christ.
30
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Eusebius, EH 5.28.
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sharply with what we learn of him in the Refutatio. The Refutatio portrays Zephyrinus as
a weak and servile man who is easily moved by the machinations of Callistus, but The
Little Labyrinth presents him as someone who was very concerned with proper discipline
in the church.33 If nothing else, the testimony of The Little Labyrinth regarding
Zephyrinus should make us even warier of the distorting tendencies of the Refutatio.34
Another episode in the EH merits our attention. Eusebius writes about Beryllus,
who was bishop of Bostra in the time of Origen. He states that Beryllus “attempted to
introduce things foreign to the faith, daring to say that our Saviour and Lord did not preexist in an individual existence of his own before his coming to reside among men, nor
had he a divinity of his own, but only the Father's dwelling in him.”35 Concerned bishops
then invited Origen to intervene in order to correct Berrylus. As Eusebius recounts it,
Origen reasoned Beryllus back to “orthodoxy.”36 It is interesting to note that Eusebius
here accuses Beryllus of something similar to his earlier charge against the Ebionites,
namely, that he denied the pre-existence of the Son.37

33

See, for example, Refutatio 9.7.

34
It is also interesting that The Little Labyrinth can speak of the truth being corrupted during the
time of Zephyrinus while also showing him to be a firm disciplinarian.
35

Eusebius, EH 6.33 (trans. and Greek from Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History: Books 6-10, trans. J.
E. L. Oulton, Loeb Classical Library 265 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 86–7): ...
ξένα τινὰ τῆς πίστεως παρεισφέρειν ἐπειρᾶτο, τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν λέγειν τολμῶν μὴ
προϋφεστάναι κατ’ ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίας μηδὲ μὴν θεότητα ἰδίαν
ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐμπολιτευομένην αὐτῷ μόνην τὴν πατρικήν.
36
Eusebius’ account here has many similarities with Origen’s Dialogue with Heraclides. In both,
Origen appears to have been summoned by bishops, and he functioned as something of a theological
trouble-shooter. In both accounts, Origen also wins over the errant person with whom he is in dialogue.
Eusebius himself introduces the vocabulary of “orthodoxy” here even though it was often difficult to
sharply delineate what was orthodox and what was heterodox at the beginning of the third century.
37

For this discussion of the Ebionites, see Eusebius, EH 3.27.
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Finally, and even though he post-dates Origen, Eusebius’ treatment of Paul of
Samosata in the EH is worth consideration because it illuminates some of the common
threads that run through Eusebius’ different accounts of errant views of Christ. Eusebius
states that Paul “espoused low and mean views as to Christ, contrary to the Church's
teaching, namely, that he was in his nature an ordinary man.”38 Eusebius earlier used the
same word, ταπεινός, to describe the Ebionite views of Christ.39 Furthermore, Eusebius
describes both the Ebionites and Paul of Samosata of teaching that Christ was a common
(κοινόν) man. In Eusebius’ descriptions of those who hold errant views of Christ, several
terms recur: ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον, κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον, ταπεινός. Eusebius says that both the
Ebionites and Artemon claimed that Christ was ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον. Eusebius also accuses
Paul of Samosata of trying to resurrect the heresy of Artemon. Eusebius clearly has Paul
of Samosata in his sights during the composition of the EH, and there is little doubt that
he intended to create some sort of heretical genealogy with the similarities we see in his
account. The tendentious nature of Eusebius’ account calls for caution when determining
the value of his reports on the heresies that antedated Paul.
Neither Eusebius nor The Little Labyrinth gives us any details about the sort of
monarchianism we see in Contra Noetum, Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, the Refutatio,
or Novatian’s De Trinitate. As I argue in what follows, the same impulse to preserve the
uniqueness of God probably prompted both monarchianism and psilanthropism. Thus,
although they do not mention monarchianism directly, Eusebius and The Little Labyrinth

Eusebius, EH 7.27 (trans. and Greek from LCL 265:209-11): τούτου δὲ ταπεινὰ καὶ χαμαιπετῆ
περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρὰ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν διδασκαλίαν φρονήσαντος ὡς κοινοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπου
γενομένου.
38

39

Eusebius, EH 3.27.
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are helpful. As we see it in Eusebius and The Little Labyrinth, psilanthropism can be
interpreted as an attempt to safeguard the uniqueness of God that travelled to Rome
during the second century. Calling Christ a “mere man” and saying that he was filled by
the power of God would certainly be ways of safeguarding this understanding of
monotheism. Novatian’s fixation on both psilanthropism and the later “modalistic”
monarchianism shows that these were closely related. If nothing else, Eusebius’ EH and
The Little Labyrinth demonstrate that strong views of the uniqueness of God and of
Christ’s mere humanity were already a pressing issue in Rome by the time of Victor.

The Hippolytan Question

Before addressing either the Refutatio omnium haeresium or the Contra Noetum,
two works often attributed to Hippolytus, it is necessary to outline the contours of the
scholarly discussion about Hippolytus. The nature of the questions about Hippolytus and
the texts attributed to him is such that it has a great bearing on how the works are treated.
For example, very few scholars still argue that the Refutatio and Contra Noetum are by
the same author. If different authors wrote these two works, we should expect to see
differences in style and theology. Questions of authorship regarding these two texts will
in turn affect determinations we make about the relationship between Tertullian’s
Adversus Praxean and Contra Noetum. In short, a thorough grasp of the debate about
Hippolytus must necessarily precede any attempt to locate or analyze either the Refutatio
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or Contra Noetum. Accordingly, I here highlight the key pieces of the scholarly debate
and draw preliminary conclusions about the Refutatio and Contra Noetum.40
The debate about Hippolytus extends far beyond the Refutatio and Contra
Noetum; but because they feature so prominently in the scholarly debate and represent its
major contours, I will mostly limit my summary of the debate to pieces that deal with
these works. Prior to the twentieth century, scholars commonly accepted that the
Refutatio and Contra Noetum were both written by Hippolytus.41 Since the beginning of
the twentieth century, such a claim for common authorship has become problematic.
There is a cloud of uncertainty surrounding both Hippolytus and many of the works
ascribed to him. Scholars lack precise details about who Hippolytus was, which writings
can be attributed to him with any degree of confidence, and the dating of both his life and
the works attributed to him. Scholars have presented numerous theories attempting to
make sense of the disparate pieces of data, but these theories are not plausible enough to
gain widespread acceptance. Uncertainty is regnant regarding most questions related to
Hippolytus.42
Eusebius first mentions Hippolytus as he is discussing church leaders who left
written works to posterity. He refers to Hippolytus in passing as someone “who also

40

Because questions about these two works are so intertwined, I have chosen to address them
together rather than with an introduction to each of the specific works.
41
Harnack is a good example of this position. See Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans.
Neil Buchanan, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907), 52–4, 62–3.
42

For a concise summary of the major trends and problems in Hippolytus research, see Ronald E.
Heine, “Hippolytus, Ps.-Hippolytus and the Early Canons,” in The Cambridge History of Early Christian
Literature, ed. Frances M. Young, Lewis Ayres, and Andrew Louth (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 142–51.

109
presided over another church somewhere.”43 Even here, our uncertainty about Hippolytus
is evident because Eusebius gives him no geographical epithet. A short while later,
Eusebius provides us with a list of Hippolytus’ works to which he has access. Among
these, he includes the Refutatio or Πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς αἱρέσεις.44 Although Eusebius does
not mention the Contra Noetum in this list, he does say that there are many other works
of Hippolytus that have been preserved by other people.45 Eusebius’ final reference to
Hippolytus in the EH comes during his discussion of Dionysius of Alexandria, where he
says that Dionysius sent a letter to “those in Rome” and that the letter was delivered
through Hippolytus (διὰ Ἱππολύτου).46 This last reference, despite the earlier absence of a
geographical epithet, does lend some credence to the common association of Hippolytus
with the church in Rome.
Furthermore, a statue was discovered in Rome in 1551 near the tomb of a martyr
named Hippolytus.47 This statue contained both a calculation of dates for the Passover

43

Eusebius, EH 6.20 (trans. LCL 265:65).

44

Eusebius, EH 6.22.

45

Scholars debate whether Contra Noetum should be viewed as an independent work or as a part
of a larger whole. Those who argue that it is a fragment of a larger work usually assume that it was part of
the Syntagma mentioned by Photius in Bibliotheca, codex 121. Pierre Nautin represents the scholarly
trajectory that thinks Contra Noetum was the conclusion of the Syntagma. See his Hippolyte et Josipe:
Contribution à l’histoire de la littérature chrétienne du troisième siècle, Études et textes pour l’histoire du
dogme de la Trinité 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1947), 100. Harnack also considered Contra Noetum to be the
conclusion of the Syntagma (History of Dogma, 3:51–2, n. 1). Butterworth argues at length that Contra
Noetum is an independent work and should not be considered a fragment dislocated from a larger whole.
He argues that it is structured as an adaptation of profane diatribe and that this helps explain the structure,
style, and content of the work. See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum, ed. Robert Butterworth, Heythrop
Monographs 2 (London: Heythrop College [University of London], 1977), 118ff. Manlio Simonetti accepts
the conclusions of Butterworth and argues that Contra Noetum is an independent work (“Una nuova
proposta su Ippolito,” Augustinianum 36, no. 1 (1996): 40).
46

Eusebius, EH 6.46. Eusebius does not specify those to whom Dionysius sent the letter. He
merely tells us that it was sent to “those in Rome” (τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ).
47

See Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 17ff; Josef Frickel, Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom: Ein
Lösungsversuch; Die Schriften Elenchos und Contra Noëtum, Grazer theologische Studien 13 (Graz:
Eigenverlag des Instituts für Ökumenische Theologie und Patrologie an der Universität Graz, 1988), 65ff;
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and a list of written works.48 The similarity of the titles of the works on the statue with
other lists of Hippolytus’ writings, coupled with its location near the tomb of Hippolytus
the martyr, led scholars to conclude that this statue depicted Hippolytus. Varying
interpretations of the statue have been weighted heavily in the accounts of many scholars
on the works of Hippolytus.49
As noted above, the authorship and provenance of the Refutatio and Contra
Noetum have been hotly contested for most of the twentieth century.50 The common view

Allen Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century: Communities in Tension before the
Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 31 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 3–50;
Heine, “Hippolytus, Ps.-Hippolytus and the Early Canons,” 144.
For a good summary of the list of works on the statue, see Miroslav Marcovich, “Introduction,”
in Refutatio Omnium Haeresium, Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (New York; Berlin: W. De Gruyter,
1986), 12–3.
48

49

For a number of reasons, Nautin doubted that Hippolytus was the author of numerous works
attributed to him, especially the Elenchos or Refutatio omnium haeresium. Nautin, therefore, denied that the
statue depicted Hippolytus. Nautin argued that the statue actually depcited a certain Josipe (or Josephus)
and that this Josipe was the author of the Elenchos. See Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 79ff. One of the chief
means Nautin used to posit two authors, Hippolytus and Josipe, was that there were differences between
chronological sections in works attributed to Hippolytus and the paschal calculations on the statue. Nautin
thought it improbable that a single author would produce conflicting chronologies, and thus argued that
there were two authors. More recently, John Behr, following Brent’s conclusion argues that Hippolytus was
not the author of the Refutatio and that it antedated the Contra Noetum, which was written by Hippolytus.
John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, The Formation of Christian Theology 1 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s
Seminary Press, 2001), 141–2.
50

Nautin thinks the Refutatio is the product of "Josipe", and he places it earlier than Contra
Noetum, which he deems to be genuinely Hippolytan (Hippolyte et Josipe, 85–6). Marcel Richard notes
that serious questions arise when we consider whether the Refutatio and Contra Noetum are by the same
author. See his “Sainte Hippolyte, ‘Hippolyte et Josipe’: Bulletin de Patrologie,” Mélanges de science
religieuse 5 (1948): 297–8. Marcovich (1986) argues that the Refutatio is actually by Hippolytus and dates
it between 222 and 235 (“Introduction,” 16–17). Roberth Butterworth sees no reason to doubt that
Hippolytus of Rome was the author of Contra Noetum (“Introduction,” in Contra Noetum, Heythrop
Monographs 2 [London: Heythrop College (University of London), 1977], i). In his 1988 monograph,
Frickel argued that the Refutatio is legitimately by Hippolytus, as is Contra Noetum. His argument
proceeds by comparing the demonstrations of truth at the end of Contra Noetum and Refutatio, 10. He
builds on the work of Richard and argues strongly against Nautin. See Frickel, Das Dunkel um Hippolyt
von Rom, 299. Caroline P. Bammel says of Frickel’s monograph: "Frickel writes as an advocate rather than
as an impartial umpire" (“The State of Play with Regard to Hippolytus and the Contra Noetum,” Heythrop
Journal 31, no. 2 [1990]: 195). Later, however, Frickel changed his position and suggested that Contra
Noetum was not written by Hippolytus but was actually responding to fourth- and fifth- century problems.
See Josef Frickel, “Hippolyts Schrift Contra Noetum: Ein Pseudo-Hippolyt,” in Logos: Festschrift für Luise
Abramowski, ed. Hans Christof Brennecke, Ernst Ludwig Grasmück, and Christoph Markschies, Beihefte
zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 67 (Berlin: de
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that Hippolytus was the author of both the Refutatio and Contra Noetum was forcefully
challenged with the publication of Pierre Nautin’s Hippolyte et Josipe in 1947.51 At the
beginning of the work, Nautin signaled his intention to critically reevaluate the prevailing
paradigm with the following statement about the Refutatio: “Modern criticism attributes
this work to Hippolytus, but it presents such very profound divergences with a certainly
authentic text of Hippolytus, the fragment Contra Noetum, that it was not possible to
avoid posing anew the question of its origin.”52 In this statement, Nautin shows two of his
central propositions: (1) that there are substantial differences between the Refutatio and
the Contra Noetum, and (2) that the Contra Noetum is a genuine and reliable work of
Hippolytus.53

Gruyter, 1993), 87–123. Reinhard M. Hübner adopts a similar position and argues that Contra Noetum is a
product of the fourth century and is unreliable for establishing the theology of Noetus (“Melito von Sardes
und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine: antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert
[Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1999], 4–9). Brent thinks the Refutatio was written by someone other than
Hippolytus, but that Hippolytus touched it up and used it as a source for composing Contra Noetum, which
was an attempt at rapprochement with the semi-monarchianism of Callistus. (Hippolytus and the Roman
Church in the Third Century, 206, 211, 256–8). Nautin also argues that Trinitarian formulae in Tertullian’s
Adversus Praxean are not treated as skeptically as those in Contra Noetum. Therefore, he sees no reason
that the seemingly advanced Trinitarian theology in Contra Noetum would have to be considered a later
interpolation. While his observation about the lack of skepticism regarding the pneumatological passages in
Adversus Praxean is true, Nautin fails to consider whether Tertullian’s Montanism influenced him to
emphasize pneumatology. See, Nautin, 46-7.
51

Nautin clearly and somewhat polemically outlines the rise of the scholarly consensus regarding
the Hippolytan authorship of both works. He pays particular attention to its rise in German scholarship
before stating that “A. d'Alès vulgarisait définitivement en France la thèse allemande” (34). For this
narration, see Ibid., 17–35.
Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 7. Translation mine. “La critique moderne attribue cet ouvrage à
Hippolyte; mais il présente des divergences si profondes avec un texte certainement authentique
d'Hippolyte, le fragment contre Noët, que l'on ne pouvait éviter de poser à nouveau la question de son
origine.” Note that Nautin and other scholars prefer to call the Refutatio the Elenchos. Still others refer to it
as the Philosophoumena. While any of these titles is appropriate, I will use Refutatio for the sake of
consistency.
52

53
Nautin states that one of the reasons he considers Contra Noetum to be genuinely Hippolytan is
that it is attributed to him by the fifth-century authors Gelasius and Theodoret (ibid., 35). As I will note
later, several scholars have questioned the Hippolytan authorship of Contra Noetum. Nautin notes that
some earlier scholars had viewed the seemingly well-developed pnematological passages in Contra Noetum
as later interpolations, but Nautin dismisses these critiques. He claims that these pnematological sections
are so tightly interwoven into the fabric of the work that it is highly improbable that they are interpolations.
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Nautin attempts to compare the works attributed to Hippolytus in four major areas
to determine if they are genuinely Hippolytan: (1) doctrine, (2) genre, (3) formation of
general spirit, (4) style.54 After a detailed analysis, Nautin concludes that the Refutatio
and Contra Noetum are not by the same author. Since he had pre-determined that Contra
Noetum was a genuinely Hippolytan work, he needed to posit a different author for the
Refutatio. Eventually, he settled on a certain “Josipe” as the author of the Refutatio.55
Nautin further suggests that the Refutatio was the earlier of the two works and that
Hippolytus drew on it when he composed Contra Noetum.56 Despite some of the highly
speculative or tendentious conclusions Nautin came to, his work catapulted questions
about Hippolytus back into the scholarly consciousness.57 His work was a substantial
challenge to the prevailing views at the time.

Furthermore, Nautin accepts Photius’ assertion that Hippolytus was a student of Irenaeus and claims that
such pneumatology as we see in Contra Noetum was already present in the earlier works of Irenaeus (ibid.,
37–42). One of the similarities Nautin claims to see between Irenaeus and Hippolytus is that they both
identify the Holy Spirit as Wisdom. Nautin is correct to note that Irenaeus identifies the Holy Spirit and
Wisdom, but he is quite mistaken with regard to the Contra Noetum. The passage from Contra Noetum 10
that Nautin cites to support his position is not about the Holy Spirit, but rather the Son. See ibid., 44. What
we see in Contra Noetum 10, then, is nothing more than the standard early-third century connection of the
creative functions of the Son with those of Wisdom. Brent also notes this erroneous assertion of Nautin
(Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century, 533 n. 126).
Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 48. By “formation of general spirit” (formation d’esprit générale)
Nautin seems to mean something like the intellectual horizon of each author. For example, he thinks that
the divergence in usage of scripture between the Refutatio and Contra Noetum “révèle déjà deux esprits de
formations très différentes” (ibid., 51).
54

55

Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 88.

56

Ibid., 56–8. One of the chief reasons Nautin gives for believing that the Refutatio is earlier is
that it has no mention of the condemnation of Noetus. Contra Noetum, on the other hand, does have an
account of Noetus’ condemnation. Since Nautin assumes that there is some dependence between the works,
he finds it very implausible that the “Josipe” would not have included details about the condemnation of
Noetus if he had been aware of them. Thus, for Nautin, it makes sense that Contra Noetum was later. This
whole argument about which of the works was earlier, however, begs the question about dependence. Was
there actually direct dependence between the works? If there was, is Nautin’s dating scheme the only way
to explain the absence of Noetus’ condemnation in the Refutatio?
Nautin’s work is tendentious in that he exhibits a marked preference for Hippolytus. He views
“Josipe” as a pretentious dilettante, while he claims that Hippolytus was a pious man of the church. The
following is a good example of his estimation of the two: “Hippolyte et Josipe représentent ainsi deux types
57
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The publication of Nautin’s monograph touched off a controversy among French
scholars that lasted for nearly a decade.58 Gustave Bardy quickly responded to Nautin’s
thesis with acerbic criticism and argued for common Hippolytan authorship.59 Shortly
following Bardy’s harsh critique of Nautin’s thesis, Marcel Richard began a series of
articles in which he disputed the conclusions Nautin drew from the chronological
inconsistencies. Richard argued that such inconsistencies do not necessarily lead one to
conclude that there were two different authors. Indeed, Richard argued that Hippolytus
was the author of the works Nautin divided between Hippolytus and Josipe, although he
was willing to admit that there were interpolations in the extant texts.60
An Italian school of scholars devoted substantial attention to the Hippolytan
question beginning in the 1970s and held two coferences devoted to Hippolytus. They
generally accepted Nautin’s fundamental thesis that the Refutatio and Contra Noetum

d'esprit très différents, et l'on ne peut s'empêcher de comparer l'impression qu'ils nous laissent après bientôt
deux millénaires. L'oeuvre de Josipe nous apparaît bien vieille, à cause de l'érudition périmée qui
l'encombre. Quand nous lisons aujourd'hui ses développements copieux sur la physique de la création ou
sur la description de l'Hadès, nous trouvons que l'"amour de la science", dont il se vantait, l’a entraîné à
beaucoup de puérilité. La sobriété d'Hippolyte dans les mêmes matières relève d'une intelligence religieuse
plus pénétrante et incontestablement plus proche de l'esprit moderne. C'est à son esprit ecclésiastique, qu'il
nous faut accepter d'en savoir gré. Parce qu'Hippolyte n'a pas voulu d'autre science que celle des 'saintes
Écritures', son oeuvre reste vivante pour nous” (Hippolyte et Josipe, 103).
58

Butterworth gives a competent summary of the whole controversy, although it precedes the
substantial contributions made by the Italian school in the late 1970s. See Robert Butterworth, “The
Growth of the Problem,” in Contra Noetum, Heythrop Monographs 2 (London: Heythrop College
(University of London), 1977), 1–33.
59

Gustave Bardy, “L’énigme d’Hippolyte,” Mélanges de science religieuse 5, no. 1 (1948): 63–

88.
For Richard’s response to Nautin, see Richard, “Sainte Hippolyte, ‘Hippolyte et Josipe’:
Bulletin de Patrologie”; idem, “Comput et chronographie chez Saint Hippolyte,” Mélanges de science
religieuse 7 (1950): 237–68; idem, “Comput et chronographie chez Saint Hippolyte,” Mélanges de science
religieuse 8 (1951): 19–51; idem, “Encore le problème d’Hippolyte,” Mélanges de science religieuse 10
(1953): 13–52; idem, “Dernières remarques sur s. Hippolyte et le soi-disant Josipe,” Recherches de science
religieuse 43 (1955): 379–94.
60

114
were not composed by the same author.61 Josef Frickel, who participated in both of the
Italian conferences, maintained the common Hippolytan authorship of the Refutatio and
Contra Noetum.62 In 1993, however, Frickel revised his position and argued that Contra
Noetum was actually not by Hippolytus.63
Since Frickel’s change of position in 1993, the majority of scholars have rejected
the older view that both texts were composed by Hippolytus of Rome.64 Brent’s more
recent proposal accepts that Hippolytus was not the author of both the Refutatio and
Contra Noetum, but he innovatively, if not convincingly, argues that there was a
Hippolytan school operative in Rome.65 These scholarly arguments about Hippolytus
have ranged widely, drawing upon both archaeological evidence and the written works
attributed to Hippolytus. Scholars have clearly shown that there are substantial
theological differences between the extant works, especially between the theological
positions favored by one or another work.66
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See the two volumes of conference proceedings, and especially the essays of Simonetti and Loi.
Ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 13 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum,
1977); Nuove ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 30 (Rome: Institutum patristicum
Augustinianum, 1989).
Josef Frickel, “Contraddizioni nelle opere e nella persona di Ippolito di Roma,” in Ricerche su
Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 13 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1977), 137–
49; idem, Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom; idem, “Ippolito di Roma, scrittore e martire,” in Nuove
ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 30 (Roma: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum,
1989), 23–41.
62

63

Frickel, “Hippolyts Schrift Contra Noetum: ein Pseudo-Hippolyt.”

64

Hübner thinks that Contra Noetum was written in the fourth century and is fundamentally
unreliable for the reconstruction of Noetus’ teaching (“Melito und Noët,” 1999, 4–9).
65
66

Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century.

I am referring to places where the authors go beyond refuting their opponents and lay out their
own positions. For example, Frickel’s earlier argument examines the positions endorsed in the
“demonstrations of truth” in Refutatio X and Contra Noetum (Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom). On the
basis of this study, though, Frickel argues that the two works were written by the same author. His
argument countered the multiple-authors hypothesis that was becoming dominant.
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One of the most recent detailed treatments of the Hippolytan question is that of J.
A. Cerrato.67 Cerrato notes at the outset of his work that he is critical of the traditional
Roman hypothesis, namely, that all the works commonly ascribed to Hippolytus were
penned by a Roman bishop named Hippolytus. Cerrato notes that the majority of studies
from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries focused on the relationship between the
controversial works: the Refutatio and Contra Noetum. His study breaks new ground
because he concentrates his analysis on the biblical commentaries ascribed to
Hippolytus.68 He argues that the overwhelming majority of biblical commentaries of the
same style as those ascribed to Hippolytus were produced in the East; there is little
literary evidence for this commentary tradition in Rome. Furthermore, Cerrato sees
enough similarities between these (most likely) eastern commentaries and Contra Noetum
to argue that they were by the same author. The same cannot be said of the Refutatio.
Although Cerrato does not spend much time discussing the dating of Contra Noetum, the
fact that he lumps it with the eastern biblical commentaries suggests a date at the
beginning of the third century.
The scholarly opinion that the Refutatio and Contra Noetum are not both the
product of Hippolytus’ pen has grown increasingly strong since the publication of
Nautin’s monograph in the 1940s. Indeed, nearly all scholars have abandoned attempts to

67

J. A. Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the
Corpus, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Ibid., 82: “Throughout the literary controversy between Nautin and his critics the emphasis
remained on the anti-heretical works, especially the Contra Noetum and the Refutatio. This had been the
focus of the nineteenth century. It was the original point of attack against the Roman hypothesis and,
therefore, the centre of defence by advocates of the western provenance view. The evidences for the eastern
character of the commentaries, perhaps the most positive and persuasive data in the debate were not
brought to the forefront of the discussion.”
68
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show that Hippolytus wrote both texts.69 Accordingly, my treatment of these two works
begins with the well-founded assumption that they were not written by the same author.
Although traditional claims about Hippolytan authorship have fallen out of favor, these
texts still prove to be worthwhile sources for the reconstruction of the monarchian
controversy. Both the Refutatio and Contra Noetum were concerned with refuting
monarchian teaching; and if Heine’s thesis is correct, these two texts provide a lens into
how monarchianism developed over a period of about thirty years (from ca. 200 to ca.
230).70 Even though they are probably by different authors and there are stylistic
differences between the two, the texts can still be used to create a more substantial
coherent picture of the monarchian teachings. Regarding stylistic differences, I am
thinking specifically of the way the accounts of monarchian teaching are organized. In
the Refutatio, few scriptural references are used when laying out the positions of Callistus
et al. In Contra Noetum, however, the work is structured around biblical quotations,
monarchian interpretation of those verses, and then a rebuttal of their interpretation.

Mansfeld notes, however, that he finds Frickel’s argument that they are by the same author
mostly convincing. See Jaap Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source for
Greek Philosophy, Philosophia Antiqua 56 (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 317.
69

Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 78.
Heine argues that Contra Noetum bears witness to an earlier form of Monarchianism wherein patripassian
assertions were not viewed as problematic. The Refutatio, on the other hand, shows a more developed form
of Monarchianism that sought to distance itself from the difficult patripassian claims of earlier forms of
Monarchianism. If Mouraviev is correct, the development of Monarchian teaching is even visible in the
different reports on Noetian teaching in the Refutatio. See Serge N. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et
Noët (Commentaire d’Hippolyte, Refut. omn. haer. IX 8 - 10),” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen
Welt, vol. 2.36.6, 1992, 4375–4402.
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Hippolytus: Contra Noetum

Introduction

As the summary of disparate positions regarding the works of Hippolytus above
demonstrates, scholars are divided regarding the date of Contra Noetum. Despite the
difficulties of dating the work, determinations about its date remain quite important.
Nearly all scholars agree that there is a relationship of dependence between Contra
Noetum and Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean.71 Narrowing the date of Contra Noetum
helps us determine the directionality of that dependence. Furthermore, an accurate dating
of the work allows us to make determinations about any developments within monarchian
theology. Even with the uncertainty about dating, Contra Noetum contains snippets of
simple and early monarchian teachings that help lay bare some of the core monarchian
commitments.
Nautin and Brent both take Contra Noetum to be a genuine work of Hippolytus,
and both place its composition after the Refutatio. In Brent’s scheme, the date of the work
is sometime after 225 C.E.72 Frickel disagreed with the conclusions of Nautin and

71
One of the main reasons scholars think that there is some sort of dependence between the two
works is that they both deploy a similar understanding of “economy” against the monarchians. I detail the
theories about dependence in the following discussion. One notable exception to this is Michael Decker,
who thinks that the two works were composed independently. See his “Die Monarchianer: Frühchristliche
Theologie im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rom und Kleinasien” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hamburg,
1987), 49.
72

See Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 85–6; Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third
Century, 529. Brent is fully aware that his proposal contradicts the positions of the Italian school. He
directly engages Simonetti in this section, stating, “We shall argue therefore that though Tertullian is
dependent upon the theology of El., C.N. is in fact dependent upon Tertullian. We shall show that where
Simonetti claims Tertullian develops, it is in fact C.N. which shortens and omits in order to depersonalize
the pre-existent λόγος and thus forge a rapprochement with Monarchianism, which would have regarded a
personal pre-existent λόγος as part of a ditheism or tritheism” (529).

118
proposed that Contra Noetum preceded the Refutatio.73 Specifically, he dated Contra
Noetum before 217 and the Refutatio around 235.74 Later, he changed his position and
argued that Contra Noetum had undergone substantial redaction.75 Simonetti has
forcefully and repeatedly rejected the claims of Nautin and Brent that Contra Noetum is
later than the Refutatio.76 He contends that Contra Noetum was written in the late second
century or early third and that it antedates Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean.77 On the whole,
I find Simonetti’s arguments regarding the early dating of Contra Noetum to be more
compelling than those that argue it was composed after the Refutatio.78 The argument for
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Frickel, Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom, 204–10. For an explicit rejection of Nautin’s
proposal, see 208, n. 628.
74

Ibid., 299.
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Frickel, “Hippolyts Schrift Contra Noetum: Ein Pseudo-Hippolyt.”
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See especially Simonetti, “Una nuova proposta su Ippolito,” 29–31. Here Simonetti explicitly
engages with Brent’s work and rejects his conclusions. Although Simonetti rejects many of the details of
Brent’s argument, he is not fundamentally opposed to Brent’s core thesis that there was a Hippolytan
school. For a protracted discussion of the relationship between Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean, see
Manlio Simonetti, “Due note su Ippolito: Ippolito interprete di Genesi 49; Ippolito e Tertulliano,” in
Ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 13 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum,
1977), 121–36.
77

Simonetti, “Due note su Ippolito,” 136.
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Although the subject is beyond the scope of this current section, many scholars have observed
that the Pneumatology in Contra Noetum seems to be rather developed if the document is from the early
third century. Despite the rigorous debate, no consensus has been reached. Nautin thinks the Pneumatology
is intelligible coming from Hippolytus and does not see the need to posit later interpolations (Hippolyte et
Josipe, 36–47). Richard disagreed with Nautin and thought that the Holy Spirit passages were perhaps an
indication that the entire work was later. See, for example, Richard, “Sainte Hippolyte, ‘Hippolyte et
Josipe’: Bulletin de Patrologie,” 298. Reinhard Hübner accepted Richard’s theory and viewed Contra
Noetum as a product of the fourth century and as completely unreliable for the reconstruction of Noetus’
thought. See two of his discussions: Der Paradox Eine, viii; “Die antignostische Glaubensregel des Noët
von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 39. Although Hübner thinks that Contra Noetum is a late work, he
repeatedly claims that Noetus himself was an early figure and that Ignatius, Irenaeus, Melito, and others
drew on this theology. I will discuss his theory in more detail in my section on the Refutatio, but suffice it
to say that I find it unconvincing. Note also Mark Edwards’ negative appraisal of Hübner’s main thesis: M.
J. Edwards, “Review of Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im Zweiten Jahrhundert,”
Journal of Theological Studies 52, no. 1 (2001): 354–56. In his earlier works, Frickel did not think that
these pneumatological passages were later interpolations and noted that such Trinitarian formulations can
be found in the earlier work of Irenaeus (Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom, 254–5).
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an early dating of Contra Noetum is further strengthened by Heine’s contention that the
straightforward patripassianism of Contra Noetum represents an earlier strain of Asian
monarchianism.79 Thus, I will proceed from the assumption that Contra Noetum is the
earliest extant witness that we possess to monarchian teachings. Furthermore, this
conclusion leads me to consider Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean to have been at least
partially dependent upon Contra Noetum.
Textual Analysis

Contra Noetum begins with a condensed representation of the most troublesome
aspects of the Noetians’ teaching and offers some limited biographical background about
Noetus. We learn that he was from Smyrna and that he lived not long before the author of
Contra Noetum.80 Next we are informed that Noetus had friction with “the elders” and
was eventually condemned.81 If we can trust Hippolytus’ account, Noetus opened his own
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Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 89. Note also Mouraviev’s discussion of the possible
development of Noetus’ teaching by his successors: Serge N. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët
(Commentaire d’Hippolyte, Refut. omn. haer. IX 8 - 10),” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt,
vol. 2.36.6, 1992, 4375–4402. Especially helpful are his two charts that map out the main areas of
development within Noetian theology on pp. 4385-6.
80

Contra Noetum 1.1. Unless otherwise noted, the Greek for Contra Noetum is taken from
Butterworth’s edition. Because the section numbers are the most specific reference, I will not include the
page number from Butterworth.
81
Contra Noetum 1.4; 1.6-7. It seems as though Noetus had multiple run-ins with the elders. In
1.3, Hippolytus mentions one condemnation and in 1.6 speaks of Noetus being called in again by the elders.
Hippolytus’ tone in this section is far from friendly, and it is possible that this account is unreliable.
However, such actions by presbyteroi fall in line with what we see in Origen’s Dialogue with Heraclides
and the episode with Beryllus in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 6.33. Scholars who argue that Contra
Noetum post-dated the Refutatio often fixate on these details about the condemnation of Noetus. They
claim that if the author of the Refutatio had known these details, he would have included them. The absence
of the condemnation in the Refutatio signals to them that Contra Noetum had not yet been written. For a
representative expression of this line of reasoning, see Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 57–9.
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didaskaleion in response to the condemnation of the elders.82 Hippolytus gives us further
information about Noetus’ teaching and the response of the elders to him, but Noetus
himself does not appear to be Hippolytus’ main target.83 Hippolytus’ invective is directed
against the disciples of Noetus.84 When he provides the details of the teaching he is
opposing, he presents it not as the teaching of Noetus but as the teaching of his
disciples.85 Noetus is the villainized heresiarch who quickly fades into the background as
Hippolytus addresses the teachings of his disciples, who were most likely the
contemporaries of Hippolytus.
One God

After this introduction, Hippolytus begins his exposé of the Noetians’ teaching
before rebutting it point-by-point. From the outset it becomes clear that the Noetian
teaching was firmly rooted in scriptural exegesis.86 The first texts presented are all
adduced by the Noetians in order to support their foundational claim that there is only
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Contra Noetum 1.8.

Hippolytus gives us a digest of his teaching in 1.2: “He said that Christ himself was the Father,
and that the Father himself had been born and had suffered and had died.” (trans. Butterworth, 42 with my
modifications). Both Hippolytus’ digest of Noetus’ teachings and the response of the elders to Noetus are
important for reconstructing the positions of the Noetians. I will offer a fuller treatment of them as I
develop the major themes of the Noetian teaching.
83
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Contra Noetum 1.1: Ἕτεροὶ τινες... τινος Νοητοῦ μαθηταί.

Contra Noetum 2.1. οἳ καὶ δεῖξαι βούλονται σύστασιν τῷ δόγματι λέγοντες… The οἳ here is
referring to the Ἕτεροὶ τινες... τινος Νοητοῦ μαθηταί with which the work opens.
85
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This will be important to note in our later discussion of the Refutatio, which expurgates almost
all scriptural references when it reports on the teachings of key monarchians. As I observe in my later
discussions of the Refutatio, scholars have recognized that this was a result of the polemical tendency of the
author. Decker argues that the scriptural quotations were not actually used by the Noetians and that they
were inserted by Hippolytus to be fodder for his exegetical rebuttal. Decker, “Die Monarchianer,” 156–7.
Given the prominence of biblical exegesis in every account of monarchianism except the Refutatio,
Decker’s theory lacks textual support.
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one God. As the analysis continues, it will become clear that theirs was a particularly
rigid interpretation of the claim that there is only one God.87
Hippolytus’ account has them combining Gen. 46:3 (or Ex. 3:6) with Ex. 20:3 to
affirm that there is only one God: Ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πατέρων ὑμῶν· οὐκ ἔσονται ὑμῖν
θεοὶ ἕτεροι πλὴν ἐμοῦ.88 These two conjoined texts precede a rough paraphrase of Isa.
44:6: Ἐγώ, φησίν, πρῶτος καὶ ἐγὼ ἔσχατος καὶ μετ’ ἐμὲ οὔκ ἐστιν οὐδείς.89 Immediately
following his presentation of these Noetian prooftexts, Hippolytus states that “this is the
way they are claiming to establish a single God” (οὕτω φάσκουσιν συνιστᾶν ἕνα Θεόν).90
Given the centrality of this claim to their teaching, the Noetians almost certainly had
more proof texts in their dossier to prove that there is only one God. Nevertheless,
Hippolytus reproduces enough of their argument to make it clear that their first step was
to argue that there is only one God and that passages from the Old Testament were
critical pieces of their exegetical argument.91
The Noetian fixation on the claim that there is only one God is evidenced in
numerous other places in Contra Noetum. It is clear that the Noetians accused Hippolytus
(and probably the elders also) of being ditheists. Hippolytus twice clarifies his own
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Remember that this rigid interpretation of the uniqueness of God is what I take to be the
common denominator of the different expressions of monarchianism and some forms of psilanthropism.
Although they diverge about the best way to protect monotheism, the impulse to preserve a strong form of
it motivated each of their theologies.
88

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.1. These quotations are nearly verbatim from the LXX. In the
LXX of both of the verses, the second person pronouns are singular. Butterworth identifies the first
quotation as Ex. 3:6, but it is actually closer to Gen. 46:3.
89

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.2. Again, this is not an exact quotation of the LXX.

90

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.3. (trans. Butterworth, 44).

91
Mouraviev also identifies the assertion that there is only one God as the first postulate of the
Noetian system. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët,” 4379.
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claims in order to state that he does not teach that there are two Gods.92 The response of
the elders to Noetus in the introduction is particularly telling in this regard. They state,
“We too have knowledge of a single God – in the true way” (Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἕνα Θεὸν οἴδαμεν
ἀληθῶς.).93 It was necessary for them to restate that they believed in one God precisely
because Noetus and his followers accused them of being ditheists.
The centrality of the Noetians’ concern with the oneness of God is again on
display as Hippolytus begins his demonstration of the truth. He starts as follows, “There
is one God, and we acquire knowledge of him from no other source, brethren, than the
Holy Scriptures.”94 Hippolytus’ choice to start his demonstration of truth this way is
indicative of two prominent features of his conflict with the Noetians: (1) it focused on
the proper understanding of monotheism, and (2) the conflict was thoroughly
exegetical.95 This emphasis on the proper understanding of monotheism is further borne
out by the way in which Hippolytus refutes the Noetian claims before his demonstration
of truth: “After all, would not everyone say that there is a single God? – but it is not
everyone who would scrap the economy.”96 For Hippolytus, the question is not whether
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Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 11.1, 14.2-3. That the monarchians charged their opponents with
being ditheists is well attested in the extant literature. I will highlight occurrences of this charge in the
discussions of the other primary sources. The charge appears twice in the Refutatio.
93

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.7 (trans. Butterworth, 44).

94
Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 9.1 (trans. Butterworth, 66): εἷς Θεός, ὃν οὐκ ἄλλοθεν
ἐπιγινώσκομεν, ἀδελφοί, ἢ τῶν ἁγίων γραφῶν.

Again, contra Decker’s thesis, Hippolytus’ conflict with the Noetians was thoroughly
exegetical. He complains numerous times about the bad exegetical practices of his opponents. See Contra
Noetum 2.4, 3.1, 4.2, 9.3.
95

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.4 (trans. Butterworth, 48): τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἐρεῖ ἕνα Θεὸν εἶναι; ἀλλ’
οὐ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἀναιρήσει. Hippolytus’ use of economy is quite important, and I will discuss it later.
Note also that economy is an important term in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, and the role of the term in
both Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean is one of the primary reasons that scholars think there is a
relationship of dependence between the two works.
96
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there is one God; everyone believes this. The question is how to interpret the statement
that there is only one God. Hippolytus follows his commitment to monotheism by
outlining his exegetical task against the Noetians: “So really, in view of all of this, the
first of our two tasks must be to refute our opponents' understanding of the passages
quoted, and to show what they mean in the light of the truth.”97 Again, the dual emphasis
on monotheism and scriptural exegesis shows that both Hippolytus and the Noetians saw
the question of monotheism as one best resolved through scriptural exegesis.98
Visible

From this bedrock assertion that there is only one God, the Noetians moved to
address passages wherein God is said to have been visible to humans. Oddly absent from
the texts they marshal in support of their argument are loci classici such as the episode of
the burning bush (Ex. 3) or the Sinai theophany (Ex. 19:16-25). It is not surprising that
the next step of the Noetians’ argument was to address the visibility of God. By the late
second century, it was an exegetical commonplace to identify the one manifest in the
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Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.5 (trans. Butterworth, 48): ὄντως μὲν οὖν τὰ κεφάλαια διὰ ταῦτα
πρότερον δεῖ ἀνατραπῆναι κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνων νοῦν· κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δειχθῆναι. This passage
particularly tells against Decker’s claim that the Noetian exegesis is the invention of Hippolytus. If
Hippolytus did invent the exegesis, this passage shows how far he was willing to extend his ruse.
98
It is very interesting to note that Hippolytus links the exegetical tendencies of the Noetians with
those of Theodotus. He states, “And in this way they themselves, too, wish to explain these individual
verses – using them in the way that Theodotus spoke in his attempt to establish that [Christ] was a mere
man” (Contra Noetum 3.1 [trans. Butterworth, 48]). Therefore, it is very likely that psilanthropism and
monarchianism were both responses to the same problem. Unfortunately, we do not have access to texts
that preserve the exegetical proclivities of Theodotus and other second-century psilanthropists. Access to
Theodotus’ exegesis of these passages could help us fill in details about the distinct ways these exegetes
sought to defend monotheism. Hippolytus and Eusebius both accuse Theodotus of teaching the same thing:
that Christ was ἄνθρωπον ψιλόν.
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theophanies as the Logos.99 This interpretation of the theophanies was driven by an
attempt both to affirm the invisibility of God the Father (cf. Ex. 33:20) and to maintain
that God did appear in the theophanies. The argument that it was the divine Logos who
was seen in these manifestations allowed interpreters to uphold both claims. Justin
Martyr is an early and strong example of this exegetical trend.100 Because the Noetians
had a strong reaction against anything they deemed to contradict a rigorous understanding
of the uniqueness of God, this exegetical avenue was unpalatable.
Rejecting the prevailing interpretation of the OT theophanies, the Noetians argued
that it was the one God who became visible in history. As noted earlier, Hippolytus’
account has the Noetians sustaining their argument without reference to the classic OT
theophanies. Perhaps they avoided these passages because they were precisely the ones
used by those who argued that the Logos was present in the theophanies.101 The first
passage the Noetians use to argue about the visibility of God is Baruch 3:36-8.102 They
appear to have chosen this passage because it begins with an affirmation of the
incomparability of God (a statement of God’s uniqueness) before proceeding to speak of
God becoming visible to humans. In the Noetian exegesis, we have here a clear example

See Bogdan G. Bucur’s recent article on the importance of the interpretation of theophanies in
the second century: “Justin Martyr’s Exegesis of Biblical Theophanies and the Parting of the Ways between
Christianity and Judaism,” Theological Studies 75, no. 1 (2014): 34–91.
99
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See especially Justin Martyr, I Apology 63.

101

Again, see Justin, I Apology 63, where he uses Ex. 3:6 as a major example.

On the use of Baruch 3:36, see Elena Cavalcanti, “Osservazioni sull’uso patristico di Baruch 3,
36-38,” in Mémorial Dom Jean Gribomont (1920-1986), Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 27 (Roma:
Institutum Patristicum “Augustinianum,” 1988), 145–65; Reinhard M Hübner, “Der antivalentinianische
Charakter der Theologie des Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 117–9; idem, “Εἷς θεὸς Ἰησοῦς
Χριστός,” in Der Paradox Eine, 228–9. Cavalcanti is more concerned with later use of this verse but still
has some helpful background.
102

125
of the one God becoming visible in human history. Hippolytus records Noetus as
interpreting this passage as follows: “So you see… that this is the God who is one alone,
and who subsequently was seen and conversed with men.”103
Following the exposition of Baruch 3:36-38, Hippolytus presents Noetian
interpretation of Isa. 45:14-5. This passage seems to have been chosen by the Noetians
for the same reasons as the passage from Baruch. Like the Baruch passage, this passage
contains an affirmation of the oneness of God (ἐροῦσιν Οὐκ ἔστιν θεὸς πλὴν σοῦ) and the
presence and manifestation of God among humans (ὅτι ἐν σοὶ ὁ θεός ἐστιν). Hippolytus
again gives Noetus’ interpretation of the passage: “the scriptures proclaim one God—the
one who is visibly revealed.”104
The Noetian combination of affirmations about the oneness of God with
affirmations about the same God’s visibility is no mistake. In the late second century, OT
theophanies were often interpreted as an example of the place of the Logos alongside the
Father, even if the specifics of the divinity of the Logos and the relationship of the Logos
to the Father had not yet been worked out with the precision that would come in later
centuries. By addressing together God’s oneness and visibility, the Noetians were
offering an alternative exegesis to the dominant one which saw the Logos in the
theophanies.
From these two exegetical movements, the main thrust of the Noetian argument
becomes exceedingly clear. According to Hippolytus, their central claim is, without a

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.5. (trans. Butterworth, 46): Ὁρᾷς οὖν, φησίν, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ
θεὸς ὁ μόνος ὦν καὶ ὕστερον ὀφθεὶς καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συνανεστραφείς.
103

104
Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.6. (trans. Butterworth, 46): ἕνα θεὸν κηρύσσουσιν αἱ γραφαί,
τούτου ἐμφανοῦς δεικνυμένου.
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doubt, that there is only one God. Furthermore, their linkage of this affirmation to
assertions about the visibility of God demonstrates that they considered exegesis that saw
the Logos in the theophanies as a direct contradiction of the assertion of the oneness of
God. Thus, in the Noetian exegesis presented by Hippolytus, the Noetians offer the sine
qua non of their theology: the oneness of God. They follow this claim by offering
exegesis of passages dealing with the visibility of God, for it is the frequent exegesis of
these passages that they deem to be a critical threat to the oneness of God. Hippolytus
records other passages that the Noetians used to support their arguments, but these
passages are largely used to work out the implications of the particularly rigorous
understanding of the oneness of God to which the Noetians adhered. I address exegesis of
these passages in the following thematic analysis of Noetian teaching.
Both Father and Son

The next salient characteristic of the Noetian system is the stark identification of
the Father and the Son. This assertion appears repeatedly in the first few chapters of
Contra Noetum. Hippolytus reports that the Noetians retorted to questions about
maintaining one God as follows, “If, therefore, I confess Christ as God, then he himself is
the Father, if in fact he is God. But Christ himself, being God, suffered. Therefore, did
not the Father suffer? For he himself was the Father.”105 I will address the
patripassianism of this passage later; but for now, there are several other interesting
features to consider.

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.3. Translation mine. Εἰ οὖν Χριστὸν ὁμολογῶ Θεόν, αὐτὸς ἄρα
ἐστὶν ὁ Πατήρ, εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός. ἔπαθεν δὲ Χριστὸς αὐτὸς ὢν Θεός. ἆρα οὖν ἔπαθεν Πατήρ; <Πατὴρ>
γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν.
105
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The first notable thing about this statement is the tag on the end of the first
sentence: “if in fact he is God at all.”106 If this statement actually comes from the
Noetians, it lends support to the hypothesis that monarchianism and psilanthropism were
closely related. This quip implies that one way to deal with the trouble of maintaining
monotheism is to deny the divinity of Christ. This is not the path the Noetians chose, but
they seem to have been aware of it as a live option.
The psilanthropists did not need to identify the Father and the Son because they
felt no compulsion to maintain the divinity of the Son. The Noetians, on the other hand,
accepted the divinity of Christ as a fundamental premise (“But Christ himself, being
God”). Their acceptance of Christ’s divinity then fed into their logic of monotheism: if
Christ is God and the Father is God, then Christ must be the Father.107 Hippolytus then
gives us another Noetian excerpt: “You see, brethren, how rash and reckless a doctrine
they introduced in saying quite shamelessly, ‘The Father is himself Christ; he is himself
the Son; he himself was born, he himself suffered, he himself raised himself up!’”108 This
is another straightforward statement that the Father and the Son are the same.

It is difficult to tell if this is an actual quotation or if this is merely Hippolytus’ reproduction of
their position. If this is not an actual quotation, we must be wary of any less-than-generous additions
Hippolytus might have made.
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Note that this is precisely what Evans is getting at in his discussion of the logic at work in
monarchianism (“Introduction,” 8).
Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.2 (trans. Butterworth, 48): ὁρᾶτε, ἀδελφοί, πῶς προαλὲς καὶ
τολμηρὸν δόγμα παρεισήνεγκαν ἀναισχύντως λέγοντες, Αὐτός ἐστι Χριστὸς ὁ Πατήρ, αὐτὸς Υἱός, αὐτὸς
ἐγεννήθη, αὐτὸς ἔπαθεν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤγειρεν. Note the importance the pronoun αὐτός has in these
statements. This use of the pronoun features prominently in all of the extant accounts of monarchianism.
Butterworth is not always consistent with his translations of αὐτός. Sometimes he translates it as “in
person.” I prefer in these cases to translate it as “himself” because I think it captures the thrust of the
monarchian doctrine a bit better. The use of αὐτός here could also be translated as “the same,” which I still
prefer to Butterworth’s translation. Where Butterworth uses “in person” or something similar, I have tried
to modify the translation to reflect this preference. Also worth noting is the seeming redundancy in this
statement: “The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the Son.” While we could have here nothing more
than repetition, it could also reflect a technical usage of the terms Christ and Son. Note here Heine and
Loofs’ observation that the monarchians almost always used Son to refer to the historical Jesus (Heine,
108
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Although it seems as though the Noetians could have arrived at this identification
of the Father and Son purely by means of the logic of the restrictive understanding of the
oneness of God, they nonetheless bolstered their claim by means of scriptural exegesis, as
we should expect by now. In order to do so, the Noetians appear to have used the two
passages that recur in later stages of the monarchian controversy: Jn 10:30 and Jn. 14:810. Hippolytus does not give us direct quotations from the Noetians regarding these
passages, but he presents the use of them somewhat hypothetically (ἐὰν δὲ λέγῃ).
Hippolytus writes, “And if he were to say, ‘He himself said: “I and the Father are one”’
(Jn 10, 30), let him apply his mind to the matter and learn that he did not say, ‘I and the
Father am one’, but ‘are one’. ‘We are’ is not said with reference to the one, but with
reference to the two. He revealed two persons, but a single power.”109
The Noetians supplemented their exegesis of John 10:30 with exegesis of John
14:8-10. Hippolytus writes,
But supposing they were to try also to quote the fact that Philip asked about the
Father: ‘Show us the Father and we shall be satisfied’ (Jn 14, 8); and the Lord
answered him with the words: ‘Have I been with you so long, Philip, and yet you
do not know me? He who has seen me has seen the Father. Do you not believe
that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?’ (Jn 14, 9-10) – and they want to

“The Christology of Callistus,” 71; Friedrich Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed.
[Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1906], 188). If this usage is in play here, we could be seeing the monarchians’ way of
identifying the Father with the incorporeal, heavenly Son of their opponents as well as with the incarnate
Son. The repetition of αὐτός could also be a subtle reaction against the use of ἕτερος to describe the Son, as
in Justin.
Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 7.1 (trans. Butterworth, 60): ἐὰν δὲ λέγῃ, Αὐτὸς εἶπεν, Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ
Πατὴρ ἐν ἐσμέν, ἐπιστανέτω τὸν νοῦν καὶ μανθανέτω ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν εἰμί, ἀλλ’ ἓν
ἐσμέν. τὸ γὰρ ἐσμὲν οὐκ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ δύο· <δύο> πρόσωπα ἔδειξεν, δύναμιν δὲ μίαν. Note
that Hippolytus’ distinction between “am” and “are” here is a clear example of the anti-monarchian
exegesis of these passages that Mark DelCogliano has highlighted. See his “The Interpretation of John
10:30 in the Third Century: Antimonarchian Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading Techniques,”
Journal of Theological Interpretation 6, no. 1 (2012): 117–38.
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say that thereby their doctrine prevails, since [Christ] maintains that he himself is
the Father.110
Although Hippolytus does not provide us with any of the specifics of their exegesis of
this passage, it is easy to see how it fit within their theological framework. This passage
addresses the visibility of God; and because they used it to identify the Father and Son, it
would have supported their contention that they believed in the one God who was visibly
revealed.111 As the monarchian controversy developed through the third century, John
10:30 and John 14:8-10 became centerpieces of their exegetical argument. While the
Noetians appear to have used them before the time of Hippolytus, they seem not to have
had yet the central role in the argument. Later authors, like Tertullian and Novatian, note
that these two passages from the Gospel of John were fundamental for the monarchians.
Suffered and Died

The Noetians moved from their identification of the Father and the Son to what
was for them the logical consequence of that identification: the attribution of suffering to
the Father. If Hippolytus’ fixation on this claim is an accurate indicator, this last phase of
the Noetian system was quite irksome for him. He highlights this aspect of their teaching
in the opening lines of the text: “[Noetus] said that Christ was the Father himself, and that
the Father himself had been born and had suffered and died.”112

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 7.4 (trans. Butterworth, 62): εἰ δὲ καὶ Φίλιππον ἐπερωτᾶν περὶ
Πατρὸς βούλοιντο λέγειν—Δεῖξον ἡμῖν τὸν Πατέρα καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἡμῖν· πρὸς ὃν ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Κύριος λέγων,
Τοσοῦτον χρόνον μεθ’ ὑμῶν εἰμι, Φίλιππε, καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωκάς με; ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακε τὸν Πατέρα· οὐ
πιστεύεις ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί ἐστιν; —καὶ θέλουσιν λέγειν διὰ τούτου κρατύνεσθαι τὸ
δόγμα αὐτῶν, ὁμολογοῦντος αὐτοῦ ἑαυτὸν Πατέρα.
110

111

Remember that they spoke of the one God who was visibly revealed in Contra Noetum 2.6.

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.2 (trans. Butterworth, 42 with modifications): ἔφη τὸν Χριστὸν
αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Πατέρα γεγεννῆσθαι καὶ πεπονθέναι καὶ ἀποτεθνηκέναι. In this
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The same theme is restated a little later, with the Noetians reasoning, “But Christ
himself, being God, suffered. Therefore, did not the Father suffer? For he himself was the
Father.”113 Unlike the earlier passage, the logical flow of the Noetian argument is explicit
here. Because the Noetians held that the Father and Son were the same, they attributed to
the Father everything that was ascribed to the Son, including suffering. The Noetians’
sense of the logical necessity of their patripassian claim is again highlighted a bit later.
Hippolytus has his opponent stating the following, “‘I am bound’, says he, ‘since the
existence of a single one is maintained to submit this very one to suffering.’”114
Hippolytus repeatedly focuses on the same claims of the Noetians, and his short
digests of their teaching punctuate the sections where he details their exegesis in depth.
He produces one more example of the Noetian claim before demonstrating how they are
in error: “You see, brethren, how rash and reckless a doctrine they introduced in saying
quite shamelessly, ‘The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the Son; he himself was
born, he himself suffered, he himself raised himself up!’”115 This passage shows that the
Noetians extended their logic beyond suffering when attributing the Son’s experiences to
the Father. They seem to have applied their logic to all aspects of the life of Christ.

digest of the Noetian teaching, Hippolytus does not mention their repeated assertions that they believed in
only one God. Perhaps he does not mention it here because the Noetian claim that they believed in only one
God was not problematic on the surface. After all, Hippolytus himself began his demonstration of the truth
with the same claim.
Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.3 (trans. mine): ἔπαθεν δὲ Χριστὸς αὐτὸς ὢν Θεός. ἆρα οὖν
ἔπαθεν Πατήρ; <Πατὴρ> γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν.
113
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Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.7 (trans. Butterworth, 46): Τούτων οὕτως μαρτυρουμένων
ἀνάγκην, φησίν, ἔχω, ἑνὸς ὁμολογουμένου, τοῦτον ὑπὸ πάθος φέρειν.

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.2 (trans. Butterworth, 48): ὁρᾶτε, ἀδελφοί, πῶς προαλὲς καὶ
τολμηρὸν δόγμα παρεισήνεγκαν ἀναισχύντως λέγοντες, Αὐτός ἐστι Χριστὸς ὁ Πατήρ, αὐτὸς Υἱός, αὐτὸς
ἐγεννήθη, αὐτὸς ἔπαθεν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤγειρεν.
115
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Immediately preceding his demonstration of the truth, Hippolytus offers a final refutation
of the Noetians’ position, saying, “There is one God, in whom we must believe; but he
does not become, cannot suffer, cannot die.”116
In Hippolytus’ treatment, the Noetians never use scripture to support their claims
that the Father suffered. Hippolytus examines and refutes the exegetical underpinnings of
all of the other Noetian claims, so it is probable that the Noetians made their assertions
about the Father suffering without additional scriptural exegesis. This approach would be
in line with the logical sequence in which the Noetians argued for the suffering of the
Father: if the Father and the Son are the same, and the Son suffered, then the Father must
have suffered. Thus is confurmed Heine’s conclusion that the patripassian thesis of the
Noetians was a logical conclusion to an exegetical argument.117
Conclusion

Despite being a short treatise, Contra Noetum gives us a clear window into the
teachings of the Noetians. Furthermore, this treatise might be the earliest in-depth
attestation we have to any monarchian teaching. The following are the salient points of
the Noetian system according to Contra Noetum. (1) The Noetian teaching, with the
exception of the patripassian thesis, was heavily based in scriptural exegesis.118 (2) Their

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 8.3 (trans. Butterworth, 64): εἷς γὰρ Θεός ἐστιν, ᾧ δεῖ πιστεύειν,
ἀλλ’ ἀγένητος ἀπαθὴς ἀθάνατος.
116
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Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 83: “The monarchian thesis, in which the Noetians
included Christ, is derived from their reading of Scripture, but the patripassianist thesis is supported solely
by logic based on the monarchian thesis.”
118
Again, Decker’s claims that the scriptural references are interpolations seem implausible. See
Decker, “Die Monarchianer,” 156–7.
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strict interpretation of the claim that there is only one God underwrote the rest of their
theological system. (3) Their repeated contention that the one God was visible seems to
have arisen as a response to interpretations that saw the Logos in the Old Testament
theophanies. (4) The Noetians identified the Father and the Son, and they most likely
used key passages from the Gospel of John to sustain this identification. (5) The
patripassian thesis of the Noetians was the one aspect of their system that was not
supported by exegesis. It appears to have been a logical conclusion drawn from the
earlier exegetical premises.

Tertullian: Adversus Praxean

Introduction

Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean is one of the most important extant treatises for
reconstructing the positions of the monarchians in the early third century. Although this
work gives us valuable information about monarchian teaching, it still leaves many
historical and biographical questions unanswered. It addresses the teachings of Praxeas, a
character shrouded in mystery, but it tells us little about the origins of monarchianism.
Despite all of the questions that Adversus Praxean leaves unanswered, scholars are
relatively confident about dating the text to ca. 213 C.E.119 Tertullian’s emphasis on the

See Evans’ discussion of external evidence for this dating (“Introduction,” 18). See also René
Braun’s suggestion that it was written in 213 or shortly after. Braun also gives a short summary of dating
proposals by major scholars (Deus Christianorum: Recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien,
2nd ed., Collection des études augustiniennes 70 [Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1977], 576). Timothy
David Barnes dates the text a bit earlier—to 210/11 (Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985], 55). Andrew McGowan notes that the work certainly comes from Tertullian’s
Montanist period and places it sometime in the second decade of the third century (“Tertullian and the
‘Heretical’ Origins of the ‘Orthodox’ Trinity,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 14, no. 4 [2006]: 440).
119
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Paraclete and prophecy throughout the text lets us confidently place it during the
beginning of his Montanist phase.120 Tertullian directs his ire against Praxeas because “he
drove out prophecy and introduced heresy: he put to flight the Paraclete and crucified the
Father.”121
Although there is relative certainty about the dating of the text to the earliest years
of Tertullian’s Montanist phase, there are many basic questions that the text leaves
unanswered. Chief among these is the question of the exact identity of Praxeas, for whom
we have no further attestation beyond Adversus Praxean and works that seem to be
dependent on it.122 Tertullian gives us two major pieces of data about Praxeas, neither of
which does much to help us identify him with any precision. First, Tertullian recounts
that Praxeas journeyed from Asia to Rome.123 Given the paucity of other details about
Praxeas’ life, his Asian origin does little to help us identify him.124 Tertullian next
For the role of Tertullian’s Montanism in his articulation of the Trinity against the
monarchians, see McGowan, “Tertullian and the ‘Heretical’ Origins of the ‘Orthodox’ Trinity.”
120
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.5 (trans. Evans, 131): prophetiam expulit et haeresin intulit,
Paracletum fugauit et Patrem crucifixit. Unless otherwise noted, all Latin of Adversus Praxean is from
Tertullian, Tertulliani Opera: Pars II, ed. A Kroymann and Ernest Evans, Corpus Christianorum, Series
Latina 2 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1954).
122

Praxeas is mentioned in Ps. Tertullian, Adversus omnium haereses 8.4. We know very little
about the author of this text, although scholars have noted that it has some interesting similarities with the
Refutatio ascribed to Hippolytus. See William Tabbernee, Fake Prophecy and Polluted Sacraments:
Ecclesiastical and Imperial Reactions to Montanism, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 84 (Leiden: Brill,
2007), 78–9. The work itself does not add anything to our knowledge of Praxeas, so I will not treat it
further.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.4.
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This geographical information, however, is useful for trying to reconstruct different streams or
schools of monarchianism. See, for example, Heine’s discussion of Roman and Asian schools of
monarchianism discussed above (“The Christology of Callistus,” 78-89). Decker especially focuses on the
fact that both Noetus and Praxeas are said to have come from Asia. He concludes, unconvincingly, that
theologians from Asia Minor focused on the action of the one God in history, while theologians from the
West were focused about differentiation between God and creatures and differentiation within the
Godhead. See especially his “Die Monarchianer,” 203–5. Such sweeping assertions about differences
between East and West with regard to Trinitarian theology were accepted when Decker wrote his
dissertation, but they have since been criticized.
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complains that Praxeas somehow gained the ear of the bishop of Rome and convinced
him to reject Montanist teachings.125 Tertullian’s statements give the impression that
Montanism had gained a favorable hearing in at least some sectors of the church in Rome
and that the hierarchy of the church there had not formally rejected it.126
Even with the scarcity of biographical information about Praxeas, scholars have
ventured a number of theories about his identity and activity. Hermann Hagemann argued
that Praxeas was a pseudonym for Callistus.127 Others have argued that Praxeas was not a
pseudonym. Bardy thought that the identification of Praxeas with Callistus faced “too
many difficulties to be sustained.”128 Harnack noted the many “hazardous hypotheses”
that had been advanced regarding Praxeas before arguing that Praxeas was operative in
Rome during the episcopate of Victor. This brief sojourn in Rome, thought Harnack, was
followed by Praxeas’ journey to Carthage.129 Like Harnack, La Piana and Bardy suggest
that Praxeas was operative in Rome during the episcopate of Victor.130 Evans, however,
finds plausible the suggestions that Praxeas might have been a pseudonym.131 Moingt
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.5.
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For a discussion of the question of Montanism in Rome at the beginning of the third century,
see La Piana, “The Roman Church at the End of the Second Century,” 244-251.

See Hagemann’s lengthy section “Wer war Praxeas” in his Die römische Kirche und ihr
Einfluss auf Disciplin und Dogma in den drei ersten Jahrhunderten (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1864), 234–57.
127

Gustave Bardy, “Monarchianisme,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, contenant
l’exposé des doctrines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, ed. Alfred Vacant, E.
Mangenot, and Émile Amann, vol. 10.2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1929), 2203.
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Harnack, History of Dogma, 3:59–60.
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Bardy, “Monarchianisme,” 2197. Not surprisingly, Henri Leclercq adopts Bardy’s conclusions
in “Monarchianisme,” in Dictionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie, ed. Fernand Cabrol and
Henri Leclercq, vol. 11.2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1934), 1953–5. La Piana further argues that Praxeas
convinced Victor to drive out Montanism (“The Roman Church at the End of the Second Century,” 246–7).
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Evans, “Introduction,” 10–11.
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rejects the suggestion in older German scholarship and the work of Evans that Praxeas
was really a pseudonym that Tertullian used to address the views of someone such as
Callistus.132 He sees no reason for us to doubt the separate existence of a Praxeas. Stuart
Hall has advanced the speculative claim that Praxeas is really a pseudonym for
Irenaeus.133 More recently, Allen Brent has taken up the old view that Praxeas is actually
a pseudonym for Callistus.134 Ronald Heine has proposed something of a hybrid theory.
He argues that a real Praxeas was operative in Rome, but that Tertullian was also
addressing the views of Callistus under the name of Praxeas.135 There is scarcely enough
data to determine with any certainty whether a Praxeas actually existed or was merely a
pseudonym used by Tertullian. Our inability to know even this most basic fact about
Praxeas does not, however, invalidate the usefulness of this treatise for reconstructing the
monarchian position.

132
See, Joseph Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, vol. 1, Théologie 68 (Paris: Aubier,
1966), 91 n. 2.

Stuart George Hall, “Praxeas and Irenaeus,” Studia Patristica 14.3 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1976), 145–47. Hall’s suggestion is tenuous. It is based on an impressionistic reading of the texts, and he
fails to produce strong evidence for his claims. The following quotation sums up his reasoning, which is
quite abbreviated: “Irenaeus was a figure already revered in the whole Western Church. His great book had
been put into Latin. Tertullian himself, in his early days, borrowed from him. But in the crucial issue of
Tertullian's life, Irenaeus was on the wrong side. He had persuaded Rome against the new prophecy. So
when Tertullian gets the chance, he pins theological heresy upon the honoured theologian of the Catholics.
He had not only exiled the Paraclete; he had crucified the Father” (147).
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Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century, 525–9.

Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 59–60. The identification of Praxeas with Callistus
depends on a specific confluence of the rise of Callistus in Rome and the composition of Adversus
Praxean. If we assume that Adversus Praxean was written in 213 and we accept the identification of
Praxeas and Callistus, we must propose that Callistus had developed enough influence in Rome prior to 213
to attract the attention of Tertullian. The Refutatio does suggest that Callistus was already making his
influence felt before his elevation to the episcopacy, but the exact chronology of this whole scenario is
murky. If, however, we push the date of composition for Adversus Praxean later by a few years, the
probability that Callistus was wielding power in Rome is substantially higher. Even this reasoning,
however, relies on the hostile witness of the Refutatio. In the absence of more reliable evidence, theories
about the identification of Praxeas and Callistus must remain conjecture, although this conjecture does
seem probable.
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Another question that this text leaves unanswered is how exactly the monarchian
teaching made its way to Tertullian. Scholars have advanced numerous theories to
account for the transmission of this teaching, and these are often drawn from scholars’
imaginations as much as from concrete data. Harnack suggests that Praxeas journeyed
from Rome to Carthage, evidence for which is nowhere found in the primary literature.136
Moingt, on the other hand, believes that Praxeas’ followers, not praxeas himself, carried
his teaching to Carthage.137 Again, none of these suggestions is supported by concrete
data from the text. All we can say with certainty is that sometime prior to 213, Tertullian
had encountered the monarchian teaching that he attributes to a certain Praxeas.
Furthermore, this teaching seems to have been accepted by a large portion of the Roman
population (the simplices). Any conclusions beyond these data must be provisional
because of the lack of evidence.
Textual Analysis

Although Adversus Praxean offers little in the way of historical background of the
monarchian position, it provides a store of data that is useful for reconstructing the
monarchian teachings during the first quarter of the third century. Hippolytus’ treatment

Harnack, History of Dogma, 3:59–61; idem, “Monarchianism,” in The New Schaff-Herzog
Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson and George William Gilmore, vol. 7
(Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker, 1963), 459.
136
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Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, 1:94. Moingt later proposes (p. 100) a chronology
for the events in question: “Nous proposons en conséquence cette chronologie. Peu avant 200, venue et
agitation de Praxéas à Rome; 200-202, arrivée de ses émissaires à Carthage, première crise et rétractation
du docteur; 202-204, agnitio Paracleti (fin des écrits purement 'catholiques' de Tertullien vers 204-205, et
apparition dès cette époque des écrits à tendances montanistes); vers 208, defensio Paracleti (ouvrages de
propagande puis de polémique montaniste), suivie de la rupture avec l'église officielle (vraisemblablement
antérieure aux prodromes de la persécution, soit à 211); 212-214, second crise et Adv. Praxean; 214-215
(au plus tard), De Pudicitia et fin de l'activité littéraire de Tertullien.” Ibid., 1:100.
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of monarchianism in Contra Noetum is frontloaded with a summary of core monarchian
teachings and the exegesis of certain passages used to support these positions. After
Hippolytus summarizes the monarchian positions, he offers alternative exegesis and an
exposition of what he considers to be true teaching. Tertullian does not lay out the
monarchian positions and scriptural passages quite as neatly as Hippolytus.138
Monarchian positions and exegetical tendencies are scattered throughout the treatise.
Tertullian also spends much more time than does Hippolytus offering alternatives directly
opposed to those of the monarchians. For example, Tertullian expends a great deal of
energy trying to wrest the term “monarchy” from his opponents and to show that it can be
used without destroying distinction in the Godhead.139 Simonetti argues that the treatise
presents a more advanced version of monarchian teaching than Contra Noetum.140
One God

Like Hippolytus, Tertullian spends a great deal of time addressing the monarchian
assertion of the absolute unity of God. In the first words of Adversus Praxean, Tertullain
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Simonetti notes that Adversus Praxean is often rambling and is not as well-organized as Contra
Noetum (“Due note su Ippolito,” 126).
For discussions of Tertullian’s positive use of monarchia and its background, see Kevin B.
McCruden, “Monarchy and Economy in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeam,” Scottish Journal of Theology 55,
no. 3 (2002): 325–37; T. Verhoeven, “Monarchia dans Tertullien, Adversus Praxean,” Vigiliae Christianae
5, no. 1 (1951): 43–48. Verhoeven focuses on the background of the term. He argues that the major
scholars who discuss its usage (Prestige, Lebreton, Evans) do not pay enough attention to the Hellenistic
Jewish context in which it was used by the likes of Philo. Verhoeven argues that within Hellenistic
Judaism, it was a defense against pagan polytheism. McCruden focuses a bit more attention on why the
Monarchians might have been using the term.
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Simonetti, “Due note su Ippolito,” 128. See especially Adversus Praxean 27-29, where
Tertullian’s testimony shows that there was an early impulse to move away from overt claims of
patripassianism.
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accuses the devil of making “a heresy out of the unity.”141 Shortly thereafter, Tertullian
bemoans the fact that the Praxean profession holds that it is “impossible to believe in one
God unless it says that both Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same.”142 In
his rendition of the regula fidei immediately preceding this complaint he, like Hippolytus,
states explicitly that he believes in only one God.143 Tertullian’s account of the
monarchians starts with their assertions regarding the strict unity of God because this
seems to have been their most foundational premise, the one that drove all of their other
teaching and exegesis.
As I noted above, Tertullian’s presentation of the monarchian positions is not
nearly as methodical and linear as that of Hippolytus in Contra Noetum. Accordingly,
Tertullian does not here provide us with the core passages the Praxeans used to support
their exclusive understanding of the unity of God. Perhaps one exception to the lack of
exegetical underpinning in his presentation of the Praxean understanding of the unity of
God is a brief reference to Isa. 45:5. Tertullian states, “Therefore there is one God, the
Father, and besides him there is no other, and he himself who introduces this <statement>
is denying, not the Son, but another god: whereas the Son is not another <god> than the
Father.”144 Tertullian is not explicit about how his opponents are using this verse, but his
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.1 (trans. Evans, 130): ut et de unico haeresim faciat.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3 (trans. Evans, 132): maxime haec quae se existimat meram
ueritatem possidere, dum unicum deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et Patrem et
Filium et Spiritum dicat.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.1-2. Because he wishes to differentiate his articulation of the
one God from that of the monarchians, he quickly adds that his belief in this one God is subject to a
dispensation that includes a Son through whom all things are made, a Son who comes from the Father.
144
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 18.3 (trans. Evans, 156): Igitur unus Deus pater et alius absque eo
non est. Quod ipse inferens non Filium negat sed alium deum. Ceterum alius a Patre Filius non est.

139
emphasis makes it probable that they were using it in a way similar to the Noetians’ use
of Isa. 44:6.145 While Tertullian argues that the verse is combatting polytheism, the
Praxeans seem to have suggested that it ruled out Tertullian’s understanding of the Son.
Later in the treatise, Tertullian suggests that Isa. 45:5 was the monarchians’ favorite
passage from the Old Testament:
For as in the old <scriptures> they retain nothing else but, I am God and other
beside me there is not, so in the Gospel they uphold the Lord's answer to Philip, I
and the Father are one, and, He that hath seen me hath also seen the Father, and,
I am in the Father and the Father in me. To these three citations they wish the
whole appurtenance of both testaments to yield, though the smaller number ought
to be understood in accordance with the greater.146
Thus, while Tertullian is not as focused as is Hippolytus on detailing the exegesis used to
underpin the monarchian articulation of the unity of God, he does make it clear that Isa.
45:5 was a key passage for their argument.
This monarchian interpretation of the oneness of God was particularly appealing
for those whom Tertullian calls simple folks. For Tertullian, claims about the oneness of
God must be balanced by assertions about the plurality of God in the economy, a balance
that Tertullian’s simplices seem unable to achieve. Tertullian states, “Simple people…
not understanding that while they must believe in one only <God> yet they must believe
in him along with his economy, shy at the economy.”147 Tertullian, in ways that parallel
Hippolytus closely, argues that the unity of God is administered or distributed in the
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Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.2.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20.1-2 (trans. Evans, 159): Nam sicut in ueteribus nihil aliud
tenant quam Ego Deus et alius praeter me non est, ita in euangelio responsionem Domini ad Philippum
tuentur: Ego et Pater unum sumus, et: Qui me uiderit, uidit et Patrem, et: Ego in Patre et Pater in me. His
tribus capitulis totum instrumentum utriusque testamenti uolunt cedere cum oporteat secundum plura
intellegi pauciora.
147
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.1 (trans. Evans, 132): Simplices enim quique… non
intellegentes unicum quidem sed cum sua oikonomia esse credendum, expauescunt ad oikonomiam.
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economy.148 The monarchian emphasis on the unity of God does not allow for the
admission of any plurality into the Godhead. Although Tertullian’s discussion of the
monarchian emphasis on the absolute unity of God is concentrated at the beginning of
Adversus Praxean, he returns to the claim later in the treatise as well.149
It appears as though the Praxeans used the term “monarchy” to signify an
exclusive understanding of the unity of God. Tertullian sums up their position succinctly:
They claim that the plurality and ordinance of trinity is a division of unity—
although a unity which derives from itself a trinity is not destroyed but
administered. And so <people> put it about that by us two or even three <gods>
are preached, while they, they claim, are worshippers of one God—as though
unity irrationally summed up did not make heresy and Trinity rationally counted
out constitute truth. “We hold”, they say, “to the monarchy”: and even Latins so
expressively frame the sound, and in so masterly a fashion, that you would think
they understood monarchy as well as they pronounce it: but while Latins are
intent to shout out “monarchy”, even Greeks refuse to understand the economy.150
Tertullian, however, does not surrender the term “monarchy” to his opponent. In fact, he
places his own claim on the term and demands that it be coupled with a proper
understanding of the economy.151 The fact that Tertullian claims the term “monarchy” for
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See, for example, Adversus Praxean 12.1, where Tertullian tells us that the monarchians were
offended by the plurality of the Trinity.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean: 3.1-2 (trans. Evans, 132-3): Numerum et dispositionem trinitatis
diuisionem praesumunt unitatis, quando unitas ex semetipsa deriuans trinitatem, non destruatur ab illa sed
administretur. Itaque duos et tres iam iactitant a nobis praedicari, se uero unius Dei cultores praesumunt,
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constituat. “Monarchiam, inquiunt, tenemus”, et ita sonum ipsum uocaliter exprimunt etiam Latini, et tam
opifice ut putes illos tam bene intellegere monarchiam quam enuntiant. Sed monarchiam sonare student
Latini, oikonomiam intellegere nolunt etiam Graeci.
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See Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3-4. See also Adversus Praxean 9, where Tertullian argues
that a proper balance must be maintained between the monarchy and the economy.
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himself bears out the argument of Uríbarri, who thinks that Praxeas’ use of the term is
aberrant.152
Also evident in the above quotation is the common accusation that the
monarchians made against their opponents, the charge of ditheism. This charge is
repeated later when Tertullian discusses how both the Father and Son were active in
creation. Tertullian records the objection of the Praxeans, “‘Consequently’, you say, ‘if
God spake and God made, if one God spake and another made, two gods are
preached.’”153 Shortly thereafter, Tertullian has them repeating the accusation, “I will
challenge you, today, also by the authority of those scriptures consistently to preach two
gods and two lords.”154 Tertullian stridently denies that he has ever proclaimed two gods
or two lords, but the monarchian accusation persists.155
Tertullian suggests that the monarchians were offended by the Trinity because “it
is not combined in a simple unity (unitate simplici).”156 It is in the context of his
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Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 148–50. If Uríbarri is correct, Tertullian here
represents the traditional usage of the term. Given the absence of the term in many of the other monarchian
works, I think Uríbarri is correct in proposing that Praxeas’ usage is a distortion of the traditional sense.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 13.1 (trans. Evans, 146): Ergo, inquis, si Deus dixit et Deus fecit,
si alius Deus dixit et alius fecit, duo dii praedicantur.
154

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 13.5 (trans. Evans, 147): prouocabo te ut hodie quoque ex
auctoritate istarum scripturarum constanter duos deos et duos dominos praedices. For another iteration of
this charge, see Adversus Praxean 23.7, where Tertullian states, “Though it were the case that we spoke of
two divided <from each other>, as you put it about that we do, yet it were more tolerable to preach two
divided than one chameleon god” (trans. Evans, 166): Vt sic duos diuisos diceremus, quomodo iactitatis,
tolerabilius erat duos diuisos quam unum Deum uersipellem praedicare. Tertullian, of course, argued
strongly that the Father and Son were not divided in his understanding; they were distinct. With the
chameleon image, Tertullian accuses them of positng a God who masquerades using different visages for
which there is no underlying distinction.
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Tertullian repeatedly claims that the Father and Son are two. He qualifies this statement in a
number of ways: two, but inseparable; two persons, not two things, indivisibly two, etc. For a dense cluster
of these assertions, see Adversus Praxean 22.
156

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 12.1 (trans. Evans, 145).
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discussion of this “simple unity” that Tertullian mockingly asks if God speaks in the
plural in the Genesis 1:26 because God is “father-son-spirit” (pater filius spiritus). The
occurrence of this pater filius spiritus language here calls to mind the teachings about the
υἱοπάτωρ often attributed to Sabellius.157 If this pater filius spiritus language is fulfilling
the same function as the allegedly Sabellian υἱοπάτωρ, it is quite possible that Sabellius
himself was pulling on an earlier tradition, perhaps that of Praxeas and his followers.
Although he gives few details about the exegetical underpinnings of the Praxean claim
that there is only one God, Tertullian’s responses to this claim are littered throughout the
work. Tertullian repeatedly asserts that he too believes in one God, but he always
qualifies his assertion to make it clear that his understanding of the unity of God is
different from that of his opponents.
Father and Son

As in Hippolytus’ account of monarchianism, Tertullian bears witness to the fact
that the bedrock claim that God is absolutely one was foundational for other core
monarchian positions. Also like Hippolytus, Tertullian deals at length with one of the
main conclusions the monarchians drew from this assertion: arguing for the absolute
identity of the Father and Son. At the beginning of the treatise, Tertullian reproduces a
classic expression of the identity, stating, “and in particular this [teaching/heresy] which
supposes itself to possess truth unadulterated while it thinks it ought not to believe in one

157
See, for example, Eusebius’ attribution of this teaching to Sabellius at De ecclesiastica
theologia 1.1.2.
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God unless it says that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same.”158
Although the “one and the same” formula does not occur in Contra Noetum, it seems to
have become a standard formula for the monarchian assertion of the identity of the Father
and Son.159 Tertullian repeats the formula often in Adversus Praxean.160 In the above
quotation, Tertullian adds a reference to the Spirit, which does not appear to have been a
focus for the monarchians in the other extant witnesses. The vast majority of their claims
were about the absolute identity of the Father and Son, without any reference to the
Spirit.161
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3 (trans. Evans, 132 with my modification): maxime haec quae
se existimat meram ueritatem possidere, dum unicum Deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum
eundemque et Fatrem et Filium et Spiritum dicat.
159
See, for example, the very formulaic use of it in the Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.10.11-12,
where the author reports on the teaching of Noetus: “For in this manner he thinks to establish the monarchy
of God, alleging that Father and Son, so called, are one and the same, not one individual produced from a
different one, but himself from himself; and that he is styled by name Father and Son, according to
vicissitude of times” (οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ
υἱόν, γινόμενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ· ὀνόματι μὲν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καλούμενον
κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν). Translation from ANF, 5.128 with modifications Greek from Hippolytus, Refutatio
Omnium Haeresium, ed. Miroslav Marcovich, Patristische Texte Und Studien, Bd. 25 (New York ; Berlin:
W. De Gruyter, 1986), 348–349.
160
161

See Adversus Praxean 14, 15, 18, 27.

Perhaps Tertullian has inserted the Spirit into a standard formula here. Another explanation is
also possible. The author of the Refutatio argues that some of the Montanists were also followers of the
doctrine of Noetus. See Refutatio 10.26. If there was actually a confluence of Montanists and Noetians, it is
possible that it could have influenced a form of monarchianism that paid more attention, at least nominally,
to the Spirit. For a discussion of the possible relationship between Montanists and Noetians, see Alistair
Stewart-Sykes, “The Asian Context of the New Prophecy and of Epistula Apostolorum,” Vigiliae
Christianae 51, no. 4 (1997): 432–3. However, nearly everywhere else that Tertullian interacts with
monarchian charges, he is dealing with the Father and Son. He is constantly arguing that they are two while
guarding against the charge of ditheism. While Tertullian certainly mentions the Spirit when he is
articulating some of his own views, his engagement with the monarchians is largely binitarian, most likely
because the monarchians framed their argument almost exclusively in terms of the Father and Son.
Although I find his interpretation of monarchianism implausible, Daniel Boyarin also notes that the
monarchian controversy was mainly focused on the Father and Son. See Daniel Boyarin, “Two Powers in
Heaven: Or, the Making of a Heresy,” in The Idea of Biblical Interpretation, ed. Hindy Najman and Judith
H. Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 346; idem, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity,
Divinations (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 137.
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Tertullian explicitly hypothesizes that the motivation behind the monarchian
identification of the Father and Son was safeguarding the unity of God. He writes the
following: “Therefore if their reason for thinking they must believe the identity of the
Father and the Son has been that they may prove their case for the unity of God….”162
Tertullian was particularly troubled by this teaching of the identity of the Father and Son,
and it is clear in his rebuttal that he finds it completely preposterous. Employing a
mocking tone, Tertullian pushes his opponents regarding their formulations of the
generation of the Son from the Father. He sallies, “Further, you who identify Father and
Son, cause the same one both to have brought forth from himself that which is God, and
as such to have come forth.”163 Tertullian continues to challenge his opponents, saying,
“If you will have me believe that the Father himself is also the Son, show me that it is
stated elsewhere in this form, The Lord said to himself, I am my son, today have I
begotten myself.”164 In this quotation, Tertullian is employing what comes to be an
important method for refuting the monarchian claims about the identity of the Father and
the Son: the use of grammatical exegesis.165
Within this grammatical exegesis, interpreters paid close attention to the persons
(or speakers or actors) revealed in a given passage. At multiple points in Adversus
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 19.7 (trans. Evans, 158): Igitur si propterea eundem et Patrem et
Filium credendum putauerunt ut unum Deum uindicent….
163

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.1 (trans. Evans, 143): porro qui eundem Patrem dicis et
Filium, eundem et protulisse ex semetipso facis et prodisse.
164
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.3 (trans. Evans, 143): Si uelis ut credam ipsum esse Patrem et
Filium, ostende sic pronuntiatum alibi, “Dominus dixit ad se: filius meus sum ego, ego hodie generaui
me”.
165
Use of this method of reading during the onarchian controversy has been ably documented by
Mark DelCogliano in his “The Interpretation of John 10:30.”
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Praxean, Tertullian focuses his exegesis on who is speaking in a passage and to whom
that person is speaking.166 Another good example of this approach is Tertullian’s exegesis
of 1 Cor. 15:24-28., a passage that was also very important in later Trinitarian debates.
Tertullian argues,
By this one passage of the apostolic epistle we have already been able to show
that Father and Son are two, besides <by deduction> from the names Father and
Son, also from the fact that he who has delivered the kingdom and he to whom he
has delivered it, as also he who has subjected it and he to whom he has subjected
it, must of necessity be two.167
In this passage, Tertullian identified two actors. If the Son delivered the kingdom to the
Father, argued Tertullian, the Son and Father cannot be the same. As DelCogliano notes,
this exegetical technique gained widespread usage and was a central feature in the
refutation of monarchian positions. Tertullian and other users of this anti-monarchian
technique had at their disposal a host of passages that spoke of action between the Father
and Son.168 Tertullian even codified this rule for interpreting scripture:
You however would make him a liar and a deceiver, a disappointer of this faith
<of mine>, if being himself his own son he assigned the role of son to another,
since all the scriptures display both the demonstration and the distinctness of the
Trinity: and from them is derived also our standing rule, that speaker and person
spoken of and person spoken to cannot be regarded as one and the same, for as
much as neither wilfulness nor deception befits God as that, being himself the one
spoken to, he should prefer to speak to another and not to himself.169
166

See ibid., 120.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 4.4 (trans. Evans, 134): Hoc uno capitulo epistolae apostolicae
potuimus iam et Patrem et Filium ostendisse duos esse, praeterquam ex nominibus Patris et Filii etiam ex
eo quod qui tradidit regnum et cui tradidit, item qui subiecit et cui subiecit duo sint necesse est.
168

For another notable example of this argument, see Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 12.1. There
Tertullian writes, “If you are still offended by the plurality of the Trinity, on the ground that it is not
combined in simple unity, I ask you how it is that one only single <person> speaks in the plural, Let us
make man after our image and likeness, when he ought to have said, Let me make man after my image and
likeness, as being one only single <person>… Or was he speaking to the angels, as the Jews explain it,
because they, like you, do not recognise the Son?” (trans. Evans, 145).
169

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.4 (trans. Evans, 144): Tu porro eum mendacem efficias et
fallacem et deceptorem fidei huius si, cum ipse esset sibi filius, alii dabat filii personam quando scripturae
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For Tertullian, a responsible reading of the text could never collapse the distinct actors
into one as the monarchians did. These grammatical reading techniques gave authors an
arsenal of passages that became an important polemical tool against monarchianism.
Within a few generations, this reading technique had become commonplace.170
In the passage I quoted in the previous section, Tertullian gave the three favorite
passages of the Praxeans: Isa. 45:5, Jn 10:30, and Jn 14:9-11.171 Later, Tertullian further
discusses their use of Jn 10:30 and shows that it was one of their favorite passages for
arguing for the identity of the Father and Son:
Here then they wish to make a stand, these fools, yea blind, who see not, first, that
'I and the Father' is an indication of two; secondly, at the end <of the sentence>,
that 'are' is not from the person of one, because it is spoken in the plural; and then,
that he says 'are one <thing>', not 'are one <person>'. For if he had said 'are one
<person>' he would have been able to assist their case: for 'one <person>' is
apparently an indication of the singular number. Yet when he says that two, of the
masculine gender are one <thing>, in the neuter—which is not concerned with
singularity but with unity, with similitude, with conjunction, with the love of the
Father who loveth the Son, and with the obedience of the Son who obeys the

omnes et demonstrationem et distinctionem trinitatis ostendant a quibus et praescriptio nostra deducitur
non posse unum atque eundem uideri qui loquitur et de quo loquitur et ad quem loquitur, quia neque
peruersitas neque fallacia deo congruat ut, cum ipse esset ad quem loquebatur, ad alium potius et non ad
semetipsum loqueretur.
170

Tertullian used other techniques to combat the identification of the Father and Son. One
example can be seen in Adversus Praxean 10. There, Tertullian argues that the terms Father and Son
necessarily imply two who are mutually distinguished from each other. He argues that the monarchians
want one person to be both terms of the relationship, but that this is nonsensical. For an excellent
discussion of Tertullian’s use of Stoic logic in Adversus Praxean 10, see Gerald P. Boersma, “The Logic of
the Logos: A Note on Stoic Logic in Adversus Praxean 10,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 22, no. 4
(2014): 485–98. Boersma argues that chapter 10 is the heart of the treatise: “The heart of the treatise is to
be found, I believe, in section 10. Here Tertullian establishes his guiding theological hermeneutic—the
ground that sustains the rest of the treatise. Thus, in the rest of the work Tertullian mines the Scriptures,
especially the Gospel of John, for all the key passages in which Christ distinguishes himself from the
Father. As such, the guiding principles of logic and language that Tertullian lays down in Adversus Praxean
10 serve to aid in correctly understanding the scriptural distinction of Father and Son laid out in the rest of
the work." (487) I also argue in my last chapter that surbordinationism was another common antimonarchian tool at the beginning of the third century.
171

See Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20.1-2.
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Father's will--when he says, One <thing> are I and the Father, he shows that
those whom he equates and conjoins are two.172
That the Praxeans focused on John 10:30 is not surprising. Remember that Hippolytus
worked to counteract the Noetians’ apparent use of this passage in Contra Noetum.173
There are striking similarities between the rebuttals that Hippolytus and Tertullian give of
this passage. Both focus on the fact that the verb (sumus in this case) is plural, not
singular. Tertullian goes further in his analysis of John 10:30 and focuses on the fact that
“one” (unum) is in the neuter. Tertullian focuses on this fact to show that the unity of
Father and Son is not a personal unity. Although “one” (ἕν) is also neuter in the Greek,
Hippolytus does not cite this fact as further evidence that the Father and Son are not one
in the sense that the monarchians would have it. If Tertullian was drawing on Contra
Noetum, he appears to have taken the basic argument of Hippolytus and added further
proof to it. Since John 10:30 was so important for the monarchians, it would be little
surprise if Tertullian sought to bolster a pre-existing anti-monarchian reading of the
verse.174

172
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 22.10-11 (trans. Evans, 164). Note Tertullian’s focus on the
distinction between unus and unum: Hic ergo iam gradum uolunt figere stulti, immo caeci, qui non uideant
primo "ego et pater" duorum esse significationem, dehinc in nouissimo "sumus" non ex unius esse personae
quod pluraliter dictum est, tunc quod "unum sumus", non "unus sumus" <dicit>. Si enim dixisset: "unus
sumus", potuisset adiuuare sententiam illorum, unus enim singularis numeri significatio uidetur. Adhuc
cum duo masculini generis unum dicit neutrali uerbo (quod non pertinet ad singularitatem sed ad unitatem,
ad similitudinem, ad coniunctionem, ad dilectionem patris qui filium diligit et ad obsequium filii qui
uoluntati patris obsequitur): vnum sumus, dicens, ego et pater, ostendit duos esse quos aequat et iungit.
173

See especially Contra Noetum 7.1.

Just following the passage I quoted, Tertullian notes that Jesus says “I and the Father are one”
in order to show that he is the Son of God, not “God himself (ipsum deum).” Although beyond the
immediate scope of this chapter, it is interesting to note that when he wishes to call both the Father and Son
“God” yet maintain their distinction, he will argue that the Father is ipsum deum. This understanding of the
Father as ipsum deum fits well with Tertullian’s conception of divine monarchy wherein the Father is God
most fully and the Son is God derivatively or by ordinance. This approach is also, in many ways, similar to
Origen’s discussion of God with and without the article in ComJn 2.13-32. I discuss Origen’s treatment of
this issue at length in the last chapter.
174
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Visible

Tertullian expends a great deal of energy discussing questions of the visibility and
invisibility of God. As is clear from the earlier discussion of Contra Noetum, this
question also occupied the Noetians. Whereas the Noetians focused on Baruch 3:36-38
and Isaiah 45:14-15, Tertullian’s discussion is primarily concerned with the proper
interpretation of Exodus 33:20.175 Despite the difference in passages used, the same
exegetical moves are present in both Hippolytus’ and Tertullian’s accounts of
monarchianism.
Tertullian opens his section on the visibility and invisibility of God by offering an
interpretation of Exodus 33:20 that is standard for the early third century. For Tertullian,
this passage vindicates his claim about the duality of the Father and Son: “Once more, we
have the support in our vindication of the duality of the Father and the Son, of that rule
which has defined God as invisible.”176 The tension between the claim that Moses spoke
to God face to face and lived (Ex. 33:11) and that none shall see God and live (Ex. 33:20)
did not go unnoticed by Tertullian. He diffused this tension by repeating the already
commonplace assertion that the God who was seen face to face by Moses was in fact the
Son. He escapes the apparent difficulty in the following way:

175

One expects to see Exodus 33:20 as the centerpiece of a debate about the visibility of God.
Indeed, this verse is perhaps the locus classicus for discussing these matters. Hippolytus’ discussion of
visibility and invisibility, on the other hand, treats monarchian exegesis of passages that seem less directly
related to the question at hand. The fact that Tertullian and Hippolytus do not include the same passages in
their discussion of visibility and invisibility might suggest that there is not as strong of a relationship of
dependence between the two as some have suggested. Alternatively, if a strong relationship is maintained,
it could be that the specific opponents of each author used different passages to make common claims.
176
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean: 14.1 (trans. Evans, 148): Adhuc et illa nobis regula adsistit duos
uindicantibus patrem et filium, quae inuisibilem deum determinauit.
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So then it will be another who was seen, for it is impossible for the same one who
was seen, to be characterised as invisible: and it will follow that we must
understand the Father as invisible because of the fulness of his majesty, but must
acknowledge the Son as visible because of the enumeration of his derivation, just
as we may not look upon the sun in respect of the total of its substance which is in
the sky, though we can with our eyes bear its beam because of the moderation of
the assignment which from thence reaches out to the earth.177
Like many of his forebears and contemporaries, Tertullian argued that it was in fact the
Son who was visible in the OT theophanies. Thus, for Tertullian, the apparent tension in
this text becomes grounds to assert the duality of the Father and Son.
The monarchians against whom Tertullian was writing were also well aware of
the tension presented in the biblical text. The monarchians apparently welcomed this
tension within the text, for they attributed both visibility and invisibility to the same
God.178 In Tertullian’s account, the first move the monarchians made was to consider the
ways in which scripture speaks of the Son. Tertullian says that his opponents wish to
claim that in addition to being visible in the incarnation, “the Son is also invisible as
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.3 (trans. Evans, 149): Iam ergo alius erit qui uidebatur, quia
non potest idem inuisibilis definiri, qui uidebatur, et consequens erit ut inuisibilem patrem intellegamus pro
plenitudine maiestatis, uisibilem uero filium agnoscamus pro modulo deriuationis, sicut nec solem nobis
contemplari licet, quantum ad ipsam substantiae summam quae est in caelis, radium autem eius toleramus
oculis pro temperatura portionis quae in terram inde porrigitur. Tertullian’s emphasis that it is the Son’s
derivation from the Father that allows him to be seen is important for my later examination of Origen’s
Trinitarian theology within the context of other third century theologians. Although Tertullian does not
state it explicitly, it seems that whatever it was that prevented the Father from being visible was not
transferred to the Son in the process of derivation.
178

Note here that this is one of the same paired opposites that the author of the Refutatio attributes
to his opponents in an attempt to show that they derive their teachings from the philosophy of Heraclitus.
Not present in Tertullian’s account, however, are any of the author of the Refutatio’s tendentious assertions
of monarchian dependence upon Heraclitus. Given the centrality of discussions about the visibility and
invisibility of God in the monarchian system, it is highly probable that the monarchians did claim that God
is both visible and invisible. In an attempt to discredit their teaching, however, the author of the Refutatio
constructed a link between this teaching and the philosophy of Heraclitus that probably was not actually
present in the monarchian system. For an in-depth discussion of these antitheses, see Mouraviev,
“Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët.” Note also that the antitheses feature prominently in the general argument of
Hübner. He claims that the antitheses are early snippets from an anti-Gnostic rule of faith. These claims run
throughout all of his work on monarchianism. See the collection of his essays: Hübner, Der Paradox Eine.
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Word and Spirit.”179 With this move, the monarchians were able to argue that there is
precedent for attributing both visibility and invisibility to the same one.
After claiming that the same one can be visible and invisible, the monarchians
used their oft-repeated assertion of the identification of the Father and the Son. Tertullian
rehearses their argument as follows:
For they also add this to their quibbling, that if on that occasion it was the Son
speaking to Moses, he pronounced his own face visible to no man, because of
course he was the invisible Father himself under the name of Son. And
consequently they wish the visible one and the invisible one to be taken as
identical, in the same way as <they wish> Father and Son <to be taken as>
identical, because also a little earlier, before he refused Moses <the sight of> his
face, it is written that the Lord spake to Moses face to face as a man speaks to his
friend, and furthermore that Jacob says, I have seen the Lord face to face:
consequently the same one is visible and invisible: and because the same one has
both attributes, therefore also the invisible Father is himself visible as being also
the Son.180
Later, Tertullian restates the position of his opponents: “Our adversary will argue that
both are rightly spoken, <since he was> visible in the incarnation but invisible before the
incarnation; and that consequently the Father, invisible before the incarnation, is the same
<Person> as the Son, visible in the incarnation.”181 Tertullian and the monarchians
offered competing and opposite interpretations of the same passages. When Tertullian
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.4 (trans. Evans, 149): Hic ex diuerso uolet aliquis etiam filium
inuisibilem contendere, ut sermonem, ut spiritum.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.5 (trans. Evans, 149): Nam et illud adicient ad
argumentationem quod, si filius tunc ad moysen loquebatur, ipse faciem suam nemini uisibilem
pronuntiarit quia scilicet ipse inuisibilis pater fuerit in filii nomine. Ac per hoc sic eundem uolunt accipi et
uisibilem et inuisibilem, quomodo eundem patrem et filium, quoniam et paulo supra, antequam faciem
moysi neget, scriptum sit dominum ad moysen locutum coram uelut si quis loquatur ad amicum suum, non
minus quam et iacob: ego uidi, inquit, deum facie ad faciem. "Ergo uisibilis et inuisibilis idem, et quia idem
utrumque, ideo et ipse pater inuisibilis, quia et filius, uisibilis".
181

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 15.3 (trans. Evans, 151): Ad hanc diuersitatem uisi et inuisi in
unum conferendam qui ex diuerso nobis argumentabitur recte utrumque dictum, uisibilem quidem in carne,
inuisibilem uero ante carnem, ut idem sit pater inuisibilis ante carnem qui et filius uisibilis in carne.
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considered these passages together, he saw them as clearly demonstrating that the Father
and Son must be two, the Father invisible and the Son visible. The monarchians, on the
other hand, took these passages as manifesting that the same God was both visible and
invisible, both Father and Son, one and the same.
Tertullian’s discussion of the visibility of God and its implications for the
distinction of the Father and Son is concentrated in Adversus Praxean 14-17. Noticeably
absent from this concentrated discussion of the visibility of God, however, is any mention
of John 14:9-11. The absence of this passage here is striking because Tertullian elsewhere
indicates that this was one of the Praxeans’ favorite passages.182 Even more, John 14:9
(he who has seen me has seen the Father) would seem to fit their argument perfectly here.
There is a high probability that the Praxeans did use John 14:9-11 to argue that the same
God is both visible and invisible, but for undisclosed reasons, Tertullian has omitted it
from his most concentrated discussion of the visibility of God.
Became Incarnate, Suffered, and Died

Tertullian repeatedly attacked his opponents because of the consequences their
views had on teaching about the incarnation. The monarchian position on the incarnation
is straightforward: God “made himself his own Son.”183 As with some of their other
claims, the testimony of Tertullian shows that the monarchians were aware that their
position seemed to entail an impossibility. They responded to this difficulty as follows,
“But”, <they say>, “to God nothing is difficult.” Who does not know it? And who
is not aware that things impossible with the world are possible with God? Also
182

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20.1-2.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 10.1 (trans. Evans, 141): Ipse se, inquiunt, Filium sibi fecit.
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God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the things that are
wise. We have read it all. “Consequently”, they say, “it was not difficult for God
to make himself both Father and Son, contrary to the law traditional in human
affairs: for it was not difficult for God, contrary to nature, to cause the barren
woman to bear—or even the virgin.”184
For the monarchians, the claim that the same God was Father and Son is of the same
order as the claim that the same God is both visible and invisible. They did not shy away
from teachings that ostensibly entailed contradiction.185
Tertullian draws out the implications of the monarchian teaching on the
incarnation in such a manner that the connections between this teaching and the claim of
the identity of the Father and Son are clear. Tertullian states,
Yet these people bring [the Father] down into Mary's womb, and set him at
Pilate's judgement seat, and shut him up in Joseph's sepulchre. Hence therefore it
is evident that they are astray. For not knowing that from the beginning the whole
course of the divine ordinance has come down through the Son, they believe that
the Father himself both was seen and conversed and wrought, and suffered thirst
and hunger, in spite of the prophet who says The eternal God shall never thirst
nor hunger at all—and how much more shall he neither die nor be buried—and
that thus the one God, that is, the Father, has always done those things which <in
fact> have been performed by <the agency of> the Son.186
For Tertullian, the claim that the Father became his own Son entailed a whole host of
problems, including the attribution of every event in the life of Christ to the Father. If, as
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 10.7 (trans. Evans, 142): Sed nihil deo difficile, quis hoc nesciat?
et: impossibilia apud saeculum possibilia apud deum, quis ignoret? et: stulta mundi elegit deus, ut
confundat sapientia. Legimus omnia. ‘Ergo, inquiunt, difficile non fuit deo ipsum se et patrem et filium
facere aduersus traditam formam rebus humanis. Nam et sterilem parere contra naturam difficile deo non
fuit, sicut nec uirginem’.
There is also the possibility here that Tertullian is stylizing his opponents’ position here in
order to make them look foolish.
185

186

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 16.6-7 (trans. Evans, 154-5): quem isti in uuluam mariae
deducunt et in pilati tribunal imponunt et in monumentis ioseph reconcludunt. Hinc igitur apparet error
illorum. Ignorantes enim a primordio omnem ordinem diuinae dispositionis per filium decucurrisse, ipsum
credunt patrem et uisum et congressum et operatum et sitim et esuriem passum - aduersus prophetam
dicentem: deus aeternus non sitiet nec esuriet omnino: quanto magis nec morietur nec sepelietur? - et ita
unum deum, id est patrem, semper egisse quae per filium gesta sunt.
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the monarchians claimed, the Father and the Son are the same, one need not try to ascribe
some things to the Son and some to the Father, for they could all be equally ascribed to
Father and Son. For Tertullian, however, it is improper to attribute to the Father many of
the things said of Christ in the gospels, as well as all the apperances of God in the Old
Testament.
Tertullian argued that the attribution of suffering to the Father was improper. The
monarchians, much to Tertullian’s dismay, claimed precisely that the Father did suffer.
Tertullian sums up the monarchian teaching at the beginning of his treatise: “And so,
after <all this> time, a Father who was born, a Father who suffered, God himself the Lord
Almighty, is preached as Jesus Christ.”187 The fact that Tertullian includes this digest of
the most troublesome aspects of monarchian teaching at the beginning of the work is a
close parallel to Hippolytus in Contra Noetum. Later in the work, he accuses the
monarchians of crucifying the Father.188 Tertullian again charges them with claiming that
the Father was both crucified and died.189
Although that they did not have trouble attributing things proper to the Son to the
Father, some monarchians tried to avoid the bald assertion that the Father suffered.
Tertullian states, “Further, if the Father is impassible he is of course incompassible: or if
he is compassible he is of course passible. So you do him no benefit by this fear of yours.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.1 (trans. Evans, 131): Itaque post tempus pater natus et pater
passus, ipse deus dominus omnipotens iesus christus praedicatur.
188

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 10.8.

189

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 29.3.
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For you fear to call passible him whom you do call compassible.”190 This distinction
between passibility and compassibility is elucidated by Heine’s work on Callistus’
Christology. Heine argues that the introduction of the language of compassibility was
meant to distance monarchians from overtly claming that God suffered.191
By employing the techniques of grammatical exegesis, Tertullian seeks to show
how problematic it was to claim that the Father suffered, was crucified, and died:
You have him [the Father] crying aloud at his passion, My God, my God, why hast
thou forsaken me? Consequently either the Son was suffering, forsaken by the
Father, and the Father did not suffer, seeing he had forsaken the Son: or else, if it
was the Father who was suffering, to what God was he crying aloud?192
Thus, for Tertullian, the monarchian claims that the Father suffered were brought about
by a way of reading the text that could not account for all of the main actors. These
problems derived from the monarchian identification of the Father and the Son, which
itself was an outflowing of their strict understanding of the assertion that there is only one
God.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 29.5-6 (trans. Evans, 177): porro si impassibilis pater, utique et
incompassibilis; aut si compassibilis, utique passibilis. Nihil ei uel hoc timore tuo praestas. Times dicere
passibilem quem dicis compassibilem.
191
Heine notes the tension between the claims at the beginning of Adversus Praxean that the
Father suffered and the later claims that the Father was actually compassible. Heine has convincingly
argued that Callistus and the Roman school developed their monarchian theology away from the
patripassian implications that were readily accepted by early monarchians. Heine suggests that it is these
views of the later Roman school that are represented in Adversus Praxean 27-29 (“The Christology of
Callistus,” 59–60). This is the insight that underwrites Heine’s suggestion that there was actually a
monarchian named Praxeas but that Tertullian was also addressing the theology of Callistus under the name
of Praxeas. Although it is hard to prove definitively, Heine’s theory has the virtue of explaining the
seeming contradiction between the theology attributed to Praxeas at the beginning and end of Adversus
Praxean.
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 30.1 (trans. Evans, 178): habes ipsum exclamantem in passione:
deus meus, deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti? ergo aut filius patiebatur a patre derelictus et pater passus
non est qui filium dereliquit; aut si pater erat qui patiebatur, ad quem deum exclamabat?
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Conclusion

Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean exhibits a number of similarities with Hippolytus’
Contra Noetum. It is clear that both Tertullian and the Praxeans were concerned with the
unity of God. Like the Noetians, the Praxeans claimed that the Father and Son were one
and the same (ipsum eundemque). Consequently, they claimed that the one God was seen
in the theophanies, that this one God was both visible and invisible. Adversus Praxean
does present some notable developments in comparison with Contra Noetum. Tertullian
records that there were some monarchians who, like the Noetians, had no problem
affirming that the Father suffered. Tertullian also bears witness to the fact that some other
monarchians began to shy away from a straightforward claim that the Father suffered. In
order to avoid this troublesome conclusion, they began to argue that the Father suffered
with the Son, that he was compassible but not passible. Despite this development, a solid
core of monarchianism is evident in both works. The monarchians defended a strong
view of the unity of God using scriptural exegesis. Similarly, they identified the Father
and Son, often using passages from the Gospel of John to support their claim. From the
foundation of this identification of the Father and Son, they argued that the same one God
was both visible and invisible. Views regarding the passibility of the Father shifted within
monarchianism, but the stable, exegetically-supported core, remained.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE REFUTATIO OMNIUM HAERESIUM AND
NOVATIAN’S DE TRINITATE

In this chapter, I continue my analysis of contemporary texts that attest to
monarchianism. The first of the texts I examine in this chapter, the Refutatio omnium
haeresium, presents a host of difficulties. Not least among the difficulties is that the
author (of whose identity we are uncertain) has distorted the positions of those whom he
opposes. Therefore, evidence gleaned from this text must be used with caution.
Novatian’s De Trinitate, too, presents a clear, sometimes simplistic portrait of his
opponents. His portrait of his monarchian opponents is almost certainly less subtle than
their theology itself. However, his simplistic portrayal of their theology has the benefit of
highlighting the most basic aspects of monarchian theology. After treating these two
works, I offer a synopsis of the monarchian sources, summarize my conclusions, and
reassess some of the scholarly views about monarchianism. My reconstruction of
monarchianism in Part One of this dissertation provides the foundation for re-examining
Origen’s early Trinitarian theology in Part Two.

The Refutatio

Introduction

As my earlier discussions of the Hippolytan problem made clear, there is little
scholarly consensus regarding the specifics of the Refutatio. Most scholars think it was
written by a different author than the one who composed the Contra Noetum. Among
those who think it was written by a different author, there is little agreement about when
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it should be dated. Because I find Simonetti’s arguments convincing, I think the most
probable date for the Refutatio falls somewhere between 225 and 235 C.E.1 My
acceptance of this dating means that I think Refutatio postdates Contra Noetum and likely
draws upon it.2 Because of the gaps in knowledge surrounding the work, I will speak of
“the author of the Refutatio” instead of Hippolytus. This somewhat cumbersome
circumlocution indicates that I consider the work to be the product of a different author
than the Contra Noetum.
One of the chief difficulties with the Refutatio is that it is fiercely polemical and
often highly tendentious. In an attempt to discredit the teaching of his opponents, the
author often resorts to ad hominem arguments. For instance, he details at length the
alleged dishonesty and deception of Callistus.3 The reliability of these accusations is
difficult to corroborate from external sources. Eusebius makes only a brief mention of
Callistus in his Ecclesiastical History, noting that he succeeded Zephyrinus in the Roman
see.4 Eusebius does not signal any major problems with the teaching or career of

Simonetti’s argument proceeds by first comparing Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean.
Against Allen Brent, he concludes (with the majority of earlier scholars) that Contra Noetum represents an
early, simple form of monarchianism and that Adversus Praxean draws on it. Since most scholars agree that
the Refutatio postdates Adversus Praxean, Simonetti concludes that it also postdates Contra Noetum. This
reconstruction of the dating of the texts makes the most sense of the data. See Manlio Simonetti, “Una
nuova proposta su Ippolito,” Augustinianum 36, no. 1 (1996): 13–46; idem, “Due note su Ippolito: Ippolito
interprete di Genesi 49; Ippolito e Tertulliano,” in Ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum
13 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1977), 121–36.
1

2
I have chosen here not to address in any detail the question of the hypothetical relationship
between the Refutatio and Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean. The overlap in specific vocabulary and analogies
between Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean is too great to ignore. This is not the case with the
Refutatio, which has a completely different tenor and purpose. If the Refutatio does draw upon Tertullian’s
Adversus Praxean, the reliance is obscured by the differing tendencies of the two authors.

Refutatio 9.12.1-19. In this section on the Refutatio, I use Marcovich’s edition of the text and the
translation in the ANF unless otherwise noted. Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Refutatio omnium haeresium,
Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (New York; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986).
3

4

Eusebius, EH 6.21.
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Callistus, and this lack stands in stark contrast to our author’s overwhelmingly negative
portrayal of him. Eusebius does not give any of Callistus’ backstory or accuse him of
dishonest dealings. Another example of the Refutatio’s overt anti-Callistan bias is his
philosophical genealogy of Callistus’ heresy. The author of the Refutatio is at pains to
argue that Callistus derived his teaching from Heraclitus.5 Heine’s thorough article has
demonstrated that in order to make the connection between Callistus and Heraclitus, the
author substantially modified some of the distinctive features of Callistus’ teaching.6
Heine has drawn on Mansfeld, who has shown that the author of the Refutatio doctored
the teaching of Heraclitus as well.7
Despite the polemical tone of the Refutatio, and the many unanswered questions
surrounding Hippolytus, it remains the case that the Refutatio and Contra Noetum are two
of the most important extant sources for reconstructing the monarchian controversy. The
importance of these polemically charged works illustrates acutely the difficult nature of

For an examination of the role of Heraclitus in the Refutatio, see Mouraviev’s discussion.
Mouraviev focuses on the use of Heraclitus with respect to the teaching of Noetus rather than Callistus.
Because his study was published at roughly the same time as that of Jaap Mansfeld, Mouraviev did not
have the benefit of access to Mansfeld’s detailed argument about the distortions present in the Refutatio.
Serge N. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët (Commentaire d’Hippolyte, Refut. omn. haer. IX 8 10),” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, vol. 2.36.6, 1992, 4375–4402; Jaap Mansfeld,
Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy, Philosophia Antiqua
56 (Leiden: Brill, 1992).
5

6

Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 56–

91.
7
Jaap Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context, 231–42. Elsewhere, Mansfeld states regarding
Hippolytus, “He is an intelligent and erudite person, an industrious Christian intellectual, but one without
an interest in philosophy for its own sake. Philosophy is important to him insofar as, following in Irenaeus'
footsteps, he can use it, or rather those of its ingredients which were most favoured in his own time, as
powerful polemical tools…. Hippolytus must be considered guilty of doctoring the evidence concerned
with the Greek philosophers” (ibid., xvi–xvii). Note the different tone of Mansfeld and Nautin. Nautin
considered the Refutatio to be the work of Josipe, whom he viewed as a pretentious dilettante. See Pierre
Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe: Contribution à l’histoire de la littérature chrétienne du troisième siècle,
Études et textes pour l’histoire du dogme de la Trinité 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1947), 103.
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reconstructing the monarchian controversy. We have no extant primary sources from
monarchian writers, and we are forced to reconstruct their positions from opponents who
often misrepresented their views in an attempt to discredit them. The Refutatio seems to
be more prone to this misrepresentation than, for example, Tertullian’s Adversus
Praxean. All of these anti-monarchian writings contain some quotations from
monarchians, but it is difficult to judge the reliability of these quotations given the
absence of any extant monarchian writings.
Textual Analysis

Genealogy of Heresy

Because the author of the Refutatio is so concerned with tracing the genealogy of
the heresy of Noetus and Callistus, whom he repeatedly connects to each other, our first
task is to reconstruct the family tree of the heresy as presented in the Refutatio.8 He
regularly sees the heresy of Noetus and his successors as part of a complicated web,
which can make a reconstruction difficult. His treatment of those whom he considers to
be teaching aberrant doctrines follows a long survey of philosophers and their systems.
These preceding philosophers provide part of the genealogy that the Refutatio is trying to

8
I use “heresy” here not as an evaluative tool of my own, but to represent the position of the
author of the Refutatio, who unmistakably views monarchianism as a heresy. As I note elsewhere, drawing
a sharp line between orthodoxy and heresy at the beginning of the third century is tricky business. See the
clarifying essay of Rowan Williams and the extensive studies of Alain le Boulluec for more discussion of
this matter: Rowan Williams, “Does It Make Sense to Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?,” in The Making of
Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. Henry Chadwick and Rowan Williams (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1–23; Alain le Boulluec, La notion d’hérésie dans la littérature
grecque, IIe-IIIe siècles, 2 vols., Collection des études augustiniennes 110-111 (Paris: Etudes
augustiniennes, 1985); idem, “L’écriture comme norme hérésiologique dans les controverses des IIe et IIIe
siècles (domaine grec),” Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband 23 (1996): 66–76.
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trace.9 Books nine and ten of the Refutatio are the focus of my analysis, but I also
highlight relevant sections from the earlier books.10
In the Contra Noetum, Hippolytus gives no information about the transmission of
the teachings of Noetus.11 He does tell us that Noetus was a Smyrnaean and that he lived
recently.12 The author of the Refutatio confirms that Noetus was from Smyrna.13 At the
beginning of book nine of the Refutatio, the author traces the teaching of Noetus through
to Callistus.14 He states that Epigonus learned the teaching of Noetus and passed it on to
Cleomenes. He later reports that Zephyrinus learned the teaching from Cleomenes.15
Thus, the arrival of Noetus’ teaching in Rome would have been by means of either
Epigonus or Cleomenes.16

9
Again, note Heine’s article that details how the author of the Refutatio distorts the theology of
Callistus to make it align with Heraclitus’ philosophical teaching. See notes 6-7 in this chapter.
10

My decision to focus on book nine and ten of the Refutatio is one of necessity. A fuller
examination of the Refutatio would make the dissertation even longer than it already is. Furthermore, the
Refutatio focuses on Noetus and Callistus in books nine and ten, making them the most important for my
study. Callistus seems to be the main target of the author of the Refutatio, so he waits to report on his
teaching until the culmination of the work.
11
Without giving a detailed account of the genealogy of Noetus’ teaching, Hippolytus signals at
the beginning of Contra Noetum that Noetus’ disciples are troublesome. He appears to focus on Noetus in
an attempt to get to the root of the problem. See Contra Noetum 1.1.
12

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.1.

13

Refutatio 9.7.

14

See especially Refutatio 9.7, 10.27.

15

Refutatio 9.7.

16

The translator of the Refutatio in the ANF mistranslated 10.27.1 and took it to mean that Noetus
learned his heresy from Epigonus. This is certainly not the case; the author of the Refutatio consistently
traces the heresy from Noetus through Epigonus and Cleomenes. The passage should be translated roughly
as follows: “Likewise Noetus… introduced such a heresy as this, which advanced from a certain Epigonus
unto Cleomenes and thus until now it continued through successive teachers….” (Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Νοητός,
τῷ μὲν γένει ὢν Σμυρναῖος, ἀνὴρ <δὲ> ἀκριτόμυθος καὶ ποικίλος, εἰσηγήσατο τοιάνδε αἵρεσιν—ἐξ
Ἐπιγόνου τινὸς εἰς Κλεομένην χωρήσασαν καὶ οὕτως ἕως νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς διαδόχοις διαμείνασαν).
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This teaching that proved problematic for the author of the Refutatio appears to
have been introduced to Zephyrinus through the influence of Cleomenes.17 This statement
is interesting because it might shed light on a vague statement of Eusebius in the EH.
Eusebius considered the teaching of the church in Rome to have been somehow corrupted
during the time of Zephyrinus.18 Eusebius does not provide any details of how the
teaching of the church was corrupted during this time, but he does tell us that Zephyrinus’
predecessor, Victor, rejected the teaching of Theodotus.19 The author of the Refutatio, in
one of his more polemically charged moments, informs us that Zephyrinus’ successor,
Callistus, at times subscribed to the teachings of Theodotus; but he does not disclose the
details of how Theodotus’ teaching gained a foothold with the successors of Victor.20
If we take the testimony of Eusebius and the Refutatio in tandem, we can
reasonably assume that one of the things that was probably accepted by the church during
the episcopate of Zephyrinus was the teaching of Theodotus, which had previously been
rejected by Zephyrinus’ predecessor, Victor. Even more, Hippolytus briefly mentions
Theodotus in the Contra Noetum and, like Eusebius, accuses him of teaching that Christ
was a mere human (ἄνθρωπον ψιλόν). The connection of the teachings of Noetus and

17

Refutatio 9.7.

18
Eusebius, EH 5.28. Eusebius writes that Victor had repelled improper teachings but “that the
truth had been corrupted from the time of his successor, Zephyrinus” (ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ διαδόχου αὐτοῦ
Ζεφυρίνου παρακεχαράχθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν). Trans. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History: Books 1-5,
trans. Kirsopp Lake, Loeb Classical Library 153 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1926), 517.
19
Eusebius, EH 5.28. Decker devotes a good portion of his dissertation on monarchianism to
reconstructing the theology of the Theodotians. See especially Michael Decker, “Die Monarchianer:
Frühchristliche Theologie im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rom und Kleinasien” (Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Hamburg, 1987), 66–130. On my narrower definition, the Theodotians are not properly
monarchians.
20

Refutatio 9.12.19, 10.27.4.
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Theodotus is a common theme in both the Refutatio and Contra Noetum.21 When the
Refutatio is augmented by these other sources, it provides us with enough information to
establish a rough genealogy of the teaching of Noetus, one that has it gaining a foothold
among leaders of the church in Rome during the episcopate of Zephyrinus. With this
established, we must move on to examine the teaching of Noetus and others whom the
Refutatio often lumps with him.
Books nine and ten of the Refutatio have Callistus as their primary target; but
before I discuss their presentation of Callistus, it will be fruitful to examine the
Refutatio’s presentation of Callistus’ predecessors. Doing so will help both to show the
framework within which the Refutatio presents the theology of Callistus and to elucidate
other teaching on the doctrines of God and Christ that the Refutatio views as aberrant.
After giving this context, I examine the Refutatio’s accounts of the teaching of
Zephyrinus and Callistus, giving special attention to similarities with, and divergences
from, Noetus and the others the Refutatio examines.
The first person of interest for us in the Refutatio is Apelles. The author of the
Refutatio accuses him of teaching that there are four gods, thus seeming to remove him
from the orbit of monarchian teaching, which strongly held that there is only one God.22
Apelles is of interest here because he also shows up in Eusebius’ EH. Both the author of
the Refutatio and Eusebius include a section on Apelles directly following a discussion of
Marcion, and the Refutatio states that Apelles was a disciple of Marcion.23 Drawing from

21

See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.1.

22

For the primary discussions of Apelles, see, Refutatio 7.38 and 10.20.

23

Hippolytus, Refutatio 10.20.1.
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his source, Rhodo, Eusebius records that Apelles confessed that there was only one
principle (μίαν ἀρχὴν ὁμολογεῖ).24 Eusebius is obviously contrasting this position with
the teaching of Marcion, whom he describes as teaching that there are two principles (δύο
ἀρχὰς).25 Eusebius goes on to say that Apelles could not explain his reasons for holding
that there was only one principle, but that he held it nonetheless. If Rhodo’s account of
Apelles’ teaching is correct, it lines up well with the monarchian emphasis; but Eusebius’
account of Apelles teaching does not agree with the Refutatio. It is possible that Apelles
managed to both affirm that there was only one principle and that there were multiple
gods, but this possibility seems unlikely. Presenting him as a disciple of Marcion, the
Refutatio suggests that he took Marcion’s teaching a step further and argued for more
than two gods. This emphasis in the Refutatio fits well with its placement shortly after
discussions of various Gnostic figures. Given the absence of an arbitrating source, it is
difficult to determine which source for Apelles’ teaching is more accurate.
The next figure of interest in the Refutatio is Cerinthus.26 It begins its discussion
of Cerinthus by noting that he taught that the world was not made by the “first [god], but
by a certain power (δυνάμεώς) which had been separated (κεχωρισμένης) from the power
(ἐξουσίας) which is above all and which is ignorant of the God who is above all.”27 In
many ways, this teaching resembles Gnostic formulations wherein the demiurge is

24

Eusebius, EH 5.13.2.

25

Eusebius, EH 5.13.3.

26
Eusebius mentions Cerinthus a few times in the Ecclesiastical History. See EH, 3.28, 4.14, 7.25.
With regard to Cerinthus, Eusebius is not concerned with any of the same issues as the author of the
Refutatio. Eusebius’ overriding concerns regarding Cerinthus have to do with issues of chiliasm and the
proper conception of the Kingdom of Christ.
27

Refutatio 7.33.1. Translation mine.
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ignorant of the fact that there is a higher God. However, it is interesting to note that
Cerinthus does not appear to have argued that another god created the world; rather a
“power” did so. Although the account is too brief to offer anything definitive, the fact
that Cerinthus calls the creator a “power” could be the result of his impulse to protect
monotheism.28
The Refutatio accuses Cerinthus of denying the virgin birth and teaching that
Jesus was born of Mary and Joseph in a way similar to all humans.29 Cerinthus held that
the Christ descended upon Jesus in the form of a dove at the baptism. Furthermore, he
allegedly taught that this Christ left Jesus after the passion but that the Christ did not
suffer because he was πνευματικόν.30 This sort of teaching is what Harnack wishes to
identify by his “dynamistic monarchian” label.31 Immediately after this treatment of
Cerinthus, the Refutatio claims that the Ebionites held views of Jesus that were similar to
those of Cerinthus.32 Although the Refutatio does not alert us to the motivations of his
teaching about Christ, Cerinthus’ teaching effectively protects a strict understanding of
the uniqueness of God. He does not use the exact wording, but Cerinthus’ teaching is

28

What I mean by this is that certain strands of Gnosticism had an impulse to be monotheistic, or
at least monistic. By saying a power created, Cerinthus is able to avoid positing the existence of another
god, if that was his intention. See John Dillon, “Monotheism in the Gnostic Tradition,” in Pagan
Monotheism in Late Antiquity, ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede (Oxford; New York:
Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1999), 69–79. Note also that in 10.21.1, the Refutatio reports
that Cerinthus thinks the demiurgic power is “angelic.”
Refutatio 10.21.2: Τὸν δὲ Ἰησοῦν λέγει μὴ ἐκ παρθένου γεγεν<ν>ῆσθαι, γεγονέναι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξ
Ἰωσὴφ καὶ Μαρίας υἱὸν, ὁμοίως τοῖς λοιποῖς <ἅπασιν> ἀνθρώποις. See also 7.33.1.
29

30

Refutatio 10.21.3; 7.33.2.

31
For Harnack’s naming schema of “modalistic” and “dynamistic” monarchianism, see History of
Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907), 3.13; idem, “Monarchianism,”
in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson and
George William Gilmore (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker, 1963), 7.454.
32

Refutatio 10.22.1; 7.34.
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almost identical to the “mere man” Christologies I discussed earlier. In his scheme, Jesus
is nothing more than a human upon whom Christ descends. Jesus is certainly not
presented as divine.33 This scheme, too, may be the result of an impulse to protect
monotheism.
Immediately following its discussion of the Ebionites, the Refutatio examines the
teachings of Theodotus, who is important for its later discussions of Zephyrinus and
Callistus. According to the Refutatio, Theodotus taught that Jesus was similar to all
humans, except that he was born of a virgin by the will of God. Like Cerinthus, he is
accused of teaching that the Christ descended upon Jesus in the form of a dove at his
baptism. The Refutatio then reports that the followers of Theodotus expanded on this
doctrine and taught that before the descent of the Christ onto Jesus, the latter’s “powers”
were inoperative. The Refutatio takes Theodotus’ position to be a denial of the divinity of
Christ.34
After Theodotus, the Refutatio examines the teachings of the Montanists. At first
it gives a standard account of Montanism springing from Montanus, Maximilla, and
Priscilla; but then it states that there were other Montanists who followed the teachings of
Noetus.35 It states that these Noetian Montanists held that the same one is both Son and

33
The Refutatio does not clarify whether the descending Christ is divine or what the precise
relationship between the Christ and Jesus is.

Refutatio 10.23.1-2: Θεόδοτος (δὲ) ὁ Βυζάντιος εἰσηγήσατο αἵρεσιν τοιάνδε, φάσκων τὰ μὲν
ὅλα ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντως θεοῦ γεγονέναι, τὸν δὲ Χριστόν, ὁμοίως τοῖς προειρημένοις γνωστικοῖς, φάσκει
τοιούτῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ πεφηνέναι. Εἶναι μὲν τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἄνθρωπον κ(οι)νὸν πᾶσιν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ διαφέρειν, ὅτι
κατὰ βουλὴν θεοῦ γεγένηται ἐκ παρθένου, ἐπισκιάσαντος τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος <τ>ὸν ἐν τῇ παρθένῳ
σαρκωθέντ(α)· ὕστερον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος κατεληλυθέναι τὸν Χριστὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐν εἴδει
περιστερᾶς. ὅθεν φησὶ μὴ πρότερον «τὰς δυνάμεις <ἐν> αὐτῷ ἐνεργηθῆναι». θεὸν δὲ οὐκ εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν
θέλει. καὶ τοιαῦτα <δὴ καὶ> Θεόδοτος. See also 7.35.
34

35

Hippolytus, Refutatio 10.25.1.
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Father, seen and unseen, begotten and unbegotten, etc.36 Antithetical pairings of this sort
recur in the Refutatio’s accounts of Heraclitus, Noetus, and Callistus. There is some
question about the relationship of monarchianism and Montanism, but a full exploration
of this matter is beyond the scope of the current chapter.37
The Refutatio often mentions Zephyrinus in its accounts of the theology of Noetus
and Callistus, but it seldom describes what Zephyrinus actually taught. In its account,
Zephyrinus is portrayed as a dull and servile man: an “ignorant and illiterate individual,
and one unskilled in ecclesiastical definitions.”38 The author of the Refutatio also reports
that Zephyrinus was bent to the will of Callistus by means of bribes.39 Later, he expands
this portrait of Zephyrinus and presents him as oblivious to the designs of Callistus.40
According to the author of the Refutatio, Zephyrinus is merely an instrument in the
transmission of the Noetian teaching. As the author of the Refutatio presents it, it is
because of his weakness that Noetian teaching gained a foothold in the church in Rome.41

Hippolytus, Refutatio 10.26.1: <τὸν> αὐτὸν εἶναι υἱὸν καὶ πατέρα λέγοντες, ὁρατὸν καὶ
ἀόρατον, γεννητὸν καὶ ἀγέννητον, θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, τούτων τὰς ἀφορμὰς ἀπὸ Νοητοῦ τινος λαβόντες.
36

37

For a short discussion about similarities between Montanism and the teaching of Noetus, see
Alistair Stewart-Sykes, “The Asian Context of the New Prophecy and of Epistula Apostolorum,” Vigiliae
Christianae 51, no. 4 (1997): 432–3. Note also that one of Tertullian’s main complaints against Praxeas
was that he was instrumental in getting Montanism expelled from Rome. He writes, “Thus Praxeas at Rome
managed two pieces of the devil's business: he drove out prophecy and introduced heresy: he put to flight
the Paraclete and crucified the Father.” See Adversus Praxean 1.5 (trans. Evans, 131). If Tertullian can be
trusted here, monarchianism and Montanism appear to be incompatible. We should thus proceed with
caution when assessing the Refutatio’s claims here.
Refutatio 9.11.1 (trans. ANF 5:128): ἄνδρα ἰδιώτην καὶ ἀγράμματον καὶ ἄπειρον τῶν
ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ὅρων.
38

39

Ibid.

40

Refutatio 9.12.14.

41

The author of the Refutatio is never clear about the extent to which monarchian teaching
pervaded the church in Rome. He does not clarify whether it was actively propounded by the leaders of the
church in Rome or whether those leaders merely let it thrive as a popular movement.
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It is difficult to isolate monarchian teachings in the Refutatio because of the
highly polemical and tendentious nature of the work. Furthermore, the author of the
Refutatio has placed these portraits of monarchianism near the end of his genealogy of
heresy. This placement of key sections on monarchianism at the end of the work enables
the author of the Refutatio to stylize the monarchians so that they appear to be derivative
from the philosophers and “heretics” surveyed earlier in the work. Nevertheless, there are
a few dense sections where the Refutatio addresses monarchianism directly. The tenor of
these passages is quite different than similar passages in Contra Noetum and Adversus
Praxean. There are brief glimpses into monarchian teaching, but they are planted in a
forest of ad hominem caricatures. Even this fragmentary evidence is important because it
gives us a view into a Roman monarchianism that probably postdates Contra Noetum by
some twenty years.
One God

As in the earlier accounts, the monarchian concern to defend the unity of God is
readily apparent in the Refutatio. The first indication of this fact is seen an episode in the
Refutatio where Callistus urges Zephyrinus to confess, “I know that there is one God,
Jesus Christ; nor except Him do I know any other that is begotten and amenable to
suffering.' And on another occasion, when he would make the following statement: 'The
Father did not die, but the Son.’”42 Whether we should trust the Refutatio regarding the
machinations of Callistus, the statement it attributes to Zephyrinus rings true because the

42
Refutatio 9.11.3 (trans. ANF 5:128): «ἐγὼ οἶδα ἕνα θεὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ
ἕτερον οὐδένα γεν<ν>ητὸν καὶ παθητόν», ποτὲ δὲ λέγειν· «οὐχ ὁ πατὴρ ἀπέθανεν, ἀλλὰ ὁ υἱός».
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statement so neatly encapsulates the central concern that the monarchians tried to
address: the maintenance of a strict view of monotheism while simultaneously confessing
that Jesus is God.
The second statement that the Refutatio attributes to Zephyrinus, that the Son
died, not the Father, also seems possible, even though it appears to contradict the earlier
claim that the one God was “amenable to suffering.” Already in Tertullian’s Adversus
Praxean we saw variance about whether the Father suffered—a seemingly necessary
consequence of arguing that the Father and Son are one and the same.43 In the above
quotation, it appears as though Zephyrinus was willing to admit a certain (albeit limited)
distinction between Father and Son in order to protect the Father from suffering.
Immediately following this passage, the author of the Refutatio notes that both
Zephyrinus and Callistus accused him of being a ditheist (δίθεοί ἐστε) because he would
not consent to their teaching.44 Despite the seeming concession to protect the Father from
suffering, the monarchians continued to maintain that their opponents where ditheists. A
short while later, the Refutatio gives what appears to be a direct quotation from Callistus:
“‘I will not,’ he says, ‘say two gods, Father and Son, but one.’”45 Callistus here is
protecting himself against the very things he accuses his opponents of.
The author of the Refutatio even works this strict understanding of the uniqueness
of God into his claims about monarchian teachings being derived from the philosophy of
Heraclitus. He has Heraclitus urging that it is proper to believe that “all things are one”

43

See Adversus Praxean 27-29. Note again that this equivocation could reveal different
chronological strata of monarchianism as well as possible geographical variation.
44

Refutatio 9.12.16.

45

Refutatio 9.12.18 (trans. mine): Οὐ γάρ, φησίν, ἐρῶ δύο θεούς, πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν, ἀλλ’ ἕνα.
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(ἓν πάντα εἶναι).46 According to the Refutatio, Heraclitus teaches that the oneness of all
things includes contrary pairs such as visible and invisible: “In this manner, Heraclitus
assigns to the visible an equality of position and honour with the invisible, as if what was
visible and what was invisible were confessedly some one thing.”47 It is probably no
mistake that the author of the Refutatio claims that Heraclitus taught that the invisible and
visible were one thing, for this assertion is commonly attributed to monarchians.48
Although the term μοναρχία does not appear in Contra Noetum, it makes a single
perplexing appearance in the Refutatio, where the latter reports that Noetus “thinks to
establish the monarchy, saying that the Father and Son are one and the same….”49 There
are a few possible reasons for this appearance. First, as Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao has
suggested, the term might not occur in Contra Noetum because it was not a key term for
those whom we now call monarchians. It could have been a pejorative label that was
mockingly applied to groups for whom it was not an important term.50 On the other hand,
I think Simonetti’s hypothesis about the absence of the term in Novatian’s De Trinitate
also gives a plausible explanation of the absence of the term in Contra Noetum. Simonetti
argued that the term was absent from De Trinitate because Novatian knew how important

46

Refutatio 9.9.1.

Refutatio 9.10.1 (trans. ANF 5:126): Οὕτως <οὖν> Ἡράκλειτος ἐν ἴσῃ μοίρᾳ τίθεται καὶ τιμᾷ τὰ
ἐμφανῆ τοῖς ἀφανέσιν, ὡς ἕν τι τὸ ἐμφανὲς καὶ τὸ ἀφανὲς ὁμολογουμένως ὑπάρχον·
47

See Mouraviev’s detailed discussion of the relationship between Heraclitus’ teaching and the
successors of Noetus: Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët,” 4386–4402.
48

49
Refutatio 9.10.11 (trans. mine): οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων
ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ υἱόν….

See Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad: El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la
controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie I:
Estudios 62 (Madrid: UPCO, 1996), 236ff, 247, 279. See also my earlier discussion of Uríbarri’s work in
the introduction.
50

170
them term was for his opponents and, therefore, intentionally avoided it.51 Whether the
term enjoyed widespread (or any) use by all of those whom I label monarchians, the
author of the Refutatio suggests that Noetus at least used it to signify a strong conception
of the unity of God.52
The Refutatio presents Callistus as having a concern, like Noetus and Zephyrinus,
to maintain the unity of God. After saying that Callistus corroborated the heresy of the
Noetians, the Refutatio claims that he “confesses that there is one God, the Father and
creator of all.”53 This statement parallels the beginning of the Refutatio’s demonstration
of truth and its portrayal of Jewish beliefs. Concerning the Jews, it says, “And they affirm
that there is one God, and that He is Creator and Lord of the universe: that He has formed
all these glorious works which had no previous existence; and this, too, not out of any
coeval substance that lay ready at hand, but wishing to create, He did create.”54 The
author of the Refutatio begins his own demonstration of truth similarly: “The first and
only (one God), both Creator and Lord of all, had nothing coeval with Himself; not
infinite chaos, nor measureless water, nor solid earth, nor dense air, not warm fire, nor
refined spirit, nor the azure canopy of the stupendous firmament. But He was One, alone

See, for example, Manlio Simonetti, “Monarchia e Trinità: Alcune osservazioni su un libro
recente,” Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 33, no. 3 (1997): 628. Simonetti articulated this theory in
response to Uríbarri Bilbao’s thesis. Note also that if Simonetti is right about Novatian, the latter takes the
approach opposite to that of Tertullian, who seeks to wrest his opponents’ key terms and verses from them
and to use them to support his own position.
51

52

This attribution is not nearly as striking as that in Adversus Praxean 3.1-2, where the Praxeans
seem to use it as a battle cry: “We hold to the monarchy” (monarchiam tenemus).
53

Refutatio 10.27.3: ἕνα εἶναι θεὸν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦ παντός·

Refutatio 9.30.1 (trans. ANF 5:138 with my modifications): καὶ τὸν μὲν θεὸν ἕνα εἶ(ν)αι
λέγουσι, δημιουργόν τε τοῦ παντὸς καὶ κ(ύριον), ποιήσ(α)ντα πάντα οὐ πρότερον ὄντ(α), οὐδὲ ἔκ τινος
ὑποκειμένης συγχρόνου οὐσίας, ἀ(λ)λ(ὰ) θελήσαντα καὶ κτίσαντα.
54
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in Himself.”55 Nothing about the above claim attributed to Callistus is necessarily
offensive for the author of the Refutatio. The problem for the author is the way the
monarchians parsed this claim out, as will become clear in the next section. Although it is
not uncommon for statements of faith to start with an affirmation of belief in one God,
the strength and repetition of our author’s claims is striking. These strong affirmations of
the unity of God countered the frequent monarchian accusation of ditheism.
Father and Son

As in the previous accounts, the identification of the Father and Son was one of
the key byproducts of the monarchian affirmation of the unity of God. The Refutatio’s
account of Noetus’ teaching expresses this identification poignantly and is worth quoting
fully:
Now, that Noetus affirms that the Son and Father are the same, no one is ignorant.
But he makes his statement thus: "When indeed, then, the Father had not been
born, he yet was justly styled Father; and when it pleased him to undergo
generation, having been begotten, he himself became his own Son, not another's.”
For in this manner he thinks to establish the monarchy, alleging that Father and
Son,are one and the same, not one individual produced from a different one, but
himself from himself; and that he is styled by name Father and Son, according to
vicissitude of times. But that he is one who has appeared, both having submitted
to generation from a virgin, and as a man having held converse among men. And,
on account of the birth that had taken place, he confessed himself to those
beholding him a Son, no doubt; yet he made no secret to those who could
comprehend him of his being a Father. That this person suffered by being fastened
to the tree, and that he commended his spirit unto himself, having died, and not
having died. And he raised himself up on the third day, after having been interred
in a sepulchre, and wounded with a spear, and perforated with nails. Cleomenes
asserts, in common with his band of followers, that this person is God and Father

Refutatio 10.32.1 (trans. ANF 5:150): Θεὸς εἷς, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ μόνος καὶ ἁπάντων ποιητὴς καὶ
κύριος, σύγχρονον ἔσχεν οὐδέν· οὐ χάος ἄπειρον, οὐχ ὕδωρ ἀμέτρητον, οὐ γῆν στερράν, οὐκ ἀέρα πυκνόν,
οὐ πῦρ θερμόν, οὐ πνεῦμα λεπτόν, οὐκ οὐρανοῦ μεγάλου κυανέαν ὀροφήν· ἀλλ’ ἦν εἷς, μόνος <ἐφ’>
ἑαυτοῦ.
55
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of the universe, and thus introduces among many an obscurity (of thought) such
as we find in the philosophy of Heraclitus.56
In Contra Noetum and some sections of Adversus Praxean, the Father and Son were
clearly identified; and their identification was strongly grounded in exegesis. In the
Refutatio’s account of Noetus, however, the identification of the Father and Son is more
complex.57 The Refutatio claims that the Noetians taught that God appeared differently
depending on the “changing of the times” (κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν). In this schema, the
names are merely convenient descriptors, and they all refer to the one, undivided God.58
There is no underlying reality within the Godhead that corresponds to the different
names. There is one God who appears in different ways at different times, and this is
precisely the sort of teaching that prompts many scholars to use the term “modalism.”
Although this focus on the applicability of names being determined by the
changing of the times adds a new dimension to the monarchian position, there are still
vestiges of a simple identification of the Father and Son. Here, as in the preceding

Refutatio 9.10.11-12 (trans. ANF 5:127-128 with my modifications): Ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν
εἶναι λέγει καὶ πατέρα, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ· λέγει γὰρ οὕτως· ὅτε μὲν οὖν μὴ <γε>γένητο ὁ πατήρ, δικαίως πατὴρ
προσηγόρευτο· ὅτε δὲ ηὐδόκησε γένεσιν <ἐκ παρθένου> ὑπομεῖναι, γεν<ν>(η)θεὶς ὁ <πατὴρ> υἱὸς ἐγένετο
αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ἑτέρου. οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα
καὶ υἱόν, γινόμενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ· ὀνόματι μὲν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καλούμενον
κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν, ἕνα δὲ <ὄντα καὶ> τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φανέντα, καὶ γένεσιν ἐκ παρθένου ὑπομείναντα,
καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπο(ις) ἄνθρωπον ἀναστραφέντα· υἱὸν μὲν <γὰρ> ἑαυτὸν τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ὁμολογοῦντα διὰ τὴν
γενομένην γένεσιν, πατέρα δὲ <ὄντα> [εἶναι] καὶ τοῖς χωροῦσιν (μ)ὴ ἀποκρύψαντα. <καὶ> τοῦτον <εἶναι
τὸν> πάθει <προσελθόντα καὶ> ξύλῳ προσπαγ(έ)ντα καὶ ἑαυτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα παραδόντα· <τὸν> ἀποθανόντα
καὶ μὴ ἀποθανόντα καὶ ἑαυτὸν τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀναστήσαντα· τὸν ἐν μνημείῳ ταφέντα καὶ λόγχῃ τρωθέντα
καὶ ἥλοις καταπαγέντα. τοῦτον <οὖν> τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν καὶ πατέρα <υἱὸν> εἶναι λέγει Κλεομένης καὶ ὁ
τούτου χορός, Ἡρακλείτειον σκότος ἐπεισάγοντες πολλοῖς.
56

Mouraviev’s detailed analysis of the difference between the Refutatio’s presentation of the
theology of Noetus and that of his followers is helpful here. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët.”
57

The scheme that the Refutatio presents here is what is typically referred to as “modalism,” and it
is easy to see how the term developed to describe this theology. The Greek τρόπος comes from the verb
τρέπω, which can mean “to turn.” The Latin modus translates the Greek τρόπος. Thus, the development of
the term Modalism by scholars is not completely without foundation. The problem with the term, however,
is that we do not see it used in any of the contemporary texts.
58
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accounts, we see the nearly ubiquitous monarchian phrase asserting that the Father and
Son are “one and the same” (ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ υἱόν). The
phrase continues with a further clarification that uses the same sort of language present in
the earlier treatises. We are told that the names Father and Son, especially with regard to
the incarnation, do not reveal two, but rather the same one: “not one coming to be from
another, but himself from himself” (γινόμενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἐξ
ἑαυτοῦ).
This explicit denial that the incarnation entails two, one and another, draws
together strands that we have already seen in monarchian theology. First, the rejection of
“one and another” could be an allusion to the passages from Exodus and Isa. 44-45 that
featured prominently in the monarchian theology in Contra Noetum and Adversus
Praxean. Contra Noetum claims that the Noetians use an amalgam of passages from
Exodus as follows, “He said in the law, ‘I am the God of your fathers; you shall not have
any gods other than me’” (Εἶπεν ἐν νόμῳ, Ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πατέρων ὑμῶν· οὐκ
ἔσονται ὑμῖν θεοὶ ἕτεροι πλὴν ἐμοῦ).59 The strong rejection of the use of ἕτερος when
discussing the names Father and Son echoes the biblical expressions of monotheism that
deny the existence of θεοὶ ἕτεροι.60 Thus, while the author of the Refutatio has tried to
expunge any trace of scripture from the theology of his opponents, this usage of ἕτερος
might very well bear the marks of the earlier interpretive trajectory.61

59

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.1. This quotation is a combination of Gen. 46:3 (or Ex. 3:6) with

Ex. 20:3.
Note also that this approach could be a reaction to Justin’s theology in the Dialogue with
Trypho. Justin unabashedly referred to the Son as another God. See, for example, Justin Martyr, Dialogue
with Trypho 56.4.
60
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Hübner has also argued that there is an allusion to Baruch 3:36-38 in Refutatio 9.10.11, where
God is said to have conversed with humans (καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπο(ις) ἄνθρωπον ἀναστραφέντα). Hübner has a
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Second, this rejection of the assertion that Father and Son are “one thing and
another” might be directly aimed at the sort of expression we find in the demonstration of
truth in Contra Noetum. There, Hippolytus argues that when the Logos was made
manifest in the creation of the world, “another stood beside the Father” (καὶ οὕτως αὐτῷ
παρίστατο ἕτερος).62 Hippolytus quickly goes on to clarify, “but when saying ‘another,’ I
am not saying two gods” (ἕτερον δὲ λέγων οὐ δύο θεοὺς λέγω).63 For Hippolytus, the use
of ἕτερος was important to ensure proper distinction between the Father and Son. He did
not use ἕτερος indiscriminately, and his immediate qualification was probably meant to
affirm with the passages from Exodus and Isaiah that there are not ἕτεροι θεοὶ. Insofar as
this formulaic use of ἕτερος in the Refutatio responds directly to the theology of the early
anti-monarchian writers, it seems to be authentic.
The Refutatio’s report on Noetus’ teaching at times seems to suggest the absurdity
of the claims of the Noetians. It is unclear if this absurdity was in fact part of the Noetian
teaching, or if it is the work of our author’s imagination. For example, the claim that the
Father became his own Son in the incarnation gives the whole account a farcical feel.64

solid case here, as there is a strong similarity with συνανεστραφείς in the quotation of Baruch 3:36-38 in
Contra Noetum 2.5. See Reinhard M Hübner, “Der antivalentinianische Charakter der Theologie des Noët
von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden;
Boston: Brill, 1999), 115–8. See also Elena Cavalcanti’s brief discussion of the use of Baruch 3:36-38 prior
to the Arian controversy: “Osservazioni sull’uso patristico di Baruch 3, 36-38,” in Mémorial Dom Jean
Gribomont (1920-1986), Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 27 (Roma: Institutum Patristicum
“Augustinianum,” 1988), 145–9. The fact that this seeming verbal parallel has made it into the Refutatio
shows how difficult it would have been for the author of the Refutatio to remove any traces of the biblical
exegesis that underwrote monarchian theology. Furthermore, the presence of this apparent allusion to
Baruch 3:36-38 in the Refutatio is particularly damaging to Decker’s claim that the Monarchian exegesis in
Contra Noetum is a polemical invention of Hippolytus. This apparent allusion demonstrates that it was
woven into the fabric of their theology. See Decker, “Die Monarchianer,” 156–7.
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Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 11.1.
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Ibid.
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See Refutatio, 9.10.11-12.
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Perhaps this was the actual teaching of the Noetians. It seems more likely, however, that
this sentence is the product of our author’s tendentious imagination, even if it was built
upon actual monarchian theology.65
Visible and Invisible

The issue of God’s visibility was still a prominent feature in monarchian teaching
when the Refutatio was written, probably because, as I suggested earlier, questions about
the visibility of God were important for those who argued that it was the Logos who was
visible in the theophanies of the Old Testament.66 The importance of these questions for
the Refutatio’s opponents is clear in the section where the Refutatio explicitly seeks to
show that the Noetians derive their teaching from the philosophy of Heraclitus. It states,
For they advance statements after this manner—that one and the same God is the
Creator and Father of all things; and that when it pleased him, he nevertheless
appeared, (though invisible,) to just men of old. For when He is not seen He is
invisible; and He is incomprehensible when He does not wish to be
comprehended, but comprehensible when he is comprehended.67
The author of the Refutatio is clearly presenting the Noetian teaching in pairings of
contraries, which he views as absurd. Althrough the author of the Refutatio is clearly

65

The reports about monarchian positions in the Refutatio lack the sort of subtlety such positions
probably would have had in their original form. The author of the Refutatio seems determined to show that
his opponents were ridiculous, even if it means distorting some of the details.
66

In some contexts, the claim that the Logos appeared in the theophanies could be used to support
claims that the Logos was divine and that the Logos was distinct from the Father.
Refutatio 9.10.9-10 (trans. ANF 5:127): λέγουσι γὰρ οὕτως· ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν θεὸν εἶναι <τὸν>
πάντων δημιουργὸν καὶ <τὸν> πατέρα, εὐδοκήσαντα μὲν πεφηνέναι τοῖς ἀρχῆθεν δικαίοις, ὄντα <δὲ>
ἀόρατον. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ἐστὶν ἀόρατος, <ὅτε δὲ ὁρᾶται, ὁρατός· καὶ> ἀχώρητος μὲν ὅτε μὴ
χωρεῖσθαι θέλει, χωρητὸς δὲ ὅτε χωρεῖται· Note here that we see the use of Father without any correlation
to a son. As in 1 Clement in the first chapter, this usage of the title Father seems tied to creation rather than
a specific Father-Son relationship.
67
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reshaping the Noetian teaching to fit it into a Heraclitean paradigm, the core assertions
about visibility and invisibility match up with earlier accounts of monarchianism.68
In the Refutatio’s later discussion of Noetus’ teaching, similar notions about the
visibility of God are reported; but this time, they do not seem to be forced into the
Heraclitean paradigm of paired contraries. The Refutatio states, “Noetus asserts that there
is one Father and God of the universe, and that He made all things, and was imperceptible
to those that exist when He might so desire. Noetus maintained that the Father then
appeared when He wished; and He is invisible when He is not seen, but visible when He
is seen.”69 Like the earlier discussion of the names Father and Son, whether God is
visible seems to depend on the vicissitudes of the times or the will of the deity. There is
no distinction between God and the Logos on the basis of visibility as there was for
someone like Justin.
The author of the Refutatio records some of Callistus’ teaching regarding the
visibility of God. In the first passage of interest, the Refutatio states,
And he adds, that this is what has been declared by the Saviour: “Believest thou
not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?” For that which is seen, which is
man, he considers to be the Son; whereas the Spirit, which was contained in the
Son, to be the Father. “For,” says (Callistus), “I will not profess belief in two
Gods, Father and Son, but in one. For the Father, who comes to be out of Himself,
after He had taken unto Himself our flesh, raised it to the nature of Deity, by
bringing it into union with Himself, and made it one; so that Father and Son must

Hübner claims that the sort of antitheses we see in this passage were part of Noetus’ early antiGnostic rule of faith and that they were then adopted by Ignatius, Melito, Tertullian, and others who postdated Noetus. Hübner’s contention that monarchian use of antithetical statements about God might be antiGnostic seems possible, but his revisionist dating of Noetus and Ignatius is untenable. See especially
Hübner’s two essays on Melito and Ignatius in relation to Noetus: Reinhard M Hübner, “Melito von Sardes
und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 1–37; idem, “Die Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der
Paradox Eine, 131–206.
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Refutatio 10.27.1-2 (trans. ANF 5:148): λέγων ἕνα <εἶναι θεὸν> τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν τῶν ὅλων
<δημιουργόν> [τοῦτον πάντα πεποιηκότα]· ἀφανῆ μὲν <γὰρ> τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γεγονέναι ὅτε ἠβούλετο,
φανῆναι δὲ τότε ὅτε ἠθέλησε. καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι ἀόρατον <μὲν> ὅταν μὴ ὁρᾶται, ὁρατὸν δὲ ὅταν ὁρᾶται·
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be styled one God, and that this Person being one, cannot be two, and thus that the
Father suffered with the Son.70
The most interesting feature about his passage is the fact that the author of the Refutatio
has shown that his opponent used Scripture to support his positions. Even though nearly
all of the biblical exegesis of his opponents has been expurgated, this one key passage
(John 14:11) manages to make an appearance.
In this passage, Callistus espouses a view that is more akin to psilanthropist views
than the sort of monarchianism we see in Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean. Instead
of the traditional monarchian assertion that the Father is the Son, Callistus reportedly says
that the Father was in the Son. He even qualifies and says that the Son is the human
(ἄνθρωπος). The passage quoted above is immediately followed by an attempt to guard
the Father from the bald assertion that he suffered and died, and it appears that the
concern with the suffering of the Father is what drives Callistus’ position on the visibility
of the Son and seeming invisibility of the Father. Here, the visible Son is not properly
divine; he is, rather, an ἄνθρωπος who is deified by the Father. This passage clearly
demonstrates the ways in which Callistus modified earlier and simpler monarchian
teaching.71

Refutatio 9.12.17-18 (trans. ANF 5:130 with my modifications): καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἰρημένον·
«οὐ πιστεύεις ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί;» τὸ μὲν γὰρ βλεπόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος,
τοῦτο εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, τ(ὸ) δὲ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ χωρηθὲν πνεῦμα, τοῦτ<ο> εἶναι τὸν πατέρα. οὐ γάρ, φησίν, ἐρῶ δύο
θεούς, πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, ἀλλ’ ἕνα· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ <ἑ>αυτοῦ γενόμενος πατήρ, προσλαβόμενος τὴν σάρκα
ἐθεοποίησεν <αὐτὴν> ἑνώσας ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐποίησεν ἕν, ὡς καλεῖσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἕνα θεόν. καὶ τοῦτο,
ἓν ὂν πρόσωπον, μὴ δύνασθαι εἶν(αι) δύο, καὶ οὕτως τὸν πατέρα συμπεπονθέναι τῷ υἱῷ.
70

71
The theology present here could also be motivation for the Refutatio’s depiction of Callistus as
wavering between the theology of Sabellius and Theodotus in 9.12.19.
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Despite the allegedly Noetian underpinnings of his theology, Callistus’ distinctive
developments of monarchian theology appear in another passage. The Refutatio states
that Callistus believes
that He who was seen in the flesh and was arrested is Son, but that the Father is
[the Spirit] who dwells in Him. Callistus thus at one time branches off into the
opinion of Noetus, but at another into that of Theodotus, and holds no sure
doctrine. These, then, are the opinions of Callistus.72
This belief offers a sharp contrast to the teaching that the Refutatio earlier ascribed to
Noetus. For Noetus, the one God was visible, sometimes revealed as Father, sometimes
as Son. Callistus, as in the passage in the immediately preceding paragraph, seems to be
making some sort of distinction between the Father and Son. Callistus distinguishes
between God (the Father) and a human (the Son), so this distinction does not imperil
Callistus’ commitment to the uniqueness of God. The fact that the visibility of God is
again closely tied to the suffering of the Son indicates some of the potential motivations
for the development. As Heine has argued, Callistus had a strong aversion to the
straightforward patripassianism of the earlier monarchians.73 He suggests that Callistus
used Stoic mixture theory in order to argue that the Father was in the (human) Son in
such a manner that he could separate himself before the crucifixion and death of the
(human) Son. Consequently, people see the flesh (body) of the human Jesus, not the
Father himself. Callistus’ solution regarding the visibility of the Son allows him to say
that the Father was invisible without having to sacrifice his strong claims about the unity
of God. The resulting development is something of a hybrid of pure monarchianism and

Refutatio 10.27.4 (trans. ANF 5:148 with my modifications): καὶ τὸν μὲν κατὰ σάρκα ὁρώμενον
καὶ κρατούμενον υἱὸν εἶναι θέλει, τὸ δὲ <αὐτῷ> ἐνοικοῦν <πνεῦμα> πατέρα, ποτὲ μὲν τῷ Νοητοῦ δόγματι
προσρηγν(ύ)μενος, ποτὲ δὲ τῷ Θεοδότου, μηδέν <τε> ἀσφαλὲς κρατῶν. ταῦτα τοίνυν <καὶ> Κάλλιστος.
72
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Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 70-71.
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psilanthropism. This development also seems to avoid the critique by the Refutatio that it
is unintelligible to say that the one God is both visible and invisible, passible and
impassible. Within Callistus’ teaching, at least as presented in the Refutatio, Jesus can
only be said to be divine in a qualified sense. For Callistus, Jesus would have been divine
only as long as the Father continued to remain with or in him.
Suffered and Died

My discussion of Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean has shown that the
question of whether the Father suffered became increasingly acute in the development of
monarchianism. Callistus’ teaching on the visibility of God and its linkage to issues of
patripassianism shows that the concern with patripassianism instigated development
away from the simpler forms of monarchian teaching. The changing attitude toward
straightforward patripassianism is evident within the account of the Refutatio. In order to
make the development explicit, I will reexamine the Refutatio’s account of the Noetians
before analyzing how Callistus modifies this earlier view.74
The first instance where the Refutatio discusses Noetus’ view of the suffering of
the Father is of questionable reliability because it is in a section where the Noetian
teaching is clearly being distorted to fit into the mold of Heraclitean philosophy. The
Refutatio accuses the Noetians of teaching that the one God is “immortal and mortal”
(ἀθάνατος καὶ θνητός), clearly the sort of antithetical statement that the Refutatio

74

Noët.”

Note again that Mouraviev analyzes this development in detail in his “Hippolyte, Héraclite et
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suggested was representative of Heraclitus’ philosophy.75 The teaching itself does not
seem too far afield for the Noetians, but the distinctly Heraclitean phrasing is suspect.
Just after the overtly Heraclitean wording, the Refutatio elaborates on Noetus’
teaching without forcing it into the philosopher’s alleged paradigm. Noetus claims that
the one God underwent generation and became his own son; the one God was then
crucified and handed his spirit over to himself; this same one who died did not die (<τὸν>
ἀποθανόντα καὶ μὴ ἀποθανόντα) and raised himself on the third day.76 Here, Noetus
allegedly attributes the full range of Christ’s human experience to the one God: birth,
suffering, death, resurrection. Although he says that God died and did not die, he does not
try to parcel this out between the Father and the Son. Noetus does not appear to have any
aversion to saying that the Father suffered and died. In this regard, the Refutatio’s
account squares with that of Contra Noetum. Later, the Refutatio similarly reports that
Noetus taught that the Father was at one time unbegotten and at another begotten, at one
time suffered and died while at another time did not suffer and die.77 While there seems
to be contradiction here, Noetus does not hesitate to say that the Father, at certain times,
did suffer.
The Refutatio’s presentation of Callistus’ teaching about the suffering of the
Father is more complex than that of Noetus. The Refutatio reports that Callistus was
willing to say that the Father became incarnate from the virgin: “And he affirms that the
Spirit, which became incarnate in the virgin, is not different from the Father, but one and
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Refutatio 9.10.10.

76

Refutatio 9.10.11-12.

77
Refutatio 10.27.2. It is possible that these two texts share a common distortion of Noetus’
doctrine, but without any primary Noetian sources, we cannot be certain.
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the same.”78 In the Noetian schema, where there is a simple identification of the Father
and Son, subjecting the Father to birth from the virgin would seem necessarily to entail
the suffering of the Father. Callistus, however, employs a Stoicized conception of spirit in
attempt to guard against the suffering of the Father.79
The Refutatio continues to lay out Callistus’ teaching, and I include the fuller
context in the quotation here:
Callistus alleges that the Logos Himself is Son, and that Himself is the Father;
and that though denominated by the names “Son” and “Father,” yet that in reality
He is one indivisible spirit. And he maintains that the Father is not one [thing] and
the Son another, but that they are one and the same spirit; and that all things are
full of the Divine Spirit, both those above and those below. And he affirms that
the Spirit, which became incarnate in the virgin is not different from the Father,
but one and the same. And he adds that this is what has been declared: “Believest
though not that I am in the Father and the Father in me?” [Jn 14:11] For that
which is seen, which is man, he considers to be the son; whereas the Spirit, which
was contained in the Son, to be Father. “For,” says (Callistus), “I will not profess
belief in two Gods, Father and Son, but in one. For the Father, having come to be
from himself, after He had taken flesh, he deified it, bringing it into union with
Himself, and made it one; so that Father and Son are styled one God, and that this
Person being one, cannot be two.” And in this way Callistus contends that the
Father suffered along with the Son; for he does not wish to assert that the Father
suffered, and is one Person, being careful to avoid blasphemy against the Father.
The senseless and knavish fellow, who improvises blasphemies in every direction,
only that he alone might seem to speak according to the truth, and is not abashed
at being at one time betrayed into the tenet of Sabellius, whereas at another into
the doctrine of Theodotus.80
Refutatio 9.12.17. Heine rightly suggests that Callistus’ emphasis on Spirit in this passage
probably indicates that it was a central concept for his linkage of the Father and Son (“The Christology of
Callistus,” 64).
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See Manlio Simonetti’s discussion of Callistus’ use of a Stoic understanding of spirit in order to
avoid patripassianism: “Il problema dell’unità di Dio a Roma da Clemente a Dionigi,” Rivista di storia e
letteratura religiosa 22, no. 3 (1986): 455–6.
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Refutatio 9.12.16-19 (trans. ANF 5:130 with my modifications): λέγων τὸν Λόγον αὐτὸν εἶναι
υἱόν, αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα, ὀνόματι μὲν <υἱὸν καὶ πατέρα> καλούμενον, ἓν δὲ ὄν<τα>, τὸ πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον·
οὐ <γὰρ> ἄλ<λ>ο <μὲν> εἶναι πατέρα, ἄλλο δὲ υἱόν, ἓν δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ <πνεῦμα> ὑπάρχειν. καὶ τὰ πάντα
γέμειν τοῦ θείου πνεύματος, τά τε ἄνω καὶ <τὰ> κάτω. καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῇ παρθένῳ σαρκωθὲν πνεῦμα οὐχ
ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν πατέρα, ἀλλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἰρημένον· «οὐ πιστεύεις ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ
πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί;» τὸ μὲν γὰρ βλεπόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, τ(ὸ) δὲ ἐν
τῷ υἱῷ χωρηθὲν πνεῦμα, τοῦτ<ο> εἶναι τὸν πατέρα. οὐ γάρ, φησίν, ἐρῶ δύο θεούς, πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, ἀλλ’
ἕνα· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ <ἑ>αυτοῦ γενόμενος πατήρ, προσλαβόμενος τὴν σάρκα ἐθεοποίησεν <αὐτὴν> ἑνώσας ἑαυτῷ
καὶ ἐποίησεν ἕν, ὡς καλεῖσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἕνα θεόν. καὶ τοῦτο, ἓν ὂν πρόσωπον, μὴ δύνασθαι εἶν(αι)
80
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This is a dense passage and needs to be analyzed carefully. The aspect of Callistus’
teaching that helps bring the above quotation into focus is that Callistus thought that the
one God was “one indivisible spirit” (ἓν δὲ ὄν<τα>, τὸ πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον).81 For
Callistus, the names Father and Son were both ways of referring to this one indivisible
spirit. The incarnation, then, was a joining of this spirit to human flesh.82 As the
discussion continues, it appears as though Callistus did not use the name “Son”
consistently. At one point, the names Father and Son are both used to refer to the one
divine spirit, and the particular name used is determined by the exigencies of the
situation. In the quotation above, however, Callistus seems to use “Son” also to refer to
the human Jesus, the flesh. Callistus says that the Father “suffered with the Son”
(συμπεπονθέναι τῷ υἱῷ).83 This is motivated by the fact that Callistus did not want to say
that the Father suffered (οὐ γὰρ θέλει λέγειν τὸν πατέ(ρα) πεπονθέναι). The operative
difference here is that Callistus appears willing to admit that τὸν πατέ(ρα)
συμπεπονθέναι, but not that τὸν πατέ(ρα) πεπονθέναι. For Callistus, suffering and

δύο, καὶ οὕτως τὸν πατέρα συμπεπονθέναι τῷ υἱῷ. οὐ γὰρ θέλει λέγειν τὸν πατέ(ρα) πεπονθέναι καὶ ἓν
εἶναι πρόσωπον, <οὕτως νομίζων> ἐκφυγεῖν τὴν εἰς τὸν πατέρα βλασφημίαν ὁ ἀνόητος καὶ ποικίλος· ὃ<ς>
ἄνω κάτω σχεδιάζων βλασφημίας, ἵνα μόνον κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν λέγειν δοκῇ, ποτὲ μὲν εἰς τὸ Σαβελλίου
δόγμα ἐμπίπτων, ποτὲ δὲ εἰς τὸ Θεοδότου οὐκ αἰδεῖται. This passage raises a number of questions that must
be bracketed for later: why do we see the introduction of πρόσωπον language in this passage? Was this
language introduced by the author of the Refutatio or by Callistus? What does Callistus mean when he
speaks of the Father bringing flesh into union with himself and making it one? Questions like these will
require a treatment beyond the scope of this chapter.
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Refutatio 9.12.16.
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In other contexts, such an understanding of the incarnation was not problematical. For example,
Tertullian considered spirit to be divinity. For him, the statement that spirit was joined to flesh was nothing
more than an affirmation that divinity was joined to flesh.
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Refutatio 9.12.18.
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suffering with were two different things; the former was inappropriate for God, while the
latter did not pose as much of a problem.
Although he does not explicitly state it, the implication is that it was the Son who
suffered. If Callistus were using “Son” consistently to refer to τὸ πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον,84
the attribution of suffering to the Son but not the Father would be self-defeating, for the
Father and the Son would be just different names for the same spirit. The equivocation in
Callistus’ usage of “Son” elucidates the developments that were taking place within
monarchianism. On the one hand, he uses traditional monarchian affirmations that the
Father and the Son are the same.85 On the other hand, he wants to argue, in the manner of
the psilanthropists, that the Son was only human in order to guard against the charge of
patripassianism. Thus, Callistus uses traditional language to argue that the Father and Son
were the same while moving away from the earlier claim that this argumentmeant that the
Father suffered. Perhaps when he refers to the suffering of the Son, he is talking about the
human Jesus to whom the indivisible spirit was joined, and from whom this same spirit
could be separated to avoid suffering.
The Refutatio accuses Callistus of vacillating between the teaching of Sabellius
and Theodotus.86 If we can trust the account of the Refutatio, there is some truth to this
accusation. At the same time, however, this alleged vacillation throws the enduring
concern of the monarchians into stark relief: the protection of the unity and uniqueness of
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Refutatio 9.12.16.
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The phrase he consistently uses for this idea is some variation of “ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό.” Note the
repetition of this phrase in 9.12.16-18.
86

As I note shortly, it is very difficult to know what Sabellius taught. Our main reliable reference
to him is Novatian, but he gives us a picture of Sabellian teaching that differs little from the core of
monarchianism we have established thus far.
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God. At one time, Callistus can espouse simple monarchian teachings; at another, he can
utilize psilanthropist elements to guard against accusations of patripassianism; but the
impulse to protect a strong understanding of the unity and uniqueness of God underlies
both of these Callistan theological positions.

Novatian: De Trinitate

Introduction

Novatian’s De Trinitate (De Trin.) was most likely composed between 240 and
250 C.E.87 Because it postdates the other works considered in this chapter by twenty to
thirty years, it provides valuable testimony regarding the perdurance of monarchian
teaching in Rome. De Trin. was most likely written as a commentary on the local regula
fidei, but Novatian spends a substantial amount of time defending the regula against any
teachings that jeopardize its central tenets.88 Novatian’s primary concerns are to refute
teachings that deny either the divinity or humanity of Christ and to refute monarchianism,

Russell J. DeSimone, “Introduction,” in The Trinity, The Spectacles, Jewish Foods, In Praise of
Purity, Letters, The Fathers of the Church 67 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1974),
14; idem, The Treatise of Novatian, the Roman Presbyter on the Trinity: A Study of the Text and the
Doctrine, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 4 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1970), 43–
4. In an earlier work, James Leonard Papandrea dates the work to the 240s C.E.: The Trinitarian Theology
of Novatian of Rome: A Study in Third-Century Orthodoxy (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 2008), 43.
Later, he suggests that it might have been written as early as the late 230s: Novatian of Rome and the
Culmination of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy, Princeton Theological Monograph Series 175 (Eugene, Ore.:
Pickwick, 2012), 57–8.
87

De Trin. begins with a reference to the “rule of truth,” and Novatian states explicitly in chapter
21 that his purpose is to explain the “rule of truth” concerning Christ. DeSimone notes that De Trin. was
almost certainly not the original title of the work. See Novatian, The Trinity, The Spectacles, Jewish Foods,
In Praise of Purity, Letters, 23, n. 1. See also Geoffrey D. Dunn’s warning against reading later Trinitarian
concerns back into Novatian’s text: “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,”
Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses 78, no. 4 (2002): 389–90.
88
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which rejects what he regards as proper distinction between the Father and the Son.89 Of
particular interest for my discussion are the sections that Novatian devotes to those who
collapse distinction between the Father and the Son and confuse them. Sabellius is the
only “heretic” mentioned by name in De Trin., but the monarchianism that Novatian is
combatting is little developed from that which is present in Tertullian and Hippolytus.90
On the whole, the monarchianism opposed by Novatian seems to have been built
upon the simple propositions that we also find in Contra Noetum, Adversus Praxean, and
the Refutatio.91 However, unlike the Refutatio, Novatian presents the positions of the
monarchians as a product of the exegesis of the same cluster of passages that appeared in
Adv. Prax. Even more, Novatian makes explicit some of the reasoning that funded the
exegetical conclusions peculiar to the monarchians. Novatian reproduces the arguments
of the monarchians in a simple and straightforward manner. He is by no means a
sympathetic witness, but his account is less tendentious than the accounts in Refutatio 910, which distort the monarchian positions to demonstrate that they derive from the
teaching of Heraclitus.

Unlike Tertullian and Hippolytus, Novatian’s De Trin. does not use any of the language of
monarchy to describe the positions of those who denied the distinction between the Father and the Son.
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that he is addressing positions very similar to those with which Tertullian and
Hippolytus concerned themselves. See Simonetti’s discussion (contra Uríbarri Bilbao) of possible reasons
the term monarchia is not present in De Trin.: Simonetti, “Monarchia e Trinità,” 628.
89

Noetum.
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Sabellius is mentioned in De Trin. 12.7 and 12.9.

91

See, for example, my summary of the Noetian positions at the end of my section on Contra
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One God

Towards the end of his work, Novatian asserts that the teachings regarding Christ
he has been combatting all derive from mistaken attempts to understand the claim that
there is only one God. Because this passage demonstrates the lens through which
Novatian approaches all the arguments of his opponents, it is worth quoting at length. He
states,
They are scandalized by Christ because the Scriptures assert that He is also God
and we believe this. Therefore, that all heretical calumny against our Faith may
cease, it is right that we should discuss the fact that Christ is also God (in such a
way that it will not interfere with the truth of Scripture or with our faith) because
the Scriptures assert and because we maintain and believe that there is only one
God. In fact, the heretics who say that Jesus Christ is Himself God the Father, as
well as those who would have him to be only a man, have drawn from Scripture
the elements and the reasons for their error and perversity. For when they
observed that it was written that God is one, they thought that they could not hold
such a belief unless they thought they should believe that Christ was a mere man
or that He was really God the Father.92
In Novatian’s account, his opponents are attempting to preserve the fundamental claim
that there is only one God. They first do so by identifying the Father and Son so that there
are not two to whom divinity is attributed. They seek to salvage the divinity of Christ by
denying that there is any distinction between Christ and the Father. The second group of
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Novatian, De Trinitate 30.2-3 (trans. FC 67.104-105). Unless otherwise noted, all English
translations of De Trinitate are from this translation. scandalizati in christum, quod etiam deus et per
scripturas asseratur et a nobis hoc esse credatur, merito a nobis, ut omnis a fide nostra auferri possit
haeretica calumnia, de eo quod et deus sit christus sic est disputandum, ut non impediat scripturae
ueritatem, sed nec nostram fidem, qua unus deus et per scripturas promittitur et a nobis tenetur et creditur.
Tam enim illi qui iesum christum ipsum deum patrem dicunt quam etiam illi qui hominem illum
tantummodo esse uoluerunt, erroris sui et peruersitatis origines et causas inde rapuerunt, quia cum
animaduerterent scriptum esse quod unus sit deus, non aliter putauerunt istam tenere se posse sententiam,
nisi aut hominem tantum christum aut certe deum patrem putarent esse credendum. Unless otherwise
noted, all Latin for Novatian’s De Trinitate is from Novatianus, Opera, quae supersunt nunc primum in
unum collecta ad fidem codicum, qui adhuc extant, ed. G. F. Diercks, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 4
(Turnholti: Brepols, 1972).

187
Novatian’s opponents attempts to solve the problem by arguing that Christ was a mere
man, thereby scrapping any attempts to maintain the divinity of Christ.93
The above quotation demonstrates that both Novatian and his opponents viewed
the preservation of monotheism as a first-order question. Elsewhere, he summarizes his
opponents’ positions, saying, “They express themselves in this manner: Scripture teaches
that there is one God. But Christ is God. Therefore, say the heretics, if the Father and
Christ are the one God, Christ will be called the Father.”94 Note again that the
fundamental premise on which their argument is built is that there is only one God.
Like his opponents, Novatian seeks to preserve the oneness of God. In his
discussion of God as creator near the beginning of the work, he echoes the strong
assertion of monotheism from Isaiah 45: “I am God, and there is none beside me.”95
Tertullian also dwells on this passage and states that it is directed against the idolatry of
the Gentiles and does not, therefore, deny that the Son is God with the Father.96
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By the time of Novatian, the identification of the Son with the Father and the denial of the
divinity of the Son were fairly common ways of attempting to preserve the core teaching that there is only
one God. Both Hippolytus and Eusebius report that Theodotus taught that Christ was a mere human
(ἄνθρωπον ψιλὸν). See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.1 and Eusebius, EH 5.28. The Refutatio accuses
Callistus of wavering between the teaching of Sabellius and Theodotus. While the Refutatio no doubt
includes this note in order to show that his opponent is inconsistent, this alleged inconsistency is much
more intelligible if we remember that the distinct positions of Sabellius and Theodotus were designed to
protect the oneness of God. See Refutatio 9.12.19. Whatever other shortcomings they might have,
Harnack’s terms “modalistic” and “dynmasitc” monarchianism at least show that the two positions are
related. Decker, however, rejects Harnack’s label and thinks that psilanthropism and monarchianism are
entirely distinct phenomena. He claims that Novatian distorts the evidence in order to argue that there is
some sort of family resemblance between psilanthropism and monarchianism. See Decker, “Die
Monarchianer,” 4–5, 53. There is enough linkage between monarchian and psilanthropist positions in other
works to surmise that the two might have been related in some way.
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Tertullian’s opponents also utilized passages like Isa. 45 that assert that there is only one
God in order to deny any distinction between the Father and the Son.97 Since strong
assertions of monotheism drawn from Isa. 45 are prominent in the accounts of both
Tertullian and Novatian, which are separated by roughly thirty years, it seems that neither
the fundamental assertions of the monarchians nor the dossier of scriptural passages they
used to support these assertions had substantially changed during that span of thirty years.
Novatian, like earlier anti-monarchian writers, was apparently accused of being a
ditheist by his monarchian opponents. He states, “First of all, then, we must refute the
argument of those who presume to make against us the charge of saying that there are
two gods.”98 Following a chain of passages where Christ is referred to in the same
manner as the Father (good, Lord, etc.), Novatian rejects the accusation of his opponents
and turns it against them: “Let them acknowledge, then, by the same line of reasoning
that the truth that there is one God is not hindered in any way by the other truth that
Christ is also declared to be God.”99 The fact that Novatian had to combat the charge of
ditheism as late as the mid-third century clearly demonstrates both that monarchianism
was persistent and that its central teachings remained fairly consistent throughout the first
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Passages from Isaiah 45 feature prominently in second- and third-century theologies. Irenaeus
places words from Isa. 45 on the lips of the Valentinian demiurge, who is ignorant of the fact that there are,
in fact, many other gods, and others who are higher than he (Adversus haereses 1.5.4). There are other
indications that monarchianism was, at least in part, a reaction to the tendency of Gnosticism to multiply
divine figures in the Pleroma. Thus, passages like Isa. 45 became theological battlegrounds. Those authors
who found the positions of Gnosticism and monarchianism unpalatable had to carefully chart a course
between the two extremes: a heavily populated Pleroma that bordered on polytheism and a strict
understanding of monotheism that rejected distinction in the one God.
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Novatian, De Trinitate 30.25 (trans. FC 67:107 with modifications): eadem ratione intellegant
offici non posse ab illo quod unus est deus ei quod deus pronuntiatus est et christus.
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half of the third century. Attempts by Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Novatian to distinguish
the Father and Son were consistently seen by the monarchians as a confession that there
were two gods.
Excursus: Sabellius Outside of De Trinitate

As I noted in my discussion of naming the monarchian controversy in the
introduction, one of the commonly used names for this theology is “Sabellianism.” There,
I argued that calling this theology “Sabellianism” adds little to our understanding of it. In
order to support that contention, I offer here a brief excursus on our knowledge of
Sabellius. In its brief discussion of Sabellius, the Refutatio paints a murky picture. First, it
suggests that Callistus perverted Sabellius even though Callistus had the power to set him
straight.100 This statement seems to suggest that Callistus corrupted Sabellius (to his own
teaching?). Later, however, the Refutatio tells us that Callistus drove Sabellius away
(ἀπέωσεν) as someone not thinking rightly (ὡς μὴ φρονοῦντα ὀρθῶς), an odd statement
given the Refutatio’s earlier assertion that Callistus corrupted Sabellius.101 Furthermore,
the Refutatio suggests that Callistus distanced himself from Sabellius in order to prove
his own orthodoxy in response to the Refutatio’s accusations against him. The Refutatio’s
account of Sabellius grows even more complicated when it tells us that Sabellius accused
Callistus of having passed beyond his first faith.102 Finally, after describing the mutual
animosity between Callistus and Sabellius, it claims that Callistus waivers between the
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dogma of Sabellius and that of Theodotus.103 Despite the repeated linkage between
Sabellius and Callistus in the Refutatio, its account does not allow us to form a coherent
picture. The Refutatio alternately accuses Callistus of corrupting Sabellius, falling into
the error of Sabellius, and publicly distancing himself from Sabellius. All of these
references to Sabellius occur in one of the Refutatio’s most venomous attacks on
Callistus, and it seems that Sabellius appears in the scene only to besmirch the reputation
of Callistus. The Refutatio gives us precious little about the content of Sabellius’
teaching.
By the end of the third century and the beginning of the fourth, the mere
invocation of the name of Sabellius was all that was needed to pillory an opponent.
Following Harnack, Bienert notes that the name “Sabellianism” had become the general
name for “modalistic monarchianism” in the East at the end of the third century.104
Despite the widespread use of Sabellius’ name to designate monarchianism, we still have
very little information on the distinctive features of Sabellius’ teaching. Scarcely more is
known about the details of his biography. The author of the Refutatio places Sabellius in
contact with Callistus in Rome, but later writers place him outside of Rome.105 Basil of
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Refutatio 9.12.19. This might be an indication that even in the time the Refutatio was being
written, monarchianism and psilanthropism were both live options for protecting the uniqueness of God.
Wolfgang A. Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” in Logos:
Festschrift für Luise Abramowski (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1993), 124–39. Bienert is drawing from Adolf
von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, vol. 1 (Freiburg: Mohr, 1886), 674. Bienert later reiterates
his position: “Vor diesem Hintergrund wird der Name Sabellius schließlich zur Chiffre für einen in Rom zu
Beginn des 3. Jahrhunderts verurteilten Modalismus im Sinne des Patripassianismus, von dem sich auch
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Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” 130. Bienert suggests that
Methodius of Olympus is the earliest author to place Sabellius outside of Rome, but his argument seems to
be a bit of a stretch. His contention is not based on any geographical epithet in Methodius, but rather on the
fact that Methodius accuses Sabellius of teaching that the Father suffers. See Methodius of Olympus,
Symposium VIII, 10.
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Caesarea, for example, identifies Sabellius as having been from Libya.106 The Refutatio
and Novatian, our earliest witnesses to Sabellius, suggest that Sabellius was active in
Rome during the beginning of the third century. Since later authors seem to have little
firsthand knowledge of Sabellius’ teaching, there is little reason to doubt that Sabellius
was present in Rome in the early third century.
One might think that Ephiphanius’ section on Sabellius in the Panarion would
shed valuable light on the teaching of Sabellius. Sadly, it does not. Lienhard notes that
Hübner has convincingly demonstrated that Epiphanius’ primary source for his section on
Sabellius is the Contra Sabellianos of Pseudo-Athanasius.107 Lienhard then goes on to
note that “the ‘Sabellius’ of this work is actually Marcellus.”108 The Contra Sabellianos
actually reproduces the theology of Marcellus under the name of Sabellius.109 Althrough
Epiphanius heavily employed a source that wrongly attributed Marcellan teaching to
Sabellius, that teaching still bears some resemblance to the fundamental tenets of the
monarchianism of the beginning of the third century. Near the beginning of his
discussion, Epiphanius tells us that the Sabellians taught that the Father and the Son and

Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” 136. See, for example, Basil
of Caesarea, Epistle 9.2.
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Joseph T. Lienhard, “Basil of Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra, and ‘Sabellius,’” Church History
58, no. 2 (1989): 166. Lienhard cites Reinhard M Hübner, “Die Hauptquelle des Epiphanius (Panarion, haer
65) über Paulus von Samosata: Ps-Athanasius, Contra Sabellianos,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 90,
no. 2–3 (1979): 201–20. See also Andrew Radde-Gallwitz’s discussion on this text, at least part of which
he thinks sheds light on Sabellius’ actual teaching: “The Holy Spirit as Agent, Not Activity: Origen’s
Argument with Modalism and Its Afterlife in Didymus, Eunomius, and Gregory of Nazianzus,” Vigiliae
Christianae 65, no. 3 (2011): 233–5.
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the Spirit are the same—one ὑπόστασις with three names.110 He next recounts that the
Sabellians used a dossier of biblical texts from both the Old and New Testaments.111 As
in the earliest accounts of monarchianism, this dossier of texts begins with those that
assert that there is only one God. Also included in this dossier are key texts from John’s
Gospel that feature prominently in third-century accounts of monarchianism. As in
Tertullian’s account of monarchianism, Epiphanius suggests that Sabellius and his
followers preyed on the simple people in the church:
Then, when they encounter simple or innocent persons who do not understand the
sacred scriptures clearly, they give them this first scare: 'What are we to say,
gentlemen? Have we one God or three gods?' But when someone who is devout
but does not fully understand the truth hears this, he is disturbed and assents to
their error at once, and comes to deny the existence of the Son and the Holy
Spirit.112
It seems, therefore, that there is little in Epiphanius’ account that is of use for clarifying
details about the life and teaching of Sabellius. We must be wary of anything in
Epiphanius that reflects a substantial change from the earlier sources, as it likely reflects
the teaching of Marcellus more than the teaching of Sabellius. The elements in
Epiphanius’ account that comport well with the the third-century accounts of

110
Epiphanius, Panarion 62.1. Given the paucity of references to Sabellius that are reliable at the
requisite level of detail, it is difficult to know if Sabellius actually used terms like ὑπόστασις to denote the
oneness of God.
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Epiphanius, Panarion 62.2. Translation from Epiphanius, The Panarion of Epiphanius of
Salamis, trans. Frank Williams, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 36 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987), 122.
The clear Trinitarian focus of this passage is indicative that it postdates the earliest phases of the
monarchian controversy. Recall that the debates of the early stage of the monarchian controversy were
largely couched in binitarian terms.
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monarchianism tell us little more than that some key features of monarchianism survived
until at least 377, when Epiphanius most likely completed the Panarion.113
It turns out, then, that the attestation to Sabellius that postdates the third century is
of little use for reproducing the details of Sabellius’ life and teaching. First, we do not
even have a detailed explication of his teachings from contemporary sources. Second,
shortly after his lifetime, his name became a watchword used by the opponents of
monarchianism and its continued influence. When his name became used as a general
cypher for monarchianism, as Bienert suggests, there was little hope that any later author
would add nuance to accounts of his teaching.
Novatian Continued

While the Refutatio focuses on the political relations between Callistus and
Sabellius to the exclusion of any of Sabellius’ specific doctrines, Novatian cursorily
makes mention of Sabellius’ teaching without going into the details of his life. What
exactly was it about Sabellius that warranted him being the only “heretic” mentioned by
name in Novatian’s De Trinitate? Certainly it was not merely the erroneous doctrine that
Novatian attributed to him. As I noted in the quotations above, Novatian twice accused
Sabellius of teaching that Christ is the Father. There is nothing spectacular or novel about
this teaching that Novatian ascribes to Sabellius. By the time of Novatian’s writing, such
statements identifying the Father and the Son were commonplace, little more than
garden-variety monarchianism in the middle of the third century. Since there is nothing
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especially noteworthy about the teaching that Novatian attributes to Sabellius, there must
be something else that makes him notable. The most likely reason Novatian mentions
Sabellius by name is that he had become the most public and influential monarchian in
Rome by Novatian’s day. Sabellius deserved to be mentioned by name not because his
teaching was any worse than that of other monarchians but because Novatian wished to
attack the leader of the monarchian cause in Rome.114
Father and Son

As in the earlier accounts of monarchianism, Novatian portrays his monarchian
opponents as still claiming that the same [one] was both Father and Son. He writes,
They want to show that Christ is God the Father by the very fact that He is
declared to be not only Man but also God. They express themselves in this
manner: Scripture teaches that there is one God. But Christ is God. Therefore, say
the heretics, if the Father and Christ are the one God, Christ will be called the
Father. In this syllogism they are proved to be in error, not knowing Christ, but
rather favoring the mere sound of a name. For they want Him not to be the
Second Person after the Father, but the Father Himself.115
This passage highlights one of the idiosyncrasies of Novatian’s depiction of
monarchianism: their identification of the Father and the Son appears to flow only in one
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DeSimone claims that Novatian is concerned with Sabellius because he “came to Rome and
introduced a second, more refined form of Monarchainism called Modalist Monarchianism” (The Treatise
of Novatian, 74, italics in original). DeSimone’s use of “modalist Monarchianism” here, as opposed to
“crass Monarchianism” is not standard usage of the term; and it does not add any clarity to the discussions.
As I argued above, it is difficult to see anything distinctive about Sabellius’ teaching in De Trin. Uríbarri
Bilbao suggested that Novatian was directly addressing the theology of Sabellius in De Trin. and that this is
one of the reasons Novatian does not use the term monarchia (Monarquía y Trinidad, 429). As I note
elsewhere, I do not find Uríbarri’s views convincing in this case.
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Novatian, De Trinitate 26.1-2 (trans. FC 67:90): hoc ipso patrem deum uolentes ostendere
christum esse, dum non homo tantum asseritur, sed et deus promitur. Sic enim inquiunt: si unus esse deus
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direction. Almost every time Novatian rehearses his opponents’ position, he records that
they say that Christ is the Father, never that the Father is the Christ. This tendency is
elucidated by other, clearer passages. The following passage is especially helpful:
The Scriptures so clearly teach that Christ is also God that many heretics, deeply
moved by the reality and the grandeur of His divinity, stressed His glories to such
an extent that they did not hesitate to declare (or at least were of the opinion) that
He was not the Son, but God the Father Himself. Though this opinion of theirs is
contrary to the truth of the Scriptures, it is, nevertheless, a weighty and excellent
argument for the divinity of Christ. He is so indisputably God—that is, as Son of
God, born of God—that many heretics, as we have said, took Him to be God in
such a manner that they thought that He must be called the Father, not the Son.116
Novatian reiterates his point in this passage when he says, “Hence, though they read in
Scripture that He is the Son, they think that He is the Father because they readily perceive
that the Son is God.”117 For Novatian’s monarchian opponents, the Father is God; and
divinity appears to reside exclusively with the Father.118 For them, any admission that the
Son is God necessarily entails that he is the Father.119 Since the monarchians, unlike the
psilanthropists, had no reservations about affirming the divinity of Christ, they did not
hesitate to identify Christ with the Father.
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Novatian, De Trinitate 23.2-3 (trans. FC 67:84): Nam usque adeo hunc manifestum est in
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This teaching in itself is not necessarily troubling. Recall that for many first- and secondcentury authors the one God is said to be the Father.
This is an interesting similarity to Origen’s schema in ComJn 2.13ff. There, Origen argues that
the Father is αὐτόθεος. In the context, Origen’s unique construction seems to mean that the Father is
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Father. Both Origen and Novatian’s monarchian opponents agreed that divinity is preeminently (or in the
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Novatian also depicts his opponents as expressing the identity of Christ and the
Father with syllogistic reasoning.120 Novatian repeats a condensed version of this same
reasoning later in the treatise, writing, “Now the heretics who say that Jesus Christ is the
Father argue as follows: If God is one and Christ is God, then Christ is the Father,
because God is one.”121 The frequency with which Novatian addresses the monarchian
contention that the Son was the Father shows how central he thought this claim was to
monarchian theology. Such an emphasis prompts Novatian to devote substantial energy
to showing that the Father and Son are not the same.122
Sabellius receives brief mention in the Refutatio, but we learn very little about
what he actually taught.123 As noted above, Sabellius is the only opponent whom
Novatian mentions by name in De Trinitate.124 Novatian briefly discusses his teaching,
but this discussion does not reveal too much distinctive about his theology. It is evident,
however, that one of Novatian’s chief problems with him is that he claims that Christ is
the Father. Novatian writes, “Thus the sacrilegious heresy of Sabellius, as we said, takes
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Novatian, De Trinitate 30.4 (trans. FC 67:105): “Et quidem illi qui iesum christum patrem
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concrete form because of these men who believe that Christ is not the Son but the
Father.”125 Later, he states again that Sabellius “says that Christ is the Father.”126
Toward the end of the treatise, Novatian claims to have disarmed his opponent,
saying, “Now that he has been deprived of those two passages, he is like a man who has
had his two eyes gouged out; he is completely overcome by the blindness of his own
doctrine.”127 In this comment, Novatian is referring to John 14:9ff and John 10:30. As I
noted in the discussion of Adversus Praxean and Contra Noetum, these passages were
two of the favorite scriptural warrants of the monarchians.128 In his treatment of John
10:30, Novatian makes a very familiar argument:
For if Christ were the Father, as the heretics think, He should have said: 'I, the
Father, am one [unus].' But when He says 'I' and then introduces the Father, by
saying 'I and the Father,' He thereby distinguishes and separates the individuality
of His own Person, viz. that of the Son, from the authority of the Father, not only
as regards the mere sound of the name [Son] but also in regard to the order of
power in the divine economy.129
Novatian makes a grammatical point here that is almost exactly the same as the move
Hippolytus makes in Contra Noetum. Hippolytus states there,

125

Novatian, De Trinitate 12.7 (trans. FC 67:51): Et iam per istos, ut diximus, sabelliana haeresis
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126
Novatian, De Trinitate 12.9 (trans. FC 67:52): Si patrem, quid dubitant cum sabellii temeritate
misceri, qui christum patrem dicit?
127

Novatian, De Trinitate 28.30 (trans. FC 67:99): quandoquidem duobus istis locis quibusdam
effossis luminibus orbatus totus sit in doctrinae suae caecitate superatus.
128

It is hardly surprising that neither of these passages occurs in the Refutatio. To be sure, it has
been well documented that this work distorted the positions of its opponents in order to make them fit its
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And if he were to say, “He himself said: ‘I and the Father are one,’” let him apply
his mind to the matter and learn that he did not say “I and the Father am one”, but
“are one”. “We are” is not said with reference to one, but with reference to two.
He revealed two persons, but a single power.130
Both of these passages are clear examples of the grammatical exegesis that became the
common defense against the monarchian interpretation of these passages.131 Novatian
thought that these passages were so important to the monarchians that he was able to
claim that he had defeated them once he had successfully refuted the monarchian
interpretation.
Visible and Invisible

Further along in the De Trinitate, Novatian addresses another of the major
emphases of monarchianism: the visibility and invisibility of God. As I highlighted in my
examination of the earlier texts, questions of visibility and invisibility were major pieces
of the monarchian contention that there is only one God. Novatian sets the problem up by
juxtaposing texts that claim God appeared to Abraham with Ex. 33:20, which states that
none shall see God and live.132 For Novatian, God was seen in the biblical theophanies;
but to uphold the invisibility of the Father, he argues, “Accordingly, this can only mean
that it was not the Father, who never has been seen, that was seen, but the Son, who is
wont both to descend and to be seen, for the simple reason that He has descended. In fact,
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He is ‘the image of the invisible God.’”133 Novatian’s argument here seems to be directed
against something like the monarchian contention that when the Father wishes to be seen,
he is visible; and when the Father wishes to remain unseen, he is invisible.134
Commenting on the Sermon on the Mount, Novatian takes up the theme of
visibility and invisibility again:
When Christ Himself is seen and touched by the crowd and yet promises and
declares that he who is clean of heart shall see God, He proves by this very fact
that He, who was then present, was not the Father because He promised, while
actually present to their gaze, that whoever was clean of heart would see the
Father.135
The monarchians consistently maintained that the one God is sometimes visible and other
times invisible. Novatian’s position above functions as a ready-made rebuttal of the
position we see in the Refutatio: God appeared as Son but told those who were able to
receive it that he was also the Father.136 Novatian, on the other hand, takes the passage he
interprets here to be a clear demonstration that there is a distinction between the Father
and the Son, and that it is the Son who is now seen. Throughout the treatise, Novatian
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asserts that gazing upon the visible Son is preparation for the presumably eschatological
vision of the Father, which will come after purification.137
Because a group of Novatian’s opponents argued that the Son and the Father were
the same, he goes to great lengths to demonstrate that they are distinct. Although the
central aim of this section is to add detail to our account of monarchianism by means of
Novatian’s depiction of his opponents, a brief examination of his responses to them is
useful. In the following discussion, Novatian’s concern to explain another theophany
shows that the proper interpretation of these theophanies was one of the most contested
points between the monarchians and their opponents.
Novatian’s assertion that the Son is both God and angel is one of the more
interesting moves that he makes in order to prove the distinction between the Father and
the Son. Novatian’s discussion of the Son as an angel follows directly upon the heels of
his examination of the Old Testament theophanies. Novatian sets up the problem by
analyzing Gen. 31:11-13, where an angel says to Jacob, “I am the God who appeared to
you in the place of God.”138 This passage merits Novatian’s attention precisely because
he has just argued that the Father was not seen in the theophanies. Novatian needed to
137

See, for example, De Trinitate 28.4, 14, 25. Novatian does not clarify what exactly this vision
of the Father will be like. He also does not spend too much time trying to explain how the Father is
invisible but will later be seen by the pure in heart. The image of God plays an important part in this
discussion: “The Lord, therefore, would never have used all these arguments, especially after having
already given so many that clearly bear witness that He is not the Father but the Son, if He had been
mindful that He was the Father or wished that He be considered the Father. His sole purpose in these words
was to make it clear to us that every man should henceforth account it to be the same thing to see the image
of God the Father through the Son, as if he had seen the Father. Every man, by believing in the Son,
exercises himself in the contemplation of the image, that he may advance and grow even to the perfect
contemplation of God the almighty Father, after he has grown accustomed to see the divinity in the Image”
(De Trinitate 28.25 [trans. FC 67:98]). D’Alès comments about the vision of the Father, “seul le Fils, image
du Dieu invisible, a été vu, parce que seul il est descendu. Par lui la fragilité humaine se fortifie peu à peu
et s’accoutume par degrés à voir enfin le Père” (Novatien, 90).
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Novatian, De Trinitate 19.2 (trans. FC 67:73). See also Justin’s assertions that the Son was also
an angel, when he interprets Gen. 31:11-13 (Dialogue with Trypho 58-9).
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explain how the Father remained invisible when this angel, claiming to be God, was seen
by Jacob. In order to maintain the invisibility of God, Novatian argues that we must
preserve a distinction between “Him who is called simply God and Him who is declared
to be not simply God, but an angel as well.”139 He continues and states that while the
Father is simply God, the Son is both God and angel, thus using the interpretation of
theophanies as a means of distinguishing Father and Son.140
Suffered and Died

Although there are signs in Adversus Praxean and the Refutatio that some
monarchians were moving away from asserting that the Father suffered, Novatian’s
testimony demonstrates that by the middle of the third century, he thought it still
worthwhile to oppose the monarchian assertion that the Father suffered, or at least that
accusing people of having made such an assertion was an effective polemical tool. He
writes, “Well then, say the heretics, if Christ is not only Man but also God, and Scripture
says that Christ died for us and rose again, surely Scripture is teaching us to believe that
God died.”141 In his attempts to refute this teaching, he states it again in a much simpler
form: “If scripture had declared that Christ was only God and there was no association of
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Novatian, De Trinitate 19.3 (trans. FC 67.73): distinctio sit inter eum qui tantummodo deus
dicitur et inter eum qui non deus simpliciter, sed et angelus pronuntiatur.
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Novatian, De Trinitate 19.4. Novatian also argues this in De Trinitate 18.22.

Novatian, De Trinitate 25.1 (trans. FC 67:88): Ergo, inquiunt, si christus non homo est tantum,
sed et deus, christum autem refert scriptura mortuum pro nobis et resuscitatum, iam docet nos scriptura
credere deum mortuum.
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human frailty traceable in him, then their twisted syllogism would have had some force
here: 'If Christ is God, and Christ died, then God died.’”142
Novatian constantly reiterates that Christ is both human and divine, which allows
him to affirm that Christ suffered and to avoid affirming that the Father suffered. If
Novatian can be trusted in the passage above, the monarchians used syllogistic logic to
claim bluntly that the Father suffered.143 Novatian later claims that the psilanthropists
used the sufferings and human frailties of Christ to prove that he was only human. They
could have used syllogistic reasoning similar to what Novatian outlines above: God does
not suffer; Christ suffered; therefore, Christ is not God.144 In order to counter
psilanthropist claims that Christ was only human, Novatian points out that the miracles he
performed demonstrate that he was also divine. By his insistence that Christ was both
divine and human, Novatian sought to meaningfully say that Christ suffered and at the
same time to avoid having to predicate suffering of God.145

Scholarly Theories Reconsidered

Monarchian theology came from Asia Minor to Rome at the end of the second
and beginning of the third century. It quickly gained a following in Rome among both the
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Novatian, De Trinitate: 25.3 (trans. FC 67:88): Si enim scriptura proponeret christum
tantummodo deum et nulla in illo fragilitatis humanae sociatio esset permixta, merito illorum hic aliquid
ualuisset sermo contortus: ‘si christus deus, christus autem mortuus, ergo mortuus est deus’.
It is difficult to determine here if Novatian’s opponents were this direct about the death of the
Father or if this is a polemical amplification of something he thought followed from other monarchian
premises.
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Novatian, De Trinitate 11.3-4.

Novatian likewise wants to protect God from the charge of being changeable: "He never
changes or transforms Himself into other forms, lest through change he should appear to be also mortal"
(De Trinitate 4.4 [trans. FC 67:31]).

203
leaders, such as Callistus, and other members of the community. As far as the extant
witnesses indicate, Rome became the epicenter of monarchian theology, but
monarchianism elicited rebuttals from theologians from Asia Minor (Hippolytus, the
author of Contra Noetum), North Africa (Tertullian), Alexandria (Origen),146 and Rome
(the author of the Refutatio and Novatian). By all accounts, monarchianism was a
theological force to be reckoned with in the early-third-century church.
Early Third Century Orthodoxy?

Despite its notable influence in the early-third-century church, it is difficult to
sustain claims that monarchianism was the majority position in the church, or something
like an early-third-century orthodoxy. Reinhard Hübner is the most recent proponent of
this theory, and he suggests that monarchianism was the overwhelming majority position
in Christianity until the middle of the third century. 147 Hübner’s theory is built upon a
number of suppositions, the most problematic of which requires a revisionist reading of
virtually all second-century theology and a revisionist chronology of some major figures.
Although he dismisses Contra Noetum as a product of the fourth century, Hübner
claims that Noetus antedated a number of major figures in the second century and that
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Although I have not included Origen in any of the analysis up to this point, the final two
chapters are devoted to demonstrating his interaction with, and rejection of, monarchianism.
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See, for example, his introductory remarks to his collection of essays on monarchianism, Der
Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden: Brill, 1999), vii. See
also Daniel H. Williams’ interaction with Hübner’s theories: “Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as
the Persistent Heretical Face of the Fourth Century,” Harvard Theological Review 99, no. 2 (April 1,
2006): 188–91.
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these figures, including Ignatius, Irenaeus, and Melito, drew on his theology. 148 Because
he does not consider Contra Noetum a reliable attestation of Noetus’ thought, Hübner
bases his portrait of Noetus’ theology almost exclusively on the accounts contained in the
Refutatio. He spends substantial time examining the antithetical statements about God
contained in the Refutatio’s account of Noetus. These, he claims, were excerpted from an
anti-Gnostic rule of faith or paschal homily of Noetus.149 Hübner then surveys other
second-century authors who use such antithetical statements about God before
concluding that all of these authors must have been drawing on Noetus’ allegedly earlier
theology.150
Unfortunately, the connection Hübner draws between Noetus and the other
second-century authors is tenuous. The main point of contact Hübner alleges is
antithetical statements about God.151 Whenever he sees these sorts of statements in
second-century writers, he concludes that they are drawing on Noetus. If, in fact, the
antithetical statements are authentically Noetian and not the distortions of the author of
the Refutatio, Hübner’s theory does not necessarily follow. Noetus could just as easily
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und Noët,” 6–9.
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Hübner, “Die antignostische Glaubensregel des Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 39–
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Hübner concludes that the Ignatian epistles are late, most likely between 165-175. See his, “Die
Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 203–4. Hübner also claims that Ignatius’
statements are rendered more intelligible if they are considered as responses to Gnosticism (ibid., 194). He
is well aware of the bold nature of his revision, and he explicitly argues that Ignatius should no longer be
considered an “Apostolic Father” but rather an Apologist (ibid., 204).
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Further difficulty arises because Hübner draws on the Refutatio to establish that such antitheses
were one of the distinguishing characteristics of Noetus’ theology. Although he is aware of the polemical
distortions in the Refutatio, he brushes them aside too easily. Another reason he dismisses Contra Noetum
as an unreliable witness to Noetus’ thought is that it does not contain these sorts of statements (Hübner,
“Melito und Noët,” 8–9).
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have been speaking about God in a manner common to second-century writers from Asia
Minor. There is no evidence that demands (or even suggests) that Noetus was the source
on which other second-century theologians drew for such antitheses.
Hübner never explains why one of the most distinctive elements of Noetus’
theology, the explicit identification of the Father and Son and concomitant denial of any
distinction between them, is absent from all of these authors who allegedly rely on
Noetus. Second-century writers were concerned with maintaining that there was only one
God, and they often left the precise relationship between the Father and Son unexplored.
Even though they did not carefully define the distinction between the Father and Son,
they did not overtly identify the Father with the Son as did Noetus. Recall the Refutatio’s
summary of Noetus’ teaching in one of the passages Hübner deems trustworthy: “For in
this manner he thinks to establish the sovereignty (μοναρχίαν) of God, alleging that
Father and Son, so called, are one and the same, not one individual produced from a
different one, but himself from himself; and that he is styled by name Father and Son,
according to vicissitude of times.”152
All of the extant accounts of monarchianism that I have studied thus far have
shown that the explicit identification of the Father and Son was at the core of monarchian
theology. The absence of such strong statements about the Father and Son being identical
in second-century texts is an insurmountable obstacle for Hübner’s theory. Were Noetus
as influential as Hübner contends, one would surely find this central aspect of his
teaching mirrored in those writers who allegedly relied on him. It is more probable that

Refutatio 9.10.11 (trans. ANF 5:128 with modifications): οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν
συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, γινόμενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν
ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ· ὀνόματι μὲν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καλούμενον κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν.
152

206
Noetus’ antithetical statements about God were drawing on traditional ways of speaking
about God in Asia Minor.153 He added to this traditional phraseology the monarchian
postulate, that the Father and the Son are one and the same.
Once Hübner’s assertions in favor of an early date for Noetus have been
problematized, his theories about monarchianism as the overwhelming majority position
until the mid-third century lose their firm basis. There is evidence that monarchianism
gained a strong following in Rome at the beginning of the third century. However, there
is scarcely enough information to determine the extent to which monarchianism was
adopted in other regions. Monarchianism was a conscious reaction to the varieties of
Christian theology (like that of Justin) that were perceived as destroying the uniqueness
of God. Although authors like Melito and Ignatius do not seem concerned to sharply
distinguish the Father and Son, we see nothing in them like the conscious, reactive
assertion that the Father and Son are “one and the same.” Pace Hübner, monarchianism
cannot be found in nearly all second-century authors. In fact, there is little evidence for
the conscious identification of the Father and Son before the beginning of the third
century.
An Exegetically-Based Theology?

All of the extant witnesses to monarchianism show that monarchian theology was
thoroughly exegetical. Even though the author of the Refutatio tried to expunge all
references to scripture in his accounts of monarchianism, scriptural exegesis was so
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See, for example, those occurences in the corpus of Ignatius of Antioch, which I discussed in
the first chapter.
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thoroughly entwined with this theology that he was unsuccessful.154 The monarchians
relied on classic proclamations of monotheism from Deutero-Isaiah, Genesis, and Exodus
to establish their fundamental commitment to protecting the uniqueness of God.155
Decker claims that the biblical exegesis attributed to the Noetians in Contra
Noetum is a distorting insertion of Hippolytus.156 His argument, however, is belied by the
other witnesses to monarchianism from the early third century. The biblical exegesis
Hippolytus attributes to his opponents addresses the same topics as versions of
monarchian exegesis reported by the anti-monarchians (especially Old Testament
theophanies), and it uses some of the same passages, such as John 10:30 and John 14:810. In his source-critical reconstruction of monarchianism, Decker has discarded what
appears to be authentic content in an attempt to find the core of monarchianism.157
East vs. West?

Michael Decker has also argued that monarchian theology and the responses to it
are symptomatic of a divide between East and West in early Christianity. He contends
that theologians from Asia Minor emphasized the unity of God in response to the
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Note that my rejection of Decker’s claim is supported by Heine, who writes concerning the bias
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Christology of Callistus,” 60).
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theology of the Gnostics.158 Although he does not call Irenaeus an outright monarchian,
he notes that Irenaeus’ theology has a number of similarities with the monarchians and is
a good example of the theology of Asia Minor. Decker further characterizes theology
from Asia Minor as being almost exclusively concerned with the action of God in
salvation history, economic theology.159 Rome serves as the epicenter of Western
theology in Decker’s narration. When the monarchians came to Rome from Asia Minor,
he argues, they found theologians engaged in speculation about differentiation within the
Godhead and accused them of being ditheists.160 Rather than focusing on the unity of
God in the economy of salvation, Decker avers, Roman theologians were preoccupied
with ontological questions about the Godhead.161
Decker’s geographical theory has a number of problems. In the first place, if there
was such a large difference between the theologies of the East and West, how did Asian
monarchian theology gain such a large following in Rome? Had the divide between East
and West been as strong as Decker contends, monarchian theology would have gained no
following in Rome. The primary sources paint a picture of a theology that found ready
acceptance from both leaders and the “simple” Christians in Rome. In the second place,
Contra Noetum, perhaps the earliest of the anti-monarchian treatises, was probably
written in Asia Minor.162 This probability complicates Decker’s picture and suggests that
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there was within the theology of Asia Minor the type of diversity that Decker wants to
split between East and West: both monarchian and anti-monarchian theologies arose in
Asia Minor.
Was Monarchianism the Privileging of Jewish Theology?

Several scholars have suggested that monarchianism is best understood as a
privileging of Jewish theology and a Jewish understanding of monotheism. Uríbarri
Bilbao, for example, understands monarchianism as a “Judaizing tendency” and an
“attempt to maintain the monotheism inherited from the Jewish tradition.”163 More
recently, Daniel Boyarin has pushed the alleged relationship between Judaism and
monarchianism even further. He argues that monarchianism’s defeat was Judaism being
cast out of Christianity.164 For Boyarin, the expulsion of monarchianism was one of the
main ways that borders between Judaism and Christianity were “inscribed” and
solidified.
Much of Boyarin’s narration presupposes his understanding of Christianity and
Judaism as an undifferentiated mass of “Judaeo-Christianity” in the second century.165
Such a characterization is difficult to sustain in the monarchian controversy—if only on

Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus, Oxford
Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 116–23.
Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 502. See also his list of four reasons he thinks
Monarchianism is a return or defense of Jewish monotheism at p. 499.
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Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, Divinations (Philadelphia, Pa: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2004); idem, “Justin Martyr Invents Judaism,” Church History 70, no. 3 (2001): 427–61.
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the basis of which texts were cited as authoritative. Both monarchian and antimonarchian writers cited texts from the New Testament as authoritative, and both
considered Jesus to be divine. Neither of these practices would have been acceptable for
second-century Jews who did not believe that Jesus was the Messiah. Boyarin’s theory
also seems to presuppose some type of connection between monarchianism and rabbinic
Judaism, but he never explains how such contact between Asian monarchians and early,
Palestinian rabbis occurred. Furthermore, there are no clear textual or exegetical linkages
between monarchianism and rabbinic Judaism.166
Uríbarri Bilbao’s suggestion that monarchianism represents a Judaizing tendency
within early Christianity is never elaborated. He merely claims that it is the defense of
monotheism inherited from Judaism. His statements suggest a monolithic conception of
monotheism within first- and second-century Judaism, but such characterizations of
Jewish monotheism have been problematized by scholars since at least the late 1980s.167
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Tertullian does call the Praxean theology “Jewish,” but that fact proves only that
Tertullian found the accusation of “Judaism” to be effective in anti-monarchian
polemics.168 Whether monarchian theology was underwritten by a specific stream of
Jewish theology is an open question, but sweeping categorizations of monarchianism as
“Jewish” or “Judaizing” are methodologically problematic and do little to advance our
understanding of monarchianism.169
The Development of Monarchianism and Geographical Schools

Noting the differences in monarchian texts with regard to patripassianism, some
scholars have suggested that there was a development within monarchianism. Heine, for
example, argues that the early, Asian school of monarchianism readily accepted
patripassian conclusions while the later, Roman school rejected patripassianism.170 The
move away from patripassianism in the Refutatio and parts of Adversus Praxean suggests
that there was diversity regarding the acceptance of patripassianism within
monarchianism. In the latest text, Novatian’s De Trinitate, we see unabashed statements
of patripassianism.171

See Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 31.1, where Tertullian writes, “Moreover this matter is of
Jewish faith, so to believe in one God as to refuse to count in with him the Son, and after the Son the Spirit”
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Unfortunately, we do not have enough extant data to determine the cause of the
variations regarding patripassianism in presentations of monarchianism by its opponents.
To determine if the acceptance of patripassianism was a persistent, particularly Asian
phenomenon, we would need a later Asian source to show that the acceptance of
patripassianism survived in Asian monarchianism. To prove that the rejection of
patripassianism by some monarchians was a peculiarly Roman phenomenon, we would
either need to show that Novatian’s testimony is incorrect or have other Roman sources
that corroborated the portrait of Callistus in the Refutatio. As it stands, perhaps the most
we can say is that there was variation within monarchianism, especially with regard to
patripassianism. Whether this variation was geographically or chronologically
characterized requires more data than we have.
Summary of Monarchianism

Monarchianism was a powerful theological movement that began in the late
second century and continued well past the middle of the third. Although it seems to have
originated in Asia Minor, it quickly gained influence in Rome. It was an important
enough theological movement to merit rebuttals from several theologians in the third
century. These anti-monarchian treatises give us our only glimpse into monarchian
theology, and their polemical portrait leaves us with a meager amount of data from which
to reconstruct that theology. Despite this lack of data, the few scholars who have treated
monarchianism in any depth have advanced a number of broad theories.
As my appraisal of these theories has shown above, I consider many of them to be
misguided or incomplete. They push the evidence too far or assume things for which
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there is no witness in the primary texts. Once these theories and narratives are stripped
away, however, we are still able to ascertain a stable core of monarchian theology, which
then allows us to determine what parts of monarchianism might have been variable. The
establishment of this stable core of monarchianism is crucial for understanding the role
monarchianism played in theological development and polemics in the early third
century.
The most foundational tenet of monarchian theology, and the one that remains
stable across all witnesses, is the strong affirmation that there is only one God. At the
beginning of the third century, such claims were common. Both the monarchians and
their opponents claimed to believe in only one God. The distinctive thing about the
monarchian commitment to belief in only one God was that it interpreted the oneness of
God in a manner that rejected the position held by their opponents, namely, that Jesus and
the father were distinct realities and both God. The monarchians supported their
understanding of the oneness of God with references to classic biblical affirmations of
monotheism, like Isaiah 44:6.
The second core component of monarchian theology was the unwavering
confession that Jesus was divine. The acceptance of the divinity of Jesus demarcated
them from the psilanthropists, who also sought to preserve the oneness of God by
denying that Jesus was God. Because the monarchians had an interpretation of
monotheism that did not allow for two distinct realities to be God, they argued that the
Father and Son were one and the same. In their monotheistic reasoning, if the Father was
God, and the Son was God, then they were necessarily the same. Any argument affirming
that both were distinct and divine was tantamount to ditheism in the eyes of the
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monarchians. Using this same logic, the monarchians focused on biblical theophanies and
argued that one and the same God was both invisible and visible. This approach was a
stark rejection of the way someone like Justin interpreted the Old Testament theophanies.
Despite the stable core of teachings just outlined, there was variety within
monarchianism. Even from the limited attestation that we have, we know that
monarchians after Noetus had mixed feelings about arguing that the Father suffered.
Patripassianism can be seen as a necessary byproduct of the assertion that the Father and
the Son are one and the same, and the anti-monarchian writers did not hesitate to point
out this entailment. For reasons unknown to us, however, some monarchians rejected this
conclusion and sought to preserve the impassibility of the Father.
As I demonstrate in the remaining chapters, the struggle against monarchianism
catalyzed development in the language theologians used to speak about the distinction
between the Father and Son. If only for this reason, the monarchians deserve a more
prominent place in narrations of Trinitarian theology in the early third century than they
now have. The monarchians, though, were more than a foil for the development of
“proto-orthodox” theology. Their distinctive theology represents an earnest attempt to
harmonize the claim that there is only one God with the affirmation that Jesus was also
God.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MONARCHIANISM, ORIGEN’S COMMENTARY ON
JOHN, AND WISDOM CHRISTOLOGY1

Reading Origen in Situ: Origen and Monarchianism

Many modern accounts of Origen’s Trinitarian theology present him as moving
along this or that trajectory toward the Nicene debates. The focus on Origen’s legacy in
the Nicene debates brings with it questions that are foreign to the period in which Origen
actually wrote, such as one of the main sorts of questions scholars like to ask regarding
Origen: Did he teach that the Father and the Son were equal (with regard to divinity,
power, substance, etc)? The work of Bruns and Ramelli is a good example of this
tendency.2 Origen’s surroundings thus are only a blur receding into the distance. My
approach to Origen in these final two chapters is an attempt to slow him down, an attempt
to arrest his motion toward Nicaea so that his immediate, contemporary surroundings can
come into sharper focus. A densely contextual reading is necessary to achieve this sharp
focus. I undertake this reading by making three choices.
First, I attempt to isolate as much as possible one part of his polemical context in
my examination of Origen: the monarchian controversy that spanned the first half of the
third century.3 The spate of anti-monarchian texts produced at the beginning of the third
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and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christianae 65, no. 1 (2011): 21–49.
3

As will become clear, it is not possible to completely isolate this controversy by considering
Origen’s thought only with reference to it. Origen did not write any exclusively anti-monarchian works like
Contra Noetum or Adversus Praxean. His Dialogue with Heraclides is the closest he comes to doing so, but
it is difficult to date precisely. The main work I consider, Origen’s Commentary on John, was requested by
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century demonstrates that monarchianism was perceived to be a serious threat by some
notable theologians at the beginning of the third century.4 The interplay between the
monarchian controversy and the development of Origen’s thought has not received its
due attention from scholars.5 One of the ways I bring monarchianism into focus is by
reading Origen alongside other anti-monarchian writers from the early third century.6 As
I noted above, mine is a conscious decision to read Origen with his contemporaries rather
than with his heirs in the Nicene debates.
Second, I focus my analysis almost exclusively on ComJn 1-2, books which
Origen composed during the height of the monarchian controversy. These opening books
of ComJn survive in well-preserved Greek.7 This fact is important because even the
transmission and preservation of Origen’s works bears the mark of concern about

his patron, Ambrose, as a response to the Valentinian Heracleon’s commentary on the Gospel of John.
Origen interacts with monarchian ideas in books 1-2 of ComJn, but the Valentinian polemical context is
never too far out of view.
4

As the preceding reconstruction of monarchianism shows, these theologians included
Hippolytus, Tertullian, the author of the Refutatio omnium haeresium, and Novatian. I should note here that
there is a substantial difference between the passages of Origen I examine and those of the other antimonarchian writers. Origen was not writing an anti-monarchian treatise. He addresses monarchian theology
within the context of a larger biblical commentary and so does not give a detailed account of many of the
monarchian positions we saw in the other works.
There are a few notable exceptions to this trend: Antonio Orbe, “Orígenes y los monarquianos,”
Gregorianum 72, no. 1 (1991): 39–72; Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad: El concepto
teológico “monarchia” en la controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia
Comillas Madrid, Serie I: Estudios 62 (Madrid: UPCO, 1996); Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology of
Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 56–91. As I noted in the introduction, Christoph
Bruns makes a nod in this direction but never follows through on considering the full impact of
monarchianism (or modalism, as he calls it) on Origen’s thought. See Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos. Bilbao’s
account focuses on Origen’s interaction with monarchianism in the Dialogue with Heraclides, but he does
not give too much attention to ComJn 1-2.
5

6

In the last chapter, I read Origen alongside Tertullian and Novatian.

By “well-preserved Greek,” I mean to highlight the fact that after the first two books of ComJn,
the surviving text becomes very fragmentary. Compared to the later books of ComJn, there are relatively
few lacunae in books 1-2.
7
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Origen’s relationship to post-Nicene orthodoxy.8 The fact that these books are extant in a
mostly complete Greek text, untouched by the editorial hand of Rufinus, makes them
particularly valuable for reconstructing Origen’s thought.9 Further motivating my choice
to use these two books is the fact that I accept an early dating for their composition,
beginning around 217 C. E. This dating means that these two books were composed in
the middle of the monarchian controversy, with Contra Noetum (ca. 200-210) and
Adversus Praxean (ca. 213) antedating them and the Refutatio (ca. 225-235) and De
Trinitate (ca. 240-250) postdating them. This dating of the text, coupled with Origen’s
probable contact with monarchianism during his trip to Rome, suggests that the antimonarchian polemical context is important for interpreting works he composed while still
in Alexandria.10
Third, I explore one key theme in Origen’s theology that, I argue, was formed
through contact and conflict with monarchianism: the distinction of the Father and Son.11

8

I discuss this matter at length in my section on the reliability of the Trinitarian sections in
Rufinus’ translations of Origen’s works in my final chapter. I conclude that, especially with regard to
Trinitarian matters, Rufinus’ translation renders Origen inoffensive to post-Nicene Latin readers.
Origen’s De principiis is his most well-known work; and for this reason, many scholars privilege
it in their accounts of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. See, for example, how extensively Henri Crouzel relies
on it: Origen, trans. A. S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 181–204. Charles Kannengiesser
argues that the structure of De principiis itself shows the Trinitarian focus of the work: “Divine Trinity and
the Structure of Peri Archon,” in Origen of Alexandria: His World and His Legacy, ed. Charles
Kannengiesser and William Lawrence Petersen, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 1 (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 231–49. As I argue at length in my later section on Rufinus the
translator, Rufinus’ translation of De principiis distorts Origen’s Trinitarian theology to make it conform to
post-Nicene orthodoxy. Therefore, I use De principiis only when it agrees with what we see in the ComJn.
Also motivating my decision regarding De principiis is the fact that it is something of an outlier with regard
to genre. The vast majority of Origen’s extant works are biblical commentaries, and it is only fitting to start
with one of his earliest to begin an exploration of his Trinitarian theology.
9

10

I discuss the dating of the text and Origen’s Roman travels in detail in the sections below.

11
The narrowing of the scope of this project to the relationship between the Father and Son in
Origen’s early works is meant to suggest neither that Origen had no substantial Pneumatology, as scholars
like Harnack argue, nor that Origen’s later works are of no importance. See Adolf von Harnack, History of
Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907), 358. The length of my
reconstruction of monarchianism in part one of the dissertation precluded me from undertaking a pan-
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One of the most distinctive characteristics of monarchianism was its identification of the
Father and the Son, the claim that they are “one and the same.”12 In the face of this
identification of Father and Son, a careful articulation of their distinction was a pressing
matter for anti-monarchian theologians at the beginning of the third century.13 This
imperative to distinguish the Father and Son was further complicated by the fact that
early third-century theologians felt the need to avoid the kind of division of the Godhead
they perceived in the Valentinian Pleroma.14 They needed to determine how to speak of
distinction without implying polytheistic separation.
My examination of the distinction of the Father and Son in Origen’s early works
consists of two dense examinations of passages from his ComJn.15 Before these studies, I
discuss the dating of ComJn, its Alexandrian milieu, and the anti-Valentinian context set

oeuvre study of Origen’s Trinitarian theology in the present work. I hope that my focused study on
Origen’s early works here might serve as a good Ausgangspunkt for such a fuller study in the future.
12
For this claim, see especially Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.10.11-2 and Tertullian, Adversus
Praxean 2.3: maxime haec quae se existimat meram veritatem possidere dum unicum deum non alias putat
credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum dicat.
13

The anti-monarchian theologians thought the distinction of the Father and Son was a pressing
matter for a number of reasons. As we see in Contra Noetum 2.4, 3.1, 4.2, and 9.3, Hippolytus thought that
the distinction of the Father and Son was required by a proper reading of scripture. Hippolytus was also
concerned to stress that the Father did not suffer. See Contra Noetum 1.7, 8.3. Also motivating the antimonarchian theologians was the fact that the regula fidei or veritatis spoke of one God and three
(somethings), Father, Son, and Spirit. As will become clear in my discussion of Origen, he was concerned
to protect the individuality (ἰδιότης) of the Son. Note also that Novatian’s De Trinitate is really more of an
exposition and defense of the regula vertitatis than a treatise on the Trinity.
14

This dual concern with monarchianism and Valentinianism is very evident in Adversus Praxean
3. There, Tertullian presents the monarchians and Valentinians as two poles on the spectrum of error
regarding the relationship between the Father and Son. Note also that prior to its discussion of
monarchianism, the Refutatio omnium haeresium has already surveyed a number of different Gnostic
systems. At the beginning of the third-century, Gnosticism was still very much a live issue for Christian
theologians. I have elsewhere treated the question of whether there was any relationship, antagonistic or
otherwise, between monarchianism and Gnosticism. See my conference paper “Isaiah 44-45 and
Competing Conceptions of Monotheism in the 2nd and 3rd Centuries,” presented at the Oxford
International Patristics Conference, August 11, 2015. This essay is under review at Studia Patristica.
15
My analysis here does not seek to be exhaustive. In each case, I focus on one major passage and
note parallels when needed.
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by the request of his patron, Ambrose. In the first study, I analyze the ways in which
monarchianism influenced Origen’s interpretation of ἀρχή and λόγος in the opening
verses of John’s Gospel. I argue that Origen used the term ἀρχή to develop a Wisdom
Christology that responded to the difficulties created by stoicized monarchian
understandings of Logos. In the second study, I take up the question of Origen’s
subordinationism in relation to other anti-monarchian writers in the first half of the third
century. I conclude that Origen, like his contemporaries, intentionally deployed a
subordinationist model of the relationship between the Father and Son in order to
safeguard the distinction of the Father and the Son.16

Dating the Commentary on John

Although scholars agree that Origen began his ComJn while he was still in
Alexandria, they do not agree about precisely when this work was written. Dating ComJn
is not made easier by the fact that “there are no cross-references between the
Commentary on John and the other Alexandrian writings.”17 This lack of references to his
other Alexandrian works problematizes any attempts to determine where ComJn fits in
the sequence of Origen’s work; and thus, we cannot feel secure in any judgments
regarding the relation of dependence between ComJn and Origen’s other writiings. The
one thing we can be relatively certain about regarding Origen’s literary activity in

Thus I continue to use the term “subordinationist;” but my usage seeks to disentangle it from the
negative evaluative freight of post-Nicene orthodoxy.
16

17
Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church, Christian Theology in
Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 86.
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Alexandria is that it came to a close in 231-232. Eusebius tells us that Origen left
Alexandria during the tenth year of the reign of Alexander Severus.18
Despite the lack of any explicit dating by Origen or cross-references to other
works, a few pieces of data can at least help us to narrow down the timeframe in which
ComJn was most likely composed. Origen notes at the beginning of book six of ComJn
that the previous five books had been composed in Alexandria.19 Origen also makes two
references at the beginning of book one that give us some hints for dating the work. First,
he speaks of the fittingness of starting a commentary on the firstfruits of the Gospels
immediately following a physical (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα) separation.20 Origen then elaborates
and speaks of his return to Alexandria.21 While these statements seem to hint at some
concrete events relative to which we can date the work, they are not as helpful as one
would hope. Indeed, Origen made multiple trips while that he lived in Alexandria.
Unless we can determine to which of Origen’s trips he is referring here, these references
are not truly helpful in clarifying the date of the work.

18

Eusebius, EH 6.26.

19

Origen, ComJn 6.1-12. Eusebius also recounts thi fact in EH 6.23.1-24.2.

20

Origen, ComJn 1.12 (Greek from Origen, Commentaire sur Saint Jean, ed. Cécile Blanc, vol. 1
(livres I - V), Sources chrétiennes 120 (Paris: Cerf, 1966), 64).
21
Origen, ComJn 1.13. In ComJn 1.12-3, he writes, “What more excellent activity oghtut there be
after our physical separation from one another, than the careful examination of the gospel? For, indeed, one
might dare say that the gospel is the firstfruits of all the scriptures. What other firstfruits of our activities
ought there to have been, then, since we have come home to Alexandria, than that devoted to the firstfruits
of the Scriptures?” (ποίαν ἐχρῆν εἶναι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα κεχωρίσθαι ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσαν ἢ τὴν
περὶ εὐαγγελίου ἐξέτασιν; Καὶ γὰρ τολμητέον εἰπεῖν πασῶν τῶν γραφῶν εἶναι ἀπαρχὴν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.
Ἀπαρχὴν οὖν πράξεων, ἐξ οὗ τῇ Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ ἐπιδεδημήκαμεν, τίνα ἄλλην ἢ τὴν εἰς τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν
γραφῶν ἐχρῆν γεγονέναι;). Translation from Origen, Commentary on the Gospel according to John, trans.
Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the Church 80 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,
1989), 34. Greek from SC 120:64.
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To which physical separation and journey is Origen referring in ComJn 1.13?
There are two possibilities for identifying the absence that preceded Origen’s work on
ComJn. Both of these possibilities hinge on interpretations of Eusebius’ rather laconic,
enigmatic, and imprecise description of “no small warfare breaking out in the city” (οὐ
σμικροῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἀναρριπισθέντος πολέμου).22 Nautin identifies this “warfare”
with Origen’s conflict with his bishop, Demetrius La ‘guerre’ qui l'a contraint à quitter
Alexandrie n'était probablement rien d'autre que cette hostilité qui s'était déclarée contre
lui dans l'entourage de l'évêque23 Eusebius recounts amicable relations between Origen
and Demetrius earlier in Origen’s career, even claiming that Demetrius installed Origen
alone as the head of the catechetical school in Alexandria.24 Nautin’s interpretation of the
“warfare” would push Origen’s work on ComJn toward the end of his Alexandrian period
when his relationship with Demetrius seems to have deteriorated.25 From this assumption,
Nautin gives the following dating proposal: 229 – De Prin. composed; 230 – Origen
takes a trip to Palestine; 231 – Origen composes books 1 – 4 of ComJn; winter 231/232 –
Origen departs to Antioch and composes book 5 of ComJn.26 Nautin’s dating, which

22

Eusebius, EH 6.19.16 (Greek and trans. from Eusebius, EH: Books 6-10, ed. J. E. L. Oulton,
Loeb Classical Library 265 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 62–3.).
23

Pierre Nautin, Origène: Sa vie et son œuvre, Christianisme antique 1 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977),

24

Eusebius, EH 6.3.8.

366.

At least one factor in the deterioration of Origen’s relationship with Demetrius was his
ordination, not under the auspices of Demetrius, by the bishops of Caesarea and Jerusalem (see Eusebius,
EH 6.8.4). In Nautin’s dating schema, this event would give us an early time at which conflict between
Origen and Demetrius was increasing. Even still, we cannot date Origen’s ordination with any precision
and are no closer to a date for the workefore. In his relatively recent treatment of Origen, John Behr follSo
ae ows Nautin’s dating. His work was produced well before Heine’s reassessment, and Behr does not
mention Preuschen’s earlier suggestions. See John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, The Formation of Christian
Theology 1 (Crestwood, N.Y: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 167.
25

26

Nautin, Origène, 371.
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pushes ComJn to the very end of Origen’s time in Alexandria, means that all of Origen’s
other Alexandrian works were composed earlier than ComJn.27
The alternative understanding of Eusebius’ statement is given by Heine and
Preuschen. Because Heine sums up Preuschen’s work so well, I treat Heine’s argument as
representative of this view.28 Heine finds it quite unlikely that Eusebius’ statement about
warfare breaking out in the city would refer to the disagreement between Origen and
Demetrius. If Eusebius were describing the disagreement between Origen and Demetrius,
he would be suggesting that the whole city was embroiled in the controversy, which is
highly unlikely.29 Instead, Heine understands Eusebius’ statement to be referring to

Ibid., 366–7. Nautin’s dating was a substantial revision of the paradigm that had prevailed
before him. Indeed, he is well aware that his proposal is overturning the argument of Preuschen. He notes
that (unnamed) scholars had taken Origen’s reference to ComJn as the first fruits of his works since the
return to Alexandria as meaning that this was the the first of Origen’s literary efforts.
27

For Preuschen’s argument, see Origen, Origenes Werke: Der Johanneskommentar, ed. Erwin
Preuschen, vol. 4, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 10 (Leipzig: J.C.
Hinrichs, 1903), lxxvi-lxxxi. Heine’s views on the dating of books 1-2 of ComJn have shifted during his
career. In his introduction to ComJn in 1989, Heine follows Nautin’s proposal and dates the work as
follows: “This would place the composition of the first four books in Alexandria in A.D. 230-231, and part,
at least, of Book 5 in Antioch in A.D. 231-232” (“Introduction,” in Commentary on the Gospel according
to John, Fathers of the Church 80 [Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1989], 4].
Although he does not explicitly revise his dating of ComJn, Heine argues in 1993 that Origen was
responding to monarchianism at the beginning of ComJn, a key point in his later reappraisal of the dating
(“Stoic Logic as Handmaid to Exegesis and Theology in Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of John,”
Journal of Theological Studies 44, no. 1 [1993]: 92–100). In his 1998 article, Heine suggests, “The first
two books [of ComJn] were written soon after Origen returned from Rome, and are largely structured by
the modalist question” (“The Christology of Callistus,” 58). This statement appears to mark the point where
Heine’s views on the dating of the work definitively shifted to an early date, following Preuschen.
28

29
Heine finds Nautin’s suggestion implausible on linguistic grounds, among others. See Heine,
Origen, 87 n. 20, where he writes, “There are two points in Eusebius’ account which I think point to
Caracalla’s massacre. First is Eusebius’ statement that this warfare broke out ‘in the city’ (kata tēn polin).
This suggests something larger than a dispute between the bishop and a teacher. The other is the verb
Eusebius chooses to designate Origen’s departure—hupexerchesthai. The usual meaning of this word is a
secret, unnoticed departure (see, for example, Josephus, Antiquities 14.16). I can see no reason for Origen’s
departure to have been secretive had he been leaving because of Demetrius’ animosity towards him. But if
it refers to his departure at the time when Caracalla’s army was slaughtering the inhabitants of Alexandria
randomly and at will, it would have had to be secretive.”

223
Origen’s stealthy departure from Alexandria to escape Caracalla’s massacre in 215.30
This understanding of Eusebius’ statement makes his claim that warfare broke out in the
city much more intelligible than a skirmish between a bishop and a theologian. The
upshot of this dating is that the date of composition of the first books of ComJn is moved
back to sometime around 217, soon after Caracalla had left the city and Origen had time
to return.31 Heine notes the full import of this dating:
This way of reading the texts also makes the Commentary on John the first of
Origen’s Biblical commentaries. Origen would have been in his early thirties
when he began work on the commentary. He begins his literary career by trying to
sort out the thorny Christological issues centered largely on the Gospel of John
which divided the late second-and early third-century church.32
The two dating proposals that deal with the majority of the evidence at length, then, give
us very different conclusions.33 Nautin’s scheme places ComJn after Origen’s other
Alexandrian works, while that of Preuschen and Heine puts the composition at the very
beginning of Origen’s literary endeavors. There are various other suggestions for the
dating of ComJn, but Nautin and Heine/Preuschen contain the fullest discussions.34 I find
Heine, Origen, 87. On pp. 87-88, Heine gives a detailed explanation of Caracalla’s massacre.
Caracalla seems to have erected statues portraying himself as Alexander the Great, some of which might
have been destroyed in a riot in Alexandria. Upon arrival, Caracalla was incensed at the destruction of the
statues and began a massacre that lasted for some time.
30

31

Heine, Origen, 88.

32

Ibid., 89.

Neither of these dominant dating schemes, however, damages my thesis that Origen’s
distinction of the Father and Son was motivated by his contact with monarchianism. Even the late dating of
ComJn 1-2 still places it in the middle of the monarchian controversy and puts it before Novatian’s De
Trinitate.
33

34

In his 1994 article, John Anthony McGuckin dates the first books of ComJn to 230/231:
“Structural Design and Apologetic Intent in Origen’s Commentary on John,” in Origeniana Sexta
(Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1995), 444 n.9. Later, he changes his position and dates them to
between 226 and 229: John Anthony McGuckin, ed., The Westminster Handbook to Origen, 1st ed, The
Westminster Handbooks to Christian Theology (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 29.
Johannes Quasten dates books 1-4 to between 226 and 229: Patrology (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1950), 2.49.
Hans Georg Thümmel dates the work to the late 220s or by 230: Thümmel, ed., Origenes’
Johanneskommentar, Buch I-V, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 63 (Tübingen: Mohr
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Heine and Preuschen’s argument convincing, especially its treatment of the “warfare”
Eusebius mentions.

The Alexandrian Milieu of the Commentary on John

While Origen’s De prin. draws the attention of a number of scholars, we would do
well to remember that his exposition of the Christian faith in this work was not typical of
the mode in which he theologized. Indeed, Heine notes that apart from De Prin., Contra
Celsum, and a few other works, “Origen did his theology by writing commentaries on the
canonical scriptures of the Church in the manner that his contemporaries who were
Aristotelian or Platonic philosophers did their philosophy by writing commentaries on the
works of earlier philosophers.”35 In Eusebius’ list of the works Origen composed in
Alexandria, the majority are biblical commentaries.36
If the biblical commentary was Origen’s preferred theological medium, he gave
the Gospel of John pride of place among all the other scriptures. By doing so, he was
conforming to the pattern that prevailed in Alexandria in the late second and early third
centuries.37 Eusebius attributes the following opinion to Origen’s predecessor, Clement:

Siebeck, 2011), 4. Marguérite Harl notes that Eusebius’ statement is “très vague” and asserts that books 1-2
of ComJn were written either contemporaneously with, or just before, De Prin.: Marguerite Harl, Origène
et la fonction révélatrice du Verbe incarné, Patristica Sorbonensia 2 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1958), 121.
35

Heine, Origen, 83.

36
Eusebius, EH (EH) 6.24.1-3 (LCL 265:71-3). Eusebius lists the following works: Commentary
on the Gospel of John, Commentary on Genesis, Commentary on Psalms 1-25, Commentary on
Lamentations, De Principiis, On the Resurrection, and Stromateis. Eusebius also indicates that Origen
began work on the Hexapla while still in Alexandria: EH 6.16.
37
The privileging of John’s Gospel was by no means confined to Alexandria. See, for example,
Adversus Praxean 21-5, which reads almost like a commentary on the Gospel of John.
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“But that John, last of all, conscious that the outward facts had been set forth in the
Gospels, was urged on by his disciples, and, divinely moved by the Spirit, composed a
spiritual Gospel.”38 Origen himself states, “We might dare say, then, that the Gospels are
the firstfruits of all the Scriptures, but that the firstfruits of the Gospels is that according
to John, whose meaning no one may understand who has not leaned on Jesus' breast nor
received Mary from Jesus to be his mother also.”39 Heine notes that Origen does not
allegorize anything contained in the first five verses of John’s Gospel.40 This restraint on
Origen’s part is somewhat surprising, especially given his fondness for allegorizing.
What leads him to restraint here? It is likely that he shared the opinion of Clement that
John’s was a spiritual Gospel, that it soared above the rudimentary foundations laid by
the synoptics. If John’s Gospel already led people to contemplate the spiritual—the very
goal of allegory, there was no need to allegorize.41

Ambrose and the Anti-Valentinian Context

Origen produced the ComJn at the request of his patron Ambrose, whom he
addresses at multiple points in the Commentary.42 Although Origen does not refer to
Ambrose by name, he speaks of someone urging him to examine the Gospel of John.43

38

Eusebius, EH 6.14.7 (trans. LCL 265:49).

39

Origen, ComJn 1.23 (trans. FC 80:38). See also ComJn 1.21.

40

Heine, “Introduction,” 21.

41
Although not related, I suspect that something similar to this is happening in Basil’s refusal to
allegorize in his Hexaemeral Homilies.
42

For references to Ambrose, see: Origen, ComJn 1.9, 2.1, 6.6, 13.1, 20.1, 28.6, 32.2.

Origen, ComJn 1.21: “But I think that John’s Gospel, which you have enjoined us to examine to
the best of our ability, is the firstfruits of the Gospels. It speaks of him whose descent is traced, and begins
from him who is without a genealogy” (ἀπαρχὴν τῶν εὐαγγελίων εἶναι τὸ προστεταγμένον ἡμῖν ὑπὸ σοῦ
43

226
Eusebius tells us that Ambrose supplied Origen with multiple stenographers and copyists,
a luxury he would not have enjoyed without his patron.44 Eusebius also writes the
following about Ambrose: “At this time also Ambrose, who held the views of the heresy
of Valentinus, was refuted by the truth as presented by Origen, and, as if his mind were
illuminated by light, gave his adhesion to the true doctrine as taught by the Church.”45
Jerome, however, suggests that Ambrose was a follower of Marcion before being
converted by Origen.46 Heine argues that Eusebius was correct and that, as an
Alexandrian, it is more likely that Ambrose would have been a follower of Valentinus
than of Marcion.47
Sinec Ambrose had only recently converted from Valentinianism, it is no surprise
that he commissioned Origen to write a commentary on the Gospel of John.48 It is likely
that in addition to supplying Origen with stenographers and copyists, Ambrose provided
Origen with a copy of Heracleon’s Valentinian commentary on the Gospel of John.49 The

κατὰ δύναμιν ἐρευνῆσαι, τὸ κατὰ Ἰωάννην, τὸν γενεαλογούμενον εἰπὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγενεαλογήτου
ἀρχόμενον). Translation from FC 80:121; Greek from SC 120:68.
44

Eusebius, EH 6.23.1-2 (LCL 265:69). See also Jerome, De viris illustribus 61.3.

45

Eusebius, EH 6.18.1 (trans. LCL 265:55).

Jerome, De viris illustribus 56.1. “ambrosius, primum marcionites, dein ab origene correctus,
ecclesiae diaconus et confessionis dominicae gloria insignis fuit.” Latin from Jerome and Gennadius,
Hieronymus: liber De viris inlustribus; Gennadius: liber De viris inlustribus., ed. Ernest Cushing
Richardson, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 14 (Leipzig: J.C.
Hinrichs, 1896), 34. Jerome repeats this claim that Ambrose was a follower of Marcion in De viris
illustribus 61.3.
46

47

Heine, “Introduction,” 6 n. 22.

48

Eusebius, EH 6.18.1 (LCL 265:55); Heine, Origen, 95.

49
Ibid., 91. See also Heine’s discussion of Heracleon and the Tripartite Tractate: Heine,
“Introduction,” 23–26.
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Gospel of John was a favorite gospel of Valentinians.50 Irenaeus’ record of the teaching
of Ptolemaeus the Valentinian focuses on the opening verses of John’s Gospel.51 In
Irenaeus’ account, Ptolemaeus focused on many of the same Christological titles that
Origen dwells on at length in the opening books of ComJn.52
Although the refutation of Heracleon’s Valentinian commentary on the Gospel of
John is ostensibly the motivation for Origen’s composition of ComJn, there are only two
references to Heracleon’s commentary in the first two books of ComJn. The first
reference to Heracleon does not occur until about halfway through book two of ComJn.53
Heine argues that despite the scant references to Heracleon in books 1-2 of ComJn,
Origen is still addressing Valentinian views.54 Αs Irenaeus’ account of Ptolemaus’
teaching shows, the interpretation of ἀρχή was a critical part of the Valentinian

Elaine H. Pagels, The Johannine Gospel in Gnostic Exegesis: Heracleon’s Commentary on
John, Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series 17 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1973), 16–7. T. E.
Pollard suggests that one reason there is little explicit quotation of the Gospel by proto-orthodox Christians
before the end of the second century is that the Gospel was used heavily by Gnostics. See his Johannine
Christology and the Early Church, Society for New Testament Studies; Monograph Series 13 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 24–5.
50

Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 1.8.5. I use the term “Valentinian” here, as elsewhere, fully aware
that it is perhaps an oversimplification. To be sure, the fragments we have that are thought to accurately
reflect the thought of Valentinus himself lack many of the features of later “Valentinians.” Thus, we ought
not assume that all who are called “Valentinians” are representative of the thought of Valentinus. See
Heine, Origen, 53–4. See also the thorough treatment of Valentinianism and all of the attendant
complexities in Einar Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the Valentinians, Nag Hammadi and
Manichaean Studies 60 (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
51

52

Among those Irenaeus discusses in Adversus haereses 1.8.5 are the following: beginning, life,
logos, truth, God.
Origen, ComJn 2.100-4. Here Origen is refuting Heracleon’s interpretation of John 1:3: “All
things were made through him.” Shortly afterward, Origen refutes Heracleon’s interpretation of John 1:4:
“What was made in him was life.” For an examination of all of Heracleon’s fragments in ComJn, see
Heracleon, The Fragments of Heracleon: Newly Edited from the Mss. with an Introduction and Notes, ed.
Alan England Brooke, 1st Gorgias Press ed, Texts and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic
Literature, 1, no. 4 (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, 2004). Note, however, that Brooke’s numbering of the
text does not match that of Blanc and Thümmel, since his text was produced well before the newer critical
editions.
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Heine, Origen, 92.
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understanding of the Ogdoad.55 Origen’s fixation on determining the proper meaning of
ἀρχή in book one of ComJn is most likely intended to guard against Valentinian
interpretations.56 However, Origen’s discussions of ἀρχή also have utility for antimonarchian polemic.

Monarchianism and Book 1 of the Commentary on John

At multiple points in ComJn, Origen bemoans the fact that many people have
unduly fixated on the title Logos for Christ. He wishes that they would consider it as one
title among many. He states,
But let us consider more carefully what the Word is which is in the beginning. I
frequently marvel when I consider the things said about the Christ by some who
wish to believe in him. Why in the world, when countless names are applied to
the Savior, do they pass by most of them in silence? Even if they should perhaps
remember them, they do not interpret them in their proper sense, but say that these
name him figuratively. On the other hand, they stop in the case of the title “Word”
alone, as if they say that the Christ of God is “Word” alone; and they do not
investigate, consistent with the rest of the names, the meaning of what is indicated
by the term “Word.”57
After surveying the many titles ascribed to Christ, he further specifies what troubles him
about his opponents’ fixation on the title Logos:

55

Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 1.8.5. So also Heine, Origen, 94–5.

For a good example, see ComJn 1.111-8, where Origen’s discussion is concentrated on terms
important for Valentinian pleromatology: arche, logos, sophia, and demiourgos. While the Valentinians
took all of these terms to represent different Aeons, Origen collapses all of them together and unifies them
in the Son. This move is almost assuredly motivated by his opposition to the Valentinian exegesis of the
prologue to the Gospel of John.
56

Origen, ComJn 1.125 (trans. FC 80:59-60): Ἴδωμεν δ’ ἐπιμελέστερον τίς ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος.
Θαυμάζειν μοι πολλάκις ἐπέρχεται σκοποῦντι τὰ ὑπό τινων πιστεύειν εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν βουλομένων
λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτοῦ, τί δήποτε δυσεξαριθμήτων ὀνομάτων τασσομένων ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν τὰ μὲν
πλεῖστα παρασιωπῶσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ ποτε μνήμη αὐτῶν γένοιτο, μεταλαμβάνουσιν οὐ κυρίως ἀλλὰ
τροπικῶς ταῦτα αὐτὸν ὀνομάζεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ μόνης τῆς λόγος προσηγορίας ἱστάμενοι οἱονεὶ «λόγον» μόνον
φασὶν εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀκολούθως τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν ὀνομαζομένων ἐρευνῶσι τοῦ
σημαινομένου τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς «λόγος» φωνῆς. Greek from SC 120:124.
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It is worthwhile to consider those who disregard so many names and treat this one
as special. And again they look for an explanation in the case of the other names,
if someone brings them to their attention, but in the case of this one they believe
they have a clear answer to what the Son of God is, when he is named Word. This
is especially obvious since they continually use this verse, ‘My heart uttered a
good word,’ (Ps. 44:2 LXX) as though they think the Son of God is an expression
of the Father occurring in syllables. And in accordance with this view, if we
inquire of them carefully, they do not give him ὑπόστασιν, neither do they make
clear his οὐσίαν. I do not yet mean that it is this or that, but in what manner he has
οὐσίαν. For it is impossible for anyone to understand a proclaimed word to be a
son. Let them declare to us that God the Word is such a word, having life in
himself, and either is not separated from the Father and, in accordance with this
position, does not subsist (μὴ ὑφεστάναι) nor is he a son, or is both separated and
invested with ousia.58
Scholars have suggested multiple possibilities for Origen’s opponents in this passage.
Often drawing on a passage from Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2.28.5, some have argued
that Origen is addressing Valentinian positions here.59 Others have suggested that Origen

Origen, ComJn 1.151-2 (trans. FC 80:64-5 with modifications). Καὶ ἔστιν ἄξιον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς
τὰ τοσαῦτα τῶν ὀνομαζομένων παραπεμπομένοις καὶ τούτῳ ὡς ἐξαιρέτῳ χρωμένοις καὶ πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις
μὲν διήγησιν ζητοῦσιν, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς προσάγοι αὐτά, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτῳ ὡς σαφὲς προσιεμένοις τὸ τί ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ
υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος ὀνομαζόμενος, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπεὶ συνεχῶς χρῶνται τῷ· «Ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία μου
λόγον ἀγαθόν», οἰόμενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν οἱονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ
κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπόστασιν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἀκριβῶς αὐτῶν πυνθανοίμεθα, οὐ διδόασιν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ
σαφηνίζουσιν, οὐδέπω φαμὲν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ποτὲ οὐσίαν. (152.) Λόγον γὰρ
ἀπαγγελλόμενον υἱὸν εἶναι νοῆσαι καὶ τῷ τυχόντι ἐστὶν ἀμήχανον. Καὶ λόγον τοιοῦτον καθ’ αὑτὸν ζῶντα
καὶ ἤτοι οὐ κεχωρισμένον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ μὴ ὑφεστάναι οὐδὲ υἱὸν τυγχάνοντα ἢ καὶ
κεχωρισμένον καὶ οὐσιωμένον ἀπαγγελλέτωσαν ἡμῖν θεὸν λόγον. Greek from SC 120:134-6.
58

See Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen, Greek Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of
Hypostasis,” Harvard Theological Review 105, no. 3 (2012): 313–4; Christoph Bruns, Trinität und
Kosmos, 62–3; Cécile Blanc in Origen, Commentaire sur Saint Jean, 1 (livres I - V):136. Blanc suggests
that Irenaeus’ report in Adversus haereses 2.28.5 elucidates Origen’s passage. Irenaeus writes, “But ye
pretend to set forth His generation from the Father, and ye transfer the production of the word of men
which takes place by means of a tongue to the Word of God, and thus are righteously exposed by your own
selves as knowing neither things human nor divine” (Vos autem generationem eius ex patre divinantes et
verbi hominum per linguam factam prolationem transferentes in verbum Dei, iuste detegimini a vobis ipsis
quod neque humana neque divina noveritis). Trans. ANF 1.400-1; Latin from Irenaeus, Contre les hérésies:
Livre II, ed. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, vol. 2, Sources chrétiennes 294 (Paris: Cerf, 1982),
282. Ronald Heine has recently supported this view and shown how Ptolemaus appears to have focused on
the term logos, according to Irenaeus’ report in Adversus haereses 1.8.5. He argues that this focus would
make sense of Origen’s comments in ComJn 1.125. See Heine, Origen, 94–6. Elsewhere, however, Heine
notes that the interpretation of Psalm 44:2 was a point of disagreement between the “Logos theologians”
and the “modalists.” See Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 64.
59
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is addressing a monarchian reading of Psalm 44:2 (LXX).60 Ronald Heine writes, “The
difference between the Logos theologians and the modalists lay in the definition of the
Logos as either substantial or insubstantial, and this difference was debated exegetically,
as both Tertullian and Origen show, in relation to Ps. 44:2.”61 The latter group of scholars
often notes that Origen appears to be addressing both the position of the monarchians and
the teaching of someone like Tertullian.62 Part of the difficulty of determining the identity
of Origen’s opponents in this passage is that Origen’s interpretation takes place within a
crowded polemical landscape. We know that the monarchians relied heavily on passages
from the Gospel of John, especially John 10:30 and 14:8-10.63 At the beginning of the
Dialogue with Heraclides, Heraclides quotes John 1:1-3 as a statement of his belief, thus
demonstrating that the Johannine prologue could also be a focal point for someone who

Antonio Orbe, in agreement with Eugenio Corsini, shows the parallels between Origen’s
opponents and monarchian exegesis before suggesting that Origen also “has his sights set on a domestic
exegesis, like that of Tertullian.” See Orbe, “Orígenes y los Monarquianos,” 54–6; Origen, Commento al
Vangelo di Giovanni, ed. and trans. Eugenio Corsini, Classici della filosofia 3 (Torino: Unione tipograficoeditrice torinese, 1968), 160–1, n. 45. Thümmel notes the similarity to monarchianism: Origenes’
Johanneskommentar, Buch I-V, 221–2. In his earlier article, Heine, following Orbe, argues that Origen
appears to be addressing the positions of both the monarchians and someone like Tertullian in this passage
(“The Christology of Callistus,” 65–6). Perhaps the various solutions are not mutually exclusive. On the
one hand, Tertullian’s attribution of a similar interpretation of Ps. 44:2 to the monarchians in Adversus
Praxean is the closest parallel to Origen’s passage that we have. Therefore, it is probable that Origen was
addressing the monarchians in this passage. On the other hand, the resonances with the passages from
Adversus haereses describing Valentinianism are evocative and should not be dismissed.
60

61

Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 64.

The part of the “domestic exegesis” of someone like Tertullian that Origen would find
troublesome is that it can be considered a two-stage Logos theology. For example, Tertullian speaks of the
“perfect nativity of the Word” (nativitas perfecta sermonis dum ex Deo procedit) occurring when God says
“Fiat lux” in Gen. 1:3. See, Adversus Praxean 7.1 (Tertulliani Opera: Pars II, ed. A Kroymann and Ernest
Evans, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 2 [Turnholt: Brepols, 1954], 1165). Tertullian’s exegesis would
be problematic for Origen because he wants to stress that the Son has always been alongside the Father. See
De prin. 1.2.2; ComJn 10.246. Behr draws attention to Origen’s insistence that the Son has always been
with the Father: (The Way to Nicaea, 185, 193).
62

63
See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 4.7, 7.1, and 7.4-5; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20.1;
Novatian, De Trinitate 27.1, 28.1-5.
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subscribed to monarchian views.64 We also know that the Johannine prologue was a focal
point of Valentinian theology.65 Even more, the Gospel of John was important for
theologians like Origen and Tertullian, who worked to refute both Valentinianism and
monarchianism.66 In short, the Gospel of John was central to the theology of many of the
major Christians groups at the beginning of the third century.67 In what follows, I focus
on one side of the polemical context (anti-monarchian) of books 1-2 of Origen’s ComJn,
which focus on the opening verses of John’s Gospel.68
After the passage quoted above, Origen repeats that these opponents interpret the
title Logos literally although they understand many of the other titles of Christ
figuratively.69 Later, after another lengthy excursus on the names of Christ, Origen again
punctuates his discussion by countering the claims of his opponents, saying,
We have said all these things wishing to show the random and unexamined
procedure followed by many interpreters. Although so many names are applied to
Christ, they stop with the term ‘Word’ alone, and do not investigate why ‘the Son
of God’ has been recorded to be the Word, God, who was in the beginning with
the Father, through whom all things came into being.70
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Origen, Dialogue with Heraclides 1.

65

As demonstrated, for example, in Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 1.8.5.

66

See, for example, Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20-5. In these chapters, Tertullian relies heavily
on the Gospel of John to articulate his position against that of the Praxeans.
T. E. Pollard writes, “I believe that it was St John’s Gospel, with its Logos-concept in the
Prologue and its emphasis on the Father-Son relationship, that raised in a most acute way the problems
which led the church to formulate her doctrines of the trinity and of the person of Christ” (Johannine
Christology and the Early Church, xi).
67

I leave aside the discussion of Origen’s anti-Valentinian motive here in order to keep this
chapter focused and concise.
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Origen, ComJn 1.154.

Origen, ComJn 1.266 (trans. FC 80:88): Ταῦτα δὲ ἡμῖν πάντα εἴρηται τὸ τῶν πολλῶν
ἀποκληρωτικὸν καὶ ἀβασάνιστον ἐλέγξαι βουλομένοις, ὅτι τοσούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναφερομένων
ἵστανται ἐπὶ μόνης τῆς «λόγος» ὀνομασίας, οὐκ ἐξετάζοντες, τί δήποτε λόγος εἶναι θεὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν
πατέρα, δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, ἀναγέγραπται «<ὁ> υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ». Greek from SC 120:194.
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Again, the problem is that is opponents privilege the title Logos and do not consider the
reason the Son is called Logos.
At the end of book one of ComJn, Origen returns to interpretation of Ps. 44:2 and
says that his opponents cite it frequently as if they understood it.71 Origen does not give
us more detail about his opponents’ interpretation of this verse, only complaining that
they interpret literally the word mentioned in it as an expression occurring in syllables.72
Tertullian, however, discusses Ps. 44:2 at multiple points in Adversus Praxean. He
himself uses this verse to describe the generation of the Son and summarizes his
opponents’ position: “For what, you will say, is a word except voice and oral sound and
(as the grammarians’ tradition has it) smitten air intelligible in the hearing, for the rest an
empty something, void and incorporal?”73 Later, when Tertullian takes up this psalm
again, he clarifies the monarchian position:
Just as I allege as spoken by God, My heart hath disgorged a good Word, against
this do you object that God somewhere said, My heart hath disgorged myself as a
good word, so that he himself may be both he who disgorged and what he
disgorged, himself both he who brought forth and he who was brought forth, if he
himself is Word and God.74
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Origen, ComJn 1.280.
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Again, see ComJn 1.151 for those who interpret Logos as an “expression of God occurring in
syllables” (trans. FC 80:64).
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Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 7.6 (trans. Evans, 137-8): Quid est enim, dices, sermo, nisi uox et
sonus oris et, sicut grammatici tradunt, aer offensus intellegibilis auditu, ceterum uacuum nescio quid et
inane et incorporale? Latin from CCSL 2:1166.
74

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.2 (trans. Evans, 143): Sicut ego profero dictum a Deo:
Eructauit cor meum sermonem optimum, haec tu contra opponas alicubi dixisse Deum: ‘Eructauit me cor
meum sermonem optimum’, ut ipse sit qui et eructauit et quod eructauit et ipse qui protulerit et qui prolatus
sit si ipse est et sermo et deus. Latin from CCSL 2:1170-1.
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Heine ably treats these passages in his article on Callistus’ Christology, detailing the
philosophical underpinnings of monarchian teaching on the Logos as it relates to Psalm
44:2:75
If we view the statement in Ps. 44:2 from a Stoic standpoint, then the exegetical
argument of the modalists becomes clear. The Stoics distinguished between λόγος
ἐνδιάθετος (reason) and λόγος προφόρικος (speech). Ps. 44:2 is clearly about the
latter…. Consequently when the term Logos was used of Christ in the sense of
λόγος προφόρικος it could only refer to a spoken word (φωνή, vox or sonus oris)
from a Stoic standpoint. And this is precisely what Tertullian and Origen accuse
the modalists of saying in their exegesis of Ps. 44:2.76
It is most likely to this interpretation of Psalm 44:2 that Origen is referring when he
speaks of those who think the Son is an expression of the Father occurring in syllables.
Heine notes that the Stoic understanding of Logos used by the monarchians was
unpalatable to Origen, Tertullian, and the author of the Refutatio because it treated Logos
as a category of speech, not a category of ontology. 77 Tertullian complains that his
opponents’ understanding of the word makes it “void and incorporeal” (inane et
incorporale) and counters that what proceeds from substance must have substance.78

Heine also notes that the foregrounding of the Logos concept in Callistus’ theology is probably
the work of the author of the Refutatio. Heine argues that spirit was probably a more important concept for
Callistus’ theology. See “The Christology of Callistus,” 64.
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Ibid., 66. Note, however, that Mark J. Edwards does not think this distinction was as much of a
Stoic commonplace as some posit: “Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos,” Vigiliae
Christianae 54, no. 2 (2000): 161–2.
77

Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 66.

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 7.6. Note also that Tertullian’s materialist understanding of God
as spirit is probably influencing his critique here. See René Braun, Deus christianorum: Recherches sur le
vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien, 2nd ed., Collection des Études augustiniennes 70 (Paris: Études
augustiniennes, 1977), 149.
78
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Origen’s characterization of his opponents’ error fits well with Tertullian’s
testimony. Recall that in the passage I quoted above, Origen wrote that his opponents
interpreted Psalm 44:2
as though they think the Son of God is an expression of the Father occurring in
syllables. And in accordance with this view, if we inquire of them carefully, they
do not give him ὑπόστασιν, neither do they make clear his οὐσίαν. I do not yet
mean that it is this or that, but in what manner he has οὐσίαν. For it is impossible
for anyone to understand a proclaimed word to be a son. Let them declare to us
that God the Word is such a word, having life in himself, and either is not
separated from the Father and, in accordance with this position, does not subsist
(μὴ ὑφεστάναι) nor is he a son, or is both separated and invested with ousia.79
Origen criticizes his opponents for denying ousia to the prophora, which is here the
Logos.80 This criticism is very similar to Tertullian’s complaint that his opponents
understand the Word as something “void and incorporeal.”81 The Stoicized Logos
theology of their opponents allowed them to interpret the Logos as something without a
distinct existence or substance.
This background for the interpretation of Psalm 44:2 elucidates why Origen and
Tertullian are concerned with it. When substance is denied to the Logos, it is much easier
to claim that the Logos is not distinct from the Father. An indistinct Logos easily allows
for the assertion that the Father and the Son are “one and the same.”82 This fact is

Origen, ComJn 1.151-2 (trans. FC 80:64-5 with modifications). οἰόμενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν
οἱονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπόστασιν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἀκριβῶς αὐτῶν
πυνθανοίμεθα, οὐ διδόασιν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σαφηνίζουσιν, οὐδέπω φαμὲν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ἀλλ’ ὅπως
ποτὲ οὐσίαν. (152.) Λόγον γὰρ ἀπαγγελλόμενον υἱὸν εἶναι νοῆσαι καὶ τῷ τυχόντι ἐστὶν ἀμήχανον. Καὶ
λόγον τοιοῦτον καθ’ αὑτὸν ζῶντα καὶ ἤτοι οὐ κεχωρισμένον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ μὴ ὑφεστάναι
οὐδὲ υἱὸν τυγχάνοντα ἢ καὶ κεχωρισμένον καὶ οὐσιωμένον ἀπαγγελλέτωσαν ἡμῖν θεὸν λόγον. Greek from
SC 120:134-6.
79
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As I note later, Origen appears to be guarding against just the sort of tendency in his discussion
of wisdom in De principiis 1.2.2.
81
82

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 7.6

For the monarchian contention that the Father and Son are one and the same, see especially
Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.10.11-12; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3: maxime haec quae se existimat
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especially clear when Tertullian taunts his opponents to change the wording of the Pslam
so that they have a passage that supports their position: “My heart hath disgorged myself
as a good word.”83 Tertullian’s opponents do not allow for any distinction between the
one speaking and the thing being spoken; they are one and the same. Origen appears to be
addressing a similar problem when he writes, “Let them declare to us that God the Word
is such a word, having life in himself, and either is not separated from the Father and, in
accordance with this position, does not subsist (μὴ ὑφεστάναι) nor is he a son, or is both
separated and invested with ousia.”84 For Origen, if the Logos is not separated (οὐ
κεχωρισμένον) or distinct from the Father, he does not subsist (μὴ ὑφεστάναι) and,
therefore, cannot be a son. Conversely, if the Logos is separate from the Father, he has
ousia (οὐσιωμένον).85 The problem is that in the monarchian exegesis, the προφοράν is
merely syllables and is denied ὑπόστασιν or οὐσίαν; the Son does not have distinct
existence alongside the Father.

meram veritatem possidere dum unicum deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et
Patrem et Filium et Spiritum dicat (CCSL 2:1161).
83

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.2 (italics mine). Note the subtle shift between the Latin text of
the Psalm, Eructavit cor meum sermonem optimum and the modified version Tertullian puts on the lips of
his opponents, Eructavit me cor meum sermonem optimum. (Latin from CCSL 2:1171).
Origen, ComJn 1.152 (trans. FC 80:64-5 with modifications): Καὶ λόγον τοιοῦτον καθ’ αὑτὸν
ζῶντα καὶ ἤτοι οὐ κεχωρισμένον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ μὴ ὑφεστάναι οὐδὲ υἱὸν τυγχάνοντα ἢ καὶ
κεχωρισμένον καὶ οὐσιωμένον ἀπαγγελλέτωσαν ἡμῖν θεὸν λόγον. Greek from SC 120:136-8.
84

Origen gives us a rough summary of his opponents’ interpretation of Psalm 44:2, but he does
not elaborate on their teaching. From Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean, however, we know that the
monarchians denied that there was any distinction between the Father and the Son. Consider the saying
Hippolytus attributes to the Noetians: “You see, brethren, how rash and reckless a doctrine they introduced
in saying quite shamelessly, ‘The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the Son; he himself was born, he
himself suffered, he himself raised himself up!’” See Contra Noetum 3.2 (trans. Hippolytus, Contra
Noetum, ed. Robert Butterworth, Heythrop Monographs 2 (London: Heythrop College [University of
London], 1977), 48.).
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Origen returns to this Psalm repeatedly in the first book of his commentary on the
Gospel of John because it was an integral piece of the monarchian contention that the
Word was, in fact, not an existent distinct from the Father. Furthermore, one of the
reasons Origen downplays the significance of Word as a title for Christ in book one of
ComJn is this prominent exegetical trend of his monarchian opponents.86 Thus, Origen
spends so much time discussing every title of Christ but Logos in his commentary on the
opening verse of John’s gospel, which is the locus classicus for Logos Christology. As is
clear elsewhere, Origen was certainly not averse to developing a Logos Christology, but
he deemphasized it in this instance to counter the monarchian usage of the term. Origen,
of course, does not completely pass up this opportunity to speak about the Word. In book
two of ComJn, he argues that all rational creatures are rational insofar as they participate
in the Logos. See especially the section on participation starting in 2.16. He is not willing
to relinquish such an important Christological title to his opponents, but he can develop
an alternative to combat what he views as their mistaken interpretation of Logos.

86
As I noted above in my summary of scholarship, the Valentinian usage of Logos surely
contributed to Origen’s de-emphasis of it as well. A few scholars have noticed the importance of Wisdom
as a Christological title in Origen, but they do not consider the function of Wisdom as a response to
monarchianism. See A. H. B. Logan, “Origen and Alexandrian Wisdom Christology,” in Origeniana
Tertia: The Third International Colloquium for Origen Studies, University of Manchester, September 7th11th, 1981, ed. Richard Hanson and Henri Crouzel (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 123–29; W.
Ullmann, “Die Sophia-Lehre des Origenes im 1 Buch seines Johanneskommentars,” Studia Patristica 16.2
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1985), 271–78; Miyako Demura, “Origen on Sophia in Contra Celsum: The
Double Understandings of the Wisdom of Solomon 7:27,” in Origeniana Quinta: Papers of the 5th
International Origen Congress, Boston College, 14-18 August 1989 (Leuven: Leuven University Press,
1992), 174–78; Michel Fédou, La sagesse et le monde: Essai sur la christologie d’Origène, Collection
“Jésus et Jésus-Christ” 64 (Paris: Desclée, 1995). Behr writes that in books 1-2 of ComJn, Origen pays the
most attention “to the designation of Jesus as the ‘Word,’ for, as mentioned earlier, Origen is particularly
concerned about those who refrain from investigating 'the meaning of what is indicated by the term
"Word,"' so that they do not have to affirm the independent subsistence of the Son (ComJn. 1.125, 151).”
See Behr, The Way to Nicaea, 182. As I argue in what follows, despite the few passages where Origen
complains of his opponents’ misinterpretation of the title Logos, he downplays it in favor of the title
Sophia.
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Where we would expect to find lengthy meditations on Christ as Logos, we see
Origen suggest that Wisdom is perhaps the most proper name for the Son. When Origen
does discuss the Son as Logos in book one of ComJn, he locates Logos in Wisdom. He
states, “And if we should carefully consider all the concepts applied to him, he is the
beginning only insofar as he is wisdom. He is not even the beginning insofar as he is the
Word, since ‘the Word’ was ‘in the beginning,’ so that someone might say boldly that
wisdom is older than all the concepts in the names of the firstborn of creation.”87
Origen’s de-emphasis of Logos is not confined to ComJn. In his discussion of
Christ in De Prin. 1.2, Origen begins with a discussion of the names of applied to Christ.
Instead of Logos, Origen focuses on Christ as Wisdom.88 He then quickly adds, “Let no
one think, however, that when we give him the name ‘wisdom of God’ we mean anything
without substance (aliquid insubstantivum).”89 It appears that Origen made this comment
to guard against the same problem he saw in the monarchian exegesis of Psalm 44:2 that
he addressed in ComJn, namely, that they denied the Son substantiality and distinction
from the Father. Origen discusses Christ as Logos in De Prin. only after he has
considered him as Wisdom. Although Origen locates Logos within Wisdom in book 1 of

Origen, ComJn 1.118 (trans. FC 80:58): Καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιμελῶς ἐξετάζωμεν αὐτοῦ πάσας τὰς
ἐπινοίας, μόνον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι σοφία ἀρχή ἐστιν, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λόγος ἀρχὴ τυγχάνων, εἴγε «ὁ λόγος ἐν
ἀρχῇ» ἦν· ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄν τινα τεθαρρηκότως <ὡς> πρεσβύτερον πάντων τῶν ἐπινοουμένων ταῖς ὀνομασίαις
τοῦ πρωτοτόκου πάσης κτίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ σοφία. Greek from SC 120:120. In the sections preceding this one,
Origen discusses the role of Wisdom in creation. He also discusses the relationship between Logos and
Wisdom, although his discussion is not terribly clear.
87

88

Origen, De Prin. 1.2.

Origen, De Prin. 1.2.2 (trans. Butterworth, 15 with modifications): “Nemo tamen putet aliquid
nos insubstantiuum dicere, cum eum dei sapientiam nominamus.” Latin from Origen, Traité des principes,
ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, vol. 1, Sources chrétiennes 252 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), 112.
Butterworth translates aliquid insubstantivum as “anything without hypostatic existence.” This translation,
however, could be over-determined because we are not sure that hypostasis was in the original Greek.
89
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ComJn, he viewed both Wisdom and Logos as proper titles for the Son, titles that would
have been appropriate even if humans had not fallen.90
In both ComJn and De Prin., Origen interprets ἀρχή in John 1:1 as a reference to
the ἀρχή in Proverbs 8:22ff, where Wisdom is said to have been with God before
creation. By means of Pr. 8:22, which itself echoes the opening words of Genesis in the
LXX, Origen explicitly links Wisdom with demiurgic functions, even claiming that
Wisdom contains within herself all of the forms of what would be created.91 In De Prin.,
he asks if any pious person could consider the Father to have ever existed without
Wisdom by his side.92 Later in book one of ComJn, Origen stresses that the Wisdom of
God “is above all creation” (τὴν ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν κτίσιν σοφἰαν τοῦ θεοῦ).93 Thus, not only
has Origen argued that Wisdom is not something insubstantial, he has also argued that
Wisdom has been alongside of, and distinct from, the Father from the beginning, that the
Father has never been without Wisdom.94
At the beginning of book two, Origen addresses views that are surely monarchian.
He writes,

Origen, ComJn 1.124. Origen’s point here is that, in the absence of the fall, Christ would not
have needed to be “physician” or “shepherd.” In the absence of the fall, however, Christ would have still
been Wisdom and Word.
90

91

Origen, ComJn 1.111ff; De Prin. 1.2.3.

92

Origen, De Prin. 1.2.2.

93

Origen, ComJn 1.244-6 (Greek from SC 120:180).

94

Note that Tertullian does something very similar to this in his reading of Proverbs 8:22 in
Adversus Praxean 6. There, he speaks of Wisdom being “established as a second person (secundam
personam).” For both Tertullian and Origen, the description of Wisdom as being with God in creation
provides ample grounds to assert that there was another (person, being, thing?) with God at creation. As I
noted above, however, Origen probably disagreed with the fact that Tertullian thought that the Word only
achieved a perfect nativity when God spoke the first words in creation. The way Origen speaks of Wisdom
as alongside the Father prior to creation serves as a good refutation of Tertullian’s position that the Word
only achieved perfect nativity when God spoke in creation.
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Many people who wish to be pious are troubled because they are afraid that they
may proclaim two Gods (δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι θεοὺς) and, for this reason, they fall
into false and impious beliefs. They either deny that the individual nature
(ἰδιότητα) of the Son is other than that of the Father by confessing him to be God
whom they refer to as ‘Son’ in name at least, or they deny the divinity of the Son
and make his individual nature (ἰδιότητα) and essence as an individual (τὴν
οὐσἰαν κατὰ περιγραφήν) to be different from the Father.95
In this passage, he uses two terms, ἰδιότης and περιγραφή, to describe the individuality of
the Son.96 Without overtly directing it at monarchians, Origen had earlier used περιγραφή
to speak about the individuality of the Son.97 He begins, “In addition, to signify that the
Word has his own individuality, that is to say, lives according to himself….”98 He goes
on and writes about the “Logos... having ὑπόστασιν ‘in the beginning,’ in Wisdom.”99
Even when Origen is focusing on the title Logos, he employs Wisdom as the basis for
articulating the distinct ὑπόστασις or ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν of the Son.
I have argued that Origen’s turn to Wisdom Christology as a means of
establishing the individual identity of the Son was due to his rejection of monarchianism
in Rome. The monarchians identified the Father and the Son, and their Stoicized

Origen, ComJn 2.16 (trans. FC 80:98): Καὶ τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθέους εἶναι εὐχομένους ταράσσον,
εὐλαβουμένους δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι θεοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο περι πίπτοντας ψευδέσι καὶ ἀσεβέσι δόγμασιν, ἤτοι
ἀρνουμένους ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν μέχρι ὀνόματος παρ’
αὐτοῖς «υἱὸν» προσαγορευόμενον, ἢ ἀρνουμένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ
τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός. Greek from SC 120:220-2. I examine this
passage at length in the next chapter.
95

For a good discussion of the use of περιγραφή by Origen and others, see Matthew R. Crawford,
“The Triumph of Pro-Nicene Theology over Anti-Monarchian Exegesis: Cyril of Alexandria and Theodore
of Heraclea on John 14:10-11,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 21, no. 4 (2013): 549–55. Note also my
discussion of this term in the section on Clement of Alexandria in chapter one. Clement also used
περιγραφή to speak of the distinction of the Logos from the Father.
96

97

Origen, ComJn 1.291-2.

Origen, ComJn 1.291 (trans. FC 80:94): Καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸ παραδέξασθαι τὸν λόγον ἰδίαν
περιγραφὴν ἔχοντα, οἷον τυγχάνοντα ζῆν καθ’ ἑαυτόν. Greek from SC 120:206.
98

99

Origen, ComJn 1.292: λόγος... ἐν ἀρχῇ, τῇ σοφίᾳ, τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχων. Greek from SC 120:206.
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understanding of the Logos helped support this identification.100 Their understanding of
the Logos as a prophora from the Father allowed them to deny that the Logos had any
individual existence of his own. He was merely struck air or sound. This understanding of
Logos meant that the monarchians did not have to consider the Logos as another existing
alongside the Father.
Accordingly, Origen de-emphasized Logos Christology and developed Wisdom
Christology in counterpoint to his monarchian opponents. The turn to Wisdom
Christology shaped his Christology in two important ways. First, Origen de-emphasized
Logos as the pre-eminent title of Christ in response to the controversy that the
monarchian interpretation of the term had caused. Second, he emphasized Wisdom in his
understanding of the Son to counteract the monarchian position: he argued that the Son,
as Wisdom, had an individual existence distinct from the Father from the beginning.101
He then described the Logos as in the beginning (ἐν ἀρχή), which he identifies with
Wisdom, thus communicating to the Logos the distinct individual existence he had
ascribed to Wisdom. His use of Wisdom Christology was also able to counteract what he
most likely viewed as a problem in non-Stoicized Logos theologies of someone like
Tertullian. Tertullian argued that the Logos received “perfect nativity” when God spoke
the first words in creation, but for Origen, such an understanding of the Logos coming to
fully or perfectly exist at a point in time was problematic. He used the concept of
Wisdom to argue that the Son preceded creation and indeed was always alongside the

Again, see specifically ComJn 151-2 for Origen’s discussion of the reading of Psalm 44:2 that
denies ousia to the Logos.
100

101
As I have noted above, Origen uses a number of different terms to establish this distinct
individual existence: ὑπόστασις, οὐσία, περιγραφή, and ἰδιότης, to name a few.
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Father.102 In this way, his Wisdom Christology accomplished something that a deStoicized Logos theology might not have been able to.

102

See especially, De prin. 1.2.2. See also passages like ComJn 10.246, where Origen argues that
for a father to be father, he must always have a son. As John Behr astutely notes, Origen was on the early
end of those who held that the relationship between the Father and Son is constitutive of the core of their
being, and therefore, must always have existed. See Behr, The Way to Nicaea, 185.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ORIGEN THE SUBORDINATIONIST;
SUBORDINATION AS A MEANS OF DISTINGUISHING THE FATHER
AND SON

Introduction: Anti-Monarchian Subordination in the Early Third Century

Throughout this dissertation I have surveyed various ways of speaking about the
relationship between the Father and Son. In the first chapter, I introduced a heuristic to
evaluate the ways authors spoke about the distinction between the Father and Son,
ranging from “soft” distinction to “hard” distinction. On one end of the spectrum were
those authors who distinguished the Father and Son mainly through the consistent use of
names and titles.1 Others were more attentive to distinguishing the Father and Son but left
the precise manners of their unity and distinction ambiguous. For example, Clement of
Alexandria spoke of the Son as distinct from the Father by means of περιγραφή; and
Athenagoras spoke of distinction within the Godhead by means of τάξις.2 On the far end
of the spectrum was Justin, who argued that the Father and Son were distinct because
they were ἕτερος ἐν ἀριθμῷ.3 Even more dramatic is the θεὸς ἕτερος that Justin claims to
find in the Old Testament.4

Many of the so-called apostolic Fathers fall into this category. See my discussion of “soft
distinction” in the first chapter. For example, Clement of Rome consistently uses the title δεσπότης to refer
to the Father and the title κύριος to refer to the Son.
1

For Clement’s use of περιγραφή, see especially my discussion of Exc. 19 in chapter one. For
Athenagoras’ use of τάξις language, see Legatio 10.5, where he writes, “τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν.”
2

3

For one of the places Justin makes this claim, see Dialogue with Trypho 128.4.

4

See Dialogue with Trypho 56.11.
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At the beginning of the third century, the monarchians claimed that the Father and
Son were “one and the same.”5 With this claim, they denied that there was any distinction
between the Father and Son. For the anti-monarchian writers who opposed them, finding
proper means to distinguish the Father and Son was of paramount importance. Like
earlier authors, they used the language of alterity and claimed that the Son was “other”
(alius or ἕτερος) than the Father.6 Following the tradition of authors who antedated the
monarchian controversy, like Athenagoras, they also spoke of distinction by using the
language of order or τάξις.7 They used various other terms such as περιγραφή, ἰδιότης,
ὑπόστασις, οὐσία, and ὑποκείμενον to describe how the Father and Son had existences
differentiated from each other. At the beginning of the third century, however, these
terms did not yet have fixed, univocal meanings. The anti-monarchian writers used these
terms and others to argue for the distinction of the Father and the Son; but they had to
offer further explanation to clarify how they were using them.
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the intentional subordination of the Son was a
common strategy that anti-monarchian writers used to distinguish the Father and Son
during the first half of the third century. By situating their terms for distinction within a
subordinationist framework, they were able to clarify how the Father and Son were not
“one and the same.” The term subordination is often used by scholars with the negative

5
See Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3 and Refutatio 9.10.11-2 for prime examples of this claim.
Tertullian writes: maxime haec quae se existimat meram ueritatem possidere, dum unicum deum non alias
putat credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum dicat. The Refutatio records the
following language: οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ
υἱόν.
6

For examples, see Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.4; Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 11.1, among

others.
7
See especially Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3-4, where Tertullian uses gradus in a manner
similar to Athenagoras’ use of τάξις.
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evaluative judgment that whatever is deemed subordinationist was a failure to live up to
the standards of Nicaea.8 I reject this usage as anachronistic when discussing thirdcentury texts and authors and argue, to the contrary, that the subordinationist schemata
employed by the authors considered in this chapter were intentionally used to distinguish
the Father and Son.9 Although subordinationism comes to be viewed as heretical in the
post-Nicene period, it was an accepted anti-monarchian strategy among some prominent
early third-century authors.
By treating subordination in the context of anti-monarchian polemics, I hope to
avoid anachronistic evaluative judgments. Thus, I examine three instances of antimonarchian subordination in the early third century. First, I examine subordinationist
passages from Tertullian and Novatian, whose works were separated by roughly thirty
years.10 Next, I evaluate a key passage from the beginning of book 2 of Origen’s
Commentary on John, which was composed in the years between Adversus Praxean and
De Trinitate. In order to justify my focus on this passage, I preface it with an appraisal of

8

Simonetti notes that scholars often view the subordinationism of a pre-Nicene theologian as
something of an embarrassment. He then notes that it is only an embarrassment if we expect the pre-Nicene
theologians to have espoused post-Nicene orthodoxy avant la lettre. Manlio Simonetti, “Note sulla teologia
trinitaria di Origene,” Vetera Christianorum 8 (1971): 274. It is precisely this sort of embarrassment that
drives Christoph Bruns’ preoccupation with determining whether Origen’s subordinationism was
ontological, in his Trinität und Kosmos: zur Gotteslehre des Origenes, Adamantiana 3 (Münster:
Aschendorff Verlag, 2013).
9

Geoffrey D. Dunn rightly notes the importance of reading texts within their contemporary
contexts, although he has not completely escaped the post-Nicene freight attached to pronouncements of
subordinationism. He writes, “The need to read Novatian free from later developments in trinitarian
theology is important and for this reason Novatian's work deserves a re-reading. A good historical
theologian seeks not to evaluate early theological writings from a later perspective or to use them to prove
points in other debates, but to understand them as products of their own environment and to understand
them within that environment” (“The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” Ephemerides
Theologicae Lovanienses 78, no. 4 (2002): 389–90).
10

For the dating of these texts, see my discussions in the earlier chapters.
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the value of Rufinus’ translations of Origen’s work.11 Finally, I conclude that
subordinationist renderings of the Son’s relationship to the Father were a key feature in
anti-monarchian polemics and that Origen’s subordinationist scheme in ComJn 2.13-32 is
best understood within this context.12

Tertullian

Scholars have puzzled over what to make of Tertullian’s Trinitarian theology in
Adversus Praxean. On the one hand, he responds to the monarchian accusations that he
separates the Father from the Son by arguing that the Father, Son, and Spirit all share one
substance.13 On the other hand, some passages in the work strike scholars as undeniably
“subordinationist.” Eric Osborn has captured the scholarly ambivalence toward
Tertullian’s Trinitarian theology well: “Criticism of Tertullian's doctrine of the trinity has
measured him against later formulations and either applauded or bewailed his
achievement. To many he seems to have anticipated Nicaea and later developments, to
others he has succumbed to extreme subordinationism.”14 Raniero Cantalamessa judges

11
Specifically, I discuss why I have chosen to privilege ComJn over De Principiis, which appears
to provide a more compact and orderly account of Origen’s Trinitarian theology.

Adolf von Harnack rightly observes, “While Adoptianism apparently played a very small part in
the development of the Logos Christology in the church, the Christological theses of Tertullian and the rest
were completely dependent on the opposition to the Modalists. This reveals itself especially in the strict
subordination of the Son to the Father. It was only by such a subordination that it was possible to repel the
charge, made by opponents, of teaching that there were two Gods” (History of Dogma, trans. Neil
Buchanan, vol. 3 [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907], 70).
12

13
14

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3-4.

Eric Osborn, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 133. He then qualifies this scenario on the same page, “A first reading of Against Praxeas suggests
that Tertullian has not avoided a division of the divine substance, and more exact scrutiny indicates that he
may not have given the son and the spirit a totality of divine substance.”
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certain aspects of Tertullian’s theology to be subordinationist, writing, “The Christ of
Tertullian is God in the same way as the Father, but not to the same extent.”15 Similarly,
Adhémar d’Alès concludes that in Tertullian’s theology, “The divinity of the Father is
communicated by degrees to the Son and the Holy Spirit, without detriment to the
monarchy.”16 His final judgement is that “the subordinationist flavor of some of the
passages is undeniable.”17
In Tertullian’s Trinitarian vocabulary in Adversus Praxean, there are some words
that he consistently uses to denote unity and some that he uses consistently to denote
distinction. The following passage, where Tertullain focuses on monarchianism among
other heresies, gives a clear example of these terms:
and in particular this one [Monarchainism] which supposes itself to possess truth
unadulterated while it thinks it impossible to believe in one God unless it says that both
Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same: as though the one <God> were not
all <these things> in this way also that they are all of the one, namely by unity of
substance, while none the less is guarded the mystery of that economy which disposes the
unity into trinity, setting forth Father and Son and Spirit as three, three however not in
quality but in sequence, not in substance but in aspect, not in power but in <its>
manifestation, yet of one substance and one quality and one power, seeing it is one God
from whom those sequences and aspects and manifestations are reckoned out in the name
of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. How they admit of plurality without division
the discussion will show as it proceeds.18
15
Raniero Cantalamessa, La cristologia di Tertulliano, Paradosis 18 (Fribourg, Switzerland:
Edizioni universitarie Friburgo, 1962), 27: Il Cristo di Tertulliano è Dio allo stesso modo del Padre, ma
non nella stessa misura.

Adhémar d’Alès, La théologie de Tertullien, Bibliothèque de théologie historique (Paris:
Beauchesne, 1905), 73.
16

17
18

Ibid., 101.

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3-4 (trans. Evans, 132; Latin CCSL 2.2, 1161). maxime haec
quae se existimat meram ueritatem possidere, dum unicum Deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum
eundemque et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum dicat. Quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia dum ex uno omnia
per substantiae scilicet unitatem et nihilominus custodiatur oikonomiae sacramentum, quae unitatem in
trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens Patrem et Filium et Spiritum, tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec
substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis
quia unus Deus ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti
deputantur. <Qui> quomodo numerum sine diuisione patiuntur, procedentes tractatus demonstrabunt.
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In this passage, Tertullian uses substantia, status, and postestas to indicate of what there
is one among Father, Son, and Spirit.19 He distinguishes these latter three by using the
terms gradus, forma, and species.20 Of note here is gradus, which implies a gradation of
the three Trinitarian persons.21 In his discussion of gradus in Tertullian, Rankin writes,
“Here we have the suggestion of a hierarchy in the Godhead, which Tertullian is prepared
to accept with the attendant risk of suggesting a notion of subordinationism, for he will
do everything he possible [sic] can to avoid the greater dangers of modalism.”22
Elsewhere, Tertullian speaks of an order within the Godhead without the use of gradus:
how should God be thought, in the Son and in the Holy Spirit occupying second
and third place, while they are to such a degree conjoint of the Father's substance,
19

Moingt highlights that Tertullian uses substantia as a unifying term in Adversus Praxean, but he
cautions against reading too much into Tertullian’s usage. He suggests that in Adversus Praxean, Tertullian
means something like generic unity when he speaks of unity of substance, not something like numerical
unity of substance. He further notes that we should not expect Tertullian to have anticpated the
philosophical difficulty introduced by Arius. See Joseph Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, vol. 2,
Théologie 69 (Paris: Aubier, 1966), 395.
Species is not as important for my argument as gradus, but note Moingt’s lengthy discussion of
Tertullian’s use of the species: ibid., 2:433–47.
20

21

For a detailed discussion of substantia, status, and gradus in Tertullian, see René Braun, Deus
Christianorum: recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien, 2nd ed., Collection des études
augustiniennes 70 (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1977), 176–207. Note also Moingt’s detailed discussion of
gradus: Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, 2:447–78. Moingt notes that from the perspective of
God’s interaction with the world, Tertullian’s use of gradus can seem to imply that the Son is posterior and
inferior to the Father. Moingt, however, wants to avoid these conclusions (463). These very notions that
Moingt finds uncomfortable, however, are precisely the ones that help Tertullian distinguish the Father and
Son.
David Rankin, “Tertullian’s Vocabulary of the Divine ‘Individuals’ in Adversus Praxean,”
Sacris Erudiri 40 (2001): 20. Later, Rankin writes, “In employing gradus to distinguish the Persons
Tertullian comes perilously close—indeed some might suggest that he cannot avoid it—to a form of
subordinationism. Yet, used in conjunction with terms such as conserti and connexus, and understood
against the backdrop of the oikonomia, Tertullian is prepared to take this risk in order to expose and oppose
the greater danger of Praxeas' modalism” (45). Rankin’s analysis here exemplifies the typical scholarly
attitude toward pre-Nicene subordinationism. For Rankin, subordinationism is something to be avoided
almost at all costs; it is perilous and risky. Tertullian, however, does not appear to share this modern
aversion to subordinationist understandings of the Son’s relationship to the Father. Even as he describes it
as perilous, Rankin can recognize that it was commonplace in pre-Nicene theology: “Subordination is,
however, not an unusual feature of Tertullian's concept of the Trinity, as it was not for anyone prior to
Nicaea” (43). Rankin overstates his case, for the monarchians had no other to subordinate to the Father.
22
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to experience a division and a dispersion such as he does not experience in the
plurality of those angels, alien as they are from the Father's substance? 23
This sentence again highlights how Tertullian can at the same time claim unity of
substance for the Trinitarian persons and distinction by order or place, a distinction that
neither divides nor disperses them. The assignment of second or third place to the Son
and Spirit does not necessarily imply subordination, but other instances where Tertullian
uses a taxis to distinguish the Trinitarian persons lead to the conclusion that the Son and
Spirit are somehow less than the Father. Just before the quotation above, Tertullain
describes the Son’s place in the monarchy by invoking the language of participation. He
writes of the Monarchy, “it is not ipso facto divided, does not cease to be a monarchy, if
the son also is assumed as partner [particeps] in it, but it continues to belong in first
instance to him by whom it is passed on to the son: and so long as it is his, that continues
to be a monarchy which is jointly held by two who are so closely united.”24
Tertullian’s understanding of the unity of God and monarchy is further elucidated
by his description of what would destroy monarchy:
Overthrow of monarchy you should understand as <taking place> when there is
superimposed another kingship of its own character and its own quality, and
consequently hostile, when another god is introduced to oppose the Creator, as
with Marcion, or many gods according to people like Valentinus and Prodicus:

23

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.5 (trans. Evans, 133; Latin CCSL 2.2, 1162): Quale est ut Deus
diuisionem et dispersionem pati uideatur in Filio et in Spiritu sancto, secundum et tertium sortitis locum,
tam consortibus substantiae Patris quas non patitur in tot angelorum numero et quidem tam <alienorum>
a substatia Patris?
24

Adversus Praxean 3.3 (trans. Evans, 133): si vero et filius fuerit ei cuius monarchia sit, non
statim dividi eam et monarchiam esse desinere si particeps eius adsumatur et filius, sed proinde illius esse
principaliter a quo communicatur in filium, et dum illius est proinde monarchiam esse quae a duobus tam
unitis continetur. Joseph Moingt argues that Tertullian’s use of a schema of participation does not imply
subordination, that the divine power is not degraded. See Joseph Moingt, “Le problème du Dieu unique
chez Tertullien,” Revue des sciences religieuses 44, no. 4 (1970): 355–356. See also idem, Théologie
trinitaire de Tertullien, 2:395. As I argue in the following discussion of Origen’s use of participation,
however, the subordinationist implications of the framework of participation are difficult to escape.
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then is it for the overthrow of the monarchy when it is for the destruction of the
creator.25
This passage demonstrates how Tertullian understands the economy to work. There is but
one monarch who administers the economy through those who share in his rule.26 A
monarchy can, by definition, only have one monarch; and the Marcionite dualism
destroys this arrangement. In the systems of both Marcion and Valentinus, other deities
are often opposed to the rule of the supreme deity. Tertullian’s monarchical economy has
the Father at the top with the Son and Spirit in the second and third places, respectively.
Both the Son and the Spirit work in accord with the will of the Father, thus working from
within the monarchy instead of opposing it.
Tertullian next argues for the distinction of the Father and the Son in a discussion
of the visibility of the Son.27 He writes,
It will follow that we must understand the Father as invisible because of the
fulness of his majesty, but must acknowledge the Son as visible because of the
enumeration of his derivation, just as we may not look upon the sun in respect of
the total of its substance which is in the sky, though we can with our eyes bear its
beam because of the moderation of the assignment which from thence reaches out
to the earth.28

25
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.6 (trans. Evans, 133; Latin CCSL 2.2, 1162): Euersio enim
monarchiae illa est tibi intellegenda cum alia dominatio suae condicionis et proprii status ac per hoc
aemula superducitur, cum alius deus infertur aduersus creatorem cum Marcione, cum plures, secundum
Valentinos et Prodicos: tunc in monarchiae euersionem cum in creatoris destructionem.
26
Note again, that in Adversus Praxean 3.3, quoted on the previous page, Tertullian describes the
Son’s place in the monarchy by using the language of participation.

Recall from the earlier chapters on monarchianism that the question of God’s visibility was one
of the chief areas of disagreement between the monarchians and their opponents. The monarchians argued
that the same God was both visible and invisible, while their opponents consistently argued that the Father
was invisible and the Son was visible.
27

28

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.3 (trans. Evans, 149; Latin CCSL 2.2, 1176): consequens erit
ut inuisibilem patrem intellegamus pro plenitudine maiestatis, visibilem vero filium agnoscamus pro
modulo deriuationis, sicut nec solem nobis contemplari licet, quantum ad ipsam substantiae summam quae
est in caelis, radium autem eius toleramus oculis pro temperatura portionis quae in terram inde porrigitur.
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Here, Tertullian claims that the Son is visible because his majesty is derivative. The
Father possesses properly the fullness of majesty, while the Son has majesty in virtue of
the modulus of its derivation from the Father.29 The fact that the Son derivately has what
is properly the Father’s allows for Tertullian to distinguish between them. The degree to
which each possesses majesty determines whether that person is visible. Tertullian here
uses the sun/ray image that is important elsewhere in Adversus Praxean for maintaining
both the unity and distinction of Father and Son.30 The key point for Tertullian is that the
Father possesses something (in this case, majesty) in its fullness, and the Son only
possesses it in part. Were the Son the same as the Father, he too would have the fullness
of majesty.
In Adversus Praxean, Tertullian’s insistence that the Son is not the same as the
Father because the Son is less than the Father is most clearly stated in chapter nine, where
he combats the monarchian identification of the Father and Son:
Remember at every point that I have professed this rule, by which I testify that
Father and Son and Spirit are unseparated from one another, and in that case you
will recognise what I say and in what sense I say it. For look now, I say that the
Father is one, and the Son another, and the Spirit another (every unlearned or selfwilled person takes this statement in bad part, as though it proclaimed diversity
and because of diversity threatened a separation of Father and Son and Spirit: but
I am bound to make it, so long as they maintain that Father and Son and Spirit are
identical, favouring the monarchy at the expense of the economy), not however
that the Son is other than the Father by diversity, but by distribution, not by
division but by distinction, because the Father is not identical with the Son, they
even being by measure one and another. For the Father is the whole substance,
while the Son is an outflow and portion of the whole, as he himself professes,
Evan’s translation here is idiosyncratic, and he blunts the force of what Tertullian says.
“Enumeration” is not a standard definition for modulus, which normally means something like a “measure”
or “small measure.” Tertullian is intentionally contrasting modulus with plenitudo. The Father’s majesty
cannot be measured; and thus, he is invisible. Because of the derivation of the Son’s majesty and
subsequent lack of plenitude, the Son is visible.
29

30

22.6, 27.1.

For his other uses of the sun/ray image in this work, see Adversus Praxean 8.5-7, 13.10, 18.4,
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Because my Father is greater than I: and by him, it is sung in the psalm, he has
also been made less, a little on this side of the angels. So also the Father is other
than the Son as being greater than the Son, as he who begets is other than he who
is begotten, as he who sends is other than he who is sent, as he who makes is other
than he through whom a thing is made. It suits my case also that when our Lord
used this word regarding the person of the Paraclete, he signified not division but
ordinance: for he says, I will pray the Father and he will send you another
advocate, the Spirit of truth. Thus <he calls> the Paraclete other than himself, as
we say the Son is other than the Father, so as to display the third sequence in the
Paraclete as we the second in the Son, and so to preserve the economy. Is not the
very fact that they are spoken of as Father and Son <a statement that they are>
one thing beside another? Surely all facts will correspond with their designations,
and diversity of designation can by no means be confused, since neither can < the
diversity> of the things of which they are the designations. "Is" is "is", and "not"
is "not": for what is more than this is on the side of evil.31
This passage encapsulates many of the key features of Tertullian’s polemic against the
monarchians. His first task is to reiterate that he does not teach that the Father, Son, and
Spirit are separated, divided, or diverse, lest he be accused of the error of the
Valentinians.32 Such clarification, however, does not cause him to abandon the language
of alterity to describe the Father, Son, and Spirit: Ecce enim dico alium esse Patrem et

31
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.1-4 (trans. Evans, 140-1 with my modifications; Latin, CCSL
2.2, 1168-9): Hanc me regulam professum qua inseparatos ab alterutro patrem et filium et spiritum testor,
tene ubique et ita quid quomodo dicatur agnosces. Ecce enim dico alium esse Patrem et alium Filium et
alium Spiritum – male accepit idiotes quisque aut perversus hoc dictum, quasi diuersitatem sonet et ex
diuersitate separationem protendat Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Necessitate autem hoc dico cum
eundem Patrem et Filium et Spiritum contendunt, aduersus oikonomiam monarchiae adulantes – non
tamen diuersitate alium Filium a Patre sed distributione, nec diuisione alium sed distinctione, quia non sit
idem Pater et Filius, uel modulo alias ab alio. Pater enim tota substantia est, Filius uero, deriuatio totius et
portio sicut ipse profitetur: Quia Pater maior me est. A quo et minoratus canitur in psalmo: Modico quid
citra angelos. Sic et Pater alias a Filio, dum Filio maior, dum alias qui generat, alius qui generatur, dum
alius qui mittit, alius qui mittitur, dum alius qui facit, alius per quem fit. Bene quod et Dominus usus hoc
uerbo in persona Paracleti non diuisionem significauit sed dispositionem: Rogabo enim, inquit, Patrem et
alium advocatum mittet uobis, Spiritum ueritatis. Sic alium a se Paracletum, quomodo et nos a Patre alium
Filium, ut tertium gradum ostenderet in Paracleto, sicut nos secundum in Filio, propter oikonomiae
obseruationem. Ipsum, quod Pater et Filius dicuntur, nonne aliud ab alio est? Utique enim omnia quod
uocantur, hoc erunt, et quod erunt, hoc uocabuntur, et permiscere se diuersitas uocabulorum non potest
omnino, quia nec rerum quarum erunt uocabula. Est, est, non, non; nam quod amplius est, hoc a malo est.
32

This dual polemical context of monarchianism and Valentinianism suggests that monarchianism
was at least in part a reaction against Gnosticism. Tertullian is likely guarding against these Gnostic views
because the monarchians accused him of teaching the separation of the Father and the Son in the manner of
some Gnostics. Note also Moingt’s discussion of how Valentinian theology might have shaped Tertullian’s
use of substantia (Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, 2:394).
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alium Filium et alium Spiritum….33 This language, of course, harkens back to that used
by Justin in the Dialogue with Trypho. Such assertions of the alterity of Father, Son, and
Spirit would have undoubtedly been repugnant to the monarchians; it might have been
this sort of language that provoked the monarchians in the first place. Tertullian is well
aware of the harsh ring of the language of alterity, and he quickly moves to rule out
certain ways of interpreting his use of alius. The three divine persons are other non tamen
diuersitate alium Filium a Patre sed distributione, nec diuisione alium sed
distinction….34
Thus far in the passage, Tertullian has tried to secure the distinction of the persons
of the Trinity, but he has not yet used anything potentially subordinationist to accomplish
this goal. His next bevy of reasons that the Father and Son are not one and the same,
however, relies on his assumption that there is gradation within the Godhead. He writes,
“For the Father is the whole substance, while the Son is an outflow and portion of the
whole” (Pater enim tota substantia est Filius uero, deriuatio totius et portio).35 Ernest
Evans writes concerning this passage,
The unity depends on this, that the Father is the whole substance, pater tota
substatia est, while the Son is derivatio totius et portio (§9). It is tempting here,
and in §26 (portio totius quae cessura erat in filii nomen) to claim that portio
does not mean part but inheritance, and that totius is a descriptive, not a partitive,
genitive; but it seems from Novatian…that in the third century portio was
regularly used for pars, and in fact in the present passage Tertullian admits a

33

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.1.

34

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.1.

35

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.2. Kevin B. McCruden notes that such notions of the Father
containing the fullness of the divinity imply that the Logos is a lesser divinity than the Father. See his
“Monarchy and Economy in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeam,” Scottish Journal of Theology 55, no. 3
(2002): 327.
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certain minoration of the Son (not only in the incarnation but) in his divine
being.36
Evans later tries to downplay the implications of this passage, arguing, “And it would
appear likely that while the suggestion of minoration was forced upon him by
controversy, the safeguarding of equality was a requirement of the received tradition.”37
Andrew McGowan likewise notes that this passage is potentially subordinationist but
then seeks to soften the severity of that judgment. He writes, “The ‘Father is the whole
substance’ (pater enim tota substantia est, 9.2), which suggests a quite different
understanding of God's fatherhood, and potentially a subordinationist one; but this is
primarily a claim for unity of divine substance.”38
Evans is concerned to protect Tertullian from what he views to be the damning
charge of subordinationism, but his statement begs the question about whether or not the
equality of the Father and Son was yet a part of the “received tradition.”39 Tertullian here
uses straightforwardly subordinationist language as an intentional means of

36

Tertullian, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, ed. Ernest Evans (London: S.P.C.K., 1948),

37

Ibid., 247.

44.

Andrew Brian McGowan, “God in Early Latin Theology: Tertullian and the Trinity,” in Andrew
Brian McGowan, Brian Daley, and Timothy J. Gaden, eds., God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in
Memory of Lloyd G. Patterson, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 94 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 66. It is not
clear that recourse to “unity of divine substance” successfully mitigates the charge of subordinationism.
Substance and status unify the divine persons for Tertullian; but his point is that they can be possessed in
differing, and, therefore, differentiating, degrees. It is not clear that emphasizing “unity of substance” is
Tertullian’s primary goal here. Indeed, he needs to emphazie both unity and distinction equally in order to
achieve his double goal here.
38

Furthermore, Evans does not define what he means by “received tradition.” Evans seems to
assume that the equality of the Father and Son was generally accepted at the beginning of the third century
and that it was Tertullian’s duty to protect this tradition. As I hope to have demonstrated in the preceding
reconstruction of the monarchian controversy, however, few theologians were yet concerned with the
equality of the Father and Son at the beginning of the third century. More pressing for them was the
question of whether the Father and Son were “one and the same.” Only after that question was answered
would debates about their equality come into focus.
39
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distinguishing the Father and the Son. He clearly argues, without blinking, that the Son
cannot be the Father because the Father is greater than the Son. One cannot be greater
than oneself.
Tertullian then bolsters his argument with the exegesis of John 14:28 and Psalm
8:5/Hebrews 2:7.40 He quotes John 14:28 as scriptural warrant for his assertion that the
Father is greater than the Son (Sic et Pater alias a Filio, dum Filio maior).41 Evans
observes that Tertullian cites Psalm 8/Hebrews 2 elsewhere to refer to the incarnation. He
then states, “The present passage therefore stands alone in regarding the minoration as the
subordination of the Son to the Father within the Godhead.”42 Adversus Praxean 9.1-4 is
a clear and focused example of Tertullian using subordinationist imagery and exegesis as
a means of distinguishing the Father, Son, and Spirit. The intentional subordination of the
Son to the Father was one of Tertullian’s anti-monarchian means of distinguishing the
Father and Son.

Novatian

Questions about the nature of Novatian’s subordinationism have arrested the
attention of scholars for some time. Daniel Lloyd has recently offered a valuable
summary of scholarly positions regarding Novatian’s subordinationism, suggesting three

Tertullian’s quotation of Psalm 8:5/Hebrews 2:7 presents a variant reading not attested in any of
the main text-types of the Vetus Latina. See Hermann Josef Frede, ed., Epistulae ad Thessalonicenses,
Timotheum, Titum, Philemonem, Hebraeos, Vetus Latina 25 (Freiburg/Breisgau: Herder, 1975), 1127–31.
40

41
42

Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.2.

Tertullian, Against Praxeas, 248. Evans wants to protect Tertullian from his later critics, but his
statement needs much more nuance. As I have argued above, there are numerous passages within Adversus
Praxean that imply that the Son is somehow less than the Father.
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main groupings of scholarship: 1) those who view Novatian’s subordination of the Son as
ontological; 2) those who view Novatian as teaching a subordination of rank or authority,
but, nevertheless, holding that he taught that the Father and Son were equal in divinity;
and 3) those who believe “that Novatian never resolves the theological tension between
his suggestions of equality and inequality.”43 In the first group, d’Alès had no doubt that
Novatian’s subordinationism was ontological.44 James Leonard Papandrea’s work is the
most prominent in the second group, although his attempts to rescue Novatian often feel
strained.45 DeSimone’s scholarship represents those who felt that Novatian had
significant unresolved theological tension.46
Russel J. DeSimone writes that “[Novatian] strives to place in bold relief the
posteriority of the Son, insofar as his origin is concerned, so that he can better defend the
personal distinction of the Father and the Son. He has been charged with
subordinationism. Novatian, however, did not make use of explicit formulas to formally
defend subordinationism.”47 DeSimone argues that “Novatian, however, in his efforts to

Daniel Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination in Novatian of Rome’s Theology of the Son” (Ph.D.
dissertation, Marquette University, 2012), 9–13.
43

44
See especially, his, Novatien, étude sur la théologie romaine au milieu du IIIe siècle, Études de
théologie historique (Paris: Beauchesne, 1924), 120–34.
45

See his two major works: The Trinitarian Theology of Novatian of Rome: A Study in ThirdCentury Orthodoxy (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 2008); Novatian of Rome and the Culmination of PreNicene Orthodoxy, Princeton Theological Monograph Series 175 (Eugene, Or.: Pickwick, 2012).
46

See his The Treatise of Novatian, the Roman Presbyter on the Trinity. A Study of the Text and
the Doctrine, Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 4 (Roma: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1970);
idem, “Introduction,” in The Trinity, The Spectacles, Jewish Foods, In Praise of Purity, Letters, The
Fathers of the Church 67 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 13–19; idem, “Again
the Kenosis of Phil. 2,6-11,” Augustinianum 32, no. 1 (1992): 91–104.
DeSimone, “Introduction,” 19. Earlier (p. 17), Simone had argued that Novatian’s
subordinationism is a product of his reliance on the theology of Tertullian. As the above discussion
indicated, I think Tertullian’s subordination pervades more of his thought than just his conception of the
procession of the Word.
47
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posit a real distinction in the Trinity against the Sabellians, ran ashore on the dangerous
shoals of subordinationism (mitigated form).”48 DeSimone correctly perceives that
Novatian’s subordinationism was a response against his monarchian, or Sabellian,
opponents.49 He nevertheless exhibits the attitude, prevalent among modern scholars, that
subordinationism was a danger that would have best been escaped by pre-Nicene
theologians.50 DeSimone ultimately judges Novatian’s subordinationism to be the product
of some sort of theological incompetence, although Lloyd has heavily critiqued him on
this point.51
Geoffrey Dunn has more recently suggested that appraisals of Novatian’s
theology as ontological subordination perhaps expect too much from him. Referring to J.
N. D. Kelly’s classic, Early Christian Doctrines, Dunn writes,
Kelly argues that the only way Novatian maintained a belief in the oneness of
God and a distinction of persons in the Trinity was through a subordination of Son
to Father. As we have noted above, there is certainly a subordination of dignity or
function between Son and Father, but one should be a little hesitant to conclude
from this that Novatian envisaged a subordination of natures or being; he simply
seemed to have avoided anything that esoteric.52
48

DeSimone, The Treatise of Novatian, 90–1.

49
Geoffrey Dunn also notes that “Novatian was writing in reaction against those who overemphasised the oneness of God.” See his “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,”
386. See also his specific mention of monarchianism at p. 390.
50
Thus, he writes that Novatian “did not avoid the pitfall of subordinationism” (DeSimone, The
Treatise of Novatian, 78). At p. 169, he uses similar language: “He has avoided the dreaded pit of ditheism
only to fall headlong into that of subordinationism.”

Consider the following statement at ibid., 181: “Hence, Novatian's deviations are due to
doctrinal impotence rather than obstinate, heretical intent. Although it is evident from critical scrutiny that
many of Novatian's statements are truly tainted with subordinationism, he did not make use of explicit
formulas to formally defend subordinationism. Finally, we must bear in mind that the subordinationism of
certain Ante-Nicene writers was simply an erroneous theory of private theologians and does not touch the
faith of the Church.” Contra DeSimone, I argue that subordinationism was one of the most prominent
means some early third-century theologians used to distinguish the Father from the Son against
monarchianism.
51

“The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 400. Dunn here has the following
statement from Kelly in his sights: “Thus, for all his emphatic assertion of the Son's distinct subsistence as
a Person, he succeeds in avoiding the ditheism he dreads only by strongly subordinating Him to the Father,
52
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Such a judgment that Novatian avoided anything as “esoteric” as speaking about the
subordination of being or nature betrays some assumptions about Novatian that Lloyd
sought to correct. Dunn rightly notes that Novatian “was commenting on and explaining
the rule of truth (regula veritatis) as preserved in the early Roman church’s baptismal
symbol of faith.”53 Dunn’s observation comes with the concomitant judgment that “it
could well be a work designed more for catechetical instruction than for theological
investigation.”54 This judgment about De Trinitate implies that it is perhaps simplistic
and unconcerned with esoteric things such as being or nature.55 Lloyd, however, has
argued precisely the opposite. He demonstrates that in this treatise, Novatian employs the
technical language of Middle Platonism to buttress his theology.56
I find Lloyd’s arguments about ontological subordination in De Trinitate
compelling, but my primary interest in Novatian here is not whether his subordination of

or alternatively by making Him a passing moment in the divine life of the Father. His doctrine of the Holy
Spirit is, for his date, rudimentary” (J. N. D Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 5th, rev. ed. [London: A & C
Black, 1977], 126).
53

Dunn, “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 390.

54

Ibid.

55
Note Lloyd’s similar reading of Dunn at Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination,” 14. Dunn’s
implication that Novatian was philosophically unsophisticated is continued in his image of Novatian as
unable to keep from running aground in his attempt to articulate his theology: “Sailing between the Scylla
and Charybdis of Adoptionism and Modalism, Novatian could not avoid the perils of subordinationism,
although they seem to be perils about which he was largely unaware and which would only be recognised
in the following generations” (“The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 409). Dunn’s
statement here demonstrates the unnuanced way in which many scholars speak of subordinationism. On the
one hand, Dunn refers to subordinationism as a peril. On the other hand, Dunn suggests that Novatian
would not have been aware that it was perilous because it was only recognized as such by later generations.
But subordinationism can only be viewed as perilous when it is viewed through the lens of later theological
developments. For early third-century anti-monarchian authors, it was a tool to be employed intentionally
to secure the distinction of Father and Son against the monarchians, as I hope to show in this chapter.
56
See especially his first two chapters on Novatian’s conception of the Father in relation to
contemporary philosophical theology: Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination,” 22–74.
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the Son is ontological. My interest is in the purpose of Novatian’s subordination of the
Son. The following passages from De Trinitate that clearly depict subordination will aid
in determining the function of Novatian’s subordination. Commenting on John 16:14,
Novatian writes,
If [the Paraclete] received from Christ the things which He will make known, then
surely Christ is greater than the Paraclete, since the Paraclete would not receive
from Christ unless He were less than Christ. Now, the fact that the Paraclete is
less than Christ proves that Christ is also God, from whom he received what He
makes known. This, then, is a great testimony to Christ's divinity, inasmuch as the
Paraclete, having been found to be less than Christ, takes from Him what He gives
to others. If Christ were only man, Christ would receive from the Paraclete what
He should say; the Paraclete would not receive from Christ what he should make
known.57
The subordination of the Paraclete to Christ is the main focus of this passage, and
Novatian highlights this subordination in order to reiterate the divinity of Christ. For
Novatian, the subordination of the Paraclete to the Son is not an accident he could have
avoided if he had been more careful or astute. It is a strategy he employs in order to make
an intentional theological claim about the divinity of the Son. Novatian here is dealing
with the views of psilanthropists, but the logic he employs to establish the Son’s divinity
recurs in his treatment of positions that are explicitly monarchian.

57
Novatian, De Trinitate 16.3 (trans. FC 67:62; Latin CCSL 4:40): Sed si a christo accepit quae
nuntiet, maior ergo iam paracleto christus est, quoniam nec paracletus a christo acciperet, nisi minor
christo esset. Minor autem christo paracletus christum etiam deum esse hoc ipso probat, a quo accepit
quae nuntiat, ut testimonium christi diuinitatis grande sit, dum minor christo paracletus repertus ab illo
sumit quae ceteris tradit. Quandoquidem si homo tantummodo christus, a paracleto christus acciperet quae
diceret, non a christo paracletus acciperet quae nuntiaret. Dunn notes regarding this passage, “Such an
economic treatment of the Spirit still leaves Novatian open to charges of subordinationism, particularly in
the light of his comment in chapter 16 about the relationship between Son and Spirit that: '… maior ergo
iam paracleto Christus est, quoniam nec paracletus a Christo acciperet, nisi minor Christo esset” (“The
Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 402–3).
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In a passage commenting on Philippians 2:6-11, Novatian again demonstrates
subordinationist tendencies.58 He writes,
Therefore, though 'He was in the form of God, He did not think it robbery to be
equal to God.' For though He was ever mindful that He was God of God the
Father, He never compared or ranked Himself with God the Father, knowing that
He is of His Father; and this very thing (that He is) He had, because the Father
had given it to Him. Hence not only before He took upon Himself the flesh but
even after He had taken a body, and again, after His Resurrection, He rendered
and still renders perfect obedience to His Father in all things. Consequently, this
proves that He never regarded His divinity as a means of unlawfully arrogating to
Himself equality with God the Father.59
Novatian first argues that Christ was God because he was ex deo patre. He then qualifies
this statement by clarifying that the Son did not compare himself to the Father.
Novatian’s reasoning for this point is illuminating. The Son does not compare himself to
the Father because the Father has given to the Son what the Son has. Although Papandrea
claims that Novatian’s interpretation of this passage is “tantamount to asserting that [the

Novatian’s interpretation of Philippians 2:6-11 features prominently in DeSimone’s work.
Although DeSimone had earlier judged Novatian’s interpretation of this passage to be subordinationist, he
later changed his position in his 1992 article. For his earlier position, see The Treatise of Novatian, 108–13.
In his later article, he writes, “Novatian’s teaching, therefore, is not ‘frankly heretical’, as Prat thought, nor
is it a question of a diminished, inferior god of the Neoplatonics, nor the heretical crass subordinationism of
the Arians. It is the elaboration of Ante-Nicene Trinitarian language” (“Again the Kenosis of Phil. 2,6-11,”
100). Note also Lloyd’s discussion at “Ontological Subordination,” 281–4. Papandrea claims that Phil. 2:611 is the “most important New Testament passage for Novatian….” He then claims that “forma can be
synonymous with substantia for Novatian, so that to say that Christ was in forma dei, is tantamount to
asserting that He is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father” (The Trinitarian Theology of Novatian of
Rome, 268–9). To make such a judgment, Papandrea has to ignore a mass of contrary evidence.
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Novatian, De Trinitate 22.5-6 (trans. FC 67:82; Latin CCSL 4:55). Hic ergo quamuis esset in
forma dei, non est rapinam arbitratus aequalem se deo esse. Quamuis enim se ex deo patre deum esse
meminisset, numquam se deo patri aut comparauit aut contulit, memor se esse ex suo patre et hoc ipsum,
quod est, habere se, quia pater dedisset. Inde denique et ante carnis assumptionem, sed et post
assumptionem corporis, post ipsam praeterea resurrectionem omnem patri in omnibus rebus oboedientiam
praestitit pariter ac praestat. Ex quo probatur numquam arbitratum illum esse rapinam quandam
diuinitatem, ut aequaret se patri deo. DeSimone’s earlier position views chapter 22 as one of the most
egregious examples of Novatian’s subordinationism: “The note of subordinationism in Novatian, however,
is not found so much in his exegesis of the theophanies (chs. 17, 18, 19, 20)—where he follows the safe
and sure tradition of previous Ante-Nicene writers—as in his unique and unprecedented exegesis of
Philippians 2:6-11, contained in chapter 22 of his treatise. The distinctive mark of subordinationism is
clearly and apodictically found there.” See DeSimone, The Treatise of Novatian, 108.
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Son] is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father,” a reading of this passage in light of
Novatian’s earlier remarks about the Paraclete suggests a more nuanced assessment is
needed.60 Recall that Novatian had earlier argued that the Paraclete is inferior to the Son
because it receives from the Son.61 Novatian’s reasoning in the earlier passage yields a
clear conclusion when applied to his exegesis of Philippians 2:6-11. If reception of
something makes the recipient inferior to the giver, the Son must be inferior to the Father
because he receives from the Father. This line of thinking elucidates Novatian’s
conclusion that “this proves that He never regarded His divinity as a means of unlawfully
arrogating to Himself equality with God the Father.”62 Pace Papandrea, the Son can
possess divinity from the Father without being equal to the Father in divinity.
In his interpretation of Philippians 2:6-11, Novatian stresses that the Son has
always been obedient to the Father. This obedience to the Father is partially a result of
the fact that the Son is inferior to the Father. A statement later in De Trinitate makes it
clear that the Son’s obedience to the Father had polemical utility for Novatian. He argues,
“What could make it more evident that He is not the Father but the Son than the fact that
He is set before us as obedient to God the Father? If we were to believe otherwise—that
he is the Father—then we would have to say that Christ is subject to another God the
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Again, see Papandrea, The Trinitarian Theology of Novatian of Rome, 269. The introduction of
ὁμοούσιος brings with it the connotations of its legacy in the Nicene and post-Nicene debates, where it was
used to emphasize the equality of the Father and Son. Whatever Novatian thinks about shared substance
between the Father and Son, it is clear that he is stressing their inequality here.
61

Novatian, De Trinitate 16.3.
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Novatian, De Trinitate 22.6 (trans. FC 67:82).
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Father.”63 Immediately preceding this sentence, Novatian focuses on the power that the
Son has over all things. Recalling the subordinationist framework of reception discussed
above, Novatian speaks of the Son’s power as delivered and granted to the Son by the
Father.64 The Son’s obedience to and reception of power from the Father shows that he is
not himself the Father. Novatian expounds the Son’s obedience to the Father within his
subordinationist framework of reception and deploys it to argue against the monarchian
contention that the Father and the Son are the same, that the Father is the Son and the Son
is the Father. Here, obedience and subordination secure the distinction between the Father
and the Son.65
Novatian continues to multiply reasons that the Son is inferior to the Father. He
writes,
On the other hand, the Father also precedes Him; for as the Father, He must of
necessity be prior, because He who knows no origin must of necessity precede
Him who has an origin. At the same time the Son must be less than (minor) the
Father, for he knows that He is in the Father, having an origin, since he is born.66
Scholars have focused on this passage in their discussions of whether Novatian taught the
eternal generation of the Son, but those questions are beyond the scope of my argument
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Novatian, De Trinitate 26.21 (trans. FC 67:92; Latin CCSL 4:63): Quid enim tam euidens potest
esse, hunc non patrem esse, sed filium, quam quod oboediens patri deo proponitur, ne si pater esse
credatur, alteri iam deo patri christus subiectus esse dicatur?
Novatian, De Trinitate 26.20: “…potestatem, sed qua traditam, sed qua concessam, sed qua a
Patre proprio sibi indultam.”
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Manlio Simonetti also observes that Novatian’s subordination of the Son serves to distinguish
him from the Father (“Il problema dell’unità di Dio a Roma da Clemente a Dionigi,” Rivista di storia e
letteratura religiosa 22, no. 3 [1986]: 462).
66

Novatian, De Trinitate 31.3 (trans. FC 67:108; Latin CCSL 4:75): quia et pater illum etiam
praecedit, quod necesse est prior sit qua pater sit, quoniam antecedat necesse est eum qui habet originem
ille qui originem nescit, simul ut hic minor sit, dum in illo esse se scit, habens originem quia nascitur.
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here.67 What is important for my argument is that we have here another clear example of
Novatian’s contention that the Son is less than the Father. Note that in this passage,
Novatian claims that the Son is inferior to the Father because he comes from the Father.
This lines up with his argument about Phil. 2 in De Trinitate 22.5-6
Having surveyed some of the passages where Novatian implies or overtly claims
that the Son is less than the Father, let us now consider the function of Novatian’s
subordinationism.68 In chapter 27 of De Trinitate, Novatian engages with monarchian
interpretations of John 10:30, first using a grammatical argument to refute their reading
of the verse.69 After this argument, Novatian cites John 10:36, where Jesus asks, “Do you
say of Him whom the Father has made holy and sent into this world, ‘You blaspheme,’
because I said, ‘I am the Son of God’?”70 Novatian comments:
Furthermore, He declares that He has been made holy by His Father. Since, then,
He receives sanctification from the Father, He is less than the Father. Because He
is less than the Father, He is consequently <not the Father>, but the Son. For if He
had been the Father, He would have given, not received sanctification. By openly
acknowledging that He receives sanctification from the Father, He proves, by the
very fact that He receives sanctification from the Father, that He is less than the
Father; consequently He has already demonstrated that He is the Son, not the
Father.71
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See Lloyd’s discussion of this passage and its interpretation at “Ontological Subordination,”

262–70.
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Of particular note for establishing his subordinationism are De Trinitate 22.5-6, 26.20-21, and
30.3. The subordinationist import of these passages is especially clear when they are read through the lens
of Novatian’s comments about the Holy Spirit in De Trinitate 16.3.
69
On this argument, see Mark DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of John 10:30 in the Third
Century: Antimonarchian Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading Techniques,” Journal of
Theological Interpretation 6, no. 1 (2012): 117–38.
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Novatian, De Trinitate 27.10 (trans. FC 67:94).

Novatian, De Trinitate 27.12 (trans. FC 67:94; Latin CCSL 4:65): Et sanctificatum se a suo
Patre esse proponit. Dum ergo accipit sanctificationem a patre, minor patre est; minor autem patre
consequenter <non pater> est, sed filius. Pater enim si fuisset, sanctificationem dedisset, non accepisset.
Et nunc autem profitendo se accepisse sanctificationem a patre, hoc ipso quo patre se minorem accipiendo
ab ipso sanctificationem probat, filium se esse, non patrem, monstrauit.
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This passage demonstrates the polemical function of subordination within Novatian’s
thought. Note again that Novatian argues that the Son’s reception (here, of sanctification)
from the Father makes him less than the Father. The next step in his reading of the
passage is crucial for my argument. Because the Son is less than the Father, he is not the
Father but the Son. For Novatian, the subordination of the Son to the Father is neither an
accidental by-product of an anti-psilanthropist proof of Christ’s divnity nor the product of
an inferior theological mind. It is purposefully deployed to refute the monarchian
identification of the Father and Son.72 As for Tertullian, the subordination of the Son to
the Father was a crucial piece in Novatian’s anti-monarchian polemic.

Subordination and Distinction: Origen’s Schema of Participation

In this final section, I analyze a core passage from the second book of Origen’s
Commentary on John. In this passage, Origen seeks to guard against monarchian
theology by employing a framework of participation which, I argue, is subordinationist. I
supplement my analysis with others passages from Origen’s corpus, but I do not attempt
to be exhaustive. I consider the passage from ComJn 2.13-32 to be one of the most
important passages for determining Origen’s views on the relationship between the

Commenting on De Trinitate 22.2-3, Dunn writes, “That there is the suggestion of
subordinationism here is undeniable, but it was more by accident or oversight than by design. Establishing
the divinity of Christ was Novatian's concern, and questions of the relationship between Father and Son
beyond establishing that the Son was of God were more of a distraction” (“The Diversity and Unity of God
in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 398). Novatian’s comments in De Trinitate 27.12 and elsewhere make
problematic Dunn’s claim that Novatian’s subordinationism in his interpretation of Philippians 2:6-11 was
an accident or the result of oversight. In the earlier passage, Novatian uses the same logic that he employs
in 27.12. The Son, as receiver, is less than the Father, who gives to the Son.
72

264
Father and Son in his Alexandrian works.73 Before examining this passage, however, I
must make a few observations about Rufinus as a translator of Origen.
Two Origens: Rufinus’ Translation of De principiis

In my examination of Origen’s articulation of the distinction between the Father
and Son in his Alexandrian works, I use his statements in De principiis only with great
caution. Such a methodological decision, however, is not followed in several recent
reconstructions of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. The recent works of Christopher Beeley
and Illaria Ramelli are good examples of this trend. Christopher Beeley’s recent
discussion of Origen’s Christology notes the importance of Origen’s ComJn for a
reconstruction of his authentic thought, but Beeley relies heavily on statements from De
principiis without serious discussion of the reliability of Rufinus’ translation.74
In her recent article alleging anti-subordinationism in Origen, Ilaria Ramelli notes
that she offers a “painstaking analysis of [Origen’s] works (always with attention to their
reliability in relation to Greek original, translations, and fragments).”75 After this
statement of methodology, Ramelli starts her article with a series of quotations from
Latin translations of Origen, notably De principiis and the Commentary on Romans.
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Henri Crouzel notes that this passage has caused a good bit of controversy, but then he tries to
explain away its obvious implications. See his Origen, trans. A. S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1989), 181.
74

See: Christopher A. Beeley, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 9–11, 21–7. The closest Beeley comes to engaging the question
of the reliability of Rufinus’ translation of De principiis is in n. 41 on pp. 319-20. Here, defending Rufinus’
translation, he argues that Jerome’s critique of Rufinus’ translation “clearly reflects Jerome’s own biases
and tells us little about Origen’s text.” Beeley considers Rufinus’ translations to represent accurately
Origen’s thought on Trinitarian matters.
75
Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene and
Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christianae 65, no. 1 (2011): 21.
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Regarding Comm. in Rom. 7.12.146-147 (7.11.10 in SC 543), she notes that the text
claims that “Christ has nothing and nobody over him, not even the Father.”76 The
translators of the Sources chrétiennes edition note the following about the passage
Ramelli quoted: “On peut légitimement penser que cette dernière formule porte la marque
de Rufin, soucieux de défendre l'orthodoxie d'Origène. Mais le développement qui
précède n’en traduit pas moins la pensée de l'Alexandrin, et montre que celui-ci ne peut
être accusé d'avoir ouvert la voie à l’arianisme.”77 Ramelli has introduced the quotation
from Rufinus’ translation as authoritatively representing Origen’s thought; but in her
article, she does not interact with those scholars who suggest that it is clearly a Rufinian
modification or interpolation.
Furthermore, Ramelli’s decision to label Origen an “anti-subordinationist” begs a
fundamental question that she does not answer: Was anyone being accused of
subordinationism in the early third century? As my argument should make clear, my
answer is a resounding “no.” The subordination of the Son to the Father was a tool used
intentionally by Tertullian, Novatian, and Origen against the monarchians. None of these
authors was yet labeled a subordinationist because such theologies had not yet taken on
the negative evaluative judgment they were later given in the post-Nicene era. This, of
course, is not to say that the theologies of Tertullian, Novatian, and Origen were
unopposed in the third century. As I make clear, the monarchians opposed their theology;
but they opposed it because they thought it was tantamount ditheism, not because it
subordinated the Father to the Son. In the third century, the subordination of the Father to
76

Ibid., 25.
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Origen, Commentaire sur l’Épître aux Romains, ed. Caroline P. Hammond Bammel, trans. Luc
Brésard and Michel Fédou, Sources chrétiennes 543 (Paris: Cerf, 2011), 369, n. 2.
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the Son was a common anti-monarchian strategy that was rejected by the monarchians as
entailing ditheism. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Tertullian, Novatian,
and Origen do not defend themselves against charges of subordinationism, only against
charges of ditheism or polytheism.
My hesitance about the use of De principiis as a source for Origen’s Trinitarian
theology stems from my conviction that Rufinus’ translations are fundamentally
unreliable with regard to Origen’s Trinitarian theology. Numerous other scholars have
also noted this same unreliability.78 The following survey of Rufinus’ translation
methodology demonstrates why his translations of Trinitarian material are of dubious
value.79 After this discussion of his methodology, I will offer a concrete example of how
his methodological assumptions affect his translation practice.

Paul Koetschau notes that “Rufinus has adapted Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity to his orthodox
commitments either by omission or emendation.” See Koetschau, ed., Origenes Werke: Fünfter Band; De
Principiis (ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ), GCS 22 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1913), cxxx. Basil Studer discusses Trinitarian
issues in the translation of De principiis at length in his “Zur Frage der dogmatischen Terminologie in der
lateinischen Uebersetzung von Origenes’ De Principiis,” in Épektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au
cardinal Jean Daniélou, ed. Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 40314. Regarding Rufinus’ translations, Ronald E. Heine notes that “one may say that, on the whole, the
substance can be regarded as representing Origen’s thought. The major exception to this statement is
theological statements regarding the Trinity and the resurrection of the body. Whenever statements on these
subjects agree with the doctrines of the fourth-century Church they should be regarded with suspicion.” See
his “Introduction,” in Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, ed. Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the Church 71
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 38. Catherine M. Chin specifically
discusses Origen’s subordinationism with regard to Rufinus’ translation practices. See her “Rufinus of
Aquileia and Alexandrian Afterlives: Translation as Origenism,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 18, no.
4 (2010): 628–34.
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Charles Kannengiesser warns that we must not spend so much time worrying about Rufinus’
translations that we fail to grasp the thought of Origen himself in his “Écriture et théologie trinitaire
d’Origène,” in Origeniana sexta: Origéne et la Bible, ed. Gilles Dorival and Alain Le Boulluec,
Bibliotheca Ephemeridum theologicarum Lovaniensium 118 (Leuven: Leuven University Press; Peeters,
1995), 352: “Évitons que les arbres de Rufin traducteur ne nous cachent la forêt d'Origène auteur.”
Kannengiesser, of course, has a point; but so too do those who question the reliability of Rufinus’
translations. Perhaps the best way to ensure that we do not lose sight of Origen’s thought is to consider the
texts that survive in Greek as foundational, and only after a thorough examination of those texts, move on
to a consideration of Rufinus’ translations.
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Rufinus’ working assumptions for translating Origen are first expressed in his
translation of Pamphilius’ Apology for Origen and his addendum of On the Falsification
of the Books of Origen (henceforth De adulteratione). He explicitly discusses his
methodological principles in De adulteratione, so it is the logical place to begin this
discussion.80 Rufinus begins by noting that there are in Origen’s works things that do not
agree with the rule of truth (ueritatis regula). There are also contradictions in Origen’s
writings, but Rufinus is confident that both sorts of problems cannot be the product of
someone as wise and well-educated as Origen.81 Such contradictory and problematic
statements are found in Origen’s writings, argues Rufinus, because “heretics” modified
them and inserted their own heretical opinions, as is their wont.82 Rufinus claims that
such insertions were made in Origen’s work, even in his own lifetime; and then Rufinus
reproduces one of Origen’s letters, wherein Origen himself complains of the falsification
of his works.83 Rufinus finally reaches the following conclusion:
If anything is found in his works that is not consonant with the Catholic faith, we
suspect that it has been inserted by heretics, and regard it as alien both to his
understanding and to our faith. Even if we are deceived about this, we incur, as I
think, no danger from such an error. For we ourselves, through God’s help,

Rufinus’ work on Pamphilius’ Apology, De adulteratione, and De Principiis was completed
from 397 to 398 at the request of a certain Macarius, whom Rufinus mentions in his preface to the
translation of Pamphilius’ Apology. For the dating of these works and the circumstances of their
production, see Francis X. Murphy, Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411): His Life and Works, Studies in
Medieval History 6 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1945), 82–110; C. P.
Bammel, “Last Ten Years of Rufinus’ Life and the Date of His Move South from Aquileia,” Journal of
Theological Studies 28, no. 2 (1977): 386.
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Rufinus, De adulteratione 1.
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Rufinus, De adulteratione 2. Rufinus cites a number of examples of such misfortunes happening
to the works of other authors, including Clement of Rome, Dionysius of Alexandria, Cyprian, Hilary of
Poitiers.
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Rufinus, De adulteratione 6-7.
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continue unharmed by avoiding that which we regard as suspect and of which we
disapprove.84
Rufinus’ conclusions about the presence of heretical interpolations in Origen’s writings
motivate his approach to translating those same texts.85
Because Rufinus assumes that Origen’s works contain interpolations, he does not
hesitate to correct anything he deems to be contradictory or unorthodox. In the preface to
his translation of De Prin., he speaks of following the practices of a previous translator of
Origen, presumably Jerome:86
[I]n my translation I would follow as far as possible the rule observed by my
predecessors and especially by the distinguished man whom I mentioned above.
For he, when translating into Latin more than seventy treatises of Origen, called
homilies, and also a number of his other Commentaries on St. Paul’s epistles, both
of which are known to contain in the original a good many statements likely to
cause offence, so smoothed over and emended these in his translation, that a Latin
reader would find in them nothing out of harmony with our faith. His example,
therefore, I am following to the best of my ability; if not with an equal degree of
eloquence, at least observing the same rules and taking care not to reproduce such
passages from the books of Origen as are found to be inconsistent with and
contrary to his true teaching.87
84

Rufinus, De adulteratione 16 (trans. Thomas P. Scheck, Apology for Origen, The Fathers of the
Church 120 (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 136–7): Si quid autem
inuentum fuerit in his quod cum fide catholica non consonant, hoc et ab haereticis suspicamur insertum et
tam ab illius sensu quam a nostra fide ducimus alienum. In quo etiam si fallimur, nihil, ut opinor, periculi
huiuscemodi errore incurrimus. Nam et ipsi Deo iuuante permanemus inlaesi uitando ea quae suspecta
habemus et inprobamus. Latin from Pamphilus, Eusebius, and Rufinus, Pamphile et Eusèbe de Césarée
Apologie pour Origène ; suivi de Rufin d’Aquilée Sur la falsification des livres d’Origène, ed. René
Amacker and Eric Junod, Sources chrétiennes 464 (Paris: Cerf, 2002), 320–2.
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Catherine Chin helpfully catalogues some of Rufinus’ basic assumptions about the texts he is
working with: “first, the instability of texts given the mechanics of late ancient book production; second,
the presumption of authorial consistency, so that the same author cannot be both orthodox and heretical;
and third, the more general notion that textual corruption necessarily occurs over time, and that it is the task
of later readers to restore a text to its original condition” (“Rufinus of Aquileia and Alexandrian
Afterlives,” 636–7).

Above, Rufinus speaks of this person translating some of Origen’s Homilies on the Song of
Songs, and the editors of the SC edition of De prin. identify this translator as Jerome. See Origen, Traité
des principes, ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, vol. 1, Sources chrétiennes 252 (Paris: Cerf, 1978),
69.
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Rufinus, Preface to De principiis 2 (trans. Origen, On First Principles: Being Koetschau’s Text
of the De Principiis, ed. Paul Koetschau, trans. G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973),
lxii–lxiii.). ut quantam fieri potest in interpretando sequar regulam praecessorum et eius praecipue uiri,
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As Rufinus’ discussion makes clear, Origen’s “true teaching” will emerge as something
that will be in accord with what Rufinus takes to be the correct faith of his Latin readers,
especially regarding Trinitarian theology. He goes on to make a specific remark about his
treatment of Trinitarian passages:
Wherever, therefore, I have found in his books anything contrary to the reverent
statements made by him about the Trinity in other places, I have either omitted it
as a corrupt and interpolated passage, or reproduced it in a form that agrees with
the doctrine which I have often found him affirming elsewhere…. But I have said
nothing of my own, simply giving back to him his own statements found in other
places.88
Rufinus himself admits that he is especially cognizant of problematic passages regarding
Trinitarian theology in Origen’s corpus.
Rufinus states that he will correct Origen’s Trinitarian thought so that it is in
accord with what Origen says elsewhere. Although one might suspect that Rufinus is
dissimulating when he claims only to be reproducing Origen’s true thought, he is not

cuius superius fecimus mentionem. Qui cum ultra septuaginta libellos Origenis, quos homileticos
appellauit, aliquantos etiam de tomis in apostolum scriptis transtulisset in latinum, in quibus cum aliquanta
offendicula inueniantur in graeco, ita elimauit omnia interpretando atque purgauit, ut nihil illis quod a fide
nostra discrepet latinus lector inueniat. Hunc ergo etiam nos, licet non eloquentiae uiribus, disciplinae
tamen regulis in quantum possumus sequimur, obseruantes scilicet ne ea, quae in libris Origenis a se ipso
discrepantia inueniuntur atque contraria, proferamus. Latin from SC 252:70.
88

Rufinus, Preface to De Principiis 3 (trans. Butterworth, lxiii.). Sicubi ergo nos in libris eius
aliquid contra id inuenimus, quod ab ipso in ceteris locis pie de trinitate fuerat definitum, uelet
adulteratum hoc et alienum aut praetermisimus aut secundum eam regulam protulimus, quam ab ipso
frequenter inuenimus adfirmatam…. Nihil tamen nostrum diximus, sed licet in aliis locis dicta, sua tamen
sibi reddidiums. Latin from SC 252:72. At the end of this passage, Rufinus wishes to diminish his role as a
translator. He claims that he is not saying anything of his own; he is merely reproducing an undefiled
Origen for his Latin readers. Note that shortly before this passage, Rufinus offers a thinly veiled critique of
Pope Damasus’ translation of Origen for introducing too much of his own voice: “I can see, however, that
he derives most pleasure from the works of his own pen. He pursues a task that promises greater fame, that
of being a ‘father of the word’ and not a mere translator” (Sed ille, ut uideo, in stilo proprio placens rem
maioris gloriae sequitur, ut pater uerbi sit potius quam interpres). Rufinus, Preface to De Principiis, 1
(trans. Butterworth, lxii; Latin from SC 252:68). Catherine Chin notes that Rufinus privileged the role of
translator more than that of author in his attempt to produce a Latin Christian library (“Rufinus of Aquileia
and Alexandrian Afterlives”).
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necessarily being disingenuous. Shortly after his translation of the Apology and De
principiis, Rufinus translated the Dialogue of Adamantius on the Orthodox Faith.89
Although Buchheit claimed that Rufinus was aware that the work was not actually by
Origen, Bammel argues that such a cynical interpretation is not necessary.90 Whether or
not Rufinus was aware that it was not an authentic work of Origen, Murphy suggests that
“Rufinus, on discovering the complete orthodoxy of the contents, naturally seized upon it
as a justification of his contention that the errors found in the other works of Origen were
interpolations.”91 Rufinus’ belief that the Dialogue was genuinely a work of Origen
allowed him to justify using it as the touchstone for his correction of the alleged
interpolations in Origen’s works; it gave him a more fully orthodox version of Origen
from which to work.92
Test Case: De principiis 1.2.13

In order to make more concrete observations about Rufinus’ translations, I now
examine his translation of De principiis 1.2.13, a passage for which we have both
The critical edition of this text can be found in Adamantius, Der Dialog des Adamantius: ΠΕΡΙ
ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΝ ΟΡΘΗΣ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ, ed. Willem Hendrik van de Sande Bakhuyzen, Griechischen
christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 4 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1901). For an English translation,
see Robert A Pretty, ed. and trans., Adamantius: Dialogue on the True Faith in God, Gnostica 1 (Leuven:
Peeters, 1997). Bammel places Rufinus’ translation of this work ca. 398-399 (“Last Ten Years,” 428). If
Bammel’s chronology is correct, it is unclear whether Rufinus had already had contact with the Dialogue
when he was translating De principiis. Rufinus translated the Dialogue with Adamantius from Greek
sources at the request of a certain “Paul”, and Murphy suggests that Rufinus chose this work because he
was already familiar with it (Rufinus of Aquileia, 123–125).
89

Bammel, “Last Ten Years,” 390–391; V. Buchheit, “Rufinus von Aquileja als Fälscher des
Adamantiosdialogs,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 51, no. 2 (1958): 314–28.
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Murphy, Rufinus of Aquileia, 125.

See Thomas P. Scheck’s brief discussion of the Trinitarian orthodoxy of the Dialogue, in his
Thomas P. Scheck, “Introduction,” in Apology for Origen, The Fathers of the Church 120 (Washington,
D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 16–7.
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external attestation and internal parallels within Origen’s other works. The choice of this
passage is particularly apropos because of the ways it elucidates ComJn 2.13-32, which I
will discuss after the present section. Rufinus’ Latin translation reads as follows:
There remains the inquiry, what is the ‘image of his goodness’? Here, I think, we
do well to adopt the same line of reasoning which we used above in regard to the
image formed in a mirror. The original goodness is undoubtedly the Father; and
from this is born the Son, who is in every respect an image of the Father, and who
may also without any doubt be properly called an ‘image of his goodness’. For
there is no other second goodness existing in the Son, besides that which is in the
Father. So the Saviour himself rightly says in the Gospel that ‘none is good save
one, God the Father’, the purpose of this statement being to make it understood
that the Son is not of some other ‘goodness’, but of that alone which is in the
Father; whose image he is rightly called, because he neither springs from any
other source than from original goodness itself,—for if that were so, there would
seem to be a different goodness in the Son from that which is in the Father—nor
has the goodness that is in him any dissimilarity or divergence from that of the
Father. Accordingly we ought not to imagine that there is some kind of
blasphemy, as it were, in saying that ‘none is good save one, God the Father’, as if
these words were to be taken as a denial that either Christ or the Holy Spirit is
good; but, as we said before, the original goodness must be believed to reside in
God the Father, and from him both the Son and the Holy Spirit undoubtedly draw
into themselves the nature of that goodness existing in the fount from which the
one is born and the other proceeds. If then there are any other things called good
in the scriptures, such as an angel, or a man, or a slave, or a treasure, or a good
heart or a good tree, all these are so called by an inexact use of the word, since the
goodness contained in them is accidental and not essential.93
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Origen, De principiis 1.2.13 (trans. Butterworth, 27-8). Superest quid sit imago bonitatis eius
inquirere, in quo eadem, ut opinor, intellegi conuenit, quae supererius de imagine ea, quae per speculum
deformatur, expressimus. Principalis namque bonitas sine dubio pater est; ex qua filius natus, qui per
omnia imago est patris, procul dubio etiam bonitatis eius conuenienter imago dicetur. Non enim alia aliqua
secunda bonitas existit in filio praeter eam, quae est in patre. Vnde et recte ipse saluator in euangelio dicit
quoniam nemo bonus nisi unus deus pater, quo scilicet per hoc intellegatur filius non esse alterius
bonitatis, sed illius solius, quae in patre est; cuius recte imago appellatur quia neque aliunde est nisi ex
ipsa principali bonitate, ne altera bonitas quam ea quae in patre est uideatur in filio, neque aliqua
dissimilitudo aut distantia bonitatis in filio est. Propter quod non debet uelut blasphemiae aliquod genus
putari in eo quod dictum est quia nemo bonus nisi unus deus pater, ut propterea putetur uel Christus uel
spiritus sanctus negari quod bonus sit; sed, ut superius diximus, principalis bonitas in deo patre sentienda
est, ex quo uel filius natus uel spiritus sanctus procedens sine dubio bonitatis eius naturam in se refert,
quae est in eo fonte, de quo uel natus est filius uel procedit spiritus sanctus. Iam uero si qua alia bona in
scripturis dicuntur, uel angelus uel homo uel seruus uel thesaurus uel cor bonum uel arbor bona, haec
omnia abusiue dicuntur, accidentem, non substantialem in se continentia bonitatem. Latin from SC
252:140-2.
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Compare the above passage from Rufinus’ Latin to the following Greek fragment from
Justinian:94
In the same way, therefore, I consider that in the case of the Saviour it would be
right to say that he is an image of God’s goodness, but not goodness itself. And
perhaps also the Son while being good, is yet not good purely and simply. And
just as he is the image of the invisible God, and in virtue of this is himself God,
and yet is not he of whom Christ himself says ‘that they may know thee, the only
true God’; so he is the image of the goodness, and yet not, as the Father is, good
in a precisely similar way.95
Crouzel and Simonetti observe that the fragment from Justinian appears to be authentic,
and the contents are not scandalous when viewed within the wider sweep of Origen’s
thought.96 We also possess a comment from Jerome that appears to be discussing the
same passage in De principiis. Jerome writes, “God the Father almighty he [Origen] calls
good, and of perfect goodness. The Son is not good, but is a kind of breath and image of
94
As a general rule, Justinian’s fragments should be viewed with suspicion because of his overt
bias against Origen. In this case, as I discuss below, there are other texts from Origen’s corpus that
corroborate what Justinian records in the fragment.

Justinian, Epistula ad Mennam (trans. Butterworth, 27 with my modifications). Οὕτω τοίνυν
ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος καλῶς ἂν λεχθήσεσθαι ὅτι εἰκὼν ἀγαθότητος θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
αὐτοαγαθόν. καὶ τάχα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἀγαθός, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός, καὶ ὥσπερ εἰκών ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ
ἀοράτου καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο θεός, ἀλλ’ οὐ περὶ οὖ λέγει αὐτὸς ὁ Χριστὸς ἵνα γινώσκωσί σε τὸν μόνον
ἀληθινὸν θεόν, οὕτως εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀγαθός. Greek from
Justinian, Scritti teologici ed ecclesiastici di Giustiniano, ed. Mario Amelotti and Livia Migliardi Zingale,
Legum Iustiniani imperatoris vocabularium 3 (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1977), 110. This text, with a few
insignificant exceptions is the same as that printed by Koetschau in his edition of De principiis. See his
Origenes Werke: Fünfter Band; De Principiis (ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ), 47. Note also ComJn, 6.295 (trans. Origen,
Commentary on the Gospel according to John, trans. Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the Church 80
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 248.FC 80:248). “… for the Father is
good, and the savior is an image of his goodness” (ὁ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ εἰκὼν τῆς
ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ). Greek from Origen, Commentaire sur saint Jean, ed. Cécile Blanc, vol. 2: Livres VI et
X, Sources chrétiennes 157 (Paris: Cerf, 1970), 352.
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Origen, Traité des principes, ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, vol. 2, Sources
chrétiennes 253 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), 54. “Le passage de Justinian peut être authentique et raccourci par
Rufin pour être compris de ses lecteurs latins. Il n'est guère scandaleux si on le replace dans la conception
d'Origène, car il traduit uniquement un subordinatianisme d'origine.” Later they note that Justinian and
Jerome warped Origen’s thought by downplaying the unity of goodness between Father and Son (55).
Görgemanns and Karpp also note that Rufinus seems to have suppressed some of the elements in Origen’s
thought, which they think are present in the Justinian fragment. See Origen, Vier Bücher von den
Prinzipien, ed. Herwig Görgemanns and Heinrich Karpp, 2nd ed., Texte zur Forschung 24 (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985), 155, n. 43.
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goodness, so that he is not called good absolutely, but with an addition, such as the good
shepherd, etc.”97
In addition to these exterior witnesses from Justinian and Jerome, we possess
other passages from Origen where he speaks about the goodness of the Son in relation to
the Father. In ComJn 13, Origen brings up the issue of the goodness of the Son, this time
placing it in a fuller discussion of the relationship between the Father and Son:
But we are obedient to the Savior who says, 'The Father who sent me is greater
than I,' and who for this reason, did not permit himself to accept the title 'good'
when it was offered to him, although it was perfectly legitimate and true. Instead,
he graciously offered it up to the Father, and rebuked the one who wished to
praise the Son excessively. This is why we say the Savior and the Holy Spirit
transcend all created beings, not by comparison, but by their exceeding
preeminence. The Father exceeds the Savior as much (or even more) as the Savior
himself and the Holy Spirit exceed the rest. And by 'the rest' I do not mean
ordinary beings, for how great is the praise ascribed to him who transcends
thrones, dominions, principalities, powers, and every name that is named not only
in this world but also in that which is to come? And in addition to these [what
must we] say also of holy angels, spirits, and just souls? (152) But although the
Savior transcends in his essence, rank, power, divinity (for the Word is living),
and wisdom, beings that are so great and of such antiquity, nevertheless, he is not
comparable with the Father in any way. (153) For he is an image of the goodness
and brightness, not of God, but of God's glory and of his eternal light; and he is a
vapor, not of the Father, but of his power; and he is a pure emanation of God's
almighty glory, and an unspotted mirror of his activity.98
97
Jerome, Epistula ad Avitum 2 (trans. Butterworth, 27, n. 3). deum patrem omnipotentem appellat
bonum et perfectae bonitatis, filium non esse bonum sed auram quondam et imaginem bonitatis, ut non
dicatur absolute bonus, sed cum additamento ‘pastor bonus’ et cetera. Latin from Jerome, Sancti Eusebii
Hieronymi Epistulae, ed. Isidorus Hilberg, vol. 3 (epistulae CXXI - CLIV), Corpus scriptorum
ecclesiasticorum latinorum 56 (Vindobonae; Lipsiae: Tempsky; Freytag, 1918), 97.
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Origen, ComJn 13.151-3 (trans. FC 89:100). Ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς πειθόμενοι τῷ σωτῆρι λέγοντι· «Ὁ
πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με μείζων μού ἐστιν» καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ ἐνεγκόντι μηδὲ τὴν «ἀγαθὸς» προσηγορίαν τὴν
κυρίαν καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ τελείαν παραδέξασθαι αὐτῷ προσφερομένην, ἀλλὰ ἀναφέροντι <αὐ>τὴν εὐχαρίστως
τῷ πατρὶ μετ’ ἐπιτιμήσεως πρὸς τὸν βουλόμενον ὑπερδοξάζειν τὸν υἱόν, πάντων μὲν τῶν γενητῶν
ὑπερέχειν οὐ συγκρίσει ἀλλ’ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ὑπεροχῇ φαμὲν τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον,
ὑπερεχόμενον τοσοῦτον ἢ καὶ πλέον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅσῳ ὑπερέχει αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τῶν λοιπῶν,
οὐ τῶν τυχόντων ὄντων. Ὅση γὰρ δοξολογία τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος θρόνων, κυριοτήτων, ἀρχῶν, ἐξουσιῶν, καὶ
παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ
ἁγίων ἀγγέλων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν δικαίων, <τί δεῖ> καὶ λέγειν; (152.) Ἀλλ’ ὅμως τῶν τοσούτων καὶ
τηλικούτων ὑπερέχων οὐσίᾳ καὶ πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ θειότητι—ἔμψυχος γάρ ἐστι λόγος—καὶ σοφίᾳ,
οὐ συγκρίνεται κατ’ οὐδὲν τῷ πατρί. (153.) Εἰκὼν γάρ ἐστιν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπαύγασμα οὐ τοῦ
θεοῦ ἀλλὰ τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀϊδίου φωτὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀτμὶς οὐ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως
αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀπόρροια εἰλικρινὴς τῆς παντοκρατορικῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς
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Compare this passage to a similar discussion in ComMatt, where Origen writes,
The Saviour is the image of the invisible God, and in the same way, he is the
image of God’s goodness. Whenever the word ‘good’ is applied to a lesser being,
it has another meaning. Considered in relation to the Father, the Son is the image
of the Father’s goodness; considered in relation to other beings, he is to them
what the Father’s goodness is to him. And it can even be said that the analogy
between God’s goodness and the goodness of the Saviour, who is the image of
God’s goodness, is closer than the analogy between the Saviour and a good man,
and good deed or a good tree. The fact that he is the image of God’s goodness sets
the Saviour higher above the lesser beings than the fact of being good sets God
above the Saviour.99
Hermann Josef Vogt discusses both ComJn 13.151-3 and ComMatt 15.10 and concludes
that these passages are not fundamentally at odds with later post-Nicene theology. He
acknowledges that the passage from ComJn appears to be written in opposition to a
Gnostic conception of homoousios, although he does not expand on this suggestion. He
concludes that the passage in ComJn is not at odds with Nicaea because it is addressing
the incarnate Son, not the pre-existent Logos. This, conclusion, however, is not clearly
faithful to the text. Origen’s hierarchical schema in which the Son is an intermediary

ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ. Greek from Origen, Commentaire sur saint Jean, ed. Cécile Blanc, vol. 3 (livres XIII),
Sources chrétiennes 222 (Paris: Cerf, 1975), 112–4.
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Origen, ComMatt 15.10 (trans. Jean Daniélou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1955), 255): Καὶ ὁ σωτὴρ δὲ ὡς ἔστιν «εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου», οὕτως καὶ «τῆς
ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ εἰκών»· καὶ <ἐπὶ> παντὸς δὲ τοῦ ὑποδεεστέρου, ᾧ ἐφαρμόζεται ἡ «ἀγαθὸς» φωνή, ἄλλο
σημαινόμενον ἔχει τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ λεγόμενον, εἴπερ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα «εἰκών» ἐστιν «ἀγαθότητος», ὡς
δὲ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ ὅπερ ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀγαθότης πρὸς αὐτόν. ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστι τινὰ ἀναλογίαν προσεχῆ ἰδεῖν
ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγαθότητος τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὸν σωτῆρα ὄντα εἰκόνα «τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ», ἤπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος
πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔργον καὶ ἀγαθὸν δένδρον. πλείων γὰρ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ πρὸς τὰ ὑποδεέστερα
ἀγαθὰ ἐν τῷ σωτῆρι, καθό ἐστιν «εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος» αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἤπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ ὄντος
ἀγαθοῦ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα σωτῆρα. Greek from Origen, Origenes Werke: Origenes Matthäuserklärung, ed.
Erich Klostermann, vol. 10, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 40 (Leipzig:
Hinrichs, 1935), 375–6. See also Crouzel’s brief discussion of these two passages: Henri Crouzel, Origène
et Plotin: Comparaisons doctrinales, Collection “Croire et savoir” 17 (Paris: Téqui, 1992), 130–1.
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seems to be fundamentally at odds with later Nicene doctrine.100 Regarding the passage
from ComJn 13, Jean Daniélou writes,
Origen’s position can be gathered from this without a shadow of a doubt. If the
Son and the Spirit transcend all λογικοί, they are themselves transcended to a still
greater extent by the Father. They thus form an intermediate category, which
though much nearer to the Father than to the rest of creation, is still separate from
him because their essence, power and other attributes are different from his.101
Daniélou emphasizes one of the most prominent characteristics of Origen’s theology: that
of some sort of hierarchy of beings. This hierarchy is evident in the passages on goodness
from ComJn and ComMatt. In each, the Son is placed lower in the hierarchy than the
Father, from whom he receives goodness.
A comparison of Rufinus’ translation with these external attestations of his source
and parallels within Origen’s works makes Rufinus’ editorial hand evident in his version
of De principiis 1.2.13. Notably absent from Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s discussion
of the goodness of Father and Son is any notion of the sort of hierarchy that is present in
Origen’s comments on goodness in ComJn 13 and ComMatt 15. The absence of this
hierarchy, I argue, is the product of the sort of concern Rufinus expressed in his preface
to the translation. Although the degree of the Father’s superiority to the Son seems to
have been variable in Origen’s articulation of this hierarchy, the superiority itself is a
stable element, often expressed with the verb ὐπερέχω and its variants. In Origen’s
depictions of this hierarchy, the verb ὑπερέχω suggests that something on a higher level
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See Hermann Josef Vogt, Origenes als Exeget, ed. Wilhelm Geerlings (Paderborn: Ferdinand
Schöningh, 1999), 196–7.
Daniélou, Origen, 254–255. Daniélou’s statement here seems to contradict itself and the text he
is commenting on, but he is anticipating a tension in Origen’s thought that he is about to introduce. Just
following this quotation, he quotes ComMatt 15.10, where Origen states that the Son is closer to the Father
in the hierarchy of beings than to other creatures. His comment conflates the two passages. Nevertheless,
the common theme between the texts is that the Son is below the Father in the hierarchy of beings.
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“rises above” those on a lower level; and this would seem to imply that there is some sort
of distance that separates them. Thus, when Rufinus denies that there is any distantia
between the goodness of the Father and the Son, it is probable that he is denying the
implications of the hierarchical framework in which Origen elsewhere discusses
goodness.
At the end of the passage in Rufinus’ translation, Origen appears to make a hard
divide between the Father, Son, Spirit, and created beings. He writes, “If then there are
any other things called good in the scriptures, such as an angel, or a man, or a slave, or a
treasure, or a good heart or a good tree, all these are so called by an inexact use of the
word, since the goodness contained in them is accidental and not essential.”102 Goodness
in created beings is accidental, writes Rufinus’ Origen. The implication of this statement
is that the goodness in the Son and Spirit is essential, even though it is drawn from the
Father as source. This section in Rufinus’ translation again seems to expunge the
hierarchical structure of Origen’s thought in which Son and Spirit functioned as
intermediaries. Rufinus positions Son and Spirit firmly alongside the Father, while the
passages from ComJn and ComMatt place them in positions in the middle, sometimes
closer to the Father, sometimes closer to creatures.
The fragments of Justinian and Jerome both suggest that there was a dissimilarity,
between the goodness in the Father and the Son. In Justinian’s fragment, the Son εἰκὼν
ἀγαθότητος θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοαγαθόν.103 The Son may still be good, but he is not
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Origen, De principiis 1.2.13 (trans. Butterworth, 28). Iam uero si qua alia bona in scripturis
dicuntur, uel angelus uel homo uel seruus uel thesaurus uel cor bonum uel arbor bona, haec omnia abusiue
dicuntur, accidentem, non substantialem in se continentia bonitatem. Latin from SC 252:142.
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Justinian, Epistula ad Mennam.
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goodness itself. The presence of αὐτοαγαθόν in Justinian’s fragment is especially
noteworthy because a similar term, αὐτόθεος, appears in ComJn 2.17. There, Origen uses
αὐτόθεος to refer to the Father and then states that all other things that are said to be θεός
(among which Origen includes the Son) are made θεός by participation in divinity of
αὐτόθεος. Divinity properly belongs to the Father, and other things are divine only
insofar as they participate in the divinity of the Father. If we were to use the terms of
Rufinus at the end of De principiis 1.2.13 to describe the theology of ComJn 2.17, we
would say that the Father has divinity essentially and all else (including the Son) has it
accidentally. This, however, does not align with what Rufinus’ translation says with
regard to goodness. In his translation, goodness appears to be contained in Father, Son,
and Spirit essentially. Compare Justinian’s use to that of Numenius:
For if the Second (Divinity) is good, not from itself but from the First, how then
would it be possible that he (the First) is not good, if the latter derives his
goodness from participation with the (other, the First), especially as the Second
participates in him (the First) specially because he is Good? So Plato taught the
sharply observant (auditor) by his statement, ‘That the Good is One.’ That this is
so, Plato has expressed in different ways; for in the Timaeus (10) he used the
popular manner of expression, and said that he was ‘good;’ but in his Republic
(vii.14), he speaks of the ‘Idea of the Good.’ Thus the Good would also be the
Idea of the Creator, because he appears to us good through participation in the
First and Only. Just as one says, that men are formed according to the idea of
Man, and cattle after the Idea of Cattle, and the horses, after the Idea of a Horse,
so it is also probably with the Creator; for if the latter is good only because of his
participation in the goodness of the First Good, then would the First Mind, as the
Good-in-itself, be its Idea (or model). 104
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Numenius, Fragments 19-20 (trans. Numenius, The Neoplatonic Writings of Numenius, trans.
Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, Great Works of Philosophy Series, vol. 4 (Lawrence, Kans.: Selene Books, 1987),
34–6; Greek from Numenius, Fragments, ed. Édouard des Places, Collection des universités de France
(Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1973), 59–60): Εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ δεύτερος οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ
πρώτου, πῶς οἷόν τε ὑφ’ οὗ μετουσίας ἐστὶν οὗτος ἀγαθός, μὴ ἀγαθὸν <εἶναι>, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχῃ αὐτοῦ
ὡς ἀγαθοῦ μεταλαχὼν ὁ δεύτερος; οὕτω τοι ὁ Πλάτων ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ τῷ ὀξὺ βλέποντι ἀπέδωκε τὸ
ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν.Ταῦτα δ’ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἔθηκεν ὁ Πλάτων ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ χωρίσας· ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸν
κυκλικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐγράψατο ἐν Τιμαίῳ εἰπών· ‘Ἀγαθὸς ἦν’· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν
‘ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν’, ὡς δὴ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἰδέαν οὖσαν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅστις πέφανται ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸς μετουσίᾳ τοῦ
πρώτου τε καὶ μόνου. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι μὲν λέγονται τυπωθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνθρώπου ἰδέας, βόες δ’ ὑπὸ
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That Numenius uses αὐτοαγαθός to distinguish between the First and Second is
particularly elucidating. It gives us a probable context within which to interpret Origen’s
use of αὐτο-X language.105 For Numenius, the Second does not possess goodness on its
own but rather through participation (μετουσία). He supplements this notion by using
μεταλαγχάνω, which means something like possessing something because a share of it
has been allotted by another. In the fragments where Numenius uses ἀυτοαγαθός, two
things are clear: (1) there is a hierarchy with the principal possessor (the First) of an
attribute (αὐτο-X) at the top; and (2) that the Second possesses the attribute through
reception of a share of what the principal possessor has. Although the Second is good, he
does not possess goodness properly speaking, which is the sole prerogative of the First, ὁ
αὐτοαγαθός.
The fact that Origen elsewhere uses αὐτο-X language to distinguish Father and
Son (ComJn 2.17), coupled with the fact that we see a similar usage of it in Numenius,
suggests that its appearance in Justinian’s fragment is authentic. Furthermore, Justinian’s
fragment interprets the fact that the Son is not αὐτοαγαθός as suggesting that there is
some sort of dissimilarity between the goodness of the Son and the goodness of the
Father. The son is an image of the goodness of the Father, “but not as the Father, good in

τῆς βοός, ἵπποι δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἵππου ἰδέας, οὕτως καὶ εἰκότως ὁ δημιουργὸς εἴπερ ἐστὶ μετουσίᾳ τοῦ πρώτου
ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, <ἀγαθοῦ> ἰδέα ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὢν αὐτοάγαθον.
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Note here that both Origen and his predecessor and teacher Clement were familiar with the
work of Numenius and occasionally cited it favorably. See Clement Strom. 1.22.150; Origen, Contra
Celsum 4.51. Both Clement and Origen mention Numenius shortly after discussing Aristobulus. For a
thorough discussion of this fragment of Numenius and Origen’s thought, see Gerhard Gruber, ΖΩΗ: Wesen,
Stufen und Mitteilung des wahren Lebens bei Origenes, Münchener theologische Studien, 2, Systematische
Abteilung 23 (München: Max Hueber, 1962), 112–6.
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a precisely similar way” (ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀγαθός).106 If we combine
Justinian’s fragment, interpreted through the lens of Numenius, with Origen’s other
discussions of goodness, we are left with a stable schema. Origen consistently spoke
about the goodness of the Father and Son by using some form of hierarchy. The Father,
the proper possessor of goodness (ὁ αὐτοαγαθός), sat atop this hierarchy. The Son
possessed the same goodness as the Father, but through reception and therefore to a
diminished degree.107 Thus, as in the passages from ComJn 13 and ComMatt 15, the Son
was located somewhere in the hierarchy below the Father but above creatures.
Rufinus’ translation of De prin. 1.2.13, which discusses the issue of the goodness
of the Father and Son, contains vestiges of Origen’s hierarchical teaching, which implied
that there is some sort of dissimilarity or space between the Father and Son. The Son has
goodness, but not in the same way as the Father. Rufinus’ Origen denies that there is any
dissimilitudo or distantia between the goodness of the Father and Son. In ComJn 13.151153, preserved in Greek, Origen argues that the Son “is not comparable to the Father in
any way” (οὐ συγκρίνεται κατ’ οὐδὲν τῷ πατρί). Immediately after this statement, Origen
writes that the Son is an image of God’s goodness. When Rufinus’ translation of De
principiis 1.2.13 is put alongside this passage from ComJn 13 and Justinian’s fragment,
one is left with the distinct impression that the denial of dissimilitudo or distantia is
Rufinus’ attempt to correct the distance or dissimilarity within Origen’s hierarchical
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Justinian, Epistula ad Mennam.

Thus, Rufinus has not completely distorted Origen’s thought. In all extant attestation, the
Father is the source of goodness. Rufinus preserves this feature of Origen’s thought. Furthermore, Rufinus
also attests to the fact that Origen thought that the Father and Son had the same goodness. This, too, seems
to be authentically Origenian, although he would want to stress that they had it in a dissimilar manner; and
this is something that Rufinus explicitly sought to deny.
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theology. Origen’s assertion that the Father transcends the Son and that the Son is the
image of God’s goodness, but not the goodness itself, would surely have been considered
unorthodox by Rufinus as he was translating De principiis at the close of the fourth
century. All of the external evidence suggests that Rufinus was aware of the occurrence
of passages he considered unorthodox in the text of Origen he had before him. As
Görgemanns and Karpp note, he seems to have suppressed the problematic elements of
Origen’s thought in this passage.108
This examination of Rufinus’ translation of De principiis 1.2.13 has demonstrated
the ways in which Rufinus’ editorial principles led him to modify Origen’s texts. The
fragment of Justinian and similar passages elsewhere in Origen’s corpus suggest that
Origen would have emphasized the transcendence of the Father over the Son in De
principiis 1.2.13. Rufinus, in accordance with his assumptions about interpolations in De
adulteratione and stated procedure in the Preface, has likely removed those
characteristically Origenian elements that would have troubled his readers at the dawn of
the fifth century. He has stripped Origen’s theology of all but vestiges its characteristic
hierarchical structure.
Commentary on John 2.13-32

Because of Rufinus’ tendencies with regard Origen’s Trinitarian theology, I do
not mine passages from De principiis in this final vignette on Origen’s articulation of the
distinction between the Father and Son. Instead, I focus on ComJn 2.13-32, a passage that
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Origen, Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien, 155, n. 43.
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survives in a Greek untouched by the editorial hand of Rufinus. This passage is one of the
most important texts for understanding Origen’s distinction of the Father and Son in his
early works,109 and it is all the more valuable because we can be fairly certain that
Origen’s opponents here are monarchians.110 My goal in this final vignette is not to offer
a complete reconstruction of Origen’s early Trinitarian thought but to demonstrate that
Origen, like Tertullian and Novatian, used a schema of subordination to safeguard the
distinction of the Father and Son against his monarchian opponents. Because the passage
I am considering is so long, I break it up into smaller sections and discuss them in
succession.
At the beginning of this section, Origen examines the use of the definite article in
the opening verse of the Gospel of John. His deliberation on this topic forms the
foundation for his subsequent discussion:
(13) John has used the articles in one place and omitted them in another very
precisely, and not as though he did not understand the precision of the Greek
language. In the case of the Word, he adds the article 'the,' but in the case of the
noun 'God,' he inserts it in one place and omits it in another. (14) For he adds the
article when the noun 'God' stands for the uncreated cause of the universe, but he
omits it when the Word is referred to as 'God.' And as 'the God' and 'God' differ in
these places, so, perhaps, 'the Word and 'Word' differ. (15) For as the God who is
over all is 'the God' and not simply 'God,' so the source of reason in each rational
Jean Danielou notes that “this passage expresses the very heart of Origen’s vision of the
Godhead.” See his Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. John Austin Baker, History of Early
Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea 2 (London: Longman & Todd, 1973), 382.
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For the identification of Origen’s opponents here as monarchians or modalists, see Daniélou,
Origen, 253; Cécile Blanc, “Avant-Propos,” in Commentaire sur saint Jean, Sources chrétiennes 120
(Paris: Cerf, 1966), 14; Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, 375–6; Jean-Noël Aletti,
“D’une écriture à l’autre: Analyse structurale d’un passage d’Origène--Commentaire sur Jean, livre 2:1321,” Recherches de science religieuse 61, no. 1 (1973): 27; Antonio Orbe, “Orígenes y los Monarquianos,”
Gregorianum 72, no. 1 (1991): 42; Norbert Brox, “«Gott»: Mit und ohne Artikel: Origenes über Joh 1, 1,”
Biblische Notizen, no. 66 (1993): 32; Kannengiesser, “Écriture et théologie trinitaire d’Origène,” 359–61;
Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church, Christian Theology in Context
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 97–99; Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos, 50–2. Gabino Uríbarri
Bilbao notes the dual polemical context of monarchianism and adoptianism. See his Monarquía y Trinidad:
El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad
Pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie I: Estudios 62 (Madrid: UPCO, 1996), 319–20.
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being is 'the Word.' That reason which is in each rational being would not
properly have the same designation as the first reason, and said to be 'the
Word.'111
Origen’s comments on the use of the definite article here have a notable parallel in Philo,
whose thoughts help to reveal the full import of Origen’s passage. Philo comments on
Genesis 31:13,
“I am the God who appeared to thee in the place of God” (Gen. xxxi. 13). Surely
it is a good cause for boasting for a soul, that God deigns to show Himself to and
converse with it. And do not fail to mark the language used, but carefully inquire
whether there are two Gods; for we read “I am the God that appeared to thee,” not
“in my place” but “in the place of God,” as though it were another’s. What, then,
are we to say? He that is truly God is One, but those that are improperly so called
are more than one. Accordingly the holy word in the present instance has
indicated Him Who is truly God by means of the articles saying “I am the God,”
while it omits the article when mentioning him who is improperly so called,
saying “Who appeared to thee in the place” not “of the God,” but simply “of
God.”112

Origen, ComJn 2.13-5 (trans. FC 80:98). Πάνυ δὲ παρατετηρημένως καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἑλληνικὴν
ἀκριβολογίαν οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ὁ Ἰωάννης ὅπου μὲν τοῖς ἄρθροις ἐχρήσατο ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα ἀπεσιώπησεν,
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ λόγου προστιθεὶς τὸ «ὁ», ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θεὸς προσηγορίας ὅπου μὲν τιθεὶς ὅπου δὲ αἴρων. (14.)
Τίθησιν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄρθρον, ὅτε ἡ «θεὸς» ὀνομασία ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγενήτου τάσσεται τῶν ὅλων αἰτίου, σιωπᾷ δὲ
αὐτό, ὅτε ὁ λόγος «θεὸς» ὀνομάζεται. Ὡς δὲ διαφέρει κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τόπους «ὁ θεὸς» καὶ «θεός»,
οὕτως μήποτε διαφέρῃ «ὁ λόγος» καὶ «λόγος». (15.) Ὃν τρόπον γὰρ ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς «ὁ θεὸς» καὶ οὐχ
ἁπλῶς «θεός», οὕτως ἡ πηγὴ τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν λογικῶν λόγου «ὁ λόγος», τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγου οὐκ ἂν
κυρίως ὁμοίως τῷ πρώτῳ ὀνομασθέντος καὶ λεχθέντος «ὁ λόγος». Greek from SC 120:214-6. Aletti,
“D’une écriture à l’autre,” offers a very close reading of the grammar of this passage, noting subtle shifts in
Origen’s schema throughout the passage.
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Philo, De somniis 2.228-9 (Greek and trans. with my modifications from Philo, Philo: On
Flight and Finding; On the Change of Names; On Dreams, trans. F. H. Colson and Whitaker, vol. 5, Loeb
Classical Library 275 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 416–9): ‘ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὀφθείς σοι
ἐν τόπῳ θεοῦ.’ πάγκαλόν γε αὔχημα ψυχῇ, τὸ ἀξιοῦν θεὸν ἐπιφαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνομιλεῖν αὐτῇ. μὴ παρέλθῃς δὲ
τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ ἀκριβῶς ἐξέτασον, εἰ τῷ ὄντι δύο εἰσὶ θεοί· λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι ‘ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὀφθείς σοι,’
οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ἐμῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ‘ἐν τόπῳ θεοῦ,’ ὡς ἂν ἑτέρου. τί οὖν χρὴ λέγειν; ὁ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν, οἱ δ᾿ ἐν
καταχρήσει λεγόμενοι πλείους. διὸ καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος ἐν τῷ παρόντι τὸν μὲν ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τοῦ ἄρθρου
μεμήνυκεν εἰπών· ‘ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεός,’ τὸν δ᾿ ἐν καταχρήσει χωρὶς ἄρθρου φάσκων· ‘ὁ ὀφθείς σοι ἐν τόπῳ,’ οὐ
τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸ μόνον ‘θεοῦ.’
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Both Philo and Origen argue that the article before the noun θεός distinguishes between
the God and other gods.113 For Origen, ὁ θεός refers to the “uncreated cause of the
universe” (τοῦ ἀγενήτου τἀσσεται τῶν ὅλων αἰτίου).114 For Philo, the use of the article
designates the one who is truly God (ἀληθείᾳ θεός). For both, the article represents the
uniqueness of the one to whom it is applied.115 Thus far, Origen has set up a means for
distinguishing God and Word, but he has not traced its full implications.
In the next section, however, the reason for his attention to the articles as a means
of distinction becomes clear. He continues,
(16) Many people who wish to be pious are troubled because they are afraid that
they may proclaim two Gods and, for this reason, they fall into false and impious
beliefs. They either deny that the individual nature of the Son is other than that of
the Father (ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς) by confessing him to be
God whom they refer to as 'Son' in name at least, or they deny the divinity
(θεότητα) of the Son and make his individual nature and essence as an individual
(ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν) to be different from the Father.116
Origen has here described the key features of the monarchian controversy.117 The first
thing to notice is that those whom Origen is addressing are concerned to keep from

Alan F. Segal’s discusses this passage from Philo, although he does not remark on any possible
connections with Origen: Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and
Gnosticism, Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity 25 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 260–6.
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Aletti suggests that in the series of expressions in 2.13-5, the phrases that have the article are
perhaps commenting on πηγή in 2.15. The articular nouns in the passage represent the source for any others
that possess the quality (“D’une écriture à l’autre,” 29–30).
See also Hans Georg Thümmel’s brief discussion of this matter, in which he notes the common
aim of Origen and Philo to protect the claim that there is only one God: Thümmel, ed., Origenes’
Johanneskommentar, Buch I-V, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 63 (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2011), 243.
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Origen, ComJn 2.16 (trans. FC 80:98): Καὶ τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθέους εἶναι εὐχομένους ταράσσον,
εὐλαβουμένους δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι θεοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο περιπίπτοντας ψευδέσι καὶ ἀσεβέσι δόγμασιν, ἤτοι
ἀρνουμένους ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν μέχρι ὀνόματος παρ’
αὐτοῖς «υἱὸν» προσαγορευόμενον, ἢ ἀρνουμένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ
τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός. Greek from SC 120:220-2.
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Brox draws attention to the monarchian context of this passage and highlights that Origen’s
opponents here seemed concerned to protect monotheism (“«Gott»,” 32). Bruns states, “The fact Origen
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becoming ditheists, from “proclaiming two gods.” The monarchians were especially
troubled by anything they perceived to be ditheism, and ditheism was the damning label
they attached to the theology of their opponents.118
In their quest to avoid ditheism, Origen argues that his opponents often fall into
two main errors: 1) “they deny that the individual nature of the Son is other than that of
the Father” (ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς); 2) “they deny the divinity
(θεότητα) of the Son and make his individual nature and essence as an individual
(ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν) to be different from the Father.”119 Although
Origen does not reproduce the exact terminology, this first “false and impious dogma”
aligns well with the main contention of the monarchians—that the Father and Son are
“one and the same.”120 The second “false and impious dogma” also appears to be a
paraphrase, but it aligns well with psilanthropism.121 In this error, Origen’s opponents

calls the Father alone ‘true God’ shows that he wants to account for biblical monotheism” (Trinität und
Kosmos, 51).
The charge of ditheism is made explicitly by Callistus, when he says, “δίθεοί ἐστε.” See
Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.12.16. For the critical edition, see Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Refutatio
omnium haeresium, Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (New York; Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1986). See also
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.1. Although we do not see the accusation of ditheism itself in Contra
Noetum, Hippolytus and the “elders” he mentions seem to be reacting to the charge of ditheism in multiple
places. See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.7, 11.1, 14.2-3.
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Thümmel uses Harnack’s terminology and notes that the two errors are modalistic and
dynamistic [monarchianism]. See Thümmel, Origenes’ Johanneskommentar, Buch I-V, 243. Orbe notes
that both errors stem from “the same fundamental premise: the absolute oneness of God (substantial and
personal)” (“Orígenes y los Monarquianos,” 42).
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It appears as though Origen has paraphrased their positions and used one of his own key terms,
ἰδιότητα. However, his claim that they denied that the Son is “other” (ἑτέραν) than the Father accords well
with the extant testimony to monarchianism. As I suggested in the earlier chapters, early statements (like
those in Justin’s Dialogue) that the Son was “other” than the Father were a probable motivation for the
monarchian positions.
Many scholars use “adoptianism” to refer to the position Origen describes here, but I think
“psilanthropism” is a more apposite term. Origen says nothing here of the adoption of the Son or his
indwelling by the Holy Spirit; he merely states that some deny his divinity.
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argue for the alterity of the Son; but they do so only because they have already denied his
divinity. In their view, if they had admitted that the Son was divine, also admitting that
the Son was other than the Father would have been tantamount to dividing the Godhead,
to professing ditheism.
Origen’s choice of vocabulary in ComJn 2.16 is noteworthy. He uses both
ἰδιότητα and περιγραφήν to refer to the individuality of the Son, as distinguished from the
Father. The term ἰδιότης does not appear in discussion of the Godhead in Contra Noetum
or the Refutatio omnium haeresium, the two earliest attestations to monarchianism extant
in Greek.122 Likewise, neither of those works contains a use of περιγράφω that
approximates that of Origen’s use of περιγραφής here or in ComJn 1.291-2.123 He does
not use ὑπόστασις at all in 2.13-20, where he is so concerned to articulate the distinction
between the Father and Son.124
Perhaps even more interesting is the manner in which Origen uses the term οὐσία
in ComJn 2.16. Recall that the first error of Origen’s opponents was that they denied that
the ἰδιότης of the Son was other than that of the Father, that they collapsed any
distinction between the unique individualities of Father and the Son. The second error

As I argue here, Origen’s ComJn also attests to monarchianism; but Contra Noetum and the
Refutatio focus on this doctrine much more than does Origen. The term ἰδιότης does appear once in
Refutatio 7.20.4, but this is in the context of a discussion of the theology of Basilides. According to this
passage, Basilides appears to use the term to talk about the particular characteristics of things designated by
names; but he is not discussing the Godhead.
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The term is used once in the Refutatio, but it is used to describe the process of writing the tenth
book. Again, see Matthew R. Crawford’s discussion of περιγραφή in his “The Triumph of Pro-Nicene
Theology over Anti-Monarchian Exegesis: Cyril of Alexandria and Theodore of Heraclea on John 14:1011,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 21, no. 4 (2013): 549–55.
With this observation, I do not mean to suggest that ὑπόστασις was not an important term for
Origen’s formulation of the distinction between the Father and Son. I call attention to its absence here only
to suggest that it was only one of a cluster of terms Origen used to describe the individuality or distinction
of the Son and Father.
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was that the Son’s ἰδιότης and οὐσία κατὰ περιγραφήν were preserved only because the
divinity of the Son was rejected. Origen’s problem with the latter error appears to have
been the denial of divinity to the Son. Ηe is unconcerned with the fact that his opponents
held that the οὐσία of the Son according to περιγραφήν was said to be ἑτέρα τοῦ πατρός.
Origen seems comfortable with οὐσία being used to distinguish the Father and Son.125 He
does not even flinch at the suggestion that the οὐσία of the Son is ἑτέρα τοῦ πατρός.
His lack of concern with the way οὐσία is used here is reflected in the fact that the
term does not appear anymore in this section. That Origen has no problem with οὐσία
being used as part of an expression of the Father-Son distinction here is further confirmed
by a passage later in book 2 of ComJn. Origen writes,
Now since the Savior here is 'light' in general, and in the catholic epistle of the
same John, God is said to be light, one thinks it is confirmed from that source too
that the Father is not distinct from the Son in essence. But another who has
observed more accurately and speaks more soundly will say that the light which
shines in the darkness and is not overcome by it, and the light in which there is no
darkness at all are not the same.126
Origen’s problem with the position in this passage is that it claims that the Father is not
separate or distinct from the Son in οὐσία. It is clear that Origen would readily approve
the opposite, namely, that the Father and Son are distinct in οὐσία, as acceptable doctrine.
Origen, in fact, makes exactly this move in De oratione: “For if, as is demonstrated by
other arguments, the Son is a being and subject distinct from the Father, it follows that
Compare Origen’s usage here with that of Clement of Alexandria in Excerpta ex Theodoto 19,
which I discuss in chapter 1. There, Clement uses περιγραφήν to talk about the distinction of the Son (or
Logos), but he maintains that the Father and Son are not distinguished by οὐσία as Origen appears to allow
here.
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Origen, ComJn 2.149 (trans. FC 80:134; Greek SC 120:304-6): Ἐπεὶ δὲ «φῶς» ἁπαξαπλῶς
ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὁ σωτήρ, ἐν δὲ τῇ καθολικῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολῇ λέγεται ὁ θεὸς εἶναι φῶς, ὁ μέν τις
οἴεται καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ μὴ διεστηκέναι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα· ὁ δέ τις ἀκριβέστερον
τηρήσας, ὁ καὶ ὑγιέστερον λέγων, φήσει οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ φαῖνον ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φῶς καὶ μὴ
καταλαμβανόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν ᾧ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σκοτία.
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prayer should be addressed to the Son and not to the Father, or to both, or to the Father
alone.”127
Simonetti supports this conclusion and observes that in addition to ὑπόστασις and
ὑποκείμενον, Origen also uses οὐσία to distinguish the Father and Son.128 Ilaria Ramelli
claims that ComJn 2.149 supports her contention that Origen taught that the Father and
Son “are the same in their essence or οὐσία....”129 Ramelli, however, has misread the
passage. Origen puts the claim that the Father and Son (using light imagery) are not
separated in οὐσίᾳ on the lips of those whom he is opposing. He clearly signifies this fact
by introducing the statement with “someone thinks” (ὁ μέν τις οἴεται). Origen explicitly
states that he prefers the opposite stance, that the Father and the Son are not the same.
Ramelli goes on to assert that Origen here teaches that the Father and Son “are two
different individuals, having different individual substances or ὑποστάσεις.”130 Apart
from the fact that this assertion is built on a faulty premise concerning Origen’s use of
οὐσία in the passage, Ramelli’s argument cannot stand. Ramelli wants to introduce a fine
distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις in this passage, but the term ὑπόστασις does not
occur here or in the immediately surrounding context (it occurs again in 2.156, but not in

Origen, De oratione 15.1: “εἰ γὰρ ἕτερος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις δείκνυται, κατ’ οὐσίαν καὶ ὑποκείμενόν
ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, ἤτοι προσευκτέον τῷ υἱῷ καὶ οὐ τῷ πατρὶ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἢ τῷ πατρὶ μόνῳ.” Greek
from Origen, Origenes Werke: Buch V-VIII Gegen Celsus; Die Schrift vom Gebet, ed. Paul Koetschau, vol.
2, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 3 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1899), 334.
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See Simonetti, “Note sulla teologia trinitaria di Origene,” 273–4.

See her “Origen, Greek Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of Hypostasis,”
Harvard Theological Review 105, no. 03 (2012): 304.
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Ibid. Ramelli displays the same sort of tendency in her treatment of the Dialogue with
Heraclides. She notes that the term ὑπόστασις is not present but then argues that the meaning is clear:
“Although the key term ὑπόστασις does not pop up here – probably for the sake of simplicity and the lack
of a philosophical context – Origen’s conception of the two distinct hypostases in one and the same divine
nature is clear and extensively illustrated” (306).
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connection with the relationship between the Father and Son). Origen might have
catalyzed the development of these two key terms, but they had certainly not achieved
any sort of stability when he was composing the first books of ComJn.
Origen’s choice of vocabulary in this one small section which is extant in Greek is
in particular contrast with Ramelli’s thesis that Origen had a stable, advanced, and
technical usage of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις that laid the foundation for the Nicene
formulation. See, for example, her typical statement: “Origen himself had already
maintained both things: that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have the same οὐσία but
are three different ὑποστάσεις…. As I set out to argue, Origen's thought represented a
novel and fundamental theorization with respect to the communality of οὐσία and the
individuality of ὑποστάσεις, conceived as individual substances, in the Trinity.”131
After explaining the errors of those trying to avoid ditheism, Origen returns to his
exegesis of John 1:1 in order to provide a solution to the problem the monarchians raised:
(17) Their problem can be resolved in this way. We must say to them that at one
time God, with the article, is very God (αὐτόθεος), wherefore also the Savior says
in his prayer to the Father, ‘That they may know you the only true God.’ On the
other hand, everything besides the very God, which is made God by participation
in his divinity (πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος
θεοποιούμενον), would be more properly not said to be ‘the God,’ but ‘God.’ To
be sure, his ‘firstborn of every creature,’ inasmuch as he was the first to be with
God and has drawn divinity into himself (ἅτε πρῶτος τῷ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι
σπάσας τῆς θεότητος εἰς ἑαυτόν), is more honored than the other gods beside him
(of whom God is God as it is said, ‘The God of gods, the Lord has spoken, and he
has called the earth’). It was by his ministry that they became gods, for he drew
from God (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρυσά<μενος>) that they might be deified, sharing
ungrudgingly also with them according to his goodness. (18) The God, therefore,
is the true God. The others are gods formed according to him as images of the
prototype. But again, the archetypal image of the many images is the Word with
the God, who was ‘in the beginning.’ By being ‘with the God’ he always
continues to be ‘God.’ But he would not have this if he were not with God, and he
131
See Ramelli, “Origen, Greek Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of
Hypostasis,” 302–3.
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would not remain God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the
depth of the Father (οὐκ ἂν δ’ αὐτὸ ἐσχηκὼς εἰ μὴ πρὸς θεὸν ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
μείνας θεός, εἰ μὴ παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους).132
Origen begins by noting that God with the article, ὁ θεός, is “very God” (αὐτόθεος).133
By quoting Jesus’ prayer from John 17:3, Origen clarifies that the Father is αὐτόθεος, or
the only true God (ἀληθινὸν θεόν).134 The designation of the Father as αὐτόθεος allows
Origen to distinguish the Father from all of the other theoi.135

Origen, ComJn 2.17-8 (trans. FC 80:98-9): ἐντεῦθεν λύεσθαι δύναται. (17.) Λεκτέον γὰρ
αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τότε μὲν αὐτόθεος ὁ θεός ἐστι, διόπερ καὶ ὁ σωτήρ φησιν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εὐχῇ· «Ἵνα
γινώσκωσι σὲ τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν»· πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος
θεοποιούμενον οὐχ «ὁ θεὸς» ἀλλὰ «θεὸς» κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιτο, οὗ πάντως «ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης
κτίσεως», ἅτε πρῶτος τῷ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι σπάσας τῆς θεότητος εἰς ἑαυτόν, ἐστὶ τιμιώτερος, τοῖς λοιποῖς
παρ’ αὐτὸν θεοῖς—ὧν ὁ θεὸς θεός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον· «Θεὸς θεῶν κύριος ἐλάλησε, καὶ ἐκάλεσε τὴν
γῆν»—διακονήσας τὸ γενέσθαι θεοῖς, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρυσά<μενος> εἰς τὸ θεοποιηθῆναι αὐτούς, ἀφθόνως
κἀκείνοις κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ χρηστότητα μεταδιδούς. (18.) Ἀληθινὸς οὖν θεὸς ὁ θεός, οἱ δὲ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον
μορφούμενοι θεοὶ ὡς εἰκόνες πρωτοτύπου· ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῶν πλειόνων εἰκόνων ἡ ἀρχέτυπος εἰκὼν ὁ πρὸς
τὸν θεόν ἐστι λόγος, ὃς «ἐν ἀρχῇ» ἦν, τῷ εἶναι «πρὸς τὸν θεὸν» ἀεὶ μένων «θεός», οὐκ ἂν δ’ αὐτὸ ἐσχηκὼς
εἰ μὴ πρὸς θεὸν ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείνας θεός, εἰ μὴ παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους. Greek
from SC 120:216-8.
132

Compare Origen’s usage of αὐτόθεος here to Tertullian’s usage of ipsum deum: “And so that
they should not think they ought to stone him on the ground that he had wished himself to be taken for God
himself, that is, the Father, because he had said, I and the Father are one, by way of showing that he is
God, the Son of God, not by way of <showing> that he is God himself….” Tertullian, Adversus Praxean
22.12 (trans. Evans, 164; Latin CCSL 2.2:1191): et ne putarent ideo se illum lapidare debere, quasi se
Deum ipsum, id est Patrem, uoluisset intellegi quia dixerat: Ego et Pater unum sumus, qua Filium Dei
Deum ostendens, non qua ipsum Deum…. Tertullian here argues that the Father is ipsum Deum, while the
Son is only Deum. Tertullian’s usage here serves the same purpose as Origen’s distinction between
αὐτόθεος and θεός. Note also the similarity in Origen’s usage here to that of Numenius in fragments 19-20
(des Places) discussed above. In both cases the αὐτο- prefix is used to distinguish the source from the
recipient. Note also John Whittaker’s discussions of αὐτο- prefixes used in contexts of self-generation. See
his “The Historical Background of Proclus’ Doctrine of the ΑΥΘΥΠΟΣΤΑΤΑ,” in De Jamblique à
Proclus: Neuf exposés suivis de discussions, ed. Bent Dalsgaard Larsen, Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique
21 (Vandœuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1975), 193–237; idem, “Self-Generating Principles in SecondCentury Gnostic Systems,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: The School of Valentinus, ed. Bentley
Layton, vol. 1, Studies in the History of Religions: Supplements to Numen 41 (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 176–
93. Origen never uses the sort of self-generation language that Whittaker discusses, but his use of the αὐτοprefixes is similar to that of Numenius.
133

134
The ἀληθινὸν θεόν language from John 17:3 is similar to that used by Philo. Philo separated the
highest God from the others by using “true God” language as well: ὁ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν (Philo, De
somniis, 229). Note also Philo’s discussion of the God and God in the following sections. This passage in
Philo provides a parallel to Origen’s usage.
135
Recall my earlier discussion of the αὐτο-X language in Numenius and the fragment of Origen
from Justian’s Epistula ad Mennam.

290
Unlike the psilanthropists, Origen was not willing to secure the distinction of the
Father and Son by denying the divinity of the Son. In order to argue that the Son was
divine while still distinct from the Father, Origen invoked the framework of
participation.136 Within this framework, all other divine beings (the theoi) are divine only
insofar as they participate in the divinity of the αὐτόθεος.137 Origen then makes explicit
that this notion of deity by participation includes the “firstborn of every creature.” He has
“drawn divinity into himself” (σπάσας τῆς θεότητος εἰς ἑαυτόν).138 The implications of
this statement are clear: divinity (θεότης) properly belongs to the Father, and a share of it
comes to the Son from outside himself, that is, from the Father who is divinity itself.
David Balás observes that “as in the Platonic tradition, in Origen's works, too,
participation expresses the relationship of a lower degree within the hierarchy of beings
to the higher.”139 The Son is divine, but only because he participates in the divinity of the
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David L. Balás has argued convincingly that the concept of participation is fundamental for any
analysis of Origen’s thought. See his “The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought.
Christian Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic Tradition,” in Origeniana: Premier colloque
international des études origéniennes, Montserrat, 18-21 Septembre 1973, ed. Henri Crouzel, Gennaro
Lomiento, and Josep Rius-Camps, Quaderni di “Vetera Christianorum” 12 (Bari: Istituto di letteratura
cristiana antica, Università di Bari, 1975), 257. René Cadiou also highlights the foundational role of the
concept of participation in Origen’s thought. See his Origen, His Life at Alexandria, trans. John A.
Southwell (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1944), 136. Note also the comment of Corsini, cited by Balás: “Il
subordinazionismo, in particolare, sembra essere il frutto di quello che è, sostanzialmente, il nucleo
metafisico fondamentale della speculazione origeniana: l’idea di partecipazione.” Origen, Commento al
Vangelo di Giovanni, ed. and trans. Eugenio Corsini, Classici della filosofia 3 (Torino: Unione tipograficoeditrice torinese, 1968), 41.
137

Both Philo and Origen note that only one is properly called God, although they do not use the
same vocabulary to do this.
138

He uses two verbs, σπάω and ἀρύω, to speak of the Son “drawing” divinity into himself.

Balás, “The Idea of Participation,” 261. Balás’ argument in this article is abbreviated because it
is in a short conference paper. He offers a fuller discussion of the philosophical background of the idea of
participation in the first chapter of his Metousia Theou: Man’s Participation in God’s Perfections
according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Studia Anselmiana Philosophica Theologica 55 (Rome: I. B. C.
Libreria Herder, 1966). There, he notes, “The idea of participation acquired true philosophical importance
for the first time with Plato, who introduced the term μέθεξις primarily to express the relationship of the
many individual and sensible instances to the one ‘idea’ or ‘form’” (2). At p. 4 of the same work, he also
notes that in the transition from middle- to neo-Platonism occurring around the time of Origen, “the notion
139
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Father or draws it into himself.140 His participation in the divnity of the Father necessarily
entails him receiving or drawing it from the Father into himself. Only one is αὐτόθεος,
and it is not the Son. Origen’s use of αὐτό- language to establish distinction between the
Father and Son is even more intriguing when considered alongside monarchian
theological expressions. Consider Origen’s usage in response to the following passage
from Contra Noetum: “You see, brethren, how rash and reckless a doctrine they
introduced in saying quite shamelessly, 'The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the
Son; he himself was born, he himself suffered, he himself raised himself up!”141
Nevertheless, it is not inappropriate to call the Son θεός as long as he is distinguished
from αὐτόθεος.
When ComJn 2.13-32 is viewed alongside other passages where Origen employs
a hierarchical scheme (such as ComJn 13.151-3 and ComMatt 15.10 discussed above), it
becomes clear that Origen has classed the Son below the Father in terms of divinity.142

of participation naturally [came] to express not only the relationship between the intelligible and sensible
worlds, but also more generally the relation of any lower to any higher degree of reality.”
140

Jules Lebreton argues that this passage is a good example of the sort of hierarchy with unequal
degrees of divinity that he thinks is characteristic of Alexandrian theology. J. Lebreton, “Le désaccord de la
foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans l’Église chrétienne du IIIe siècle (suite et fin),” Revue
d’histoire ecclésiastique 20, no. 1 (1924): 15–6. He further notes that this sort of divine hierarchy shows
“l’influence des spéculations philosophiques” (17). Lebreton locates the sources of this hierarchical
tendency in what he considers to be an Alexandrian emphasis on the transcendence of God (16). Although I
think Lebreton is correct in his assertion that (at least some) Alexandrian theologians had a hierarchical
understanding of the Godhead, his assessment is part of a somewhat inexact characterization of different
theologies. For example, Lebreton speaks of early theologians who only considered the persons of the
Trinity “dans leurs relations avec le dogme du salut.” That is, he wants to paint a picture of early
theologians who were not influenced by philosophy.
141

Hippolytus, Contra Noetum, 3.2 (Greek and trans. Hippolytus, Contra Noetum, ed. Robert
Butterworth, Heythrop Monographs 2 (London: Heythrop College [University of London], 1977), 48:
ὁρᾶτε, ἀδελφοί, πῶς προαλὲς καὶ τολμηρὸν δόγμα παρεισήνεγκαν ἀναισχύντως λέγοντες, Αὐτός ἐστι
Χριστὸς ὁ Πατήρ, αὐτὸς Υἱός, αὐτὸς ἐγεννήθη, αὐτὸς ἔπαθεν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤγειρεν! The Noetians used
αὐτός frequently to identify the Father and the Son, but Origen’s usage turns it to the opposite purpose.
It is difficult to find the proper word to describe Origen’s view of the relationship between the
Father and Son in ComJn 2.13-32. He does not express this relationship with a single word that can easily
be translated, but alternative descriptors are inelegant. Since Origen refers to the Father as source (πηγή),
142
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He places the Son among the other theoi, who also receive divinity through participation
in the Father. Origen is aware that his classification of the Son with the other theoi might
be troubling for some, and he quickly moves to reassert the preeminence of the Son. The
Son, he writes, “is more honored than the other gods beside him” (ἐστὶ τιμιώτερος, τοῖς
λοιποῖς παρ’ αὐτὸν θεοῖς). Although the other theoi receive divinity by participation like
the Son, they only receive it through the mediation of the Son. “It was by his ministry
that they became gods, for he drew from God (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρυσά<μενος>) that they
might be deified, sharing ungrudgingly also with them according to his goodness.”143 In
this schema, then, the Son participates directly in the divinity of the Father; and the other
theoi participate indirectly through the Son. For this reason, the Son outranks them even
though he, too, receives divinity. Origen further stresses the mediatorial function of the
Son as he argues that the Son is the archetypal image upon whom the other images are
based.
There are some interesting similarities here with the work of Novatian. Recall that
Novatian had argued that the Spirit is inferior to the Son because the Spirit receives from
the Son. He also applied the same logic to the Son’s relationship to the Father. Origen’s
schema of participation implies the same sort of relationship between the source and
receiver, although he never expresses it as bluntly as Novatian. I argue that he is less

we could say that the Son is “downstream” from the Father when it comes to divinity. Such a description,
while somewhat awkward, has the virtue of emphasizing, as does Origen, that the Son receives divinity
from a source. He is not himself the source of divinity.
Note the striking structural similarity between Origen’s scheme here and that in ComMatt 15,
where he writes, “Considered in relation to the Father, the Son is the image of the Father’s goodness;
considered in relation to other beings, he is to them what the Father’s goodness is to him” (translation from
Daniélou, Origen, trans. Mitchell, 255). In each passage, the Father is the ultimate source (be it of divinity
or goodness) and the Son serves as the intermediary through whom other beings receive a share of it.
143
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blunt and explicit than Novatian here because other notions are doing the work of
describing the relationship between the Father and Son. First, Origen uses his exegesis of
the definite article in John 1:1 to establish that the Son receives divinity from the Father.
Second, this exegesis occurs within a typically Origenian hierarchical structure that
presupposes the inferiority of things that are “downstream” from the source. He did not
need to explicitly say that the Son was inferior to the Father because the whole
framework in which he was discussing the Son (or Logos here) presupposed it.
Origen ends this section in a manner that suggests how firmly he situates the Son
within the participatory framework. He writes of the Son, “By being 'with the God' he
always continues to be 'God.' But he would not have this if he were not with God, and he
would not remain God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth of
the Father” (οὐκ ἂν δ’ αὐτὸ ἐσχηκὼς εἰ μὴ πρὸς θεὸν ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείνας θεός, εἰ μὴ
παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους). Here the logic of participation is
made clear: one possesses that in which one participates only so long as one continues in
participation. Because divinity is received by the Son from a source outside of himself,
argues Origen, he would cease to be God if he stopped being with the only true God, who
is the Father. The “being-with” of John 1:1 (πρὸς τὸν θεόν) Origen thus interprets within
his framework of participation.144 Furthermore, divinity can be possessed in degrees

In light of the participated nature of the Son’s divinity, I think Crouzel misses the mark when
he writes: “Bien que le Fils et l’Esprit aient reçu tout ce qu’ils ont du Père, origine de la divinité et de
l’univers, ils le possèdent comme leur bien propre et parfaitement, sans possibilité de croissance ou de
diminution” (Although the Son and the Spirit have received all that they are from the Father, who is the
origin of the deity and of the universe, they possess it as their own and perfectly, without the possibility of
increase or decrease). See his, Origène (Paris; Namur: Lethielleux; Culture et vérité, 1985), 237 (trans.
Origen, 181). Origen does seem to think that the Son will always remain God, but Crouzel does not specify
what he means whe he says “they possess it as their own and perfectly.” In the passage I am considering,
Origen stresses the opposite: the Father is αὐτόθεος καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς, not the Son. If Origen maintained,
as Crouzel contends, that the Son and Spirit possessed as their own and perfectly what they received, we
would expect him to say something like the Son is ἀληθινὸς θεὸς or even κυρίως θεός, but he does not.
144
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depending on how perfectly one participates.145 The Son is more honored than the other
theoi because of the supremely exemplary nature of his participation.146
Origen is aware that even though he has safeguarded the uniqueness of the Father
by calling him αὐτόθεος, some will still suspect that he has failed to maintain the
traditional monotheistic assertion that there is only one God. He continues,
(19) Some, however, have probably taken offense at what we said when we
described the Father as the true God but, in addition to the true God (ἀληθινοῦ
θεοῦ), said many gods have come into existence by participation in the God (θεῶν
πλειόνων τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ γινομένων). These people might fear that the glory
of the one who transcends all creation is put on a level with the others who
happen to have the title 'god.' Because of this we must set for this explanation in
addition to the difference which has already been explained in relation to which
There is a tension in Origen’s thought that Crouzel side-steps too easily. On the one hand the Son always
remains God (ἀεὶ μένων «θεός») because he is “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν” and has been since the beginning. On the
other hand, everything except ὁ αὐτόθεος is made God (θεοποιούμενον) by participation through reception.
The tension lies in the fact that Origen seems to be bending philosophy’s schema so that he can account for
the Christian faith. Normally, a trait that is possessed by participation can be lost; but Origen claims that
this is not the case with regard to Jesus’ possession of divinity by participation.
Balás describes Origen’s use of participation well: “Common to all applications seems to be
that it expresses a relationship of a 'lower level' of being, which possesses a certain perfection in a derived,
dependent manner to a 'higher level' of being, which possesses the same perfection fully, and is the source
of it for others.” See Balás, “The Idea of Participation,” 270. Balás later suggests that within the Trinity,
“though the aspects of receiving and of personal communion are fully present, the character of an
accidental, losable, decreasing or growing possession is explicitly excluded by Origen, as is also the notion
of a temporal beginning.” (271) Balás’ argument here is unconvincing. He seems eager to avoid what he
thinks are the negative side effects of participation within the Trinity. He produces as evidence for his
claim ComJn 2.124, where Origen claims that rational beings to not possess blessedness as an inseparable
attribute (ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς τὴν μακαριότητα). This passage, however, is not directly addressing the
members of the Trinity. Even more, a passage like ComJn 2.76 seems to problematize his claim. There,
Origen writes, “The Holy Spirit seems to have need of the Son ministering to his hypostasis, not only for it
to exist, but also for it to be wise, and rational, and just, and whatever other thing we ought to understand it
to be by participation in the aspects of Christ which we mentioned previously” (trans. FC 80:114): “οὗ
χρῄζειν ἔοικε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει, οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφὸν
εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ πᾶν ὁτιποτοῦν χρὴ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ μετοχὴν τῶν προειρημένων
ἡμῖν Χριστοῦ ἐπινοιῶν” (Greek from SC 120:256). If the Holy Spirit has to participate in the Son even to
exist, it is difficult to see how Balás can support his claim that what is received in the Trinity is not
accidental—at least in the case of the Holy Spirit.
145

Joseph Trigg expresses the full import of this passage well: “Origen, although he insisted on
Christ's divinity and utter difference from all lesser beings, was unwilling to ascribe to the Son the same
dignity he ascribed to the Father. The son as a mediating hypostasis is inferior to the Father and represents
a lower stage in the cosmological scale. Only the Father, Origen said, is truly God; the Son is God only by
participation in the Father. He found in the opening verse of the Gospel of John a grammatical construction
that confirmed his evaluation of the Son's lesser divinity.” See Joseph Wilson Trigg, Origen: The Bible and
Philosophy in the Third-Century Church (London: SCM Press, 1985), 98–9.
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we declared that God the Word is the minister of deity (θεότητος) to all the other
Gods. (20) The reason which is in each rational being has the same position in
relation to the Word which is in the beginning with God, which is God the Word,
which God the Word has with God. For as the Father is very God and true God
(ὡς γὰρ αὐτόθεος καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ) in relation to the image and images
of the image (wherefore also men are said to be 'according to the image,' not
'images'), so is the very Word (ὁ αὐτόλογος) in relation to the reason in each one.
For both hold the place of a source; the Father, that of divinity, the Son, that of
reason (Ἀμφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν, ὁ μὲν πατὴρ θεότητος, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς
λόγου).147
The potential fear that Origen describes is precisely the sort of thing that would have
troubled the monarchians. The application of the title “God” to more than one being
opens one to the monarchian critique of ditheism or polytheism. Origen’s emphasis on
the title “God” here signals that the application of this title was problematic for the
monarchians unless the Son was identified with the Father. Origen reiterates that even
though they are called theoi, they are not placed in the same position as the true God with
regard to divinity, for the true God transcends all else.148 The other theoi are downstream
from the source (πηγή), as it were; and they are one step further removed from the source

Origen, ComJn 2.19-20 (FC 80:99-100). (19.) Ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ εἰκὸς προσκόψειν τινὰς τοῖς
εἰρημένοις, ἑνὸς μὲν ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαγγελλομένου παρὰ δὲ τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεὸν θεῶν
πλειόνων τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ γινομένων, εὐλαβουμένους τὴν τοῦ πᾶσαν κτίσιν ὑπερέχοντος δόξαν
ἐξισῶσαι τοῖς λοιποῖς τῆς «θεὸς» προσηγορίας τυγχάνουσι, πρὸς τῇ ἀποδεδομένῃ διαφορᾷ, καθ’ ἣν
ἐφάσκομεν πᾶσι τοῖς λοιποῖς θεοῖς διάκονον εἶναι τῆς θεότητος τὸν θεὸν λόγον, καὶ ταύτην παραστατέον.
(20.)Ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγος τῶν λογικῶν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγον πρὸς τὸν θεὸν
ὄντα λόγον θεόν, ὃν ὁ θεὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸν θεόν· ὡς γὰρ αὐτόθεος καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ πρὸς εἰκόνα
καὶ εἰκόνας τῆς εἰκόνος, —διὸ καὶ «κατ’ εἰκόνα» λέγονται εἶναι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ «εἰκόνες»—οὕτως ὁ
αὐτόλογος πρὸς τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγον. Ἀμφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν, ὁ μὲν πατὴρ θεότητος, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς
λόγου. Greek from SC 120:218-20.
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Origen discusses differing degrees of participation in De Prin. 4.4.9. Creatures which
participate in the same thing are said to share in the same nature as each other, even though they can
possess the participated thing in different degrees. Origen writes, “Everyone who shares in anything is
undoubtedly of one substance and one nature with him who shares in the same thing” (trans. Butterworth,
325-326; Latin from GCS 22:361): Omnis, qui participat alicuius, cum eo, qui eiusdem rei particeps est,
sine dubio unius substantiae est uniusque naturae. Origen does not here spell out what this might mean for
the Son’s participation in the Father’s divinity, perhaps because of Rufinian modifications; but Origen
seems to have been able to speak about things being of the same nature while possessing something more
or less fully. See also Crouzel’s discussion of this passage from De Prin.: Henri Crouzel, Théologie de
l’image de Dieu chez Origène, Théologie 34 (Paris: Aubier, 1956), 101–2.
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because divinity is mediated to them by the Word, who is the minister of deity (διάκονον
τῆς θεότητος).
After explaining the participatory schema with regard to divinity, Origen turns his
attention to the way in which rational creatures participate in the Logos. In the same way
that the Father is the source of divinity, so too the Word (ὁ λόγος, ὁ αὐτόλογος) is the
source of reason in all rational creatures.149 Origen goes on to speak of degrees of
participation in the Logos, noting that there can be “words of the second or third rank
next to the Word who is before all things.”150 Just as there is a hierarchy of reason in
those who participate in the Logos, so too there must be a hierarchy of those theoi who
have divinity through participation in the Father. The graded nature of this participatory
framework of logos is reflected in the graded nature of the participatory framework of
divinity, since Origen himself says the two frameworks are similar.151 Origen places the

Aletti draws attention to a subtle shift in Origen’s terminology here. On the one hand, those
beings which participate in the divinity of the Father are called theoi. On the other hand, those beings
which participate in the reason of the Word are called logikoi, not logoi (“D’une écriture à l’autre,” 32).
Commenting on ComJn 2.20, Aletti notes that “Origen insists not on the subordination of the Word, but on
the fact that he is, like the Father, source” (Origène insiste non sur la subordination du Verbe, mais sur le
fait qu’il est comme le Père, source). See ibid., 44. Aletti then concedes in a footnote that there is in this
passage a “subordination quant à l’origine.” Even after this concession, however, Aletti argues that nothing
indicates that this is a “subordination substantielle.” While Aletti’s observation that nothing in this section
suggests substantial subordination is technically correct, his comment reveals the imposition of foreign
concerns on this passage, namely, the heightened polemical importance of questions regarding divine
substance in the Nicene and post-Nicene contexts. Substance is of little interest to Origen in this passage;
his main concerns are with divinity, reason, and the sources of each. Aletti appears concerned to rescue
Origen from the charge of teaching the substantial or ontological subordination of the Son. Even if he is
successful in this task, though, Origen can still be said to be teaching a subordination of divinity in the Son.
Surely this is just as problematic from a post-Nicene perspective as teaching that the Son is ontologically
subordinate to the Father. Aletti’s tendency here is mirrored in the recent work of Bruns, which I discussed
earlier. See especially Trinität und Kosmos, 22–3. It seems as though both Aletti and Bruns think that if
they can prove that Origen did not teach the ontological subordination of the Son, they have proven that his
theology is consonant with that of Nicaea. As this chapter has indicated, however, I find such approaches to
be anachronistic.
149

Origen, ComJn 2.23 (trans. FC 80:100): λόγων δευτέρων ἢ τρίτων παρὰ τὸν πρὸ πάντων.
Greek from SC 120:222.
150

Harnack also notes that Origen’s notion of source implies a gradation within the Trinity: “But,
as in Origen's sense the union of these only exists because the Father alone is the ‘source of deity’ (πηγὴ
151
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Son below the Father in the hierarchy of divine beings; yet he is still above all of the
other theoi. The Son, being reason itself (ὁ αὐτόλογος), sits atop the hierarchy of the
logikoi. Although the Son must receive divinity from another, he himself is the source of
all reason.
After what he says might be seen as a digression, Origen sums up the force of his
preceding argument:
There was “the God” and “God,” then “gods” in two senses. “God the Word”
transcends the higher order of these gods, himself being transcended by “the God”
of the universe. And again, there was “the Word,” and perhaps also “Word,”
comparable to “the God” and “God,” and “the words” in two senses.152
Origen’s discussion of the Father and Son here is similar to those passages discussed
above where he speaks of the goodness of the Father and Son. In both ComJn 13 and
ComMatt 15, Origen introduced a hierarchical framework wherein the Father transcended
the Son and the Son transcended the rest of creatures. He does the same here, even using
the same key term (ὑπερέχω) to describe this transcendence. Later, in a passage where he
is considering the Son as “light,” Origen makes a similar argument in even stronger
terms, writing, “Now to the extent that God, the Father of truth, is more than, and greater
than, the truth and, being the Father of wisdom, is greater than and surpasses wisdom, to
this extent he transcends being ‘true light.’”153 Not only has Origen here used his

τῆς θεότητος) and principle of the other two hypostases, the Trinity is in truth no homogeneous one, but
one which, in accordance with a ‘subtle emanation idea’, has degrees within it” (History of Dogma, trans.
Neil Buchanan, vol. 2 [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907], 358).
Origen, ComJn 2.32 (trans. FC 80:102; Greek SC 120:230-232): Ἦν γὰρ «ὁ θεὸς» καὶ «θεός»,
εἶτα «θεοὶ» διχῶς, ὧν τοῦ κρείττονος τάγματος ὑπερέχει ὁ «θεὸς λόγος» ὑπερεχόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν ὅλων
«θεοῦ». Καὶ πάλιν ἦν «ὁ λόγος», τάχα δὲ καὶ «λόγος», ὁμοίως τῷ «ὁ θεὸς» καὶ «θεός», καὶ «οἱ λόγοι»
διχῶς.
152

Origen, ComJn 2.151 (trans. FC 80:134; Greek SC 120:310): ᾧ δὲ λόγῳ ὁ πατὴρ τῆς ἀληθείας
θεὸς πλείων ἐστὶ καὶ μείζων ἢ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὢν σοφίας κρείττων ἐστὶ καὶ διαφέρων ἢ σοφία, τούτῳ
ὑπερέχει τοῦ εἶναι «φῶς ἀληθινόν».
153
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characteristic term ὑπερέχω, he has also used the terms “more” (πλείων), “greater”
(μείζων), and “better” (κρείττων) to describe the Father’s transcendence of the Son. This
passage comes shortly after Origen brings up a problem:
Now since the Savior here [Jn 1:4] is “light” in general, and in the catholic epistle
of the same John, God is said to be light [1 Jn 1:5], one thinks it is confirmed
from that source too that the Father is not distinct from the Son in essence. But
another who has observed more accurately and speaks more soundly will say that
the light which shines in the darkness and is not overcome by it, and the light in
which there is no darkness at all are not the same.154
It is probable that the position Origen takes issue with in this passage is some form of
monarchianism. If Origen is addressing monarchians here, he would seem to be opposing
those who deny that the Father and Son are distinct in οὐσία. In the accounts of
monarchianism I considered in part one, proponents of monarchianism do not often use
technical language like οὐσία.155 A bit later, Origen argues that because the Father is the
Father of Wisdom, he is “greater than and surpasses wisdom.”156 The verb Origen uses
for “surpass” (διαφέρω) here carries the implication of differing from something else
because it excels the other thing. If this is the sense Origen intends for the verb here, it
clarifies his argument. Because the Father transcends and surpasses the Son, they cannot
be the same. Origen’s hierarchical understanding of the universe, with its concomitant

Origen, ComJn 2.149 (trans. FC 80:134; Greek SC 120:308-10): Ἐπεὶ δὲ «φῶς» ἁπαξαπλῶς
ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὁ σωτήρ, ἐν δὲ τῇ καθολικῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολῇ λέγεται ὁ θεὸς εἶναι φῶς, ὁ μέν τις
οἴεται καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ μὴ διεστηκέναι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα· ὁ δέ τις ἀκριβέστερον
τηρήσας, ὁ καὶ ὑγιέστερον λέγων, φήσει οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ φαῖνον ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φῶς καὶ μὴ
καταλαμβανόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν ᾧ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σκοτία.
154

155
They prefer to say things like the Father and Son are “one and the same” (ἑν καὶ ὁ αὐτός), but
they do not specify one and the same “what.” If this usage of οὐσία is an insertion of Origen, it does not
necessarily help us to understand the intricacies of the position he was opposing. As I noted above, his
usage of οὐσία is not fixed and consistent.
156
Origen, ComJn 2.151 (trans. FC 80:134; Greek SC 120:310): ὁ πατὴρ ὢν σοφίας κρείττων ἐστὶ
καὶ διαφέρων ἢ σοφία.
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subordinationism, pervades all of his thought; but he utilizes it in this anti-monarchian
context to prove that the Father and Son are not the same.
As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, Origen expressed a subordination of
the Son to the Father in ComJn 2.13-32. The question of whether this is an ontological
subordination is a red herring. Origen focuses on divinity and reason in this passage, not
on ousia and hypostasis. The subordination of the Son to the Father with regard to
divinity is not an oversight or mistake, nor is it a corner into which Origen is backed or a
shoal he fails to avoid despite his best efforts. Origen intentionally employs the
framework of participation, with its concomitant subordinationism, in order to refute
monarchian assertions that the Father and Son are one and the same. His distinction
between ὁ θεός and θεός and ὁ αὐτόθεος and θεοί allows him to affirm that the Son is
God (θεός, but not ὁ θεός) without the implication that he is the same as the Father.
Origen, like Tertullian and Novatian, argued that the derivative or received nature of the
Son’s divinity distinguished him from the Father, who alone properly and fully possessed
divinity. With regard to divinity, the Son was downstream from the Father, the source
from whom he drew it into himself.
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CONCLUSION

This dissertation rests on the methodological assumption that to understand
Origen’s Trinitarian theology properly, it is necessary to offer a detailed reading of that
theology within its contemporary context in the early third century.1 Any attempt to
understand his theology requires a consciousness of the theological debates of Origen’s
time. Furthermore, the more detail we can provide about the theological positions Origen
opposed or sought to correct, the better.2
Based on these methodological commitments, this dissertation has focused on a
small part of the vast corpus of Origen’s work: ComJn 1-2. In an evocative passage from
these two books, ComJn 2.13-32, Origen gives an account of the relationships among the
Father, Son, and the rest of creation that functions as a corrective to what he views as a
pious but misguided theology: monarchianism. A methodologically sound reading of this
passage requires as detailed an account of monarchianism as we can provide. Prior to my
work in this dissertation, however, such a focused attempt to understand monarchian
theology did not yet exist in English-language literature.3
The first part of this dissertation was an attempt to provide a thorough and
fulsome account of monarchianism as a theological movement. There are no surviving
works of monarchian theology from the early third century, so any reconstruction relies

This dissertation is not, then, interested in the Nachleben of Origen’s thought in the Nicene and
post-Nicene debate, as important and interesting as it may be.
1

2

Recall my note from the introduction that this dissertation is a long-form version of what Michel
R. Barnes calls a “dense reading,” a term I define there.
3
Furthermore, the examinations of monarchianism that did exist were not focused on
reconstructing the broad contours of it as a theological movement.
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on second-hand and often hostile witnesses to this understudied theological movement.
Using the available sources, I offered an account of monarchianism that demonstrates
that it had a stable core of theological commitments and development during the brief
period of time I study. The monarchians shared with other streams of Christianity two
non-negotiable theological commitments: (1) there is only one God; and (2) Jesus (or the
Son) is God. The tension produced by these two commitments led the monarchians to
what I consider their characteristic conclusion that the Father and Son are “one and the
same.”4 With this assertion that the Father and the Son were the same, the monarchians
opposed distinction between the Father and the Son, which they viewed as imperiling the
uniqueness of God.
Monarchianism was popular at the beginning of the third century, probably
because of its unabashed affirmation that Jesus was God and its staunch commitment to
defending the uniqueness of God. Despite its popularity, monarchianism did not go
unchallenged. Soon some notable theologians produced anti-monarchian treatises. Part
two of this dissertation considered Origen alongside those other theologians who wrote
against the monarchians. Origen likely wrote books one and two of ComJn at the height
of the monarchian controversy, shortly after returning to Alexandria from Rome, the
epicenter of the monarchian controversy.
My reexamination of ComJn 1-2 alongside other anti-monarchian writers and
against the backdrop of monarchian theology brings into stark relief some of the key
features of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. Both Origen and his contemporary anti-

4
In the surviving accounts that we have, the monarchians do not make this statement more
precise. They are not reported as saying, “The Father and the Son are one and the same X.”
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monarchian counterparts shared the two core theological commitments of the
monarchians; they too wanted to affirm both that there is only one God and that Jesus is
God. They could not, however, accept the conclusion that this meant that the Father and
the Son were “one and the same.” Therefore, they had to articulate theologies in such a
way that allowed them to affirm that Jesus is God, that there is only one God, and that the
Father and Son are in some meaningful way distinct.5
This is precisely what Origen attempts to do in ComJn 1-2. In ComJn 1, he
develops and emphasizes a Wisdom Christology so that he can argue that the Son, as
Wisdom, was a distinct agent or actor alongside the Father “from the beginning.”6 Where
one would expect him to devote all of his attention to the occurrence of Logos in John
1:1, we instead see him turn his focus to Wisdom as an important title for the Son.
Furthermore, Origen’s emphasis on the Son as Wisdom allows him to use scriptural texts
like Proverbs 8:22 to argue that the Son was alongside the Father prior to creation.7
In the passage I consider at the greatest length, ComJn 2.13-32, Origen’s response
to the monarchian claims is even clearer, especially since he signals that he is responding
to their theology in 2.16. In this passage, Origen argues that the Father is “the God” and

5

See my brief summary of the key terms and means they used to describe the distinction of the
Father and Son at the beginning of chapter five. Another way to define “distinct” in the context of the antimonarchian writers is “not one and the same.” Although these authors never use a phrase this unsubtle, this
is what they need to prove. The anti-monarchian theologians must walk a tightrope and affirm that the
Father and Son are one without allowing that they are “one and the same.” For this reason, they cast about
for various ways to distinguish the Father and Son without completely separating them.
I say “agent or actor” here because I do not think that Origen’s vocabulary for speaking of
different individuals had stabilized this early in his career.
6

7

As I argued in chapter four, the existence of the Son prior to creation is important for two
reasons: (1) it places another alongside the Father prior to creation; (2) this other (the Son or Logos or
Wisdom) has existence “from the beginning” or eternally. See, for example, De prin. 1.2.2 and ComJn, 2.9.
The “two stage” Logos theologies would have been problematic for Origen because they denied the
individual existence of the Son before creation, thus conceding something to the monarchians
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that the Son is “God” by participation. He uses several devices to argue that the Father is
truly God or “God himself.” This emphasis allows him to demonstrate that he, too,
believes that there is only one God. By claiming that the Son is God by participation,
Origen is also able to affirm that the Son is God without claiming that they constitute a
coordinated pair of two Gods. The framework of participation that Origen employs to
make this argument leads him to claim that the Father transcends the Son, that the Father
is greater than the Son. In their anti-monarchian writings, Tertullian and Novatian made
similar arguments. Both argued that although the Son was God, he was somehow less
than the Father. This allows them to say that the Son is not “the same as the Father,” for
something cannot be less than itself. Instead of emphasizing that the Son is less than the
Father, Origen focuses on the transcendence of the Father over the Son. Origen’s
argument varies slightly from that of Novatian and Tertullian, but the result is the same.
What is greater than something else cannot be the same as that which it is greater than.
Because of their contention that the Son is less than the Father, the theologies of
Tertullian, Origen, and Novatian have been labelled as “subordinationist” by scholars at
different points.8 Scholars who label these theologies as “subordinationist” often imply
or explicitly state that they are deficient. This negative evaluative judgment of early thirdcentury “subordinationism” is based on an anachronistic imposition of post-Nicene
definitions of Trinitarian orthodoxy onto these earlier authors. For Origen, as also for
Tertullian and Novatian,9 a subordinationist understanding of the Father and Son enabled

8
Of course, the question of Origen’s subordinationism is hotly debated; and some scholars, such
as Ramelli, would disagree with my assessment.

Regarding Novatian’s subordinationism, I agree with the broad conclusions of Daniel Lloyd’s
dissertation on Novatian’s subordinationism. See his “Ontological Subordination in Novatian of Rome’s
Theology of the Son” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Marquette University, 2012).
9
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a cogent response to the appeal of monarchianism.10 Origen’s subordinationism allowed
him to argue that there is only one God, that the Son is God, and that the Son is not the
same as the Father. This dissertation enables an appreciation of the theological force and
function of Origen’s subordinationism by demonstrating how he intentionally utilized it
to combat monarchian teaching.

10
I am not the first to argue that pre-Nicene subordinationism was not aberrant. Wolfgang Marcus
argued this position in his Der Subordinatianismus als historiologisches Phänomen: Ein Beitrag zu unserer
Kenntnis von der Entstehung der altchristlichen “Theologie” und Kultur unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung der Begriffe Oikonomia und Theologia (München: M. Hueber, 1963). While Marcus
seeks to normalize pre-Nicene subordinationism, his account is directed at determining whether this preNicene subordinationism should be considered some sort of “proto-Arianism.” His account is more
historically sensitive than most, but it is still drawn into the orbit of Nicene and post-Nicene debates. Daniel
Lloyd’s recent dissertation also sought to rehabilitate pre-Nicene subordinationism as a measured
theological strategy.
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